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1
1.  Impetus
Across Europe, the summer of 2015 will be remembered as the summer of ‘immigration’. 
Several humanitarian crises, such as the civil war in Syria, lead to new peaks of 
applications for humanitarian protection in many European states. Connected to 
these migration movements, the numbers of migrants applying for family reunification 
also rose considerably and turned the topic of immigration into a political priority of 
the European Union (EU) and its member states. 
 However, issues of migration1 have already been on the political agenda of the EU 
since the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), which provided the legal basis for Europeanised 
asylum and immigration laws. Since this Treaty, political scientists have extensively 
investigated the processes of formulating EU migration policies (Guiraudon, 2000; 
Bonjour, 2011; Kaunert and Léonard, 2012; Zaun, 2016). Moreover, the establishment 
of the first generation of EU migration directives in the early 2000s triggered legal 
scholars to study the transposition of migration directives into national legal 
frameworks (Pascouau and Labayle, 2011; Strik, 2011; Strik et al., 2012). 
 Based on these studies on EU migration law, a debate emerged on the question 
whether or not EU regulations constitute a liberal constraint for member states 
(Acosta Arcarazo and Geddes, 2013; Bonjour and Vink, 2013; Bonjour et al., 2018). 
Despite disagreement in this debate, most authors agree that there is an increasing 
shift of the core state power of migration to EU institutions (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 
2016). 
 However, as observed by Jordan et al. (2003a, 2003b) the pressure to converge 
legal standards across the EU does not necessarily lead to converging practices. 
For example, variation in practices emerged as a response to the migration pressure 
in 2015 (Carrera et al., 2015; Scipioni, 2017). In some member states, administrations 
decided to no longer apply the Dublin procedure for certain groups of asylum 
seekers. Moreover, they reinstalled temporary Schengen border controls. 
 Beyond such higher administrative decisions in times of crises, there is also 
variation when it comes to the everyday application of EU migration policies and 
laws. For example, despite common EU legislation, the organisation and standards 
of reception systems for asylum seekers differ considerably across Europe (Odysseus 
Academic Network, 2006). Moreover, the practices of granting residence permits, 
visas and work permits vary widely (Jordan et al., 2003a; Infantino, 2016). This 
variation has been shown to have implications for migration flows within Europe 
(Toshkov and de Haan, 2012). 
1 Migration policies and laws include regulations on immigration and emigration. In the EU context, the 
focus is typically on immigration policies. For the sake of simplicity, this dissertation relies on the term 
‘migration’ when speaking of national and European regulation. 
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Variation in implementation practices is not limited to the context of EU policies. 
Instead, the domestic implementation literature has studied disparity extensively in 
the application and enforcement of formal rules, up to serious implementation gaps 
(Hill and Hupe, 2002; Paudel, 2009). This literature acknowledges that no matter how 
tightly a policy area is regulated, applying laws to local circumstances and individual 
clients is often complicated and conflict-ridden (Lipsky, 1980; Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1984). Since the implementation process resembles policy formulation, it 
is commonly understood as the ‘continuation of policy-making by other means’ 
(Lineberry, 1977, p. 71). 
 EU law adds the potential for additional complexity and conflict to implementation 
processes. Since the EU lacks an implementation apparatus similar to that of its 
member states (Treib, 2014, p. 6), EU compliance is contingent on three interrelated 
sets of national activities. First, EU directives, which are one of the most common 
legally binding instruments of the EU, need to be transposed into national laws. 
Second, member states need to apply EU regulations at the frontline to individual 
cases. Finally, EU laws need to be enforced by guarding the compatibility between 
national and EU regulatory frameworks.
 So far, most EU compliance studies have treated transposition as a ‘clearance 
point’ (ibid 2014, p. 5) for consecutive implementation decisions (Steunenberg, 2007, 
p. 23). However, the implicit assumption that transposition is a necessary or sufficient 
condition for compliance and harmonised application and enforcement is problematic. 
 First, transposition, application and enforcement are the tasks of different 
national actors. While national ministries and parliaments transpose EU directives, 
agencies, municipalities, courts and other frontline bureaucracies apply and enforce 
EU and national obligations on the ground. By watering down, ‘gold-plating’ or 
customising EU law, actors in the application and enforcement phase may deviate 
from decisions made by national ministries during the transposition phase (Thomann, 
2015; Mastenbroek, 2017). Thus, while there may be compliant transposition, practical 
implementers may still fail to comply with EU law. 
 Second, as EU transposition studies have shown (Mastenbroek, 2005; Angelova 
et al., 2012; Treib, 2014), member states often fail to incorporate EU obligations 
correctly or promptly into their national regulatory frameworks. As a result, EU law 
regularly confronts national civil servants with ambiguities between national and EU 
obligations. During the application and enforcement of EU law, officials may correct 
for non-compliant transposition, for example by filling vague national legislation with 
meaning in light of EU obligations. 
 Finally, transposition may not be a clearance point for compliant and harmonised 
application because when enforcing EU law, courts may reinterpret EU regulatory 
frameworks. While the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and national 
courts often clarify EU law (Kelemen, 2006; Martinsen and Mayoral, 2017), in other 
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instances they strengthen ambiguities between the national and EU legal levels. 
These ambiguities can lead to new complications for lower-level implements in the 
application phase, because contrary to EU directives, CJEU court rulings are directly 
effective. The CJEU has been particularly active in weakly harmonised policy areas 
such as migration (Acosta Arcarazo and Geddes, 2013; Bonjour and Vink, 2013). For 
example, the Court has demanded more individual-level assessments from practical 
migration law implementers than the national statutes of some of the member states 
prescribed or even allowed2. When frontline implementers are unaware of EU rulings 
or not trained in using them, such rulings may further increase variation in the EU 
application phase.
 In sum, EU law places frontline implementers, who operate between law and 
practice, at a second frontline, namely between domestic and EU regulatory 
frameworks. This second frontline may turn national administrators into ‘multi-hatted’ 
agents (Egeberg and Trondal, 2009) that need to decide to what extent they rely on 
instructions from their national ministries, the European institutions, their bureaucratic 
profession or other authorities (Mastenbroek, 2017). These decisions not only have 
considerable consequences for the law’s target groups but they may also crucially 
influence the effectiveness of EU law as well as the level of EU compliance and 
harmonisation eventually achieved (see also Gulbrandsen, 2011). 
 Notwithstanding the relevance of frontline implementation for the fate of EU 
policies, it remains puzzling how national frontline implementers apply common EU 
migration laws in practice. By investigating frontline application in Europeanised legal 
contexts, this dissertation seeks to make at least four contributions to the existing 
literature on EU compliance and frontline implementation.
 First, the dissertation responds to the call by Conant (2012, p. 30) to bring the 
lowest level of implementation as a unit of analysis into EU studies. Thereby the study 
goes beyond existing EU compliance studies, which have mostly focused on 
aggregated units of analysis, such as member states, political actors or higher 
administrative levels.
 Second, the dissertation adopts an innovative multilevel theoretical framework 
that connects the literature on EU compliance with dominant streams in general 
public administration research. More concretely, the dissertation connects the EU 
compliance literature with theories on frontline bureaucracy (Lipsky, 1980; 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2012; Tummers et al., 2012) and job motivations 
(Perry and Wise, 1990; Grant, 2007) to develop micro-level explanations for the 
frontline application of EU law. In combining the different kinds of literature, the 
dissertation adds a bottom-up view to the predominantly institutional approaches of 
EU compliance studies (Mastenbroek et al., 2017; Thomann and Sager, 2017a). 
2  E.g. Chakroun (C-578/08) K. and A (C-153/14); Khachab (C-558/14)
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Moreover, by adding organisational theory (Egeberg and Trondal, 2009; Trondal, 
2011a) and delegation theory (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999; Huber and Shipan, 
2002) to EU compliance research, the dissertation integrates meso- and macro-level 
explanations for the application of EU law to EU compliance research. 
 Third, by integrating the macro- and meso-level context into frontline research, 
this dissertation aims to respond to the appeal by Hupe and Buffat (2014, p. 549) to 
move frontline studies beyond individual-level variation. Because of converging legal 
settings, the context of EU implementation provides a particularly suitable context to 
add organisational and country-level factors to frontline studies.
 Fourth, beyond some transposition studies, the area of justice and home affairs 
has received hardly any attention from EU compliance scholars (but see Zhelyazkova 
et al., 2016). This lack of research is not surprising, as the field has only relatively 
recently become subject to EU legislation. However, the recent migration movements 
have demonstrated the importance of finding cross-border solutions in the 
management of migration. Without internal European borders, there is a particular 
need for a fair distribution of migrants and uniform standards of entry and residency 
across the member states (Trauner, 2016; Scipioni, 2017). To evaluate to what extent 
the European regulatory framework solves these cross-border societal problems that 
form the rationale for its existence, we need to understand how and under which 
conditions EU regulations reach their intended target groups. Consequently, the 
dissertation aims to add to EU compliance studies by presenting original cross-country 
qualitative and quantitative data on the application of EU migration law.
 This introductory chapter aims to contextualise the dissertation within previous 
work and to provide an outline of the remaining chapters. The chapter first reviews the 
state of the art of migration law implementation studies and identifies relevant gaps 
in this literature. The next section reviews the literature of EU compliance and 
discusses its implications and limitations for studying frontline application. 
Subsequently, the main research question and the theoretical framework that guides 
the dissertation are developed. This section is followed by a presentation of the 
methodological approach of the dissertation. The introductory chapter concludes by 
outlining the remainder of the dissertation.
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2.  Studying the application of migration law 
Reviewing the state of the art of migration law implementation studies, several authors 
have highlighted that this policy field is particularly prone to implementation gaps 
(Ellermann, 2005, p. 2; Scipioni, 2017). For example, Ellermann (2005) highlights that 
implementation gaps exist regarding the undocumented migrants that live in many 
countries and the actual execution of deportations. Others have identified 
implementation gaps, such as the dissimilar administrative treatments of migrants 
with formally similar characteristics (Mascini, 2008). Allegedly, several features of the 
field of migration explain these gaps.
 The first aspect that stands out is the high complexity and the multilevel character 
of migration laws and their implementation (Lahav and Guiraudon, 2006; Schmidtke 
and Zaslove, 2013). Migration law is conducted at the European, national, regional 
and even at the local level (Lahav and Guiraudon, 2006). Depending on domestic 
bureaucratic structures, different levels and institutions have to work together to 
regulate and organise the legal entry of immigrants, to organise and establish 
reception facilities, or to provide integration measures (Christensen and Laegreid, 
2009). Actors include embassies and consulates, municipalities at the local level, 
agencies at the state level, and even private human service organisations (Van der 
Leun, 2006). A major difference between these administrative levels is the chain of 
delegation through which they are accountable to policy- and lawmakers (Christensen 
and Laegreid, 2009; Yesilkagit and Van Thiel, 2012). This institutional variation 
confronts frontline implementers with different levels of organisational discretion and 
local client contact, with the potential for disparity in frontline motivations, inter- 
institutional cooperation and eventually implementation practices (Buffat, 2015). 
 A second complication in the implementation process is the diversity of grounds 
for immigration. Migration law implementers handle requests from asylum seekers 
and refugees, but also from EU citizens and migrants who apply for different types of 
visas, such as for family reunification or work. Regulating these diverse grounds for 
migration often requires a combination of migration regulations with regulations from 
a wide range of other sectors, including healthcare, social security, education, public 
order and labour market. Such issue linkages complicate the implementation process 
and constitute considerable challenges for practical implementers (Givens and 
Luedtke, 2004; Christensen and Laegreid, 2009). 
 Third, as the recent refugee flows have shown, the field is highly unpredictable. 
International and humanitarian crises, ecological and environmental changes and 
global socioeconomic factors stimulate migration flows. Thus, the policy area 
constantly evolves, confronting administrations with shifting population movements 
and migrants with diverse needs and strategies for ‘entry and survival in a host 
country’ (Jordan et al., 2003b, p. 211). These changing realities require a lot of 
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administrative resources, robustness and flexibility from those who apply migration 
laws on the ground (Jordan et al., 2003b; Psimmenos and Kassimati, 2003).
 Fourth, migration law is a highly normatively-laden field as it touches on core 
state powers (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2016, p. 42) related to border controls, 
national culture, identity and security. The relatively recent EU harmonisation efforts 
in this field indicate that such state powers are especially reluctant to regulatory 
change (Zaun, 2016, p. 144). Modifications of the national regulatory framework 
typically trigger ideological and political debates over national values and the 
boundaries of solidarity between citizens and an outgroup with religious, linguistic 
and ethnic differences (Harell et al., 2017). Combined with increased immigration, 
such debates tend to go hand in hand with a rise in populist parties, which turn the issue 
of migration into a top priority of election campaigns (Rooduijn, 2015). The political 
sensitivity of migration law places politicians and administrators under close public 
scrutiny, which makes them vulnerable to blame and criticism from a wide range of 
stakeholders who try to influence the implementation process.
 Overall, the multilevel institutional realities, legal complexity as well as the un-
predictability and sensitivity of the field make the application and interpretation of 
migration law a challenging task for frontline implementers. Due to the importance of 
the frontline of implementation, the next section reviews the recently growing scholarly 
attention to this lowest level of domestic migration law implementation.
Frontline application of migration law: dilemmas of the individual3 
Frontline implementers are public workers, such as caseworkers who carry out and 
enforce actions required by laws and public policies (Meyers and Vorsanger, 2003, 
p. 154). They handle individual transactions between the law and its target groups 
by deciding on the distribution of rights and benefits. Although executive agencies 
formally hand down final decisions, in practice it is the individual frontline implementer 
who decides how he or she applies the law to real cases (Bovens and Zouridis, 
2002). 
 Due to the importance of frontline practices for the rights and services granted to 
migrants, scholars have started to pay attention to the practical knowledge and 
discretion at this level of implementation. These frontline migration studies derive 
from a variety of disciplines, including sociology and sociology of law, political 
science and related disciplines such as criminology. Relying on the concept of 
Lipsky’s (1980) street-level bureaucrats, these studies have shown that individual 
migration law implementers handle considerable tensions in their everyday work. 
3  Parts of this section will be published as Dörrenbächer, N., Strik, T. (forthcoming), ‘Implementation 
of Migration Law: Discretion in a Europeanized Context and new Research Puzzles’ in Routledge 
Handbook on the Politics of Migration in Europe. Edited by Saskia Bonjour, Agnieszka Weinar, and 
Lyubov Zhyznomirska.
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The first studies in this field were derived from North American contexts. For example, 
Gilboy (1991) investigated how immigration officers at US airports developed 
categories to decide which foreigners they investigate. Also in the 1990s, Heyman 
(1999) studied administrative decision-making at the US-Mexican border. 
Furthermore, Weissinger (1996) described the normative structure of the US 
Immigration and Naturalization Service and how the organisation struggled with its 
double function of controlling and providing services to migrants. In a later study, 
Magaña (2003) added that the ever-changing policy mandates and a lack of funding 
hinder migration civil servants’ ability to fulfil their enforcement and service functions. 
Moreover, the US-based literature has paid considerable attention to the multilevel 
character of US migration law and investigated how local civil servants reshape 
national migration laws at the city and state level (Wells, 2006; Marrow, 2009; 
Armenta, 2012; Coleman, 2012; Varsanyi et al., 2012). Frontline migration studies also 
emerged in the Canadian context, where researchers stressed the role of discretion 
of migration officers (Bouchard and Wake Carroll, 2008). For example, Satzewich 
(2013) studied how Canadian civil servants define ‘normal’ family ties when deciding 
on family visas.
 Beyond the North American context, scholars also increasingly conduct 
migration law implementation studies in the European context. For instance, Alpes 
and Spire (2014) showed how French consular employees draw on the law as a 
constraint and as a resource to handle organisational pressures and to manage their 
fear of fraud. The authors indicate how the implementers’ belief that they defend the 
national interest influences the extraordinary discretion of consulates. Likewise, 
Düvell and Jordan (2003) have studied the role conceptions of caseworkers in the UK 
Home Office. Their study demonstrates how public servants’ self-identification as 
liberal and just brings them into conflict with some of their duties. Similarly, Hall (2010) 
reveals the importance of emotions in the British detention procedure. 
 The role of emotions also features prominently in studies on Scandinavian 
migration offices. As an illustration, Eggebø (2012) observed how Norwegian 
migration officials balance emotion and reason when deciding on family immigration. 
Likewise, Graham (2002) and Ottosson et al. (2012) found dilemmas between 
emotions, organisational pressures and restrictive norms in the Swedish asylum 
procedure. Across these studies, family migration and bureaucratic evaluations of 
family ties or best interests of the child feature as particularly prominent research 
topics (see also Pellander, 2015 on the Finnish case).
 There is also a growing literature on the application of migration law and policies 
in the Netherlands. For example, Van der Leun (2006) observed that policies 
increasingly ask service providers to report undocumented migrants and to deny 
them services, even when the direct tasks of these service providers are not 
connected to migration control. Her research shows that these implementers often 
517635-L-bw-Dorrenbacher
Processed on: 20-2-2018 PDF page: 22
22
CHAPTER 1
construct the meaning of compliance with the law themselves, leading to wide 
variation in implementation practices4. Presenting one of the few quantitative studies 
in this field, Mascini (2008) compared how Dutch caseworkers differ in their asylum 
decision-making. His analysis indicates that differences result from work pressure, 
the caseworker’s reputation, their role definition, political opinion, professional back- 
ground and policy. More recently, Van der Woude and Brouwer (2017) uncovered the 
growing role of technology in Dutch migration control by showing how implementers 
use technology in a discretionary manner and beyond the purpose of migration 
control.
 Moving to the German context, Cyrus and Vogel (2003) argue that frontline 
implementers have legalistic and professional attitudes, but they use discretion in the 
interpersonal interaction with clients. When discussing how local German migration 
caseworkers use their discretion, Eule (2014) points to oral traditions. Providing one 
of the few cross-country studies, Ellermann (2005, 2006) compares how local civil 
servants in the US and their German counterparts struggle with the intention to 
dutifully implement restrictive migration policies while responding to resistance and 
pressure by pro-migrant lobby groups. Her research suggests that agencies that are 
insulated from the influence of elected politicians are better equipped to counter such 
interference.
 Finally, there has been some research on migration law application in Southern 
Europe. An example is Psimmenos and Kassimati’s (2003) study of work values in a 
Greek welfare office that handles labour migration. Moreover, by comparing two 
Spanish migration administrations, Bastien (2009) points to the role of goal 
ambiguities and informal discretion during migration law application. Research on 
the Italian case includes a recent study by Zampagni (2016) that investigates to what 
extent Italian consular officials act similarly to Lipsky’s (1980) street-level implementers 
when deciding on Schengen visas. Furthermore, Barberis and Boccagni (2014) 
highlight the centrality of social workers’ commitment and discretionary power in 
addressing migrants’ needs in an under-institutionalised Italian setting (see also 
 Triandafyllidou, 2003).
 Overall, these studies indicate that application of migration law is inherently 
discretionary and conflict-ridden. In line with the more general frontline bureaucracy 
literature (Lipsky, 1980; Ellis et al., 1999; Nielsen, 2006; Keiser, 2010; Maynard-Moody 
and Musheno, 2012; Tummers et al., 2012; Buffat, 2015; Lars Tummers et al., 2015), 
migration law implementation studies demonstrate various reasons for discretionary 
administrative behaviour. For example, implementers use discretion for instrumental 
reasons such as avoiding political and public blame (Hood, 2011), responding to 
capacity constraints and upholding agencies’ reputation (Lipsky, 1980). Additionally, 
4  For similar conclusions regarding the Swedish case see Björngren Cuadra and Staaf (2012)
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administrators use discretion normatively to bring about decisions in line with their 
personal values and emotions (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003; Hertogh, 
2009). 
 In contrast to the considerable attention paid to individual-level dilemmas and 
variation of frontline practices, the reviewed studies leave three main gaps. First, 
migration implementation studies have devoted little attention to mechanisms of 
domestic inter-institutional cooperation. However, when deciding on individual cases, 
migration caseworkers often need to work together with public offices abroad or 
migration offices at the national or local level. Possible complications during inter- 
institutional cooperation may have considerable implications for frontline implementation 
and thus deserve closer scholarly attention. 
 Second, the reviewed studies have focused only to a limited extent on the 
domestic institutional contexts in which migration law implementers operate. While 
several authors have hinted at institutional factors (Van der Leun, 2006; Christensen 
and Laegreid, 2009; Satzewich, 2013), the concrete consequences of the diversification 
of bureaucratic settings for job motivations and the use of discretion remain unclear. 
However, variation in job motivations due to differences in national institutional 
context can be assumed to constitute substantial biases for policy application and 
EU harmonisation efforts.
 Third, the lack of attention paid to institutional context also entails that research 
on migration law implementation did not explicitly examine the effects of the addition 
of the European legal level (but see Infantino, 2016; Van der Woude and Van der 
Leun, 2017 for some recent attention to  EU law). Migration studies that take EU law 
into account have focused mainly on the stage of EU migration policy formulation 
(Givens and Luedtke, 2004; Bonjour and Block, 2013; Zaun, 2016) or transposition 
(Groenendijk, 2011; Strik, 2011). In these studies, a so-called control gap debate 
(Bonjour, 2011) emerged. The debate focuses on an alleged loss of power of national 
migration policy-makers in the process of Europeanisation (Kaunert and Léonard, 
2012; Acosta Arcarazo and Geddes, 2013; Bonjour and Vink, 2013; but see Bonjour 
et al., 2018 for debate on this claim). Nevertheless, so far it remains unclear if and to 
what extent EU migration law also limits the discretion of national implementers in the 
policy application stage. Additionally, the migration law implementation literature has 
not yet investigated which role EU law plays for national caseworkers in their case 
assessments. However, these insights are needed to understand better if and how 
EU law reaches its intended target group. 
 Since the process of implementing EU law has been studied more explicitly by 
scholars interested in EU compliance, the following section reviews the main insights 
that derive from this literature. 
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3.   Studying EU compliance: Implications for 
practical application of EU law
EU law increases the complexity of compliance processes by adding to national legal 
frameworks a new legal level. As discussed above, EU compliance consists of three 
interrelated sets of national activities: transposition, application and enforcement 
(Treib, 2014). The following section sketches the main advances in EU compliance 
studies and discusses their implications for the application and enforcement phase 
(Mastenbroek, 2005; Toshkov, 2011; Angelova et al., 2012; Treib, 2014). 
 The first EU compliance studies emerged in the mid-1980s. These studies portrayed 
EU compliance as an a-political process and focused mainly on institutional (in-)
efficiencies. For example, these studies pointed to the failure to involve relevant 
institutional actors, or the problems of distributing transposition tasks to diverse actors 
(Treib, 2014). 
 As the field developed, the second wave of EU compliance studies observed the 
importance of path-dependencies. The studies in this wave emphasised specifically 
potential misfit, such as the discrepancy between EU law and existing institutional 
and regulatory traditions, as a reason for national non-compliance with EU obligations 
(Duina, 1997; Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Börzel, 2000; Börzel and Risse, 2000). 
 In the third wave of EU compliance studies, studies incorporated increasingly 
political factors relating to sectoral and country-level aspects to explain variation in 
EU compliance (Haverland, 2000; Treib, 2003; Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006; 
Steunenberg, 2006, 2007; Haverland and Romeijn, 2007). These studies drew mainly 
on insights from political science and international relations theory by highlighting 
that member states may voluntarily or involuntarily fail to comply with EU obligations 
(Tallberg, 2002). 
 Finally, in the fourth wave, scholars have started to go beyond compliance with 
EU directives (Schmidt, 2008), for instance by paying more attention to the national 
application of CJEU rulings (Blauberger, 2013; Martinsen and Mayoral, 2017). 
Additionally, studies explored the effect of factors at the EU decision-making stage, 
such as discretion in EU directives (Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied, 2009). Moreover, the 
fourth wave started to make explicit distinctions between theories that explain 
transposition and those that explain enforcement and application of EU law (Falkner 
et al., 2007; Versluis, 2007; Falkner and Treib, 2008; Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 
2013, 2017; Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017). Likewise, fourth wave scholars 
increasingly include the role of European administrative networks when studying EU 
application and enforcement processes (Hobolth and Martinsen, 2013; Mastenbroek 
and Martinsen, 2018).
 Overall, EU compliance studies have relied on highly diverse theoretical 
perspectives ranging from historical institutionalism to classical international relations 
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theory, rooted in rational or sociological institutionalism (Mastenbroek, 2005; Jenson 
and Mérand, 2010). In line with March and Olsen’s (1998) institutional actor logics, the 
capacities, preferences, and beliefs at the aggregate member state level featured as 
the dominant explanations for variation in EU compliance (Falkner et al., 2007; 
Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009; Mastenbroek, 2017). However, Angelova et al. 
(2012) noted that many EU compliance explanations, such as ‘actors’ policy 
preferences’ and ‘administrative efficiency’, remain contested. Thus, the alleged 
‘black hole’ of EU compliance studies identified by Mastenbroek (2005) has not yet 
fully evaporated. 
 Nevertheless, with increasing methodological sophistication (Treib, 2014), students 
of EU compliance have tackled several of the gaps that long hampered the field. 
For example, the pool of member states and policy sectors studied has gradually 
increased (Zhelyazkova et al., 2016). Moreover, studies increasingly go beyond 
binary conceptualisations of compliance (Bondarouk and Mastenbroek, 2018; 
Thomann and Sager, 2017a).
 Nonetheless, in light of the application of EU obligations, two aspects remain 
largely understudied in EU compliance research. First, EU compliance studies are 
biased towards units of analysis at the macro- and meso-level. For example, the first 
EU transposition studies had the aggregate member state as their main unit of 
analysis. The group of actors deemed relevant to understanding EU compliance has 
since widened. For example, scholars with interest in political variables highlighted 
the political interest of parliamentary groups, ministries and other veto players 
(Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006; Steunenberg, 2006; Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 
2013). Moreover, through a more explicit focus on practical implementation, public 
administrators, sub-national authorities and agencies entered into theories on EU 
compliance (Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Kaeding, 2006; Falkner et al., 2007; Bondarouk 
and Liefferink, 2017). Nevertheless, with a few exceptions (Gulbrandsen, 2011; 
Wockelberg, 2014), the frontline of EU compliance, where caseworkers apply EU law 
in direct interaction with its target groups received hardly any scholarly attention 
(Conant, 2012, p. 30). Therefore, Toshkov (2011, p. 6 fn. 6) argues that analysing the 
street-level application of EU law ‘remains the holy grail of compliance studies’. 
 This relative lack of research derives from the assumption that frontline 
implementers are not aware of the origins of the laws they apply, combined with the 
notion that lower-level implementers would treat EU law no differently than national 
law (Treib, 2014, p. 8). However, taking seriously the evidence of non-compliance 
provided by the transposition studies reviewed above, one can expect that EU law 
confronts practical implementers with new legal complexities of which they may 
be well aware. For example, EU law confronts implementers frequently with fuzzy 
European and national legal concepts (Treib, 2014, p. 6; Hartmann, 2016), non- 
compliant transposition laws (Angelova et al., 2012) and directly effective CJEU 
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rulings (Kelemen, 2006; Martinsen and Mayoral, 2017). These complications raise 
questions deeply seated in public administration research related to administrative 
accountability, loyalty, the ambiguity of values and beliefs, identities and the delegation 
and use of administrative discretion (e.g. Wockelberg, 2014). 
 A second shortcoming is that a bottom-up approach towards EU compliance is 
still underdeveloped. That is to say, so far EU compliance studies typically share a 
top-down (Thomann and Sager, 2017a) and institutionalist perspective (Mastenbroek 
et al., 2017). EU compliance studies rarely include individual-level variables, such as 
attitudes and motivations. When compliance studies included attitudes, the results 
were mixed. While Kaeding (2006) and Schimmelfennig et al. (2003) found little 
support for effects of pro-European attitudes on the quality of implementation, some 
authors (Lampinen and Uusikyla, 1998; Gibson and Caldeira, 2009) argued that 
attitudes are relevant in the compliance process. An important reason for these 
mixed findings seems to be that studies only investigated the effect of aggregate EU 
attitudes at the societal-level and related them to EU compliance processes (Mols 
and Haslam, 2008). 
 EU researchers only gradually start to recognise that implementers in the 
transposition and practical implementation stage have personal attitudes and 
motivations that may influence their responses towards EU obligations (Gelderman et 
al., 2010; Burcu-Bayram, 2017; Mastenbroek et al., 2017). This trend of infusing ‘blood’ 
into predominately institutional EU compliance studies (Mastenbroek et al., 2017) 
through micro-level mechanisms is particularly relevant when moving beyond 
transposition of EU law. During policy application, the actions of individual frontline 
implementers shape the compliance process, which makes their attitudes and 
motivations highly relevant for the compliance process. 
 In sum, the mechanisms that connect the micro-level of individual attitudes and 
motivations with meso-level variation of organisational set-up and the macro-level at 
the national legal level are rarely connected to explain EU compliance behaviour. 
4.  Research question and theoretical approach 
In order to start filling the identified gaps of migration law implementation studies and 
the EU compliance literature, this dissertation tackles the following research question: 
how do macro-, meso-, and micro-level factors structure frontline application of EU 
migration law?
 Frontline application of EU law is comprised of several interrelated processes. 
A first process is inter-institutional cooperation (Lundin, 2007). More specifically, inter- 
 institutional cooperation refers to the collaboration of national migration caseworkers 
with other domestic implementers to reach a joint decision on individual cases. 
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National administrative procedures often require such collaboration in the course of 
applying laws to individual cases. For example, when deciding on residence permits 
or visa applications, local migration caseworkers often need to cooperate with 
embassies abroad or national migration offices. The nature of such cooperation may 
have implications for the frontline decision-making process and the level of EU 
harmonisation achieved within member states.
 Second, application of EU law comprises the frontline use of EU law during 
administrative decision-making (also see Trondal, 2011a; Wockelberg, 2014; 
Mastenbroek, 2017). At the frontline of migration law, the use of EU law captures the 
process through which national migration officials select and incorporate legal 
options from different legal sources, such as the local-, national- and EU-level when 
deciding on individual cases.
 Third, frontline application of EU law follows a preceding cognitive step, namely 
implementers’ willingness to implement EU law. The frontline literature highlighted 
that the willingness to implement constitutes an essential precondition for the actual 
implementation (Tummers, 2011; Tummers et al., 2012). Thus, this study considers 
the willingness to implement EU migration law as a relevant aspect of frontline 
applications of EU law.
 This chapter establishes a multilevel analytical framework to investigate the 
different facets of frontline application of EU law. The first explanatory level includes, 
at the micro level, individuals’ EU-related attitudes and general job motivations as 
explanatory factors. Next, at the meso level, one can identify factors related to the 
national bureaucratic context. Finally, at the macro level, the national and European 
legal context may account for frontline applications of EU law. Figure 1-1 summarises 
the conceptual framework applied in this dissertation and specifies which chapters 
of the dissertation zoom in on the precise links of the multilevel framework.  
 Starting at the micro level, public administration scholars have recently pointed 
to insights of social psychologists that shed new light on individual-level mechanisms 
in public service organisations (Hood, 2002; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017). Social 
psychologists have investigated why individuals comply with the law by focusing on 
the normative and instrumental motivations that guide individuals in their decision- 
making (Ryan and Deci, 2000; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006; Jackson et al., 
2012). 
 The general public administration literature has specified several of these 
instrumental and normative motivations in light of administrators’ job motivations 
(Grant, 2007). More specifically, frontline bureaucracy studies (Lipsky, 1980; Brodkin, 
1997; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003; Tummers et al., 2012) and the literature 
on Public Service Motivation (PSM) (Perry, 1996; Wright and Grant, 2010; Perry and 
Vandenabeele, 2015) have highlighted that prosocial normative motivations influence 
policy application. 
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 Normative motivations are comprised of the perceptions of the input and output 
legitimacy of the law (Weber, 1968; Schmidt, 2013). For example, concerning input 
legitimacy, social psychology studies have shown that decisions to comply depend 
on individuals’ perceptions of procedural justice of the rule-making authority (Tyler, 
1990). Regarding output legitimacy, frontline bureaucracy studies have revealed that 
implementers make their policy applications conditional on their perceptions of the 
meaning of laws and policies for society and their clients (Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno, 2012; Tummers et al., 2012). 
 Beyond normative motivations, public administration scholars have also referred 
to instrumental motivations of civil servants. Examples of instrumental motivations 
are blame avoidance and the desire to reduce the risk of negative institutional and 
personal outcomes (Hood, 2002; Moynihan, 2012; Hinterleitner and Sager, 2016; 
Hinterleitner, 2017). 
 Overall, from the growing literature on PSM, we know that implementers tend to 
behave in line with their job motivations and attitudes (Perry, 1996; Wright and Grant, 
2010; Perry and Vandenabeele, 2015). Applied to the EU context, this study expects 
that implementers apply EU law in line with their EU-related attitudes and general job 
motivations.
Figure 1-1  Multilevel framework of frontline application of EU migration law
Macro Level: National 
& EU Legal Context
• Transposition
• Legal Discretion  
Meso Level: National 
Bureacratic Context
• Local Client Contact
• Accountability Structure
• Structural Discretion
Frontline Application of 
EU Migration Law
• Interinstitutional Cooperation
• Use of EU Law 
• Willingness to Implement 
Micro Level: Individual 
Attitudes
• Job Motivations
• Attitudes towards EU Law
Chapter 2  
Chapter 2, 6 & 7 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 3, 5 & 7 
Chapter 6 
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However, implementers do not operate in a vacuum but are embedded in their 
meso-level bureaucratic context. Organisational perspectives account for such 
context and hold that human rationality is institutionalised, embedded and 
contextualised (Simon, 1965; Egeberg, 1999, p. 159). Following this perspective, 
organisational variables constitute systematic biases that influence the extent to 
which individuals follow logics of consequentiality or appropriateness (March and 
Olsen, 1998). In other words, bureaucratic context constitutes an organisational bias 
that regulates, constitutes and constructs administrative attitudes, motivations and 
behaviour (March and Olsen, 1998; Trondal, 2011b; Henökl and Trondal, 2015). Thus, 
bureaucratic context can be expected to have implications for individual-level 
attitudes and motivations, as well as the application of EU law.
 This dissertation identifies three interrelated bureaucratic context factors that 
may influence frontline application. First, the bureaucratic context determines the 
accountability structure and thus the power relationships in which officials apply 
national and EU law. For example, frontline implementers may operate in a hierarchical 
setting with asymmetric power relationships. Such structures may make implementers 
blame avoidant and risk-averse in their everyday application of laws and policies 
(Hood, 2011). 
 Second, the bureaucratic context determines to what extent frontline implementers 
operate at the local level face-to-face with their clients (Bovens and Zouridis, 2002). 
Following relational job design theory, client contact can constitute an organisational 
bias by influencing job motivations of public officials (Grant, 2007, 2008). More 
concretely, Grant (2007) argues that client contact and proximity to the effects of 
one’s decisions increases the normative prosocial motivation of implementers. 
 A third bureaucratic factor examined in this dissertation is the level of structural 
discretion which civil servants have at their disposal (Egeberg and Trondal, 2009; 
Trondal, 2011a). Structural discretion may provide an organisational bias through 
which frontline implementers evaluate the risk of using either national or EU obligations 
when applying the law to individual cases. 
 Finally, at the macro level, national and European-level factors influence 
implementers. This dissertation focuses particularly on the legal context in which 
implementers operate. The legal environment provides implementers with varying 
levels of legal discretion and legal conflict. This dissertation applies the domestic 
delegation literature (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1994; Huber et al., 2001; Huber and 
Shipan, 2002) to the EU transposition context to find out how policy conflict and 
transaction costs affect the level of legal discretion that policy-makers delegate to 
practical implementers. 
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5.  Methodological approach
The following section discusses the methodological choices of the dissertation for 
applying the analytical framework empirically. The section first discusses the selection 
of subfields within the policy area of migration. Next, the cross-country design and 
the empirical data that were collected and analysed are discussed. 
Selecting subfields of migration
This dissertation examines the frontline application of EU law in various subfields of 
EU migration law. The first criterion for selecting these subfields was that EU directives 
influence national regulations. EU directives require transposition into national law, 
which allows for an exploration of how frontline implementers handle conflict between 
national transposition legislation and EU obligations. Moreover, EU migration 
directives are characterised by relatively large margins of EU discretion (Hartmann, 
2016), which provides good conditions to observe how and with which motivations 
actors in the transposition and the application phase fill EU discretion with meaning. 
 The number of EU migration and asylum directives is still of manageable size 
(see Table 1.1). Among the migration and asylum directives, a selection criterion was 
that directives were in force for at least five years. Otherwise, directives may be still in 
the transposition phase, which does not allow explorations into frontline applications 
of EU law. At the start of this research project, many of the directives had just gone 
through a revision process, leading to the adoption of several recast directives (see 
Table 1.1.). The recast directives had not yet reached the frontline application stage, 
making them unsuitable for this study. 
 To observe the relationship between meso- and macro-level variables, the field 
of asylum reception was selected. Here, the high level of discretion in the Reception 
Conditions Directive (2003/9EC) and the variety of national institutional actors 
entrusted with application provide particularly favourable conditions for testing 
domestic delegation theories. Nevertheless, these circumstances made the field of 
reception less suitable to explore the link between meso- and micro-level mechanisms. 
 Thus, to zoom in on bureaucratic context and individual motivations and attitudes, 
the largest part of the dissertation investigates frontline applications of family 
migration law. The Family Reunification Directive (2003/86/EC) constitutes one of the 
most influential European regulatory instruments in the field of migration (Pascouau 
and Labayle, 2011; Strik et al., 2012). It regulates the legal entry of third-country 
nationals (TCNs) into the EU member states. The CJEU has challenged the 
transposition of the directive of several member states (Acosta Arcarazo and Geddes, 
2013; Bonjour and Vink, 2013). Contrary to the discretionary Reception Directive, EU 
family migration law is more specific, and there is more tension between EU and 
national obligations. These conditions afford insight into how frontline implementers 
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handle the conflict between national and EU obligations. Additionally, as shown in 
the general literature on migration law implementation, issues on family migration are 
a particularly emotional field of migration law in which family norms and values play a 
Table 1.1  Overview of EU migration and asylum directives
Migration
Blue Card Directive:
Directive 2009/50 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purposes of highly qualified employment
Transposition deadline: 19 June 2011
Employers Sanction Directive:
Directive 2009/52 providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against 
employers of illegally staying third-country nationals
Transposition deadline: 20 July 2011
Freedom of Movement:
Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States
Transposition deadline: 30 April 2006
Long-Term Residence Directive:
Directive 2003/19 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term 
residents
Transposition deadline:  23 January 2006
Family Reunification Directive: 
Directive 2003/86 on the right to family reunification
Transposition deadline: 1.October 2005
Asylum
Returns Directive:
Directive 2008/115 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning 
illegally staying third-country nationals
Transposition deadline: 24 December 2010
Procedural Directive:
Directive 2005/85/EC on Minimum standards for procedures for granting and withdrawing 
refugee status 
Transposition deadline 1 December 2007
Recast: Directive 2013/32/EU, transposition deadline 20 July 2015 
Qualification Directive: 
Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international 
protection and the content of the protection granted
Transposition deadline 10 October 2006
Recast: Directive 2011/95/EU, transposition deadline: 21 December 2013
Reception Conditions Directive: 
Directive 2003/9 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers
Transposition deadline: 6 February 2005
Recast Directive 2013/33/EU, transposition deadline: 20 July 2015
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particularly important role (Bonjour and de Hart, 2012). These characteristics make 
family migration a likely case for normative dilemmas for frontline implementers 
(Ottosson et al., 2012; Eggebø, 2013; Eule, 2014). In turn, this provides favourable 
conditions for the investigation of micro-level mechanisms.
 Finally, to increase the generalisability of the findings, the dissertation also 
examines frontline applications and attitudes towards general EU migration law. 
Beyond family reunification, general migration law includes other forms of legal entry 
such as student and labour migration, as well as the long-term residency of TCNs5.  
Cross-country research design
This dissertation presents the results of a cross-country comparison of EU migration 
law application. The focus was on implementers from the old EU member states to 
ensure that countries had had the same amount of time to implement the EU 
obligations. Within the older EU member states, one can differentiate between 
traditional and new immigration states (Jordan et al., 2003a). Compared to the old 
immigration states, the newer immigration states often lack a developed national 
regulatory framework and an established implementation apparatus for migration law 
application. Moreover, because the newer immigration countries are positioned at 
the EU’s external borders, they typically function as transit countries of migration. 
Therefore, they face very different patterns of immigration than the traditional 
immigration countries.
 For closer analysis and to control for these factors, the thesis investigates 
Germany (with the Bundesland of North Rhine-Westphalia) and the Netherlands. 
While the focus on a small subset of countries limits the generalisability of the findings 
of this dissertation, several considerations motivated the country selection. 
 First, Germany and the Netherlands have comparable percentages of foreigners 
living on their territory (Eurostats, 2007). Second, they have well-developed national 
migration laws and an established implementation apparatus. Third, both countries 
are reluctant transposers of EU migration laws shown by the transposition of key EU 
legislation, such as the Family Reunification Directive (Strik, 2011; Strik et al., 2012). 
Concerning family migration, the CJEU has challenged the transposition laws of both 
countries (Bonjour and Vink, 2013). Fourth, Falkner et al. (2007) classified both 
countries within the so-called world of domestic policies. Following this world, as 
long as national transposing actors dutifully incorporate EU law into national law, the 
application runs smoothly. While EU compliance scholars have criticised this 
classification (e.g. Toshkov, 2007), Strik (2011) found support for the typology in her 
5 The field of asylum was not the focus of this general approach towards EU migration law. Asylum 
decisions are handled across the member states studied in this dissertation by frontline implementers 
in separate migration agencies or in separated departments with very different procedural requirements 
than in the field of regular migration.
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study on EU family migration law in the German and Dutch context. Finally, both 
countries share a legalistic administrative culture in which the rule of law is deeply 
embedded in administrative practice (Painter and Peters, 2010, p. 22). Overall, 
controlling for these contextual factors allows focusing on the most different 
bureaucratic contexts of the two countries.
 More specifically, at the meso level, Germany and the Netherlands employ highly 
diverse structures for the application of migration law. As will be discussed in more 
detail throughout the dissertation, application systems in the Netherlands are 
centralised, while being highly decentralised and fragmented in Germany. In sum, 
this variation has implications for the accountability structure and thus the power 
relations, local client contact and structural discretion of frontline implementers in the 
two systems. 
 Finally, one of the sub-studies of this dissertation adds France as a country case. 
The addition of France served to compare and explain macro-level variation in legal 
discretion after transposition. The case of France adds to the federal German context 
and the centralised Dutch context an application context in which a central state 
delegated application to a range of practical implementers at the central and local 
level. These meso-level characteristics provide favourable conditions to observe 
variation in the expected explanatory variables derived from the domestic delegation 
literature.
Empirical data and analysis
This dissertation relies on multiple methods and data sources ranging from legal 
analysis, qualitative investigations of interviews with practitioners and experts, and a 
quantitative analysis of original survey data. By triangulating the qualitative and 
quantitative data, the overarching research question is tackled through a multi-method 
approach (Creswell, 2017). The reason for combining different methods was to 
enhance internal and external validity (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006). 
 Beyond different methods, the dissertation presents six sub-studies that each 
rely on a distinct methodology and logic of inquiry (Haverland and Yanow, 2012). 
More concretely, to provide depth to the individual-level mechanisms for (EU) 
migration law implementation, a theory building design that contextualises the 
mechanisms in the respective bureaucratic structures was chosen. For this purpose, 
I conducted interviews with 42 migration officials in Germany and the Netherlands. 
The explanations and examples from frontline implementers provided unquantifiable 
insights into the struggles of operating in a multilevel legal framework and the 
complications of implementing family migration law in the different bureaucratic 
structures. The qualitative design with its interpretative elements aimed at filling 
micro- and meso-level variables with meaning, beyond predefined attitudinal and 
motivational categories. In addition, the interview data were collected to trace the 
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causal chain between macro-level bureaucratic structure and individual application 
practices (George and Bennett, 2005). While theory-driven, the interview data left 
room for induction (see Bennett and Elman, 2006; Haverland and Yanow, 2012; 
Beach and Pedersen, 2013). 
 By contrast, to analyse the extent to which well-established public administration 
theories apply to the context of EU migration law, a theory-testing design was adopted 
(Haverland and Yanow, 2012). For this purpose, a focused cross-country comparison 
(George and Bennett, 2005) using legal analysis and expert interviews with 
respondents in Germany, France and the Netherlands was applied. Moreover, the 
focused comparison introduces an innovative measurement tool to measure legal 
discretion systematically. The so-called Institutional Grammar Tool (Crawford and 
Ostrom, 1995; Basurto et al., 2010; Siddiki et al., 2012) adds content-specific depth to 
pre-existing quantitative measures of discretion (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999; 
Huber and Shipan, 2002). 
 Finally, to extend the generalisability of the dissertation to a larger population of 
frontline implementers, the last sub-study presents a quantitative analysis of original 
survey data collected from 339 migration officers in the Netherlands and the German 
Bundesland of North Rhine-Westphalia. The survey relied on the insights from the 
interviews and the validated measurement constructs of the frontline bureaucracy 
literature (Tummers et al., 2009, 2012). The survey allows for the systematic comparison 
of migration caseworkers within and across bureaucratic structures to capture 
the attitudes and motivations of a considerably larger sample of implementers than 
the qualitative interviews. 
 Thus, each of the sub-studies has its own research question and methodological 
approach. The different approaches afforded insight into the various mechanisms 
behind frontline applications and facets of individual-level attitudes. In combination, 
the different sub-studies answer the overarching research question of this study.
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6.  Outline of the dissertation
This dissertation consists of six empirical chapters. The chapters have been published 
or are currently under review as articles in international peer-reviewed journals6. 
Three main substantive parts divide the six empirical chapters. 
 After this introductory chapter, part two investigates the specifics of the bureaucratic 
context of family migration law implementation in Germany and the Netherlands. Part 
two consists of chapter 2 and 3. Chapter 2 investigates inter-institutional cooperation 
in the German family visa procedures. The chapter traces frontline motivations behind 
inter-institutional cooperation by taking theories of blame avoidance and street-level 
studies as points of departure. Chapter 3 brings into the dissertation the cross-country 
dimension by investigating how differences in client contact (Bovens and Zouridis, 
2002) structure job motivations among Dutch and German migration officials. Relying 
on relational job design theory (Grant, 2007), the chapter traces variation in prosocial 
motivations among frontline implementers in the family visa procedure. In combination, 
the first two chapters serve as an illustration of bureaucratic context and micro-level 
variation in frontline motivations in a Europeanised legal context.
 The third part of the dissertation zooms in on the EU dimension of migration law 
application. This part includes chapter 4, which maps and explains the extent to 
which transposing actors delegate EU discretion to practical implementers. Testing 
standard hypotheses from the domestic delegation literature (Epstein and O’Halloran, 
1994; Huber et al., 2001; Huber and Shipan, 2002), chapter 4 presents explanations 
for high variation of legal discretion after transposition. Thus, the chapter maps the 
macro-level contexts in which domestic lower-level implementers apply EU law. 
 The fourth part of the dissertation goes to the core of the overall research 
question. Chapter 5 relies on organisational theories (Trondal and Veggeland, 2003; 
Egeberg and Trondal, 2009; Trondal, 2011a) and investigates how variation in 
bureaucratic discretion conditions frontline implementers’ use of EU migration law. 
The chapter compares the use of EU law by frontline implementers in the Netherlands, 
who operate in non-discretionary bureaucratic structure and their German colleagues 
in a discretionary structure.
 Subsequently, building on the findings of chapter 5, chapter 6 raises the question 
of what motivates individual implementers to use original EU legal frameworks. 
The chapter derives a set of expectations regarding instrumental and normative 
6 Besides chapter 4 and 7, all articles are the single-authored work of the PhD candidate. The PhD 
candidate was also the leading author of chapter 4 and 7. Prof. dr. Ellen Mastenbroek contributed 
to the entire chapter 4, particularly to develop and frame the argument. Data collection and analysis, 
as well as the initial idea for the chapter were the responsibility of the PhD candidate. For chapter 7, 
the supervision team played a role in the development of the survey questionnaire and in replicating 
the statistical analysis. Data collection, analysis, the theoretical framework and writing of the chapter 
were the responsibility of the PhD candidate.
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motivations and implementers’ use of EU law. By holding the national bureaucratic 
structure constant, the chapter presents a single-country study on German migration 
officials in three multilevel legal contexts.
 Following these qualitative studies, chapter 7 complements the qualitative findings 
with a quantitative cross-country survey. The chapter investigates which EU-related 
attitudes in interaction with bureaucratic context explain implementers’ willingness to 
implement EU migration law. 
 Finally, the last chapter of the dissertation connects the dots of the six empirical 
chapters by drawing general conclusions regarding the role of lower-level implementers 
in the field of migration and EU compliance more generally. The dissertation ends 
with a discussion of the implications of the findings for practitioners and avenues for 
follow-up studies. Table 1.2 summarises the research questions and theoretical and 
methodological approaches of the empirical chapters.
Table 1.2  Outline of the empirical chapters of the dissertation
Research Question Unit of analysis Phenomenon  
of interests
Explanatory variables Data Publication status
chapter 1 Introduction Parts published in Routledge 
Handbook on the Politics  
of Migration in Europe 
Part 2
The individual in 
migration office
chapter 2 What structures inter-institutional 
cooperation of the German family visa 
procedure?
German officials Inter-institutional 
cooperation
Meso-level: local client contact  
and accountability structure
Micro-level: intrumental and 
normative motivations
Practitioner 
Interview
Under review
chapter 3 How does client contact structure job 
motivations in street-level and screen-level 
bureaucracy?
Dutch and German 
officials
Job motivations Meso-level: client contact Practitioner 
interviews
Under review
Part 3
The delegation 
of EU discretion 
chapter 4 What explains the extent to which 
transposition actors delegate EU discretion?
French, German and 
Dutch transposition laws
Legal discretion Macro-level: transaction costs, 
policy conflict, pre-existing 
preferences
Legal analysis 
and expert 
interviews
Published in: Regulation & 
Governance
Part 4
Europe at  
the frontline
chapter 5 What motivates the use of EU law at the 
frontline of migration law implementation?
German officials Use of EU law Micro-level: instrumental and 
normative motivations 
Macro-level: legal ambiguity
Practitioner 
interviews
Published in:
Journal of European 
Public Policy
chapter 6 How does bureaucratic structure condition 
frontline implementers’ use of EU migration 
law?
Dutch and German 
officials
Use of EU law Meso-level: structural discretion Practitioner 
interviews
Published in:
Journal of Public Policy
chapter 7 Which individual attitudes explain the 
willingness to implement EU migration 
law and to what extent is the relationship 
moderated by national bureaucratic context? 
Dutch and German  
officials
Willingness to 
implement EU law
Meso-level: country moderator
Micro-level:  instrumental and 
normative EU-related attitudes
Survey data Under review
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Abstract
States rely on highly diverse administrative systems to apply and enforce national 
and EU migration laws. A case in point is the family visa procedure. Germany relies 
here on a particularly decentralised system that requires the embassies abroad to 
obtain the consent from the foreign registration offices at the local level. This study 
investigates how instrumental and normative street-level motivations structure the 
cooperation of the local implementers with the diplomatic missions abroad. Relying 
on in-depth interviews, this study shows that cooperation is smooth when instrumental 
motivations of avoiding unwanted responsibilities drive the implementers. However, 
tensions can emerge when local normative motivations interfere with the cooperation. 
In extreme cases, tension triggers local bypassing of the formal procedures. Despite 
growing pressure to Europeanise national migration laws, this study highlights that 
bureaucratic structures and the localities of decision-making can trigger considerable 
variation in street-level decision-making, even within a single EU member state.
Keywords: Family visa procedure, inter-institutional cooperation, street-level motivations, 
blame avoidance, local context
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1.  Introduction
Through European Union (EU) Directives and Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) rulings, migration policies increasingly converge across Europe (Bonjour and 
Block, 2013; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2016). Nevertheless, supranational 
agencies, such as the European Asylum Support Office, only rarely turn EU rules into 
practice. Instead, these supranational agencies focus on supporting member states 
under particular pressure. Thus, the application and enforcement of national and EU 
asylum and migration policies remain mainly in the hands of national administrative 
systems.
 In line with their administrative traditions (Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Knill, 2001), 
EU member states rely on a range of actors to implement national and European 
migration policies (Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000). For example, embassies or migration 
offices at the state-level perform implementation tasks. Additionally, much of the day 
to day control-based tasks are shifted down to local actors, such as municipalities 
(Lahav and Guiraudon, 2006). The diversity of implementation locations can be 
assumed to matter for the attitudes and practices of street-level implementers (Lipsky, 
1980) who turn migration laws into practices (Gilboy, 1991; Cyrus and Vogel, 2003; 
Jordan et al., 2003a; Fuglerud, 2004; Wells, 2006; Lewis and Ramakrishnan, 2007; 
Marrow, 2009; Armenta, 2012; Eggebø, 2012; Alpes and Spire, 2014; Eule, 2014). For 
example, Ellermann (2006) has illustrated how humanitarian concerns gain 
prominence when migration policies reach the local level (see also Schmidtke and 
Zaslove, 2013). 
 What remains less explored is how lower level implementers cooperate with each 
other across institutional boundaries to apply national and EU migration policies. 
However, administrative cooperation is highly relevant because local implementers 
often have to support state agencies during the implementation of national and 
European migration policies. Consequently, multilevel challenges in migration law 
implementation not only exist across EU member states, but they may also exist 
within states when implementers cooperate across domestic levels. This study 
investigates a case of inter-institutional cooperation in which local and federal 
implementing administrations have to take joint decisions on family migration visas.
 Family migration is one of the main sources of legal entry in Europe (Kofman, 
2004), and often leads to permanent residency. These characteristics make family 
visa conditions an important tool for regulation and controlling immigration (Strik 
et al., 2012; Bonjour and Vink, 2013). To harmonise conditions for third-country 
national family reunification, the EU adopted the so-called Family Reunification 
Directive (Council Directive 2003/86/EC). The Directive allows that member states 
investigate if the family ties are real and if applicants meet age limits, income criteria, 
and language conditions. Despite the convergence of the conditions, the EU leaves 
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it to the administrative systems of the member states to issue visas and to evaluate 
the conditions. 
 The evaluation of the conditions requires domestic visa authorities to collect and 
interpret a considerable amount of information about applicants and their family 
members. As a result, scholars identified visa officers as ‘gatekeepers of state 
borders’ (Satzewich, 2013). In line with its decentralised structure, Germany 
established a two-level administrative procedure for family reunification visas. The 
procedure requires cooperation between diplomatic missions abroad and 
intra-German local foreign registration offices (Ausländerbehörden). The diplomatic 
missions decide on the visa in own responsibility, but they demand the agreement 
from the Ausländerbehörde before issuing the visa. The two administrations have 
distinct competencies and accountabilities. That means that the caseworkers who 
evaluate the visa conditions operate in a complex structure where the involved ad-
ministrations differ in powers and local proximity to service recipients. This setting 
raises the question of what motivates local caseworkers when cooperating with the 
diplomatic mission and how do they cope with potential tensions?
 This study combines theories on blame avoidance (Hood, 2011; Moynihan, 2012; 
Hinterleitner and Sager, 2015, 2016) with the street-level bureaucracy literature (Lipsky, 
1980; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2012; Tummers et al., 2012) to investigate 
motivations behind inter-institutional cooperation. The blame avoidance literature holds 
that instrumental motivations of limiting the risk of being blamed for negative institutional 
outcomes drive actors. By contrast, the street-level literature has highlighted that also 
normative motivations of implementers, related to their values, emotions and direct 
encounters with clients can explain the behaviour of civil servants (Hertogh, 2009; 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2012). 
 While institutional context is often implicitly mentioned, both in theories of blame 
avoidance and street-level studies, context is typically not incorporated from the 
outset into expected mechanisms (Hupe and Buffat, 2014; Hinterleitner, 2017). This 
study adds to the street-level and blame avoidance literature by highlighting the 
importance of bureaucratic context. In other words, this chapter develops a theoretical 
framework that incorporates accountability structures and local client contact into 
mechanisms of blame and normative motivations. 
 Relying on semi-structured interviews with caseworkers in foreign registration 
offices of the Bundesland of North Rhine-Westphalia, this chapter shows that local 
implementers typically appreciate their subordinate role, because it allows them to 
limit and share with the diplomatic missions, potential blame from clients and society 
for negative visa decisions. However, mutual blaming and inter-institutional tension 
arise when the local Ausländerbehörden adopt more liberal approaches towards 
visa applications than the diplomatic missions. Blaming encourages mainly formal 
coping practices, but in extreme situations, caseworkers develop informal practices 
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that circumvent the decisions of the diplomatic missions. In light of EU migration 
policies, the local blaming and coping mechanisms highlight that implementation of 
EU policies is not only determined by the aggregate member state level. Instead, 
national multilevel administrative arrangements can trigger variation within domestic 
administrative levels, even when member states established harmonised national 
policies and transposed EU migration laws into their national regulatory framework.
2.  The German family reunification visa procedure 
Following a recent study of the European Migration Network (2017), family migration 
accounts for a third of all arrivals of third-country nationals in the EU. In Germany, 
family reunification constitutes an even larger share of immigration: 46% of all first 
permits issued from 2011-2015 had the purpose of family reunification. 
 In Germany, family reunification is possible for the nuclear family including the 
spouses and unmarried minor children of a resident in Germany. Extended family 
members can only reunite in cases of exceptional hardship. In line with the Family 
Reunification Directive, and Art. 33 of the German residence law (AufentG), the German 
visa conditions oblige applicants to have a valid passport. Next, there may be no 
reason for expulsion against the applicant. Furthermore, family members generally 
have to obtain a basic German language certificate, before their entry into Germany 
(Art.30.1.2 AufenthG). The sponsor of family reunification has to have a valid residence 
permit and stable and regular resources.8 Spouses need to be above the age of 18, 
and the family ties between the sponsor and the family member have to be genuine. 
That means that forced marriages and marriages that arguably only serve the purpose 
of receiving a visa do not grant the right to family reunification (Art. 27 1.1 AuftentG). 
 The responsibility for the German visa procedure lies formally with the diplomatic 
missions9. The diplomatic missions are accountable to the Federal Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and consist of the German embassies and consulates in the country of origin 
of the family member. The diplomatic missions may reject visa applications, but they 
may not issue a visa without a positive recommendation from the local Ausländer­
behörde of the county or city to which the family member intends to move10. 
 The German counties (Kreise) and cities organise and finance the local Ausländer­
behörden. The Ausländerbehörden implement EU and federal migration laws and the 
decrees that the Bundesland issues to specify national legislation. Depending on the 
Bundesland, they fall within the subject supervision of district governments or the 
Ministries of Internal Affairs at the Bundesland level. Contrary to the diplomatic 
8 This includes also sufficient living space and health insurance
9 Art 71. 2 AufenthG
10 Art. 31.1 AufenthV
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missions, the Ausländerbehörden are not directly accountable to a federal ministry. 
While the local offices may review all visa conditions, they are primarily responsible 
for evaluating the conditions which the sponsor in Germany has to fulfil (see Table 2.1) 
(Visumshandbuch 65. Ergänzungslieferung: 03/2017)11. Additionally, the local offices 
are involved in evaluating the genuineness of the family ties. In cases of doubts by 
one of the public offices, both institutions conduct parallel hearings and share their 
evaluations of an alleged fraudulent marriage. 
 However, the agreement of the local foreign registration offices to the visa is only 
required for the approval of a visa application, not for rejection12. Thus, if an initial 
investigation of the visa application by the diplomatic mission already concludes that 
an applicant does not meet critical conditions for the visa, it can reject the visa 
application without the involvement of the local offices. Conversely, the instructions 
of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the diplomatic missions explicitly hold 
that once the Ausländerbehörde is involved, the two institutions shall decide on the 
visa in agreement with each other (Visumhandbuch 56. Ergänzungslieferung: 12/2013 
Art 5.1.1; Art 29.1.2 AufenthG). Only when mediation with the local offices fails can the 
diplomatic missions decline the visa in own responsibility against the recommendations 
of the Ausländerbehörde. In such cases, they have to consult with the relevant 
department of the Federal Ministry Foreign Affairs to clarify any possible proceedings 
in contentious administrative matters (Visumhandbuch 56. Ergänzungslieferung: 
12/2013). 
 Applicants can take action against a visa rejection by filing an objection with the 
diplomatic mission. In that case, the diplomatic missions review the full visa 
application once more. If the income of the sponsor is the reason for denial, they may 
request the Ausländerbehörde to provide details on their assessment (Visumhandbuch 
65. Ergänzungslieferung: 03/2017). When applicants appeal against the visa decision, 
the relevant department of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs represents the 
diplomatic mission at the administrative court in Berlin (Visumhandbuch 63. Ergänzungs-
lieferung: 06/2016).
 The diplomatic missions may not issue visas for family reunification without the 
agreement of the Ausländerbehörde. If the Ausländerbehörde, after mediation, insists 
on a visa rejection, while the diplomatic mission is of the opinion that a refusal would 
have no standing in court, the diplomatic missions may exceptionally indicate in their 
visa rejection letter that the missing agreement of the Ausländerbehörde is the 
reasons for rejection. However, the diplomatic missions shall only include this 
indication in consultation with the relevant department of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Visumhandbuch 56. Ergänzungslieferung: 12/2013). 
11 The Visumhandbook contains the instructions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the diplomatic missions 
12 Art 31.1 AufenthV
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 Overall, the visa recommendation of the Ausländerbehörde is a purely internal 
administrative procedure. That means that the recommendation only addresses 
the diplomatic mission that has the competences to review the recommendation 
before taking a final visa decision. Only the diplomatic missions notify the applicant 
of the visa decision and motivate a rejection in the official letter to the applicant 
(Visumhandbuch 58. Ergänzungslieferung: 09/2014). Thus, in the case of rejection, 
the diplomatic mission indicate to the applicant the reasons for rejection, which gives 
them the power to point at the implementing institution that was responsible for the 
negative outcome.
 Once family members have entered Germany with a valid visa, they obtain a 
residence permit from the Ausländerbehörde. From that point onwards the Ausländer­
behörde is in charge of all residence matters. The visa procedure is the standard 
procedure for family reunification for foreigners who aim to reunite with a German or 
third-country national13. However, there are exceptional cases in which the local 
 Ausländerbehörde may issue a residence permit for family reunification without the 
visa. The exceptions apply when there are special visa agreements with the country 
of origin, or when a foreigner already entered Germany with a different visa, and it 
is unreasonable for the foreigner to leave the country to start the visa procedure. 
The local foreign registration offices have some discretion to determine which 
circumstances are unreasonable. Following case law, exceptions exist in the case of 
pregnancy or health conditions that prevent the migrant to leave Germany. Table 2.1 
summarises the main responsibilities and accountabilities in the family reunification 
process.
13  It should be noted that the conditions may differ for asylum seekers and refugees
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3.   Blame and local norms: Motivations behind  
inter-institutional cooperation
The German visa procedure raises the question, how smooth the collaboration 
between the diplomatic missions and the Ausländerbehörden is in practice and what 
motivates the local caseworkers when cooperating with the diplomatic missions. In 
order to shed light into inter-institutional cooperation, it is relevant to understand the 
local and organisational context in which implementers operate because context 
constitutes the cognitive bias through which people develop motivations and 
behaviour (Egeberg, 1999; March and Olsen, 2008; Trondal, 2011b).
 Following Hinterleitner (2017), public affairs are increasingly characterised by 
scandalisation of events because negative headlines attract public attention. This 
mechanism is in line with what psychologists call the negativity bias (Weaver, 1986). 
The negativity bias assumes that people pay more attention to unpleasant thoughts 
and emotions than their positive counterparts (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Lau, 
1985). The field of migration is a prime example of scandalisation and the negativity 
bias. Political and bureaucratic decisions that cause tragedies for individual migrants, 
often receive broad public attention (Ellermann, 2006). Additionally, political and 
bureaucratic actions that supposedly harm national security and welfare are at the 
centre of public debate and criticism. For example, in the case of family reunification 
potential burdens to the national social system, problems during integration and 
reported cases of forced marriages receive public attention (Block, 2012). By contrast, 
migration law implementers rarely receive publlicly compliments when everything 
goes well. Thus, the sensitivity of the policy field promotes instrumental motivations of 
avoiding risks and blame.
Table 2.1   Main responsibilities and accountabilities in the German family 
reunification procedure
Authority Diplomatic Missions Ausländerbehörde 
(Local Foreign Registration Offices)
Accountable to Federal Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs
District government or Ministry of Internal 
Affairs of the Bundesland (subject 
supervision)
County or city (capacity and budget)
Location of operation Abroad Local level in Germany
Responsibilities Final decision on 
the visa, language 
certificate, genuineness 
of family ties
Income condition, genuineness of family 
ties, decisions on residence permits
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Consequently, theories on blame avoidance constitute a useful point of departure to 
investigate bureaucratic behaviour in the field of migration. Theories of blame 
avoidance conceptualise ‘blame’ as the attribution of responsibility for negative 
outcomes (Van de Walle, 2016). To avoid blame, actors develop practices intended 
to downplay or distance themselves from (potentially) blame-attracting events 
(Hinterleitner, 2017). For example, Hood (2002) argues that individuals and institutions 
engage in agency strategies to shift responsibility to others through buck-passing, 
blame shifting or blame diffusion. Presentational strategies aim at avoiding blame 
through denying the existence of a problem and policy strategies intend to limit formal 
responsibility and liability by referring to limited formal competences. 
 Beyond theories of blame avoidance, street-level implementation studies have 
also investigated what drives the individual in public office. For example, Lipsky 
(1980) has argued that implementers tend to adopt practices with low risks of being 
questioned by the outside world. Thus, also the street-level literature acknowledges 
that the desire to reduce risks may drive public servants (Winter and May, 2001). 
 However, the street-level implementation literature also stands out for taking into 
account the normative motivations of public officials (Nielsen, 2006; Maynard-Moody 
and Musheno, 2012; Tummers et al., 2012; Dörrenbächer, 2017a14). For example, in 
the field of migration, implementers have been shown to struggle with conflicting 
policy norms and their personal normative attitudes (Düvell and Jordan, 2003; 
Eggebø, 2012). 
 Overall, in light of March and Olsen’s (1998) actor logics, the blame avoidance 
framework can be understood to rely on logics of consequentiality, while the 
street-level literature paid more attention to logics of appropriateness to explain 
administrative behaviour. By taking into account the institutional context, the two 
frameworks can be fruitfully combined to investigate inter-institutional cooperation.
Following the blame logic, one can expect that the Ausländerbehörden appreciate 
their subordinate role in the visa procedure. It allows them to refer to the diplomatic 
missions when problems arise because due to the multilevel accountability structure, 
they are formally not the main party in charge. Moreover, the institutional setup allows 
the local caseworkers to use policy strategies of locking the embassies in in their 
negative decisions. Thus, the local caseworkers may use the asymmetric powers 
strategically by referring to their limited competencies and the formal procedures to 
deflect potential blame from clients or other external actors. 
 While Lipsky (1980) assumes that street-level implementers deliberately use their 
discretion to determine policy through their relative autonomy, the blame logic 
suggests that caseworkers have legalistic attitudes and cooperate smoothly with 
higher-ups to avoid unwanted responsibilities (Hood, 2011). The differences in 
14  This is chapter 6 of this dissertataion.
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expectations derive because the blame framework takes into account accountabili-
ties and power structures between institutions. In other words, dependency on 
higher-ups makes frontline implementers vulnerable to blame when they use 
discretion or deviate from formal procedures.
 However, the German visa procedure is not only characterised by asymmetric 
powers. The diplomatic missions and the Ausländerbehörden also differ in their level 
of local proximity to the recipients of their services. Both administrations are 
street-level bureaucracies that interact with clients, but the client contact with the 
Ausländerbehörde is local and directly connected to the place of residence of the 
sponsor of family reunification. Moreover, the client contact in the Ausländerbehörde 
typically has a long-term character because the Ausländerbehörde remains 
responsible for residence permits once the foreigner entered Germany. By contrast, 
the diplomatic missions typically handle visa applications for the whole country, and 
often they do not know the local context in which applicants live. Additionally, they are 
no longer responsible for the applicants once they entered Germany. Thus, contrary 
to the diplomatic missions abroad, the Ausländerbehörden operate due to their local 
context, in direct proximity to the sponsor of family reunification. 
 This local client contact has implications for the blaming mechanisms by bringing 
in normative considerations that may trigger inter-institutional tensions. First, as 
observed in theories on job motivations in the public sector, local context and direct 
interaction with clients affect normative attitudes towards cases (Grant, 2007). 
Similarly, the street-level bureaucracy literature holds that while unpleasant encounters 
with clients may increase suspicions and prejudices, direct interaction and expertise 
about local circumstances may also encourage empathy and sympathy with 
individual clients (Kelly, 1994; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2012; Dörrenbächer, 
2017a). Applied to the German visa procedure, differences in client contact may lead 
to inter-institutional tension as it may encourage the Ausländerbehörde to adopt a 
more liberal and pro-client view than the diplomatic missions do.
 Second, tensions may arise because there are more blaming opportunities in 
decentralised systems than in comparatively centralised implementation systems 
(Weaver, 1986). In other words, at the local level, multiple actors can directly accuse 
individual civil servants. Hood (2011) acknowledged that being locked in with the 
decisions of higher-ups could attract new blame from local actors. Similarly, the 
embassies can shift blame by pointing at the local level for negative visa recommen-
dations. In such an institutional context, it may not always be possible for lower 
implementers to avoid blame fully. Therefore, local caseworkers need to balance 
conflicting norms from multiple accountabilities in their implementation decisions. 
 In line with the street-level bureaucracy literature, implementers may cope with 
inter-institutional tension along formal or informal practices (Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno, 2012; Tummers et al., 2015). For example, formal coping may include 
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efforts to convince the diplomatic missions in the mediation process. Informal coping 
may include attempts to circumvent the visa procedure in favour of normative 
motivations or local accountabilities. 
 In sum, applying insights from the blame avoidance framework and the street- 
level bureaucracy literature to the specific bureaucratic context of the German visa 
procedure lead to two broad expectations. First, when instrumental motivations of 
avoiding unwanted responsibilities motivate implementers, they will appreciate their 
subordinate role. However, when normative motivations due to local experience, 
empathy and local accountabilities interfere into the cooperation, inter-institutional 
tensions may emerge leading the two administrations to disagree on a visa. During 
policy application, formal or informal coping practices may resolve such disagreements.
4.  Method and data 
This study relies on qualitative interviews with 21 local officials of 10 Ausländer­
behörden in the German Bundesland of North-Rhine Westphalia. Thus, the study 
focuses on the perceptions of inter-institutional cooperation from the local level. The 
interviewed caseworkers in the local Ausländerbehörden are civil servants in the 
middle or upper intermediate civil service (mittlerer or gehobere Dienst). They typically 
have a Diploma or Bachelor degree from an administrative school (Fachhochschule 
für öffentliche Verwaltung), which qualifies them for a broad range of local regulatory 
administrations. They receive their training in migration law only when they already 
work in the foreign registration office by following their more advanced peers (see 
Eule, 2014). The visa officials in the diplomatic missions are also civil servants in the 
middle or upper intermediate civil service. Contrary to the local officials, they receive 
their training from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which qualifies them for different 
tasks within the diplomatic service. 
 The interviewed officials are all involved in family reunification cases and operate 
in large and small cities of the Bundesland of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). NRW is 
population-wise the biggest German Bundesland, which allowed including cities and 
counties that differ in size. Interviews were semi-structured and lasted up to 90 
minutes. All interviews were conducted in German, recorded and transcribed into 
English. The interviewer asked respondents to provide a general overview of the visa 
procedure for family reunification. Next, the interviews discussed practices regarding 
the evaluation of the visa conditions. These discussions allowed covering experiences 
of cooperation with the diplomatic missions. Through probing, the underlying 
motivational mechanisms for cooperation were uncovered (for the interview guide, 
see the Appendix).
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The interview transcripts were analysed and coded with computer-assisted qualitative 
data analysis in Atlas.ti. First, all parts of the interviews in which respondents 
discussed cooperation with the diplomatic missions were isolated. Next, reasons for 
smooth cooperation and tension were identified. To do so, codes for blame avoidance 
included references to policy strategies such as a reliance on a lack of formal 
responsibility and agency strategies, such as passing potential blame and 
responsibility to other authorities and actors. In order to account for the local context, 
codes for local experiences, empathy and local accountabilities were created. 
Any alternative mechanisms that go beyond the established framework were coded 
inductively. Finally, it was analysed how caseworkers cope with their subordinate 
role in situations of inter-institutional tension. The following section analyses the 
mechanisms and motivations behind inter-institutional cooperation and the coping 
strategies of caseworkers in cases of tension.
5.   Analysis of inter-institutional cooperation in  
the German visa procedure 
When being asked how the collaboration between the diplomatic missions and the 
local offices works in practice, respondents evaluated the cooperation very differently. 
Some respondents appreciate the cooperation and experience it mainly as a smooth 
process (NRW_D.1). Two respondents estimated that there is a difference in opinion 
between the diplomatic missions and their local office in 1 out of 20 cases (NRW_F.1). 
However, other respondents experience tension more frequently (e.g. NRW_A.1). 
The following section first analyses the reasons for an appreciation of the cooperation. 
The next section discusses reasons behind the tension.
Instrumental motivations: An appreciated lack of power?
Starting with the motivations behind smooth cooperation, the first aspect to note is 
that all respondents pointed to the formal requirement to cooperate with the diplomatic 
missions and their limited formal competences in the visa procedures. Respondents 
typically mentioned that they officially only advise the embassies. Of those, several 
respondents highlighted that they are glad that they are not responsible for the final 
decision on the visa: ‘I am really glad that the final judgement lies with the embassy’ 
(NRW_G.1). Similarly, respondents mentioned that officially the embassies are 
responsible, ‘so we (are) in an easy position and just (go) along’ (NRW_C.2). The quotes 
demonstrate that respondents accept or even appreciate their subordinate role. 
 Additionally, many respondents referred to their lack of expertise when discussing 
their relationship with the embassies. Respondents mentioned this lack particularly 
concerning the conditions, which the family member abroad has to fulfil, such as the 
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language requirement (NRW_G.2, NRW_G.1, NRW_J.1, NRW_F.1). Checking these 
conditions formally falls within the responsibility of the diplomatic missions abroad. 
 Overall, respondents who appreciated their subordinate role in the visa procedure 
showed signs of instrumental motivation and often followed policy strategies 
assumed by Hood (2011). For example, by pointing at their formal lack of competences 
and expertise, they refrained from extending their responsibilities beyond formal 
requirements. They argued that extending their formal competences would lead to a 
loss of trust, authority and bureaucratic values.
 Similarly, several respondents highlighted that the institutional set-up does not 
only trigger them to stick to the formal requirement but also that the diplomatic 
missions have instrumental motivations to avoid risks. By cooperating closely with 
the local level, they prevent damage to their reputation. As this respondent argued: 
  If it becomes clear that the embassies did not involve us, they would have a 
big problem (…) they would have to reopen the case, and it would mean that 
the trust and authority of the embassy would be hurt. (NRW_ I.2)
Beyond blame avoidance and bureaucratic ethos, respondents also appreciated the 
cooperation with the diplomatic missions due to personal instrumental motivations. 
For example, the cooperation increases the perceived importance of their job:
  I like it when the embassies call from far abroad. It gives me a feeling that  
I have a connection to the outside world. If they call from Cairo, I directly have 
the pyramids in front of my internal eyes. That is something I find exciting. 
(…) Working well together with the embassies gives you motivation. (NRW_ D.1) 
Normative motivations: A source of inter-institutional tensions? 
The section above suggests that instrumental motivations, such as risk aversion and 
blame avoidance but also bureaucratic ethos and personal instrumental consideration 
typically structure smooth cooperation between the local offices and the diplomatic 
missions. However, the interviews also uncovered considerable inter-institutional 
tension. The first aspect to note is that beyond instrumental motivations, normative 
motivations also structure the cooperation. Most respondents perceived the 
diplomatic missions to have a more restrictive approach towards family visas, as this 
respondent explained: ‘They (the diplomatic missions) are usually much more 
restrictive than we would be’ (NRW_J.1). The diplomatic mission would never 
(NRW_A.2) or only rarely interpret the law in a more liberal way than caseworkers at 
the local level (NRW_J.2). Following the respondents, differences in opinion emerge 
particularly regarding evaluations of fraudulent marriages. 
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  We had cases where we just got a note from the embassy that they denied 
an applicant in their own responsibility against our evaluations. They officially 
involved us, but in the end, they just decided on their own, due to a suspicion 
of a fake marriage. They already told us in the notification that they already 
denied the visa in own responsibility. (NRW_I.2)
Fraudulent marriage evaluations are the aspect of the visa evaluation where local 
implementers and the diplomatic missions are equally involved with because it 
concerns both the sponsor and the family member abroad. Moreover, national and 
EU law leave some room for manoeuvre to identify the genuineness of family ties. 
It requires a case-by-case judgement from implementers to evaluate if a marriage 
constitutes a ‘true’ spousal relationship or only exists on paper for immigration 
purposes. Respondents mentioned two features of local context to explain the 
different approaches regarding alleged marriages of convenience. First, they 
mentioned local expertise and connected to that emotional considerations. Second, 
respondents mentioned perceptions of multiple accountabilities at the local level.
Local experience and emotions 
A typical reason for the inter-institutional tension that respondents mentioned were 
the local circumstances in their city or county and their direct contact with the sponsor 
of family reunification. Almost all respondents highlighted how they use their intuition 
when the embassies require parallel questionings to investigate spousal relationships 
(e.g. NRW_A.2, NRW_D.1, NRW_C.2, NRW_F.1, NRW_F.2, NRW_A.1, NRW_G.1, 
NRW_J.1, NRW_J.2). For example, this respondent explained concerning a concrete 
suspicion of the embassy of a forced marriage:
  I asked the woman (sponsor in Germany) carefully about her husband, but 
it was so clear when she started talking that they are in love. I could literally 
see little hearts in her eyes. (NRW_G.2)
Moreover, the local contact triggers respondents to rely on their local experience. 
For example, respondents in city A consider the fact that family members do not plan 
to live together after reunification as a source of suspicion against marriages. 
By contrast, caseworkers in city C mentioned that they operate in a student city. 
In University cities, couples often live in different places for a while. Thus, in city C 
separate addresses are not necessarily a ground for fake marriage suspicion 
(NRW_C.3). Such local knowledge turns into tension with the diplomatic missions 
when caseworkers feel that the diplomatic missions disregard this local expertise. 
For example, one respondent explained:
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  On the one hand, they (the diplomatic missions) want an opinion from us 
-and we have of course also the better connection to the sponsor- but then 
they question everything we do. We often have an impression of the sponsor, 
also regarding issues such as responsibility and trustworthiness, but then 
they come from abroad, even though they have never met the sponsor and 
they question our experiences and evaluations. (NRW_ A.1)
While the administrative guidelines of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly demand 
the diplomatic missions to mediate until both institutions come to a common visa 
decisions, the local caseworkers sometimes experience the discussions with the 
diplomatic missions as excessive pressure on their visa recommendation, as this 
quote shows:
  If we take a favourable decision15 and they (the diplomatic missions) take a 
negative decision, they sometimes try to press us to change our view as 
well. They try to influence our decision so that they get support for their 
negative decision. The communication is sometimes very unsatisfactory. 
They, more or less, demand that we admit that our first decision was wrong 
and that we did not do our job properly. They just do not want to take 
responsibility for a denial. (NRW_ A.1)
The quote indicates how local expertise can trigger mutual blaming between the 
institutions. While the diplomatic missions, in line with their working instructions, push 
the local offices to function as a backup to share potential blame for negative 
decisions, the local caseworkers feel not taken seriously in their local expertise.
 Likewise, respondents explained how tensions between the institutions arise out of 
mutual buck-passing for emotionally difficult decisions. As one respondent explained: 
  Sometimes… my emotions and moral considerations clearly speak in favour 
of family reunification but, clearly from a legal point, I am not allowed to grant 
it. Often the embassies still forward these applications to us, even though 
they know we cannot agree to it. They let us decline the application. And that 
leaves us of course as the bad guys. (NRW_ A.1)
The quote indicates that neither the local offices nor the diplomatic missions abroad 
want to take sole responsibility for negative decisions. Thus, this local implementer 
experiences that the diplomatic missions engage in agency strategies by shifting the 
15  Interestingly, while respondents stressed that the final decision lies with the diplomatic missions and 
that they only provide recommendations, they also talked about their ‘decisions’ when complaining 
about the diplomatic missions
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blame for uncomfortable negative decisions to the local level. At the same time, the 
respondent himself also involved in blame shifting by pointing throughout the 
interview at the diplomatic missions as the main reason for problematic visa decisions. 
That indicates that not only the embassies participate in blame shifting but that also 
the local implementers use their direct connection to the sponsor or local media to 
point at the embassies in the case of controversial visa decisions.
Multiple local accountabilities
Beyond their local expertise and emotions, respondents also referred to their multiple 
accountabilities when elaborating on their cooperation with the diplomatic missions. 
The respondents of the local offices consider themselves primarily accountable to 
administrative courts, as this quote shows: ‘The question which guides all our 
decisions is -and it should also be this way- would the decision be acceptable if it 
would go to court? So this is our guideline’ (NRW_C.2). However, some respondents 
feel that the diplomatic missions consider themselves less accountable to national 
courts. Respondents argued that the embassies often see liberal case law as a 
problematic ‘circumvention of general requirements’ (NRW_F.1) which makes them 
less willing to apply such case law. 
 Similarly, about fraudulent marriages, a respondent argued: If we know there is a 
judgment that goes into another direction, we would not doubt the marriage. I have 
the feeling the embassies are not interested in that. Or at least often they do not care 
(NRW_A.1). The respondents explained that most applicants would not appeal 
against a decision of the embassy, but rather submit a new visa application because 
court procedures are expensive and time-consuming (NRW_A.2). 
 The perception that the diplomatic missions pay less attention to court law may 
also occur because until a few years ago, the diplomatic missions did not always 
include motivations in their visa rejection letters. Often they only included a separate 
document on which they marked the box of the violated condition. The current 
working instructions oblige the diplomatic missions to individually motivate their 
rejections already in the initial decision to make the visa process more transparent for 
the applicants. Nevertheless, the respondent quoted above has the impression that 
since the diplomatic missions operate abroad, they are under less direct national 
scrutiny than the Ausländerbehörden at the local level. 
 Furthermore, local caseworkers articulated perceptions of a multitude of informal 
local accountabilities. Several respondents argued that sponsors of family 
reunification, as well as their lawyers and local media typically consider the local 
offices as the competent authority (NRW_G.1). As this caseworker argued, the 
embassies sometimes use this misconception strategically to shift blame to the local 
level:
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  Everyone always assumes that we here at the local level are more accessible 
and easier to influence in our decisions than the embassies abroad. That is 
very burdensome for us because some responsibilities are just reversed in 
this way. (…) The thing is, the embassies strengthen these mechanisms 
because mostly when there is conflict in a case, they refer to us as the reason 
for the negative decision. They hide behind our decisions, even though they 
eventually have the decision-making authority. (NRW_A.1)
The quote above is insightful in several ways. First, it is interesting that the respondent 
thinks that the diplomatic missions could still accept a visa application if they issued 
a negative opinion on the local level. Following the Visahandbuch, this is not easily 
possible. Second, the quote shows how blame considerations and local accountabil-
ities structure inter-institutional cooperation. Both administrations pass the buck for 
uncomfortable negative visa decisions to each other. Third, due to multiple account-
abilities at the local level, a fully blame free strategy is sometimes not feasible for local 
decision makers. Either they need to justify decisions for which they feel formally not 
responsible, or by relying on their limited formal competences, they contribute to a 
bad image of a non-accessible administration at the local level. 
Coping with tension at the local level
The section above showed that a common desire to avoid blame for controversial 
negative visa decisions structures inter-institutional cooperation between the local 
foreign offices and the diplomatic missions. Local caseworkers who are driven by 
instrumental motivation appreciate their subordinate role because it allows them to 
avoid responsibility. However, tensions between the institutions emerge when 
normative motivations trigger more liberal approaches at the local level than favoured 
by the diplomatic missions. In these situations, the local caseworkers experience it as 
a burden that they cannot override negative decisions of the diplomatic mission. 
These situations of tension raise the question how local caseworkers cope with their 
subordinate role in cases of tension.
 Starting with tension regarding conditions that fall mainly within the competences 
of the diplomatic missions, the interviews indicate that respondents normally do not 
challenge the decisions made by the diplomatic missions. For example, when 
discussing the application of a new exception for the language requirement 
established by European case law, respondents explained:
  The embassies for long required this (the language certificate) and we as 
foreign registration offices also went along with it because we felt not 
responsible. (NRW_C.2)
517635-L-bw-Dorrenbacher
Processed on: 20-2-2018 PDF page: 58
58
CHAPTER 2
Even when they were personally convinced that the embassies apply the rulings in 
the wrong way, they would not interfere with the decisions of the diplomatic missions: 
‘I do not have to justify why the law is applied in the wrong way. I know that it is 
applied in the wrong way, but it is not my responsibility (…)’ (NRW_A.1). An explanation 
of this approach is the fact that evaluations of this requirement fall primarily within the 
competences of the diplomatic missions. Several respondents also highlighted that 
the embassies would often not start the visa procedure if applicants submit 
applications that miss the language certificate (NRW_J.1, NRW_H.2). In such cases, 
external actors cannot hold the local implementers accountable because the visa 
procedure does not even reach the stage of requiring the agreement from the local 
level, as these respondents showed:
  We often have cases where the sponsor is here, and they tell us that their 
partner does not even manage to get access to the embassy. If there is no 
visa application, we also cannot decide on it. These are the cases where we 
cannot do anything from here. (NRW_ A.1)
Only when the diplomatic missions ask for an opinion on issues which concern the 
applicant, such as the language requirement, some caseworkers become active and 
point the embassies to recent court rulings that allow for exceptions (NRW_A.1, 
NRW_F.1, NRW_F.2. NRW_C.3). However, even when there are differences of opinion 
and conflicting legal evaluations regarding conditions that concern the applicant 
abroad, respondents typically do not question the practices of the diplomatic 
missions. 
 Coming to shared competences, most respondents highlighted again that they 
support, at least formally, the diplomatic missions. For example, several respondents 
argued that fraudulent marriage investigations are very time-consuming and rarely 
successful in denying a visa (NRW_E.1, NRW_E.1, NRW_C.2, NRW_D.1). Nevertheless, 
they would not refuse a request of the embassy to conduct parallel hearings: ‘If the 
embassy asks for such an investigation, we would not say ‘we do not do it’. That is 
not an option’ (NRW_C.2). Not to cooperate with the diplomatic missions: ‘would 
mean we are not a public office that fulfils its public duties’ (NRW_C.2). Therefore, ‘we 
normally try to find a consensus with the embassy because they take the final 
decisions’ (NRW_F.2). Thus, in line with Cyrus and Vogel (2003) who investigated 
German officials responsible for working permits, the caseworkers interviewed for 
this study had a legalistic and professional attitude. They closely cooperate with the 
diplomatic missions, even when they do not consider procedures as necessary. 
Respondents even explained how they provide the sponsor with documents that 
facilitate access to the diplomatic missions when they personally do not consider the 
documents formally relevant for the visa procedure (NRW_H.1).
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However, within formal cooperation, respondents still try to convince the diplomatic 
missions in cases of tensions. For example, they explained that: ‘Sometimes we just 
know people here better and we tell them (the diplomatic missions) that the doubts 
they have are not grounded in anything serious’ (NRW_D.1). When convincing fails, 
some respondents take an active stance by making explicit that they do not support 
the evaluations of the diplomatic missions.
  I always remember this one case where we had a citizen from country x who 
was much younger than his wife. Based on the pure facts that case could 
have been a candidate for a fake marriage (…) We really investigated 
carefully with all relevant actors and got additional information on the 
situation. (…) In that case, it was horrible to deal with the German embassy. 
They took apart our argument and questioned our competence. In that case, 
we had to react in a very impolite way and emphasised the fact that we took 
our decisions and that we stick to it. (NRW_ A.1)
Thus, local officials do not always passively support the diplomatic missions, and 
sometimes mediation fails to bring about agreements between the institutions. 
Similarly, several respondents argued that they use the exceptions for visa 
requirements established through national and EU case law more actively than the 
embassies. For example, the CJEU has argued that the German language 
requirements are not in line with the standstill clause of the Turkey Association 
Agreement, arguing that migration offices need to conduct individual assessments to 
determine if the language condition needs to be fulfilled (see Dörrenbächer, 2017a). 
When the embassies do not agree with more liberal interpretations and still deny the 
visa due to the language condition, some local caseworkers leave it again to national 
courts to evaluate which administrative level applied the European or national case 
law correctly (NRW_F.1). However, this approach implies that applicants challenge 
the visa decisions.
 Beyond such formal strategies to deal with differences in opinion, at least one 
respondent also explained how she uses informal practices to resolve the tension 
between the institutions. The respondent’s example concerned extended family 
reunification which is, as discussed above,  only possible under extraordinary 
hardship and leaves implementers some discretion (NRW_E.1, NRW_B.1, NRW_ B.2). 
The caseworker explained:
  I recently had the case of a grandmother who lived on a mountain somewhere 
in country x without heating. She had to go to a doctor regularly, and it was 
apparently very exhausting for her to go back and forth each time with a 
donkey. The thing was that the embassy did not see any special hardship. 
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They just said that everyone in country x lives under such circumstances.  
We here had the opinion that the special hardship existed. The whole family 
was here, and we considered it as too harsh. However, the embassy still 
rejected the visa. What we did then was that we asked the family to sign a 
formal obligation (Verpflichtungserklärung) to invite the grandmother to the 
wedding of one of her grandchildren. Once the grandmother was here, we 
managed to give her from here the residence permit. So, there are sometimes 
ways to circumvent the embassy decisions. The problem is, the embassies 
sometimes are very restrictive, and sometimes they already suspect that we 
try to circumvent their visa procedure. In such cases, they sometimes do not 
even agree to a visiting visa. (NRW_ J.2)
This case shows in a particular illustrative way the competition between the two 
institutions. In extreme cases of disagreement, some local caseworkers cope with 
the institutional particularities creatively. In this way, local caseworkers lock themselves 
out of the decisions of the diplomatic missions. However, as the respondent indicated, 
such active circumvention is also risky as it may lead to a breach of trust between the 
institutions. 
6.  Conclusion
This study has investigated inter-institutional cooperation in the German family visa 
procedure. The procedure constitutes a case of inter-institutional cooperation with 
asymmetric powers of diplomatic missions abroad and the Ausländerbehörden and 
varying levels of local proximity to service recipients between the administrative 
levels. The diplomatic missions are the formal decision makers, but they need the 
agreement of the Ausländerbehörden. This asymmetric power entails that the 
embassy can overrule a positive recommendation of the Ausländerbehörden with 
rejections. The chapter has investigated what motivates local caseworkers when 
cooperating with the diplomatic missions and how they cope with the inter-institutional 
tensions that emerge out of the division of competences.
 Blame avoidance and street-level studies provide well-established theoretical 
expectations on the mechanisms that drive the individual in public office. However, 
they often only implicitly (Weaver, 1986; Moynihan, 2012) include institutional context 
in their analyses (Hupe and Buffat, 2014; Hinterleitner and Sager, 2015). The main 
contribution of this study is that it has combined the two kinds of literature by 
incorporating institutional factors, such as the accountability structure and local 
contact into mechanisms of blame and normative considerations. 
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In line with theories of blame avoidance, the chapter established the expectation 
that the asymmetric power encourages instrumental motivations of avoiding blame. 
In turn, this triggers an appreciation of the subordinate role of the local level. However, 
drawing on the street-level bureaucracy literature with its more explicit attention to 
normative motivations, local experience, empathy and multiple accountabilities were 
expected to trigger inter-institutional tension. 
 The interviews with respondents of several foreign registration offices of the 
Bundesland of North Rhine-Westphalia has shown how the domestic multilevel 
administrative procedure matters for street-level implementation of migration law. 
First, the asymmetric power relations strengthen the desire of the respondents to 
avoid responsibility for uncomfortable decisions. In line with Hood’s (2011) blame 
framework, in combination with a strong bureaucratic ethos, this leads respondents 
to stick mostly close to their formal competences (see also Cyrus and Vogel, 2003). 
 However, sometimes the local position of the Ausländerbehörden triggers inter- 
institutional conflicts with the diplomatic missions. Tension emerges especially when 
the local caseworkers adopt more liberal approaches than the diplomatic missions 
do. Contrary to Hood’s (2011) blame framework, and more in line with Lipsky’s (1980) 
street-level bureaucrats, some respondents took active stances against the diplomatic 
missions. In extreme cases, implementers even took the risk of bypassing the visa 
procedure. While such strategies rarely become public and thus, have low chances 
to attract public blame, they are risky in damaging the trust between the institutions. 
 Moving beyond the specific case of the German family reunification procedure, 
the analysis uncovered mechanisms that may apply to multilevel implementation 
arrangements more broadly. The inclusion of the local level adds an extra control 
level as well as new legal uncertainties and unclear responsibilities. Furthermore, the 
local administrations provide migrants and their family members with a direct contact 
point that may encounter client demands with more empathy and local expertise than 
bureaucracies that operate at a distance (Ellermann, 2005; Schmidtke and Zaslove, 
2013). However, direct contact can also raise prejudice, making policy implementation 
contingent on individual sympathies. In the German context, local caseworkers might 
have perceived restrictive local approaches as less tension-loaded because in such 
cases the diplomatic missions have little choice but to deny the visa. 
 To further explore to what extent the local level enhances liberal approaches 
towards migration and how the inter-institutional cooperation works in practice, 
follow-up research should investigate how the diplomatic missions abroad perceive 
their role. Such research is necessary because diplomatic missions are the main 
contact point for applicants abroad. However, since the diplomatic missions often 
rely on their diplomatic status, they tend to be reluctant in offering insights into their 
working practices. These characteristics make it very complicated to gain research 
access. Outside of the German context, some scholars (Satzewich, 2013; Infantino, 
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2016) have been able to gain a glimpse into the practices of visa offices abroad. 
These positive cases of access give hope that future research will be able to 
complement this study by adding to this local perspective the experiences of inter- 
institutional cooperation from the point of view of the German diplomatic missions. 
 Finally, considering that family reunification law is one of the most harmonised 
areas of EU migration law, this study has shown that decisions at the aggregated 
governmental level of the member states are only one aspect of a harmonised 
migration policy. While legal transposition lays the foundation for the implementation 
of EU law, multilevel challenges can emerge within member states. In other words, 
variation and complication in the EU implementation process may derive out of 
complex national administrative arrangements. Consequently, studies need to go 
beyond the transposition of EU migration laws and start paying more attention to the 
national administrative structures in which EU laws are applied on the ground. Only in 
this way, we can evaluate if the European regulatory framework is capable of 
harmonising practices and which implications it has for individual migrants and their 
families.
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screen-level migration bureaucracies: 
Tracing institutional mechanisms 
behind prosocial motivation16 
16 This chapter is currently under review.
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Abstract
Across Europe, legal standards increasingly converge, but national bureaucratic 
contexts remain diverse. This diversity has possible implications for bureaucratic 
motivations and service delivery. By applying relational job design theory, this study 
traces bottom-up how different levels of client contact affect frontline job motivations. 
Empirically the study compares job motivations among Dutch and German 
caseworkers in the field of migration. Caseworkers in both countries operate in a 
Europeanised legal context, but the national bureaucratic contexts differ in client 
contact. By relying on in-depth interviews, this chapter indicates that across the two 
systems, migration caseworkers have pronounced prosocial job motivations and 
motivations that concern personal wellbeing. Disentangling the institutional 
mechanisms behind normative prosocial motivations shows that client contact 
enhances the perception that the job is meaningful for clients. A lack of client contact 
promotes perceptions of societal meaningfulness. These nuances in prosocial 
motivation may have implications for bureaucratic behaviour and the level of Europe-
anisation achieved at the frontline.
Keywords: street-level bureaucracy, screen-level bureaucracy, public service 
motivation, job motivation, relational job design
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1.  Introduction
In their daily casework, public service organisations across Europe increasingly 
apply Europeanised public policies that aim at harmonising public service delivery 
(Wockelberg, 2014; Dörrenbächer, 2017a17). However, Europeanisation is not the only 
shift that currently affects public offices. A second conversion is that many public 
service organisations are transforming from street-level bureaucracies (Lipsky, 1980), 
into so-called ‘screen-level bureaucracies’ (Bovens and Zouridis, 2002, p. 175). 
A defining characteristic of street-level bureaucracies is the personal contact between 
clients and public servants. By contrast, screen-level bureaucracies are characterised 
by a leading role of IT technologies during case assessment that makes face-to-face 
encounters between clients and bureaucrats superfluous (ibid 2002, p. 180)18. 
Research has shown that the reduced face-to-face contact influences clients’ 
perceptions of public services (West, 2004), enhances equal treatment of service 
recipients (Wenger and Wilkins, 2009), and limits frontline discretion (Buffat, 2015).
 However, it remains unclear how these transformations relate to an important 
aspect of public service delivery, namely frontline job motivations. Job motivations 
explain ‘how behavior gets started, is energised, is sustained, is directed, is stopped, 
and what kind of subjective reaction is present in the organism while all this is going 
on’ (quoted in Wright, 2001, p. 560). Thus, job motivations have direct implications for 
the harmonisation of bureaucratic behaviour and the type of personnel that is 
attracted to certain occupations. 
 In the public sector, job motivations have been studied most extensively in light 
of Perry and Wise’s (1990) conceptualisation of Public Service Motivation (PSM) (see 
Vandenabeele, 2007; Perry et al., 2010; Andersen and Kjeldsen, 2013). This literature 
holds that civil servants tend to be driven by a desire to provide meaningful services 
(Brewer et al., 2000; Tummers et al., 2012) that benefit service recipients and the 
wider public (Vandenabeele, 2007). The assumption is that civil servants’ prosocial 
motivation increases their prosocial behaviour and eventually makes public services 
effective and efficient (Perry and Wise, 1990).
 While research on frontline motivations and PSM has proliferated over the last 
decades (for reviews see Perry and Vandenabeele, 2015), most scholars used PSM 
as an independent variable (Vandenabeele, 2007; Bozeman and Su, 2015). The 
mechanisms that connect institutional bureaucratic context with individual motivation, 
have often remained implicit (but see Taylor, 2013). Consequently, the link between 
client contact as an important job characteristic and frontline job motivation remains 
understudied. 
17 This is chpater 6 of this dissertation.
18 In its extreme version Bovens and Zouridis speak of system level bureaucracies, in which frontline 
implementers are fully replaced by computer algorithms. 
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However, exploring this link is crucial in light of two strands of literature. First, regarding 
frontline implementation research (Lipsky, 1980; Tummers et al., 2015; Vink et al., 
2015), insights on how client contact affects job motivations contribute to explanations 
of service delivery. Second, in light of Europeanisation of public policies (Börzel and 
Risse, 2000) and national administrations (Knill, 2001), linking job motivations to 
bureaucratic context enhances our understanding of how national civil servants in 
dissimilar settings respond to same legal stimuli. 
 The few studies that have so far touched upon the link between client contact 
and job motivations came to conflicting conclusions, leaving the underlying 
mechanisms puzzling. For example, Lipsky (1980) in his classical study on street- 
level bureaucrats, portrayed civil servant as driven by instrumental motivations 
aimed at reducing workload and routinising client encounters. As a result, officials’ 
interactions with clients are assumed to be tension-ridden and constitute a barrier 
to meaningful public service delivery. By contrast, Maynard-Moody and Musheno 
(2012) have theorised that normative considerations drive frontline implementers 
and that it is precisely the face-to-face contact that turns public employees into 
so-called client-agents who make public policies work. Similarly, Grant and 
colleagues (Grant, 2007, 2008; Grant and Parker, 2009) have argued that client 
contact increases the desire to make a prosocial difference. However, Taylor (2013) 
found no significant connection between civil servants’ client interaction and their 
prosocial motivations. 
 These ambiguous findings on the link between client contact and prosocial 
motivation may relate to the fact that except Grant’s (2008) quasi-experimental study, 
studies have not compared public servants with similar tasks and varying levels of 
client contact. Second, as Taylor (2013) acknowledges, these studies have not taken 
into account the qualitative experience of client interaction (but see Maynard-Moody 
and Musheno, 2012). Third, studies either implicitly touched upon prosocial 
motivations (Lipsky, 1980; Tummers and Rocco, 2015), or they relied on predefined 
and aggregated measures of motivations (Grant, 2008; Taylor, 2013). Thus, it remains 
unclear if the most important job motivations are captured and which nuances exist 
across institutional contexts. 
 To tackle these aspects, the aim of this study is twofold. First, the study provides 
a bottom-up inventory of job motivations in street-level and screen-level public 
service organisations that perform comparable tasks. Second, building on Grant’s 
(2007, 2008) relational job design theory, the study qualitatively traces the institutional 
mechanisms behind prosocial job motivations. 
 The study relies on in-depth interviews with German and Dutch frontline 
implementers in the highly topical field of migration law. The German and Dutch 
caseworkers perform the same tasks of deciding on family migration visas and 
residence permits in a Europeanised legal context. However, German caseworkers 
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are street-level implementers with much client contact, and Dutch caseworkers 
operate in a document-based system with little client contact. 
 Migration caseworkers are confronted with laws and policies aimed at protecting 
social welfare, but also with personal tragedies of individual migrants (Jordan et al., 
2003a).  More so than in other policy areas, migrant clients and the wider public are 
two distinct groups. That provides favourable conditions to nuance prosocial job 
motivations beyond the existing aggregated measures. Moreover, the qualitative 
approach responds to Wright and Grant’s (2010) call to invest in comparative and 
qualitative studies on PSM that can trace the link between individual motivations and 
institutional context. 
 The main finding of this study is that the connection between client contact and 
job motivations is not as straight-forward as theorised previously. First, prosocial 
motivations are not the only job motivation driving street-level and screen-level 
bureaucrats. Motivations that concern personal wellbeing, such as instrumental 
motivations play a role as well. Second, while the relational job design framework 
highlights important institutional mechanisms of normative prosocial motivations, 
this study finds that it is problematic to treat prosocial motivations as a one-dimen-
sional orientation. Instead, there are important prosocial nuances which suggest that 
implementers in dissimilar bureaucratic contexts approach the same legal stimuli, 
such as EU laws, in different ways.
2.   Applying relational job design theory to the street- 
and screen-level context
In order to trace the link between bureaucratic context and job motivation, Grant 
(2007) relies on relational job design theory. The theory constitutes a suitable point of 
departure for comparing job motivations of frontline bureaucrats because it provides 
a stepwise mechanism that incorporates the role of client contact as an important 
aspect of bureaucratic context. Grant (2007) takes the relational architecture of jobs 
as a starting point to trace job motivations. 
 The relational architecture refers to ‘the structural properties of work that shape 
employees’ opportunities to connect and interact with other people’ (ibid 2007, p. 
396). The framework focuses on the interactions between service providers and the 
beneficiaries of the work, such as clients. The relational job architecture has two 
components: job impact on beneficiaries and contact with recipients. 
 First, job impact on beneficiaries relates to the objective degree to which a job 
provides opportunities for employees to affect the lives of others. Second, contact 
with beneficiaries refers to the frequency, duration, proximity, depth, and breadth of 
interaction between service provider and beneficiaries (ibid 2007, p. 398). The 
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relational job design framework holds that in combination with job importance, 
contact enhances the perceived impact of the job on beneficiaries. 
 Perceived impact captures ‘a state of subjective meaning, a way of experiencing 
one’s work as significant and purposeful’ (ibid 2007, p. 399). Contact allows the 
beneficiaries of the service to send verbal and nonverbal cues on the impact of the 
work (Grant, 2008). These signals provide direct feedback to civil servants and 
increase their perceived impact. For example, civil servants may experience the 
emotions of their clients in reaction to their service delivery which provides an 
important cue for perceived impact. General motivational theories have proposed 
similar mechanisms. For example, self-determination theory holds that feedback is 
an important mechanism of enhancing the meaningfulness of a job among employees 
(Ryan and Deci, 2000). 
 Next, Grant (2007) argues that contact enhances the affective commitment to 
beneficiaries. Affective commitment refers to the emotional concern and dedication 
to those who are affected by ones work (ibid 2007, p. 401). More specifically: ‘when 
employees have contact with the beneficiaries of their work, their experiences 
become emotionally charged; they are more affectively engaged in their work as a 
result of first-hand exposure to their actions affecting living, breathing human beings’ 
(ibid 2007, p. 398). In other words, close contact with real people strengthens empathy 
and the desire to help (Brehm and Gates, 1997; Winter and May, 2001; May, 2005b) 
leading to a general affective commitment to the job (Morgeson and Humphrey, 
2006). 
 However, the link between contact and affective commitment is moderated by 
social information about beneficiaries. Positive social information refers to personal 
interactions that encourage trust and cooperation between clients and civil servants, 
such as nice and friendly encounters (see also Lipsky, 1980; Taylor, 2013, p. 913). 
By contrast, negative social information refers to the perception that clients are impolite, 
undeserving (Altreiter and Leibetseder, 2015) or even aggressive (Tummers et al., 
2015, p. 1111). While positive social information strengthens the link between contact 
and affective commitment, negative social information diminishes the link (Grant, 2007).
 Finally, connecting the relational architecture to prosocial motivations, Grant 
(2007) argues that the perception of impact is a necessary condition for prosocial 
motivations. Similarly, theories on policy alienation have shown that when civil 
servants regard their tasks as meaningful for their clients and society, they are willing 
to put efforts in implementing their duties (Tummers et al., 2009, 2012). However, the 
awareness that behaviour affects outcomes is not a sufficient condition for prosocial 
motivation (Grant, 2007, p. 403). Instead, civil servants also have to care emotionally 
about their prosocial impact. Thus, affective commitment further enhances the effect 
of perceived impact on prosocial motivation. Figure 3-1 summarises the stepwise 
model developed by Grant (2007).
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It is relevant to note that job impact remains constant when implementers share the 
same decision-making tasks. For example, in the field of migration, caseworkers 
decide on the residence status and the provisions of visas which has a considerable 
impact on the course of the life of individual migrants. Thus, regardless if they meet 
their clients, job impact is high. Consequently, street-level and screen-level bureaucrats 
with the same tasks differ in their relational job design mainly regarding contact. 
 Concerning contact, the limited face-to-face interaction at the screen-level offers 
fewer possibilities to develop empathy and affective commitment (Wenger and 
Wilkins, 2009) and perceived impact may be lower. Therefore, following the relational 
job design framework, screen-level bureaucrats can be expected to develop less 
prosocial job motivations compared to street-level bureaucrats.
 Notably, the PSM literature has identified different prosocial motivational 
dimensions, such as civic duty, compassion, attraction to policymaking, or 
self-sacrifice (Perry and Wise, 1990; Coursey and Pandey, 2007). Others have 
distinguished between an individualistic prosocial motivation of doing good to 
service users, and a collectivist dimension of contributing to society as a whole 
(Andersen and Kjeldsen, 2013). However, the relational job design model by Grant 
(2007, 2008) does not make a distinction between different prosocial dimensions. 
Instead, the model seems to imply that client contact enhances all dimensions of 
prosocial motivation.
 Furthermore, it needs to be highlighted that prosocial motivations may not be the 
only motivation of civil servants. For example, Tummers et al. (2012) have highlighted 
that frontline implementers do not only care about the meaning of their work for others 
but also about the meaning of their task for themselves. Such instrumental motivations 
include, for example, the motivation of receiving a high salary or of performing an 
interesting and challenging task. The relational job design framework provides no 
Figure 3-1  Job impact framework adopted from Grant (2007, p. 396)
Prosocial motivation  
Social information
Job impact
Contact 
Perceived impact
Affective commitment
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expectations as to if and how motivations of personal meaningfulness are affected by 
client contact. Consequently, this chapter adopts an explorative approach to account 
for such alternative motivations and nuances in prosocial motivations.
3.  Method and data
This study investigates job motivations in the highly topical policy field of migration. 
The field provides ideal conditions to disentangle and detail job motivations because 
the interests of the public often do not coincide with the interests of individual migrants 
(Düvell and Jordan, 2003; Ellermann, 2006). That allows us to go beyond aggregate 
conceptualisations of prosocial motivations and to trace which prosocial motivation 
guide caseworkers. The study focuses on caseworkers in the field of family migration. 
This field requires considerable frontline decision-making and provides favourable 
conditions for affective commitment. Even employees without a migration background 
can relate to the difficulty of being separated from one’s family and partner. Moreover, 
actual task impact is relatively high because the decisions of frontline migration 
caseworkers have considerable effects on the path of life of applicants for family 
reunification visas, because frontline decision-making determines if family members 
can eventually reunite or not (Eggebø, 2012; Strik et al., 2012). These conditions make 
the field of family migration as most likely case (Eckstein, 1975) for affective commitment 
and thus, prosocial motivations.
 In order to compare job motivations in a street-level versus a screen-level 
bureaucracy, caseworkers in the German Bundesland of North Rhine-Westphalia 
(NRW) and their Dutch counterparts are investigated19. The choice of these 
implementation contexts was based on the fact that NRW has a comparable size as 
the Netherlands. Second, family migration is among the most dominant sources of 
migration in Germany and the Netherlands (EMN European Migration Network, 
2017). Third, due to EU integration, family migration laws in both countries are 
comparable (Dörrenbächer, 2017b20), which makes the tasks of civil servants 
relatively similar. Additionally, both countries are typical migration countries (Strik, 
2011), and administrative decision-making is embedded in a culture of the rule of law 
(Painter and Peters, 2010). As will be discussed in more detail below, the two countries 
differ regarding the bureaucratic context in light of their different levels of client 
contact. Thus, following the theoretical model, frontline implementers across the two 
systems are likely to differ in their prosocial motivations.
19 Cross-country comparison has the disadvantage that one cannot control for all unknown country 
specific factors but even a within-country analysis across sectors or across time would constitute 
similar challenges. Thus, a fully controlled (natural) experiment is absent.
20 This is chapter 5 of this dissertation.
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For measuring prosocial motivations, PSM studies have relied on impressive survey 
research (Coursey and Pandey, 2007; Vandenabeele and van de Walle, 2007). The 
advantage of such large-n studies is that they provide generalisable and quantifiable 
scores on specific motivational items. However, the disadvantage is that these 
studies rely on predefined sources of job motivations. Thus, as acknowledged by 
many PSM scholars (Perry et al., 2010, p. 688; Perry and Vandenabeele, 2015, 
p. 696), the focus on survey items leaves it unclear if predefined scales capture the 
primary motivations and nuances. Additionally, pre-defined motivational categories 
can prime respondents towards certain motives. Consequently, Wright and Grant 
(2010) encourage students of bureaucratic motivation to invest more in qualitative 
methods and grounded approaches to enhance theory building. Following a 
qualitative approach, Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003, 2012) have shown the 
importance of narratives of street-level implementers to trace the mechanism behind 
frontline motivations and behaviour. They revealed that qualitative methods can trace 
the psychological and behavioural processes associated with bureaucratic 
motivations beyond cross-sectional correlational designs. 
 The qualitative approach adopted in this study relies on open-ended interviews 
that trace the mechanisms of the relational job design framework as depicted in 
Figure 3-1. While it needs to be highlighted that qualitative designs cannot provide 
quantifiable motivational scores and the generalisability of the results is limited, the 
design is useful for tracing the link between different steps in the relational job design 
framework.
 In both countries, the first step was to conduct explorative interviews with six 
higher administrative employees to gain an overview of the institutional implementation 
settings and the relational job design. Next, interviews with 35 German (NRW) and 
Dutch migration caseworkers were conducted to collect data on job motivations and 
the underlying mechanisms. The strategy was to carry out interviews until the 
respondents mentioned no new job motivations. The interviews lasted between 
40-160 minutes. All interviews were recorded and transcribed into English. Table 3.1 
provides background information for the respondents. 
 The Dutch sample includes respondents from all three departments of the central 
Dutch migration agency involved in family migration. In the German context, where 
responsibility for implementation is distributed at the local level, respondents of ten 
counties and municipalities in NRW were interviewed. As shown in Table 3.1., the 
number of German respondents was slightly higher, to ensure that local specifics did 
not determine the results. 
 The interview guide (provided in the Appendix) included questions on decision- 
making practices and administrative procedures (Dörrenbächer, 2017a, 2017b). 
For tracking job motivations, the interviews asked respondents why they chose for 
employment in the migration administration, and what they like/enjoy most about 
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their job. In-depth interviewing and probing allowed to trace the role of client contact 
for the underlying mechanisms behind the motivations 
 For coding the motivations, the study relies on computer­assisted qualitative data 
analysis software using Atlas.ti. The following steps were taken:
1. Each respondent was assigned a code of either Dutch or German to classify 
quotes along the bureaucratic context.
2. Next, for each interview transcript, text passages were coded as ‘job motivation’ 
when referring to aspects which respondents enjoy and appreciate in their work. 
3. In the next step, the ‘job motivations’ were coded as prosocial if they focused on 
doing good to others.  Alternatively, when motivations focused on the wellbeing 
of the respondents, quotes were coded as instrumental for personal meaning. 
Several motivations could drive each respondent. Sometimes a single quote 
captured several motivations and was assigned two (or more) codes.
4. After classifying the motivations, the role of client contact in the development of 
prosocial motivations was traced. This was done by investigating how respondents 
perceive the role of client contact or its absence for their provision of public 
service. In doing so, the conceptualisations of the relational job design framework 
were used to trace within the quotes how respondents connect the presence or 
absence of client contact to their perceptions of impact, affective commitment, 
and social information of clients.
Table 3.1   Overview over respondents
Germany/NRW Netherlands Total
Locations 10 3 13
Caseworkers 21 14 35
Gender 12 male
 9 female
 7 male
 7 female
19 male
16 female
Experience 16 more than 5 years
 5 less than 5 years
12 more than 5 years
 2 less than 5 years
28 more than 5 years
 7 less than 5 years
Position 10  with supervisory 
tasks
11 regular
 8  with supervisory 
functions (6 seniors 
2 managers)
 6 regular
18  with supervisory 
functions
17 regular
Background 
talks
 3  respondents from 
district government
 3  respondents 
from IND policy 
department
 6  higher 
administrators
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4.  Analysis 
The analysis proceeds in the following way: The first part discusses the differences 
in contact between the German street-level and the Dutch screen-level context. 
The second part presents an inventory of job motivations in the two systems. 
The third part traces how client contact relates to prosocial motivations by discussing 
the perceptions of impact, affective commitment, and social information.
Contact to beneficiaries in the German and Dutch family migration 
procedures
Contact with recipients comprises according to the relational job design framework 
of the frequency, duration, proximity, depth and breadth of interaction (Grant, 2007) 
between the service provider and beneficiaries of family migration. When outlining 
the scope of contact, it is first of all important to note that Germany employs a 
decentralised system of implementation of family migration policies. Foreign registration 
offices (Ausländerbehörden) are the main frontline organisations that decide together 
with the diplomatic missions abroad on visas for family reunification (see chapter 2). 
They alone decide on residence permits for family reunification. The local registration 
offices divide migrants along last name letter or country of origin to specific case- 
workers. Individual caseworkers often handle the same families for years, starting 
with the family migration visa, the initial residence permits, different residence 
statuses, extensions, and permanent residency. Thus, in light of duration, caseworkers 
regularly meet individual clients over several years. Depth and breadth of the contact 
are relatively high particular if applicants have difficulties to meet the criteria for their 
desired residence status.
 Regarding the frequency of client contact, most caseworkers meet clients on a 
daily basis, and even caseworkers with managing tasks have frequent client contact. 
Due to the local proximity, client contact is close and personal. The respondents 
explained that even though the formal procedure does not always require personal 
appointments, clients often come to the office to clarify any remaining questions. 
While IT technology increasingly plays a role in keeping track of cases and sometimes 
in making appointments, it does not substantively support case assessment in the 
Ausländerbehörde, and computer systems are not harmonised across the local offices. 
 Regarding contact in the Dutch family migration procedure, it is relevant that a 
central implementation agency, namely the IND (Immigration and Naturalization 
Service) implements family migration law.  The organisation is responsible for all 
 migration-related decisions in the Netherlands. There are local IND counters across 
the country where migrants can ask for advice. Nevertheless, the actual decision- 
making on visas and residence permits happens typically without face-to-face client 
contact at three main decision-making locations. For family reunification, applicants 
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send their applications with all relevant documents to the IND. By availability and 
subject matter, cases are distributed along decision makers throughout three IND 
locations. As is typical for a screen-level bureaucracy, Dutch caseworkers have only 
limited discretion (for discussion on this link see Bovens and Zouridis, 2002). The 
IND’s computer system is highly professional, forcing implementers to document 
decision- making steps in fixed manuals. 
 Contrary to the offices in NRW, case assessment is organised on the decision-level 
and not on the client-level. That means that several decision makers may be 
responsible for a single migrant. Until a few years ago, IND decision makers were not 
allowed to call their clients to clarify issues by phone. Instead, all communication 
was formally and in writing. Increasingly, the IND softened this policy and encourages 
its caseworkers now to clarify questions on documents with clients via phone. 
The phone contact may be a step back from a purely screen-level bureaucracy 
towards more direct contact. Additionally, respondents highlighted, that marriage of 
convenience investigations or complicated matters in appeal sometimes require 
personal hearings. Nevertheless, the respondents indicated that face-to-face contacts 
remain limited to exceptional cases. Thus, client contact is relatively low in frequency, 
duration, proximity, depth and breadth21.
Inventory of job motivations in street-level and screen-level 
bureaucracies
Turning to the job motivations of decision makers in the two systems, the following 
establishes an inventory of job motivations found in the interviews (also see Table A.3. 
in the Appendix). The first aspect to note is that both Dutch and German case- 
workers were not only driven by prosocial motivations. Instead, several respondents 
highlighted motivations focused on the personal meaningfulness of their job. 
 Such motivations included the enjoyment of the task itself unrelated to its value 
for clients or society as a whole. Nine German and four Dutch respondents mentioned 
that they enjoy solving complex problems. For example, a German respondent 
explained: ‘I think it is human that it feels good to find solutions for complex questions’ 
(NRW_F.2). Similarly, the Dutch respondents highlighted: ‘To analytically solve a 
puzzle, that is what I like’ (IND_A.1), or: ‘I enjoy the part of finding solutions for 
dilemma’ (IND_A.6). Second, 12 German and eight Dutch respondents mentioned 
21 Beyond the working context, there are some differences between caseworkers regarding their 
educational backgrounds. German caseworkers are civil servants in the middle or upper middle civil 
service (mittlererer or gehobere Dienst) and they are appointed along demand to different departments 
within the local administration. The Dutch migration caseworkers have diverse educational background 
and apply actively for vacancies at the IND. In both systems, caseworkers explicitly decided for a job in 
the public sector and they have typically no explicit prior interest in the field of migration. In light of job 
motivation, the differences in education and appointment can be considered minor or entangled with 
the street-level screen-level divide.
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the variety of tasks as an important personal motivation for their job. For example, 
German respondents described: ‘What fascinates me most is that no day is like the 
other’ (NRW_B.1). Similarly, the Dutch colleagues enjoy that: ‘Every day is different’ 
(IND_C.3). 
 Additionally, three German and five Dutch respondents mentioned the positive 
office atmosphere as a motivational aspect. As one of the German respondent 
illustrated: ‘Important for me is that the atmosphere here in the office between the 
employees is really good’ (NRW_E.1). Also, several Dutch respondents mentioned 
this aspect by stressing: ‘I really like my colleagues. I always think I have a nice job 
and I come here every morning with much pleasure’ (IND_C.3). The respondent 
explained that she enjoys that the IND offers the possibility to work from at home, but 
she also needs the contact to her colleagues as a motivational aspect. That indicates 
that the motivational impact of relational job design goes beyond client contact. Also, 
the possibility to build relationships with colleagues can be motivating, even though 
it may not directly enhance prosocial motivations. 
 Other personal motivations were instrumental and referred to the salary (NRW_I.2; 
NRW_H.2.) and the possibility to be promoted. For example, respondents argued: 
‘I came to a point where further promotion was no longer an option at my old job, and 
I thought I still have a long time until retirement, so I better look for a job at the IND’ 
(IND_B.4). Likewise, respondents mentioned: ‘I changed to the IND because I earn 
more money in this job. I was at the beginning not interested in migration as such’ 
(IND_B.2).
 Despite the relevance of these motivations focused on personal wellbeing, a 
majority of respondents mentioned job motivations that connect to the prosocial 
aspects of their work. For example, respondents mentioned: ‘It is this interplay of 
having satisfied the demands of the law and to still help people with their demands 
what gives you a nice feeling’ (NRW_H.3). Alternatively, they emphasised: ‘What I like 
about my work is that it is socially relevant and it will become even more so in the 
future. It is a nice feeling to work on all these new challenges that arise’ (NRW_B.1). 
 Interestingly, the Dutch screen-level bureaucracy mentioned motivations 
grounded in PSM as often as the respondents in the German foreign registration. For 
example, the Dutch respondents explained: ‘You know, it is work that is about people. 
That just remains a fascinating subject’ (IND_B.1.), or ‘I enjoy that we deal here with 
issues that are of public relevance’ (IND_A.3). 
 The following section explores this unexpected finding in more depth, by tracing 
how client contact - or its absence - affects the mechanisms behind prosocial 
motivations. The next section investigates the steps of the relational job design 
framework separately for the German and Dutch implementers, to find out how they 
connected their client contact or absence of contact to 1) the perceived importance 
of their job, 2) affective commitment and 3) social information. 
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Prosocial motivations at the street-level: The German case
Starting with the perceived importance of the work, the German respondents 
indicated a high awareness of the impact of their decisions regarding residence 
permits or visa recommendations on the lives of the concerned migrants. For 
example, respondents highlighted: ‘Often you notice that their (clients’) live is revolving 
around this office, and they are very excited or nervous when they enter. So taking 
away the fear is a nice feeling’ (NRW_B.2). The quote shows that client contact has a 
major role in contributing to perceived impact on beneficiaries. Similarly, when 
investigating possible marriages of convenience, the respondents frequently 
mentioned that when in doubt they would rather agree to a visa or prolong residence 
permits to prevent the risk of destroying a family. To realise the impact and 
meaningfulness of their job, respondents also highlighted their personal contact with 
the recipients, as the following quote shows:
  They (a couple applying for family reunification that was suspected to be a 
case of marriages of convenience) came to the office one year later to renew 
their residence permit, and I saw them hand in hand coming to my office 
with a baby. They seemed so happy. That are the joyful moments at work, 
and I somehow had the feeling that I contributed at least a little bit to their 
happiness, or at least I made myself believe that. (NRW_G.2)
Moreover, in line with the relational job design framework (Grant, 2007), several 
German respondents highlighted how client contact contributed to their affective 
commitment, as this quote shows:
  What I really like about my work is when I can tell someone that all documents 
are there and the permit can be issued. In such cases, tears of happiness 
are sometimes running (…) So, the part of bringing over the positive news is 
very rewarding. Especially if you notice their happiness or all the stress that 
falls from these people. (NRW_B.2)
Thus, the client contact provides the German respondent with important cues about 
the impact of their work through direct positive feedback from clients which further 
enhanced affective commitment. For example, respondents exemplified: ‘I really 
enjoy the great thankfulness of people. So, if you walk the halls and people just come 
to you to tell you that their family is here and that they are so happy’ (NRW_G.3). 
In line with relational job design theory, positive feedback enhances the perceived 
impact and affective commitment: 
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  Yesterday, I talked with some Turkish clients, and they said that we are one 
of the friendliest foreign registration offices and that made me glad to hear. 
So this motivates me and gives me the feeling that what I do here is not the 
worst thing I could do. (NRW_I.1)
Eventually, positive feedback as a driver of affective commitment and perceived 
impact increases the prosocial motivations of caseworkers as expected by the 
relational job design framework. Respondents mentioned here especially how the 
feedback strengthens their desire to help individual clients: ‘I like to be of help to 
people. To take away their fear of a public office’ (NRW_A.2), or: ‘The best thing is if 
you can really help families’ (NRW_J.2).  Moreover, positive feedback increased 
general job motivation among employees:
  People also appreciate (our work) and sometimes give us the feedback that 
they felt well advised in our office. If that became more, that would be 
something, which would really motivate employees. So, if we get such 
positive feedback, I always notice how important that is for the employees. 
(NRW_E.1) 
Moreover, positive feedback does not only enhance prosocial motivations, but it also 
has implications for behaviour, and the effort respondents put into a case, as this 
quote shows:
  It really motivates me if these people show me directly how thankful they are 
if we try to help them and if we do something extra to make it work. That is in 
a way a cycle, the more positive feedback I get, the more I am motivated to 
search for positive outcomes and the more positive feedback you get again. 
(NRW_A.1) 
In line with relational job design theory, client contact also derives social information 
about clients that goes beyond case assessment. For example, respondents explain 
‘It is nice if you get to talk to these people also personally and you really get insights 
into their home country and life’ (NRW_A.2). Similarly, a German respondent 
explained: ‘I like the stories people tell me about their country of origin. How things 
work there, just to broaden my own view’ (NRW_D.1.).
 For many German respondent client contacts ‘was the attraction for the job’ 
(NRW_J.1). However, client contact was not only perceived as a source of meaning, 
motivation and prosocial behaviour. Instead, many German respondents also pointed 
to the negative social information that they derive about their clients due to the direct 
and often emotional encounters. For example, several German respondents admitted 
517635-L-bw-Dorrenbacher
Processed on: 20-2-2018 PDF page: 80
80
CHAPTER 3
that a job in the foreign registration office is an unpopular position within the local civil 
service (e.g. NRW_I.1, NRW_D.1). This finding is in line with Eule’s (2014) observations 
in German migration registration offices. The reason for the unpopularity mentioned 
by the respondents was emotional stress. Some respondents explained that they 
used to be afraid of the direct client contact (NRW_J.2). Moreover, in their regular 
working day aggressive or angry clients regularly confront them (NRW_E.1, NRW_G.1, 
NRW_G.2, NRW_G.3, NRW_A.1, NRW_A.3, NRW_F.1, NRW_J.1, NRW_J.2, NRW_D.1, 
NRW_I.1, NRW_I.2, NRW_H.2). A typical quote was:
  What is not so nice is that you do not only deal with friendly people. Often 
you have to deal with unfriendly personal accusations. (…) We also have a 
bit the problem with Salafist movements, and if you sit in front of someone 
like this, you do not feel comfortable. Also as a woman, this is not always a 
good feeling. (NRW_J.2)
Some respondents openly admitted that unfriendly or aggressive encounters limit their 
effort they put into a case (NRW_A.1). Moreover, several German respondents articulated 
frustration because they often encounter personal tragedies without being able to help 
(e.g. NRW_F.2, NRW_B.1, NRW_B.2, NRW_A.3, NRW_C.2). Such negative encounters 
decrease the perceived impact of the job. As a result, several respondents mentioned 
that they try to distance themselves from these emotional cases to prevent burnout.
 Despite these negative encounters, the client contact constituted for most 
German respondents an important part of their identity as a public servant: ‘I deal 
with people. I am not one of these administrators who sits alone in an office between 
files, tables, and my computer’ (NRW_G.1). Moreover, several respondents perceived 
client contact and affective commitment as an integral part of providing good public 
service, as this quote shows: 
  For me, the personal contact with people is highly important because you 
often cannot solve issues just based on documents. Often you need to 
discuss with the client what possible solutions there are, and you need to 
find solutions together. The advisory part is important for me and advice 
only works in a dialogue and by communicating with people. (NRW_A.1)
Overall, in line with the relational job design framework, the German street-level 
caseworkers highlighted that despite some trouble during personal encounters, 
a lack of personal interaction might increase misunderstandings between them and 
their clients and poses the danger that they fail to do justice to individual cases. 
Moreover, a lack of contact would rob them of the positive feedback which was a 
relevant driver for prosocial job motivations in the German context. 
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Prosocial motivations at the screen-level: The Dutch case
Following the centrality of client contact for the prosocial motivation of the German 
street-level implementers, the question arises how the Dutch screen-level implements 
develop prosocial motivations. Starting with perceived impact of the job, the first 
aspect to note is that the Dutch caseworkers also mentioned frequently that they 
consider their job meaningful. For example, they argued: ‘I like the fact that I deal with 
people from different cultures. That gives me the feeling that my work is useful’ 
(IND_A.2). However, compared to the German respondents, the Dutch respondents 
stressed less the meaningfulness of their work for clients but the meaning of their job 
for society. More precisely, the Dutch respondents highlighted that they consider their 
work relevant to the general public interest and that migration policies are a particularly 
socially relevant issue that is worthwhile to work on (IND_A.6; IND_C.1; IND_A.2). For 
example, a respondent argued: 
  Everyone knows that we are under direct scrutiny, everyone has an opinion 
on migration, but it makes employees also very motivated to do their best.  
I enjoy that we deal here with issues, which are of public relevance. (IND_A.3)
Moreover, the respondents perceived the processing of cases as a chance to gain 
specific expertise about different cultures (IND_B.3). Among the managing staff, the 
option to have an impact on the organisation’s rules also provided meaning as 
highlighted by this respondent:
  Sometimes, I am proud when I see a tiny issue in the rules, which became 
actual practice, and I know that I developed them, or it was my idea. So this 
is what I find funny, and it gives me the feeling that I do something, which is 
not irrelevant. (IND_A.3)
Regarding client contact, some Dutch respondents mentioned that they would prefer 
to have more client interactions. As they argued, direct contact would increase 
their perception of impact. For example, this respondent explained: ‘More generally, 
it (client contact) gives you an impression of the kind of application you are busy with, 
and it helps to realise that if we say “no” to an application that it affects a person’s life’ 
(IND_C.3).
 Connected to this, another respondent highlighted that she would appreciate it if 
clients were more aware of the fact that public servants are ordinary people who do 
their best in taking each case seriously:
  Often you notice that people have this image of The IND. When you call 
them, they are surprised that there are real people who deal with their cases. 
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Sometimes, I have the feeling that they think we are all robots. So, it is also 
our task to show that we are real people. (IND_C.1)
In light of affective commitment, the lack of client contact did not generally diminish 
feelings of empathy or pity with clients. Several Dutch respondents highlighted their 
emotional struggles when they consider it personally unfair that the law requires them 
to deny visas or to withdraw residence permits (IND_A.2, IND_A.4, IND_A.6, IND_B.3, 
IND_B.4, IND_C.2). Several respondents explained that, mentally, they take difficult 
cases home, even if they do not meet clients personally. Nevertheless, respondents 
also stated that: ‘The cases, which you do not see, you forget also fast’ (IND_C.1). 
 Overall, the Dutch respondents collected less emotional cues from their clients 
than the German caseworkers. Particularly, positive feedback constitutes a less 
prominent motivational driver. Only one Dutch respondent had ever experienced 
positive feedback from clients. However, this left such a positive emotional impression 
that she still derived motivation from this personal encounter: 
  A while ago, I had a complicated case. It concerned a complex situation 
regarding the income condition and certain social payments. I discussed 
the situation a lot with another supervisor. It took us several weeks to decide 
on the case. (…) Eventually, we could agree. A few months later, the whole 
family was standing downstairs to say: “thank you”. Those are the moments 
when you have a “wow” feeling. That really stays in your head. (IND_C.1)
While the potential for positive feedback was limited, negative social information was 
also less prominent. At the same time, some Dutch respondents emphasised that the 
introduction of telephone contact with clients leads to new emotional experiences. 
Especially the older employees are not used to direct interactions: ‘I experienced 
once that one of the very experienced employees started crying on the phone, just 
because a client got angry’ (IND_B.4). Thus, some respondents are confronted now 
with negative social information about their clients (IND_C.2), although the scope of 
this negative information was much lower than among the German caseworkers. 
Instead, the Dutch caseworkers struggled rather with the complexity of the computer 
system (IND_B.2). 
 Contrary to the German respondents, the Dutch caseworkers do not consider 
client contact necessary for actual case assessments and for performing their public 
duty. In their view, client contact is not useful for ‘the technical judicial aspects’ 
(IND_C.3), and in regular cases, there would be nothing they would have to ask 
clients that they could not derive from documents (IND_A.1). Instead, many Dutch 
respondents had internalised organisational values of handling cases impartially 
without the interference of personal emotions (e.g. IND_C.1, IND_B.1, IND_A.1). As a 
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consequence, several Dutch respondents feared that more client contact could 
endanger the provision of good public service, as emotional reactions to client 
contact could jeopardise their impartiality. Thus, contrary to the German setting, 
prosocial motivation was less emotionally charged and more focused on doing good 
to society as a whole, instead of individual clients. 
 In sum, the Dutch screen-level context indicates that even in a screen-level 
context where client contact is limited and affective commitment is less prominent, 
prosocial motivations drive civil servants. While this finding challenges the relational 
job design framework, the analysis indicates inductively that the mechanisms and 
characteristics of prosocial motivations were slightly different between the two 
contexts. More specifically, the Dutch case shows that contrary to the treatment of the 
relational job design framework, prosocial motivation is not a one-dimensional 
concept (Grant, 2007, 2008).
 Instead, the present analysis suggests that client contact affects mainly the PSM 
dimension of compassion. Similarly, the analysis supports the claim by Andersen 
and Kjeldsen (2013) that prosocial motivations have an individualist and a collectivist 
dimension. The individualistic dimension of helping individual clients seems to be 
indeed enhanced by client contact. However, in the screen-level context, the collectivist 
dimension of being of use to society as a whole is more pronounced. 
 Inductively, one can explain the prominence of societal meaningfulness in the screen- 
level context by the fact that ICT tools make implementation a ‘tool of the professional’ 
(Taylor and Kelly, 2006, p. 335). Automatised procedures increasingly handle straight-
forward cases (Buffat, 2015). Compassion and attention to individual cases would 
challenge the automated processes. Instead, the screen-level promotes the idea that 
public decisions shall be efficient, impartial and standardised (Wenger and Wilkins, 2009). 
These values connect to a bureaucratic ethos of serving the general public interest.
5.  Conclusion
This study has investigated how client contact effects motivation in public services 
that apply in their daily work similar Europeanised migration laws. Building on Bovens 
and Zouridis’ (2002) conceptualisation of screen-level bureaucrats and the relational 
job design literature (Grant, 2007, 2008), the study established the expectation 
that client contact enhances prosocial motivations. The study investigated the 
expectations in the context of migration law implementation, by comparing German 
and Dutch migration caseworkers. The German Ausländerbehörden constitute 
typical examples of street-level bureaucracies with regular client contact and little 
computer-assisted case assessment. The Dutch migration agency is a case of a 
screen-level bureaucracy with professional IT technology and little clients encounters.
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Studying job motivations in a bottom-up approach showed that prosocial motivations 
are not the only job motivation of street-level and screen-level bureaucrats. Instead, 
in both settings motivations that are unrelated to the benefits for others, such as the 
salary and performing challenging task driver civil servants. Moreover, prosocial 
motivations exist both in the street-level and screen level context. However, unpacking 
the mechanisms behind prosocial motivations showed that the concept has both 
an individualist and a collectivist dimension. Client contact enhances particularly the 
individualist dimension of client meaningfulness driven by mechanisms of compassion. 
By contrast, the screen-level context increases the collectivist dimension of prosocial 
motivation that relates to perceptions of societal meaningfulness 
 With an eye on the practical contribution of this study, the identified mechanisms 
are relevant to explain civil servants’ public service delivery. The PSM literature 
assumes that the higher the prosocial motivation of civil servants, the more they are 
willing to invest into prosocial behaviour (Perry and Wise, 1990) and thus, fulfil their 
role as public servants. However, prosocial behaviour may differ when officials 
concentrate either on the societal or client meaningfulness of their work (Tummers 
et al., 2012). Especially in the field of migration, public service delivery may look very 
different when a civil servant’s primary goal is to help individual migrants, compared 
to public officials who strive to defend the public interest. The former may move 
towards or against clients depending on perceptions of deservingness (Altreiter and 
Leibetseder, 2015; Tummers et al., 2015). By contrast, the latter may move away from 
clients by routinising and rationing service for a higher public good (Tummers et al., 
2015).
 The insights of this study enhance public administration theory in three distinct 
ways. First, concerning theories on screen-level bureaucracy (Bovens and Zouridis, 
2002), the study shows that the move from street-level to screen level implementation 
effects the individual in public service (Lipsky, 1980). Thereby, the study went beyond 
previous studies that have focused more on the consequences of computer-assisted 
case assessments for citizen perceptions of public service (West, 2004; Wenger and 
Wilkins, 2009).  
 Second, the findings of this study contribute to the relational job design framework 
developed by Grant (2007, 2008). In line with the framework, client contact indeed 
enhances the perception of client meaningfulness triggering compassion as 
important prosocial motivation. In line with Taylor (2013), positive feedback during 
personal encounters is a crucial source of perceived impact and motivation, and 
negative client encounters hamper prosocial motivations. However, beyond existing 
studies, the Dutch case showed that the absence of client contact does not 
necessarily decrease prosocial motivation. Instead, the inductive findings of this 
study support Andersen and Kjeldsen’s (2013) call to distinguish between an 
individualist and collectivist dimension of prosocial motivation. In combination with 
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the more nuanced look into job motivations beyond prosocial motivations, this study 
provides new input for debates on public service motivations and encourages to 
deepen the institutional mechanisms behind the different dimensions of the PSM 
construct. 
 Third, in light of Europeanisation, this study showed that while frontline implementers 
increasingly apply converging laws and policies (Börzel and Risse, 2000), the national 
bureaucratic context in which they operate are still highly diverse (Knill, 2001). 
The diversity of bureaucratic contexts, such as client contact has implications for 
job motivations, social service delivery and it may eventually affect the level of 
harmonisation in the provision of services across EU member states.
 Overall, the qualitative and partly explorative results of this study require follow-up 
studies for more generalisable conclusions. For example, differences between 
screen-level and street-level motivations might be less pronounced in policy fields 
where lower level implementers have limited discretion and where bureaucratic 
decision- making has less severe consequences for the quality of life of individual 
clients. Consequently, a more controlled investigation of the effect of face-to-face 
contact for job motivation and civil servants’ behaviour is required. Longitudinal 
designs or lab experiments that isolate the effect of client contact could constitute 
a fruitful addition to the investigation of how client contact effects administrative 
behaviour. 
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Abstract
This chapter seeks to map and explain the extent to which national legislators 
constrain discretion contained in European Union directives during transposition. 
To this end, we use standard hypotheses from the domestic delegation literature 
regarding the necessity of policy conflict and transaction costs. Our empirical approach 
is based on a focused comparison of the transposition of several provisions of the 
Asylum Reception Conditions Directive in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
In order to capture content-specific aspects of discretion, we employ an innovative 
measurement tool, the so-called Institutional Grammar Tool. The study shows that 
while all three states formally comply with the directive, the level of European Union 
discretion delegated to practical implementers varies considerably across the cases. 
Standard delegation theory cannot fully explain the patterns. Instead, existing 
delegation theories have to be adjusted to the transposition context, by accounting 
for domestic preferences regarding the status quo.
Keywords: asylum law, delegation of discretion, EU transposition, reception conditions 
directive, transaction costs
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1.  Introduction
A unique characteristic of European Union (EU) directives is that they are only binding 
as to the results to be achieved. Yet directives leave member states variant discretion. 
Several studies have focused on the conditions under which EU legislation delegates 
discretion to member states (Pollack, 1997; Franchino, 2007; Thomson and Torenvlied, 
2011). The exact level of discretion is considered a deliberate choice of the European 
legislator aimed at finding compromises at the EU level and at allowing member 
states to adjust their laws to local circumstances (Franchino, 2007; Hartmann, 2016).
 However, discretion is not only relevant for the stage of EU lawmaking. It also 
plays an important role in the phase of transposition, or the conversion of directives 
into national law (Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied, 2009; Hartmann, 2016). In principle, 
discretion in EU directives provides transposition actors with control over practical 
implementation and compliance. The implicit assumption in the literature on EU 
compliance is that transposition actors settle for a particular point within, or outside, 
the margins of EU discretion (Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2013). So far, the possibility 
that transposition actors further delegate EU discretion to practical implementers has 
received no explicit scholarly attention (for research touching upon this possibility, 
see Steunenberg, 2006). However, this possibility is highly relevant for compliance. 
Transposition actors that delegate discretion, ‘pass the buck’ by shifting responsibility 
for actual compliance to practical implementers who thus become, in essence, EU 
lawmakers.
 Studies on delegation in a national context have extensively investigated how 
political context affects the political decision to limit agency discretion (Calvert et al., 
1989; Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999; Huber and Shipan, 2002; McCubbins and 
Schwartz, 2009). Two key assumptions derive from this literature. First, a high level of 
risk that the agent will not comply with decision makers’ preferences is necessary for 
legislators to want to constrain discretion (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999). The risk is 
high when there is a policy conflict between decision maker and implementer (Epstein 
and O’Halloran, 1999; Huber and Shipan, 2002). Second, legislators have to be 
capable of constraining discretion. Crucially, discretion will only be constrained if the 
transaction costs of writing detailed legislation are low (Huber et al., 2001; Oosterwaal 
et al., 2012, p. 803).
 This study asks the question to what extent transposition actors indeed ‘pass the 
buck,’ that is, delegate discretion contained in EU directives down to practical 
implementers and to what extent domestic delegation theories account for constraining 
transposition measures. By answering this question, this study seeks to add to the 
literature in three ways. First, we apply insights from the domestic delegation literature 
to the EU implementation context. Thereby, the study tackles Huber and Shipan’s 
claim that analysing the delegation of discretion in parliamentary systems has its 
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limits, because of the absence of a ‘natural experiment that requires a wide range of 
political systems to address the same issue at roughly the same time’ (2002, p. 65). 
Following Huber and Shipan (2002, p. 181, fn 8), the transposition of EU directives 
might present such a natural experiment.23 Moreover, by testing to what extent 
established domestic delegation theories apply to the transposition context, the 
paper accounts for the fact that across EU member states, a considerable amount of 
legislation has its origin in EU obligations.
 Second, by exploring transposition outcomes beyond compliance, this study 
goes beyond existing studies on transposition (Treib, 2014). With the focus on EU 
discretion left to practical implementers, this study contributes to the recent discussion 
on customisation of EU law (Thomann, 2015) and enhances our understanding of 
the regulatory patchwork of the EU (Héritier, 1996). In this way, the chapter highlights 
the fact that EU implementation does not end after transposition and draws attention 
to the role of practical implementers (Versluis, 2007).
 Finally, we complement previous statistical findings on the delegation of 
discretion with a nuanced and in-depth account of the multidimensional concept of 
discretion (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999; Huber and Shipan, 2002; Oosterwaal et al., 
2012). We do so by employing a new systematic measure of discretion that draws 
inspiration from the Institutional Grammar developed by Crawford and Ostrom (1995). 
Toshkov (2013) suggested this approach as a tool to add content-specific elements 
to existing quantitative measures of discretion.
 We empirically investigate the level of discretion for the transposition of several 
provisions of a directive in the highly topical field of asylum: Council Directive 2003/9/
EC, the so-called Reception Condition Directive (RCD). So far, the implementation of 
EU asylum law has only received marginal scholarly attention. However, in light of the 
high recent refugee influx, understanding implementation outcomes in this sensitive 
policy field is more crucial than ever.
 The transposition processes and delegation outcomes are studied in a structured 
focused comparison (George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 67–72) of transposition in 
France, Germany, and the Netherlands. In order to investigate to what extent policy 
conflict and transaction costs are necessary conditions for constraining transposition, 
we select countries with highly diverse political contexts. Extensive document study 
and interviews with stakeholders in all three states serve to investigate the theoretical 
expectations.
 The analysis reveals that in all three cases, transposition acts delegated EU 
discretion to practical implementers. However, the level of discretion varied 
considerably between member states and provisions. Strikingly, the analysis shows 
that domestic delegation theories face some limitations in explaining this pattern 
23 They considered data available to be too limited for quantitative analysis.
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because policy conflict and low transaction costs do not seem to be necessary 
conditions for constrained discretion. To account for the findings, the transposition 
context needs to be taken into account. During transposition, the implicit assumption 
of domestic delegation theory that the agenda-setter advocates change is often not 
fulfilled. EU law may force transposition actors to reopen national lawmaking on 
issues they would not otherwise have initiated themselves. Thus, this study inductively 
suggests that preferences to maintain the status quo, which have received more 
explicit attention in the Europeanisation and EU implementation literature, matter for 
the delegation of discretion (see Héritier, 1996; Duina, 1997; Knill and Lenschow, 
1998).24 Preferences to maintain the status quo can trigger transposition actors to 
maintain constraining national legislation, despite the absence of necessary conditions 
assumed in the standard delegation literature.
2.   Theorising the delegation of European Union 
discretion
The transposition of EU directives tends to be regarded as a political process 
(Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006; Steunenberg, 2006; Toshkov, 2011; Dimitrova and 
Steunenberg, 2013). Depending on the bargaining environment, different interests at 
the practical implementation and decision-making stages will confront the ministry 
that coordinates transposition and drafts the transposition laws (Dimitrova and 
Steunenberg, 2013, p. 250). Following these assumptions, transposition is influenced 
by a range of domestic players, similar to domestic lawmaking (Steunenberg, 2006). 
Domestic lawmaking has been theorised extensively by the delegation literature, 
which has developed policy-specific explanations for discretion in national statutes 
(Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999; Huber and Shipan, 2002).
 The starting point of the delegation literature is that delegation serves to transfer 
power from the legislative principal to an implementing agent (Pollack, 1997). 
Delegation of discretion is considered a strategic bargaining game in which legislators 
are understood as rational actors (Moe, 1982; McCubbins et al., 1987, p. 256). Political 
factors are the main explanations for differences in the level of discretion in national 
legal statutes (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1994; Huber and Shipan, 2002; Bendor and 
Meirowitz, 2004).
 We take Huber and Shipan’s (2002, 2011) approach toward delegation as a point 
of departure because it combines recent theories on domestic delegation of discretion 
24 It must be noted that we do not go as far as the original goodness of fit argument, which holds that 
domestic actors involved in EU-induced legislative processes are necessarily inclined to maintain the 
policy status quo. Instead, we take into account the possibility that they want to do so, a situation that 
is not recognized in the domestic delegation literature (Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006).
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in the most parsimonious way. The authors distinguish four hypotheses on the 
political dynamics of delegation, emphasising the influence of policy conflict between 
principal and agent, transaction costs, policy uncertainty, and non-statutory factors. 
We focus on the first two factors, controlling for policy uncertainty and non-statutory 
factors by keeping the policy context constant.
 The central theoretical argument in the delegation literature relates to policy 
conflict between principal and agent. The assumption here is that both legislators 
and implementers seek to realise implementation close to their preferences. The 
chances that an agent implements the law not in the interest of the principal are 
higher under discretionary legislation than under constraining legislation (Bendor 
and Meirowitz, 2004). As a consequence, delegation theory assumes that if the 
policy preferences of legislators and practical implementers diverge, the former have 
strong incentives to constrain the latters’ room for manoeuvre (Epstein and O’Halloran, 
1999; Huber and Shipan, 2002). Respectively, without policy conflict, the legislator 
will have no incentive to constrain discretion (Huber et al., 2001). According to this 
view, policy conflict between principal and agents is a necessary condition for the 
adoption of constraining legislation (Huber et al., 2001, p. 343). Applied to the EU 
transposition context, this leads to the following expectation:
Expectation 1: Transposition actors will only constrain discretion granted by EU 
directives in the case of policy conflict between transposition actors and practical 
implementers concerning the directive.
Yet following Huber et al., (2001, p. 343) the risk of divergence is not a sufficient 
condition for adopting constraining legislation. Crucially, transposition actors must 
also be able to cover the costs of writing and adopting constraining legislation (Moe, 
1984; Huber and Shipan, 2002, p. 79). These transaction costs involve resources, 
such as time and expertise required when legislators need to convince critical veto 
players of their legal proposals. These costs are resources that legislators could 
otherwise channel into other tasks. The bargaining environment determines the 
height of these transaction costs (Huber et al., 2001). As argued by Oosterwaal, 
et al., (2012, p. 803), transaction costs increase when many veto players holding 
divergent preferences are involved in lawmaking. In such situations, adopting 
constraining legislation is highly costly (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1994, 1999; Huber 
and Shipan, 2002) and typically leads to the adoption of compromises with low detail 
and few specific descriptions (Oosterwaal et al., 2012).
 In the EU transposition context, the involvement and preferences of veto players 
may vary across national systems. In line with the transposition literature, we define 
veto players as actors who are either formally or informally involved in the transposition 
process and who are required to find a compromise (Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 
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2013, p. 250). Sometimes, transposition involves only the relevant ministry, for 
example, when delegated acts are adopted (Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2013, 
p. 249). Under such circumstances, no compromise needs to be negotiated, and 
transaction costs are low. In other transposition processes, powerful policy-specific 
players, such as several ministries and parliament, are actively involved (Dimitrova 
and Steunenberg, 2000; Haverland, 2000). These actors are often linked through 
networks with powerful non-state actors that become informal veto players (Dimitrova, 
2010, p. 145). The inclusion of informal veto players takes into account that some 
member states and policy areas involve strong interest groups in political deci-
sion-making (Lijphart and Crepaz, 1991). Formal and informal veto players may have 
preferences that diverge from those of the transposing ministry, which raises the 
costs of agreeing on constraining legislation and makes the transposing minister 
incapable of writing detailed legislation (Steunenberg, 2006). This leads to the second 
expectation:
Expectation 2: Transposition actors will only constrain discretion granted by EU 
directives in the case of low transaction costs resulting from low conflict between the 
agenda-setter and veto players involved in the transposition process.
Huber and Shipan (2002) suggest two additional variables that influence the level 
of discretion, which we control for in this study as they relate to the policy context. 
The first condition refers to policy uncertainty. This condition entails that principals will 
delegate discretion to agents if the latter possess highly technical expertise necessary 
for implementing complex policies (Huber and Shipan, 2002, 2011). For the purpose 
of this study, we control for this variable by selecting a relatively non-technical 
policy area.
 Additionally, Huber et al. (2001) argue that the legislator might have cheaper 
non­statutory mechanisms for monitoring and controlling the actions of agents that 
make it unnecessary to invest in detailed legislation. For example, legislators could 
veto rules adopted by agencies during hearings. Alternatively, decision makers could 
rely on external actors, such as judges, to hold agents accountable (Epstein and 
O’Halloran, 1994; Huber et al., 2001, pp. 334–335; Blom-Hansen, 2005). In the 
context of EU transposition and asylum law, such mechanisms are largely absent. 
While the EU Commission can be seen as an external actor to control member state 
under-compliance, the Commission tends to focus on legal transposition and less on 
the actions of national agencies on the ground. In case the Commission does target 
practical implementation, the possibility of enforcement applies to all member states, 
which reduces its suitability to explain cross-country differences in discretion. Finally, 
litigation by asylum seekers might be an alternative to correct under-compliance. 
However, asylum seekers are unlikely to use litigation in such a way to represent the 
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interest of the national principal against the agency; instead, they have their own 
interests.
 Moreover, there are no non-statutory mechanisms to monitor over-compliance. 
Over-compliance exists when the agency gold-plates the requirements of the 
directive against the preferences of the transposition actors. Such activities are 
unlikely to be followed up by courts because the law’s target group, as possible 
litigants, would benefit from such over-compliance. Finally, in fields such as migration 
and asylum law, many policies are applied in street-level situations (e.g. Ellermann 
2006). This makes non-statutory monitoring difficult, as legislative veto or alternative 
mechanisms do not exist to monitor street-level bureaucratic behaviour.
3.  Methods and data
The expectations developed above will be investigated through a set of in-depth case 
studies, using a structured focused comparison (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 69). 
As will be elaborated, the qualitative design allows the employment of a more 
nuanced and context-specific measure of the dependent variable of the relative 
share of discretionary and constraining provisions than commonly used in quantitative 
measures of discretion. The downside of this approach is that inferences based on a 
small sample might have lower external validity than large-N correlation studies. 
However, our qualitative approach allows us to look into the underlying causal 
mechanisms in detail. Additionally, because this study focuses on necessary 
conditions, a low-N study is suitable (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006, p. 232). For such 
set-theoretical assumptions, a single contradicting case can disqualify the necessity 
of a certain condition (Goertz and Starr, 2003). Moreover, the qualitative design 
makes it possible to inductively explore alternative mechanisms that specify existing 
theories, in case the established necessary conditions do not fully account for the 
expected outcomes.
 We investigate our expectations through an analysis of the transposition of 
several provisions of the Asylum Reception Conditions Directive 2003/9/EC in three 
EU member states. By focusing on the provision level, we add leverage to the low-N 
study because dependent variable and explanatory conditions can vary on the 
provision level.
 The RCD was chosen because, while constituting a prescriptive framework, 
many of its provisions provide ample discretion to the member states, which is a 
scope condition for exploring our expectations (Huber and Shipan, 2002, p. 181). 
In addition, it forms part of the highly politicised field of asylum, which provides 
promising conditions for the expected mechanisms to operate.
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The directive’s key aim is to limit ‘asylum shopping’ which was thought to stem from 
varying reception standards between EU member states (Zaun, 2016). The directive 
prescribes minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers that will normally 
suffice to ensure them a dignified standard of living. Additionally, it regulates various 
types of material support for asylum seekers, including housing, food, clothing, and 
non-material conditions such as healthcare and employment. Member states may 
adopt or maintain provisions that are more favourable.
 The Council of Ministers of the EU negotiated the directive from 1997 until 2003. 
During this time, the EU faced a moderate influx of asylum seekers, compared with 
the years that were to follow. Nevertheless, member states were divided on the issue. 
Council documents repeatedly stressed that the final act should leave ‘sufficient 
room for manoeuvre’ as this was seen as the only way to find a compromise (see list 
of Council of Ministers documents in the Appendix to this chapter).
Four main provisions of the directive and their 19 sub-provisions were chosen for 
in-depth study (for the wording of the provisions, see Table A.4.2). These provisions 
go to the core of the directive and constitute discretionary obligations:
• Art 11 (Access to Labour market): Access shall be given within one year, but states 
shall establish the conditions for doing so using national labour market policies.
• Art 13 (Material Conditions): States should guarantee a decent way of living. 
Benefits may be in monetary terms, through voucher, or in kind. No provision 
specifies the amount of financial allowances. Benefits may be limited if applicants 
possess sufficient own resources.
• Art 14 (Accommodation): Applicants shall be housed in centres, hotels, or 
apartments. There is no precision on minimum standards beyond a guarantee of 
human dignity. Family members should be hosted together but can be separated 
if appropriate. Access to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) shall be given. 
Emergency reception that limits the standards to emergency health care is possible.
• Art 15 & Art 17 (Health Care and Vulnerability): States must guarantee necessary 
health care and at least emergency care and essential treatment of illness. There is 
no definition of ‘necessary healthcare.’
In measuring the dependent variable of our study, which is the relative share of 
discretionary and constraining provisions in national transposition measures, we go 
beyond previous empirical studies. Most studies on discretion used an index dividing 
the number of norms, which provide explicit leeway by the overall number of norms 
in a statute (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1994; Franchino, 2007; Zhelyazkova and 
Torenvlied, 2009). Huber and Shipan (2002) used statutes’ word counts to infer 
the level of discretion left to implementers. In our view, both measures disregard 
characteristics of discretion connected to vague wordings at the provision level and, 
therefore, cannot reflect different levels of discretion within provisions. For this reason, 
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we follow the suggestion by Toshkov (2013) to measure discretion systematically 
using the Institutional Grammar Tool (IGT) (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995; Basurto 
et al., 2010; Siddiki et al., 2012).
 The IGT is a coding scheme that can be used to analyse legal documents. 
It provides a grammatical syntax to classify legal provisions into several components, 
each of which may serve to either constrain or delegate discretion. First, provisions 
specify an attribute, that is, the actor to whom the statement applies. In all provisions 
of the RCD, the attribute is the member state. After transposition, attributes are the 
practical implementers to whom discretion can be delegated, such as the operators 
of asylum reception centres. Mostly, this component leaves no discretion.
 Second, each provision has a deontic, indicating whether actions are obliged, 
permitted, or forbidden. In EU directives, obligations take the shape of ‘shall’ or ‘must 
clauses’. Permission, for its part, is signalled through ‘may clauses’. For example, 
Art 13.4 RCD states that ‘Member States may require asylum applicants (...) to 
contribute to the cost (...)’ of reception. National law can either preserve the may 
clause, or specify during transposition that the reception agency ‘should require (…)’ 
applicants to contribute to the costs of reception. So far, the deontic has been the 
main focus of existing delegation studies, because may clauses most explicitly signal 
discretion (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1994; Franchino, 2007; Zhelyazkova and 
Torenvlied, 2009). Of the selected RCD sub-provisions, five are may clauses, and 14 
are shall clauses. Focusing only on the deontic, the RCD appears to be relatively 
discretion-constrained.
 However, thirdly, each legal provision also has an aim, meaning the task that 
should or should not be performed. Aims can also add or decrease discretion. For 
example, Art 15.1 RCD holds that states shall ‘provide necessary healthcare.’ Despite 
the shall clause, the aim leaves discretion by leaving open the definition of ‘necessary 
healthcare.’
 Finally, most legal provisions include conditions specifying the temporal, spatial, 
or procedural boundaries within which a task is or is not to be performed. For 
example, Art 14.3 RCD obliges reception authorities to lodge children together with 
their parents, ‘if appropriate,’ which leaves member states discretion regarding the 
definition of appropriateness.
 We measured our dependent variable (DV) by first determining the aim, deontic, 
and condition components for the 19 RCD sub-provisions (Table A.4.2). Secondly, for 
each component, we identified the corresponding national transposition provisions. 
Transposition reports, such as the Odysseus and AIDA country reports were used to 
identify the relevant national legal texts (see Table A. 4.3).25 
25 We took 2007 as the cut-off point for the end of transposition, which was one year before the EU 
Commission initiated a recast of the RCD based on the transposition results.
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Consequently, each national transposition component was scored with a minus (−) if 
it provided less discretion than the corresponding legal provision of the directive, zero 
(0) if comparable discretion was granted, and a plus (+) if transposition laws allowed 
for more discretion.26 Table A. 4.3 in the Appendix provides the coding results.
 While identifying the IGT components in the individual sub-provisions of the RCD 
was relatively straightforward, the coding of the transposition measures was more 
complex: It required legal interpretation based on transposition reports, as well as 
making coding decisions (as explained in the Appendix to this chapter).27 We took 
the RCD as a benchmark for the coding. This means that if the aim of the directive 
provision was to establish conditions (e.g. Art 11.2 RCD), the conditions that are 
eventually established in the transposition were coded as aim component and not as 
condition component. Moreover, we focused on discretion given to practical 
implementers and did not consider it as discrete when asylum seekers are allowed to 
choose from different options. Such provisions were interpreted in light of the 
discretion practical implementers are left with.
 While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to elaborate on the coding of each 
sub-provision, we provide the original wording of the transposition laws and identify 
the different components in the Appendix. Additionally, we provide examples of 
difficult coding decisions to exemplify the coding. In the analysis, we add content 
analysis of the provisions to illustrate the delegation of discretion across the 
components and to deepen the insights provided by the IGT coding.
 To measure the explanatory conditions, we conducted extensive document 
studies of Council documents, parliamentary debates, committee reports, hearings, 
NGO reports, and the Odysseus country reports on transposition (see Appendix to 
this chapter). The data were complemented with interviews and email enquiries with 
respondents of relevant ministries, implementing agencies, NGOs, and experts who 
followed the transposition processes. We investigated the level of policy conflict 
between the implementing organisations and the agenda-setting ministry regarding 
the directive by outlining preferences concerning reception conditions of the ministry 
that was in charge of transposition.
 The data sources were triangulated to identify preferences. First, in case the 
same minister was already in charge of negotiating the directive, the preferences of 
agenda-setters regarding specific articles of the directive could be derived from 
Council documents. This provided information on which articles agenda-setters were 
critical of and in which direction they aimed to change the directive. In case a different 
26 Two sub-articles overlapped substantively and were combined.
27 For example, national law often has no explicit deontic and gives rights directly to asylum seekers. We deal 
with this complication by assuming that phrases imply ‘shall’ deontics for practical implementers. If the 
law explicitly mentioned that authorities have a choice or that these rights ‘can’ be granted, only then 
did we treat this as a ‘may’ deontic.
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minister was in charge of transposition, policy documents regarding transposition 
were investigated to trace their policy preferences regarding the directive. Additionally, 
the preferences of the ministry were discussed in the interviews and email inquiries 
with respondents who either worked for the agenda-setting ministry at the time 
of transposition and/or who were otherwise involved in the transposition process. 
Respondents were asked which goals the ministry aimed to realise during transposition.
 Next, the practical implementers of asylum reception, such as local authorities 
and organisers of receptions centres, and their preferences were identified per 
country. The policy preferences of the practical implementers were traced by asking 
representatives of implementing organisations which aims they had and which 
challenges they faced during the transposition process and to what extent they had 
different goals as the ministry. This information was cross-checked with the reports of 
the Odysseus network, which include information on national policy debates.
 If policy preferences of the relevant ministries and practical implementers 
converged and if respondents did not recall any conflict, the risk of agency drift was 
considered to be low. If respondents indicated differences in opinion, but no explicit 
policy conflict between ministry and practical implementers emerged, this was 
scored as a moderate risk of agency divergence. We assume that moderate risk still 
creates a desire on behalf of the agenda-setter to constrain discretion. When the 
agenda-setting ministry and practical implementers recalled explicit policy conflict, 
the risk of agency drift was considered to be high.
 As for transaction costs, we first identified the players involved in the transposition 
process. To this end, first, the transposition instruments were identified. This provided 
a first indication of players formally involved in transposition, such as parliament and 
coalition partners, and which informal actors had to be consulted, such as interest 
groups. In order to find out which players had potential veto capacity and to identify 
substantive preferences, the individual transposition processes were investigated 
using parliamentary documents of plenary debates, position papers, and hearing 
reports, complemented with interviews with relevant actors. If no veto players were 
involved in transposition, or if veto players shared the leading ministry’ policy preference, 
transaction costs for constraining transposition measures were considered to be low. 
If veto players with conflicting preferences were involved in the establishment of the 
transposition law, transaction costs were classified as high.
 Transposition of the provisions of the directive was investigated in three member 
states: France, Germany, and the Netherlands. The three countries share some 
general features. Crucially, none of these states had to build a reception system from 
scratch, and they were among the strongest negotiators of the directive in the Council 
negotiations (Zaun, 2016, p. 138). Thus, the challenge of transposing the directive 
was similarly low for all three member states. Additionally, the three countries have 
similar administrative and financial capacity to host asylum seekers. Third, all three 
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countries have a civil law tradition, which is, following Huber and Shipan (2002), an 
important scope condition for similar levels of legal discretion. Additionally, in all three 
countries, migration was relatively high on the political agenda, which is a favourable 
condition for observing policy conflict and transaction costs. Furthermore, during 
transposition, the states received comparable numbers of asylum applicants 
(Eurostats, 2007).
 Previous studies found that some member states literally transpose EU directives 
into national law that could influence levels of discretion (Steunenberg and Voermans, 
2006). While the Netherlands has the reputation to sometimes use this copy-out 
method, this was not the case for the RCD (Odysseus_Report_NL, 2006 p. 4, 
Odyssey_Report_general, 2006 p. 17).28 
 The three countries were selected in such a way as to maximise the chances of 
observing variance on the two explanatory conditions. France is a centralised state, 
but practical implementation of asylum reception is delegated to a range of practical 
implementers at the central and local level. Thus, there are good conditions to 
observe policy conflict between transposition actors and the practical implementers. 
Additionally, France, with its majoritarian system, is not known for its inclusion of veto 
players in the lawmaking process (Lijphart and Crepaz, 1991). Thus, the country 
provides good conditions to observe low transaction costs, making the expected 
mechanism of constrained discretion likely.
 Germany, as a federal state, delegates practical implementation of asylum reception 
to a range of state and local actors. Following Huber and Shipan (2002), federal 
arrangements provide good conditions for policy conflict between federal legislators 
and local practical implementers. The federal structure also suggests a strong role 
of formal veto players with divergent preferences, which increases transaction costs 
for constraining transposition, providing good conditions to explore the mechanisms 
of expectation two.
 Finally, the Netherlands, as a centralised state, delegates practical implementation 
of asylum reception to a single state agency, providing favourable conditions for low 
policy conflict between decision makers and practical implementers. Additionally, 
Dutch lawmaking is known for its consensus-oriented decision-making, which tends 
to include a range of formal and informal veto players (Lijphart and Crepaz, 1991). 
This may increase transaction costs for constraining transposition and makes the 
Dutch case an unlikely one for constrained discretion. Table 4.1 summarises the case 
selection criteria.
28  Article 14.2b RCD constitutes an exception. This literal transposition provides for a higher likelihood of 
the Netherlands to keep discretion in the national regulation.
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In the following, the case descriptions are presented. These have a theory-testing 
character. We start with a most likely case for constraining mechanisms (France), 
followed by a critical case to investigate expectation 2 (Germany), and conclude with 
a least-likely case for constraining mechanisms (Netherlands). For each case, we first 
assess the level of policy conflict between practical implementers and the leading 
ministry as agenda-setter. Second, we explore the transaction costs by identifying 
the preferences of players involved in the transposition and their capacity to veto 
decision-making. Third, we compare our expectations to the characteristics of the 
case, resulting in a case-specific expectation for the degree of discretion. We then 
analyse this expectation by assessing the extent of discretion across the transposition 
provisions.
4.  France
First, we investigate the application of the delegation theories in the French context. 
To assess the desire of the transposition actors to constrain discretion in the French 
transposition law, first possible policy conflict between legislator and implementing 
organisation(s) vis-à-vis the directive is investigated. During negotiation and 
transposition of the RCD, a conservative government governed France with a unified 
majority for the Union for a Popular Movement that held restrictive views on asylum. 
The French delegation of the Ministry of Immigration aimed at limiting the scope of 
the directive during Council negotiations, albeit without success (Resp. 1, Council 
doc. 5791/02). It upheld this approach during transposition (Resp. 2, 21, Odysseus_
Report_ Fr 2006).
 Concerning the preferences of practical implementers, it is important to note that 
in France, several actors implement reception policy. Besides the central French 
Immigration and Integration Service, which was founded in its current form during the 
transposition phase (Aida Report France; Resp. 6), NGOs and local authorities at the 
Table 4.1   Case selection
Likelihood of
France Germany Netherlands
Risk of deviation:
Policy Conflict between practical implementers 
and leading ministry 
High High Low 
Transaction costs:
Policy conflict between transposing actors 
Low High High 
Discretion Low Low High
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département level are involved. As a result, this agency’s preferences were uncertain. 
NGOs, which operate reception centres on the ground, favoured a liberal reception 
system. Nevertheless, they were not collectively organised and did not speak with 
one voice (Resp. 2, 21). Some implementing NGOs articulated their opposition to the 
agenda-setting ministry, but most NGOs did not want to risk budget cuts for being 
too critical (Resp. 2). Overall, there was no open policy conflict between practical 
implementers and transposition actors (Odysseus_Report_Fr 2006). However, policy 
preferences of practical implementers were divergent or uncertain. In light of our first 
expectation, this implied a moderate risk of divergence for the ministry.
 Turning to the transaction costs, it is important to note that France did not adopt a 
specific statute to transpose the directive, but only modified existing decrees. The decrees 
did not require approval by parliament or other potential veto players (Resp. 2, 5). 
Instead, transposition was the province of the Secretary-General of the Ministry of 
Immigration, Stefanini. He pulled the strings in the Ministry and did not consult any 
other actors during transposition (Resp. 2). Consequently, neither the governing 
parties nor the opposition explicitly discussed transposition (Odysseus_Report_Fr 
2006; Resp. 2, 4). Additionally, there was no hearing of informal veto players, such as 
NGOs. Thus, because of the absence of veto players, the transaction costs of 
negotiating constraining provisions were low. Given the presence of moderate policy 
conflict combined with low transaction costs, we expect French transposition to be 
relatively constraining.
 Our analysis of French reception laws shows, first of all, that while France notified 
the Commission of three decrees, French transposition laws were more complex. 
France had no unified national asylum law, but a range of very different general laws 
that transposed the directive, such as general welfare provisions, labour rights, laws 
on social institutions, and general health care, as well as temporary waiting and 
emergency regulations.29 In line with the expectations, French legislation on reception 
entailed mainly constraining provisions, as compared to the directive. Table A.4.1 
shows that 18 components of French legislation constrained discretion. Two optional 
clauses were not transposed. Fifteen components were comparable to the directive, 
and in five components, discretion extended beyond the directive. Discretion also 
existed where two obligatory provisions were not transposed. The deontic components 
remained mostly unchanged compared to the directive, particularly regarding ‘shall’ 
provisions. The aim and condition components were mostly constraining or comparable 
to the directive.
 Examination of the substance of discretion reveals that compared to the RCD, 
French regulations constrained discretion, particularly in the conditions for access to 
29 This made the application of the IGT to the French case particularly challenging as often a range of 
diverse national provisions in combination transposed individual directive provisions and had to be 
coded in combination.
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the labour market and application procedures. However, French law explicitly allowed 
prefects to establish additional conditions to access the labour market (aim of Art 
11.2 RCD). Also concerning material reception, French law was constraining (aim of 
Art 13 RCD). For example, it obliged implementers to provide benefits in monetary 
terms. While French law obliged reception centres to demand a contribution from 
applicants in case they had sufficient own resources (deontic of Art 13 RCD) and 
specified the condition under which contributions could be asked, the amount and 
enforcement of the contribution were left to prefectures and local implementers.
 For those applicants who received a place in a reception centre, accommodation 
was regulated with detail by specifying the living space per applicant and hygiene 
criteria (aim of Art 13.1 RCD, 14.1 RCD).30 Access to NGOs was regulated only 
implicitly because NGOs operate the reception centres. Health care was regulated in 
detail under the universal healthcare scheme. Some discretion existed regarding securing 
family unity (constraining deontic, but vague conditions), training of reception centre 
staff, and transfer between centres (both unregulated).
 For applicants without a place in a reception centre, emergency legislation was 
established in response to the directive. The legislation was more elaborate than Art 
14.8 RCD. However, in cases of budget shortage or overfill, French law allowed for 
the circumventing of several constraining standards set in the other transposition 
provisions.
 Overall, the French case fits our expectations relatively well. In line with the 
expectations, moderate policy conflict combined with low transaction costs fit the 
overall constraining reception laws. However, the analysis also shows that while 
French legislation formally complied with the directive, it ‘passed the buck’ to practical 
implementers in some instances, such as emergency situations or regarding staff 
training. Thus, contrary to the expectations, French transposition measures also 
contain discretionary provisions, particularly in the aim and condition components or 
through missing regulations that allowed practical implementers to interpret EU 
obligations. Hence, the French case shows that transposition actors do not always 
settle for point-specific transposition laws, even if necessary conditions are present.
30 Conditions were different for asylum seekers in the accelerated producer and Dublin cases without 
access to the centers.
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5.  Germany
Next, we investigate the delegation of discretion in a federal context. We start by 
investigating the policy conflict between transposition actors and implementers. The 
German transposition law was drafted in 2007, two years after the transposition 
deadline, by the Ministry of Internal Affairs led by the Christian-Democratic (CDU) 
Minister, Schäuble, in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Affairs led by the Social 
Democratic (SPD) Minister, Müntefering.
 During negotiation and transposition of the directive, preferences of the Ministries 
were rather restrictive (Resp. 10).31 The German delegation stressed continuously 
during Council negotiations that it would only agree to changes in German law if the 
16 Bundesländer agreed (Resp. 1, 10). With the exception of access to the labour 
market, the Länder were fully responsible for the implementation of asylum reception 
(Resp. 10, 8). In line with the principle of concurrent legislation, the Länder could even 
pass subsequent regulations as long as the federal level did not do so. Bavaria, 
Baden-Württemberg, and Hessen were most determined not to agree to any 
modifications of the federal law (Resp. 10, 11).
 The Länder were not the only practical implementers as they had delegated 
much reception implementation down to municipalities, which in turn had delegated 
to public actors, hired welfare organisations, or private companies to run reception 
centres at the local level. The municipalities coordinated their preferences within the 
Städtetag, which is an Association of German cities (Resp. 8). Interests between 
municipalities, NGOs, and private actors who implement reception on the ground 
were highly diverse within and across the Länder. Thus, there was some debate 
among practitioners on the directive (Odysseus_Report_De 2006). While this debate 
did not lead to an open policy conflict with the government, the diversity of practical 
implementers and their varying interests at the local level can be understood as 
creating at least a moderate risk of divergence, similar to the French case.
 Turning to the second condition, transaction costs, the existence and preferences 
of veto players are relevant. As two ministries from different coalition parties acted as 
agenda-setters for the transposition measure, they could have vetoed each other and 
thus raised transaction costs. However, there was no divergence in preferences 
regarding the directive between the two Ministries (Resp. 10).
 The Bundestag was another formal veto player because Germany adopted a 
transposition instrument that required parliamentary approval. However, although 
several Social-Democratic parliamentarians criticised the general package law 
(Drucksache_16/5527, 30. 05.2007; Drucksache_16/5654, 13. 06.2007; Drucksache 
16/5621, 13. 06.2007), no actual parliamentary debate concerning the RCD ensued, 
31 During negotiations, a coalition of SPD and Green party governed Germany.
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indicating that there was no explicit conflict regarding the directive among parliamen-
tarians compared to the agenda-setting ministries (Odysseus_Report_De 2006, 
Resp. 11).
 Another formal veto player with strong policy preference was the Bundesrat, 
whose consent was required (Resp. 1, 7, 8, 10, 11). The Bundesrat represents the 
interests of the Länder. As elaborated above, the majority of the Länder did not want 
to change the existing law. They particularly opposed the more liberal reception laws 
because they financed asylum reception and feared rising costs (Resp. 8, 10). 
Following the respondents, the Bundesrat took these preferences as basis for 
negotiation with the Ministries.
 Following Dimitrova and Steunenberg (2013), NGOs can also be informal veto 
players because of state capture. In Germany, a range of NGOs was formally 
consulted in parliamentary hearings, and nine NGOs established a common position, 
trying to pressure the government to ensure more liberal reception conditions (Resp. 
7, 8, 13). However, investigating their capacity to effectively veto the transposition law 
shows that their evaluations were in fact not required to find a compromise. Thus, 
even though the NGOs held divergent preferences compared to the agenda-setting 
ministries, they cannot be considered as veto players with the capacity to raise 
transaction costs.
 Overall, despite the large number of actors involved in the transposition process, 
players either held convergent preferences regarding the directive or had no veto 
capacities. Thus, the transaction costs in the German case were low. Following the 
established theories, this leads to the case-specific expectation that constraining 
transposition would be adopted.
 Surprisingly, however, German reception laws delegated extensive discretion to 
the practical implementers. In several components, the law remained even more 
discretionary than allowed by the directive. As shown in Table A.4.1, German 
transposition law constrained discretion in only 12 components. Ten components 
delegated similar levels of discretion as the RCD, and two optional clauses were not 
transposed. In 14 components, German law was even more discretionary than the 
directive. Similar to France, two obligatory provisions were not transposed. Again, 
most deontics remained similar to those of the RDC’s provisions. The aim and 
conditions components differed in the levels of discretion compared with the RCD.
 Transposition measures were partly constraining with regard to access to the 
labour market, describing a relatively detailed priority right for EU citizens (aim of Art 
11 RCD), while leaving some discretion regarding the condition by only indirectly 
connecting the restrictions to the date of making the asylum application.
 German law delegated more explicit discretion regarding material conditions. 
For example, regarding Art 13.5 RCD, German law gives priority to benefits in kind 
but ‘if necessary due to the circumstances’ (discretionary condition) benefits can 
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(keeps ‘may’ deontic) be given in cash or through vouchers (keeps discretion in aim). 
Regarding Art 13.2 RCD, most discretion is constrained as German law set a specific 
amount of pocket money. However, the transposition law did not convert the amounts 
of pocket money into Euro. Instead, German law kept the pre-existing amounts written 
in the former German currency. This led to several years of legal uncertainty regarding 
the appropriate amounts and eventually required a Constitutional Court ruling.
 Turning to accommodation, no regulation determined who should operate 
reception centres at the Länder level. Thus, for Art 14 RCD, the attribute remained 
unspecified. There are also no federal quality standards regarding reception centres 
and their staff. Only a minority of Bundesländer had binding standards. Access to 
NGOs was only vaguely regulated, similar to provisions on family unity.
 Health care was also transposed in a particularly discretionary way. German law 
stated that necessary medical or dental treatment only had to be provided under 
acute illnesses and conditions of pain. Thus, the transposition of Art 15.1 RCD shows 
that the deontic can be constraining, but the overall provision remains discretionary 
as it is not specified when and which treatment is covered. Other benefits may be 
granted ‘if they are indispensable in an individual case to secure health.’ Thus, 
regarding Art 15.2 RCD, it remained under local discretion if chronic sickness, dental 
care, and treatment of vulnerable people were covered (Art 15.2 RCD deontic and 
aim).
 The high level of discretion in the German transposition law highlights some 
 particularities of the transposition context. While domestic delegation theories assume 
implicitly that at least the legislative actor who initiates new legislation is an advocate 
of change, this was not the case during the transposition of the RCD in Germany. 
Although members of different parties led the two leading federal Ministries, they 
agreed to modify the existing reception conditions as little as possible because 
renegotiating the status quo would have been politically and financially expensive 
(Resp. 11).32 This feature highlights the importance of preferences for the status quo 
as a special aspect of the transposition context where the EU level imposes legal 
change. In the German case, the unwillingness to invest in constraining legislation 
was not a result of high transaction costs because of policy conflict between veto 
players, as assumed by domestic delegation theories. Instead, there was a unified 
preference among decision makers to maintain the legal status quo. Based on the 
inductive findings for the German case, preferences for the status quo deserve more 
explicit attention in explaining discretion after transposition than is the case in the 
domestic delegation literature.
32 The more recent renegotiation of German reception law in response to a changed asylum situation 
shows the high transaction costs of reopening lawmaking in this field
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6.  The Netherlands
In order to investigate the desire to constrain discretion in the Dutch context, we first 
explore the level of policy conflict between transposition and implementing actors. 
Here, one should note that the Dutch decision makers held less critical views toward 
the RCD than in the other two states (Resp. 1). Transposition was the responsibility of 
a coalition of the Christian Democratic Appeal, the People’s Party for Freedom and 
Democracy, and Democrats 66. While the responsible Minister, Verdonk (People’s 
Party for Freedom and Democracy), held restrictive views on migration, centrist parties 
held a majority. The government took a rather liberal stance during transposition 
(Resp. 14). 
 The agency responsible for implementing reception measures in the Netherlands 
is the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA). This central state 
agency is an independent administrative body operating under the political 
responsibility of the Ministry of Security and Justice. During both negotiation and 
transposition of the RCD, the Ministry consulted COA extensively, in order to find out 
if the COA already complied with the directive and what had to be changed (Resp. 14, 19). 
Respondents from the Ministry and the COA recalled no differences in opinion 
regarding the directive. The only problematic issue was that more categories of 
asylum seekers had to be guaranteed reception under the RCD than under existing 
Dutch law, which created some capacity problems for the COA (Resp. 14). Because 
of the limited policy conflict, the risk of agency drift was low for the Ministry, suggesting 
that the desire to constrain discretion was also low.
 Secondly, transaction costs were moderate. Although the Netherlands transposed 
the directive with a ministerial decree (Rva 2005) that did not require parliamentary 
approval, parliament was consulted, as well as the Dutch Council for Refugees. This 
central NGO became an active player during transposition (Odysseus_Report_Nl 
2006). This informal player successfully started an initiative that triggered a debate 
among formal veto players in parliament. The debate concerned the financial 
allowances for asylum seekers (Parliamentary proceeding 47 2005; Resp. 17). 
In response to this debate, the opposition successfully carried a motion to modify 
the transposition decree in such a way that financial allowances gradually increase. 
The Minister agreed to adopt this motion but stressed that it was not necessary to 
comply with the RCD (DVB 2005). Additionally, a parliamentary debate on reception 
conditions for Dublin cases emerged because of the directive, eventually leading to 
the inclusion of these cases under the reception scheme (Odysseus_Report_Nl 
2006). Thus, although the Dutch transposition measure was a decree, some veto 
players with opposing views were involved in the transposition process. It can be 
argued that the pressure to find a compromise with these actors increased the 
transaction costs of constraining legislation.
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Following theories on domestic delegation, we expect that low policy conflict and 
moderate transaction costs would trigger the Ministry to adopt discretionary 
transposition laws. However, analysis of Dutch transposition reveals that, contrary 
to the expectations, most discretion in the directive was constrained. As illustrated 
in Table A.4.1 in 25 components, discretion was limited, and 18 components were 
framed similarly to the directive. Still, in six components, discretion extended beyond 
the directive. Contrary to the other two cases, all obligatory provisions were 
transposed. Similarly to the other two cases, the deontic components remained 
mostly similar to those in the directive. The conditions and aims mostly constrained 
discretion.
 The conditions regarding access to the labour market were more specific in aims 
and conditions than in the RCD. Dutch transposition measures detailed the period for 
which asylum seekers may work per year, and the documents and administrative 
steps to be taken by applicants and employers (condition of Art 13.2 RCD).
 Coming to material conditions, Art 13.1 RCD contained no condition component, 
but Dutch law introduced a constraining condition specifying that benefits need to be 
given ‘in any case.’ Weekly allowances for food, clothes, and other expenses need to 
be in cash and are listed in detail, including public transport allowances. Although the 
COA could decide whether the asylum seekers’ own resources are checked, the 
conditions under which this was possible constrained the agency’s discretion. In 
contrast to the other two cases, access to NGOs was regulated in more detail than in 
the directive (Art 14.5 RCD). The main issue not regulated by fixed guidelines was the 
distribution of asylum seekers across the centres. Contrary to the directive, which 
holds that transfer from one centre to another should only occur ‘if necessary,’ there 
was no such condition in Dutch law (Art 14.4 RCD). However, the other two countries 
did not include this provision at all in their legislation.
 Similarly to France, an emergency system existed, but it only delegated discretion 
in exceptional cases to the Secretary of Justice, not to practical implementers 
(Art. 15.2 RCD). Concerning health care, the transposition decree referred to the 
health insurance scheme, which specifies health coverage in detail (Art. 15.1 RCD).
 The Dutch case is puzzling in light of the case-specific theoretical expectations. 
Despite the absence of marked policy conflict and moderate transaction costs, 
transposition measures were rather constraining. Features rather characteristic of the 
transposition context can, again, explain this surprising finding. Similar to the German 
case, pre­existing preferences of the agenda-setter to change as little as possible in 
the domestic laws dominated the Dutch transposition process (Resp. 14, 19, 
Odysseus_Report_Nl 2006). Thus, the directive did not modify preferences of the 
Dutch transposition actors to stay in close control of the central reception agency. 
Introducing more discretionary provisions into Dutch legislation would have raised 
new transaction costs by opening a national debate on reception beyond the 
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directive. The legislator had no incentives to introduce new discretion into already 
detailed reception laws. Similarly to the German case, the Dutch case shows that the 
implicit assumption of domestic delegation theories that leading ministries prefer a 
change in the status quo does not always hold in the transposition context.
 So far, the effect of the status quo on transposition has mainly received attention 
from Europeanisation scholars, who have relied on the goodness of fit argument 
(see Duina, 1997; Knill and Lenschow, 1998). The goodness of fit argument holds that 
successful compliance depends on the fit between European policy requirements 
and existing institutions at the national level. The argument received mixed support in 
explaining compliance, as it fails to account for domestic preferences (Haverland, 
2000; Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006; Falkner et al., 2007). Yet even though 
domestic actors will not always want to maintain the status quo, they may want to do 
so in specific cases – a situation that breaks with delegation theories. Thus, the 
German and Dutch cases show that domestic delegation theories need to account 
for the possibility that domestic actors involved in transposition want to maintain the 
status quo. Table 4.2 summarises the findings of the three case studies.
Table 4.2   Findings of the three transposition cases
Country Risk of deviation:
Policy Conflict 
between practical 
implementers and 
leading ministry
Transaction costs:
Conflict between 
transposing actors 
Discretion Particularity 
of transposition 
process
France Moderate Low Low  
(with some 
exceptions)
Germany Moderate Low High Unified preferences 
for status quo Netherlands Low Moderate Low
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7.  Conclusion
This paper set out to investigate to what extent transposition actors delegate discretion 
contained in EU directives to practical implementers and to what extent domestic 
delegation theories account for the variation. The chapter formulated two theoretical 
expectations based on the well-established domestic delegation literature (Epstein 
and O’Halloran, 1999; Huber and Shipan, 2002). First, policy conflict between 
principal and agent is necessary to make transposition actors willing to constrain 
discretion. Second, discretion is only constrained under low transaction costs.
 The expectations were investigated using the transposition laws of key provisions 
of the 2003 Asylum Reception Condition Directive in France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands. We analysed discretion after transposition systematically by using an 
innovative approach to measure discretion in legal documents, the so-called IGT 
(Crawford and Ostrom, 1995; Siddiki et al., 2012). Three main conclusions derive from 
this study.
 First, the analysis showed that all three countries delegated some of the directive’s 
discretion to practical implementers or even extended discretion beyond the margins 
set by the directive. Thus, even if states formally comply with EU law, they do not 
always settle for point-specific positions within the margins of discretion, as implicitly 
assumed by the transposition literature. Additionally, contrary to assumptions of 
some EU delegation studies, member states do not always use EU discretion to tailor 
their national law to stay in control of practical implementation (Franchino, 2007). 
Instead, states differed in the level of customisation of EU law (Thomann, 2015). Such 
passing of discretion to practical implementers forces implementers on the ground to 
determine the eventual outcomes of EU law. This highlights the importance of also 
studying the activities of national administrators beyond legal compliance when 
applying EU law in practice. Connected to this aspect, the considerable level of 
discretion left after transposition to practical implementers raises normative questions 
of accountability and legal certainty.
 The second main finding of this analysis is that in the transposition context, 
theories developed to explain the delegation of discretion in national statutes could 
only partly explain the variance of discretion left to practical implementers. The 
French case fits the theories best. Under moderate policy conflict between decision 
makers and practical implementers, coupled with the absence of veto players with 
divergent preferences and thus, low transaction costs, French transposition laws 
were relatively constrained. However, the German and Dutch cases show that the 
particularities of the transposition context need to be taken into account as well. 
While there was moderate policy conflict between transposition actors and practical 
implementers in the German case, transposition actors had unified preferences to 
maintain the legal status quo of asylum reception. The Dutch case showed this 
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mechanism even more explicitly by challenging the necessity of established conditions. 
Dutch transposition actors maintained constraining laws, even though policy conflict 
between implementers and decision makers was absent and transaction costs were 
moderate.
 The phenomenon that in contrast to domestic lawmaking, transposition does not 
necessarily include actors who advocate changes in the legal status quo, can explain 
this surprising finding. With this inductive finding, we add to the domestic delegation 
and the EU implementation literature. With regard to the domestic delegation 
literature, we add that this literature’s implicit assumption that domestic actors want 
to change the status quo may not hold in the transposition context. Domestic actors 
confronted with EU legislation may want to maintain the domestic legal status quo. As 
a result, in the transposition context, policy conflict and transaction costs are only 
necessary conditions for constraining transposition if the costs of modifying 
pre-existing levels of discretion and transposition actors’ preferences for the legal 
status quo are incorporated. This aspect may apply more broadly to domestic 
lawmaking. So far, delegation theories have focused on major legal revisions where 
agenda-setters can be assumed to be proponents of change (Epstein and O’Halloran, 
1999; Huber and Shipan, 2002). However, federal systems may force lower-level 
agenda-setters to introduce legislation, just like in the EU setting. In addition, the 
eagerness of agenda-setters to invest in minor legal revisions, which constitute a 
large part of domestic lawmaking, may not always be pronounced.
 Moreover, our study contributes to the EU implementation and compliance 
literature. This literature devoted some attention to the status quo when relying on the 
goodness-of-fit to explain timely and correct transposition (Héritier, 1996; Duina, 
1997). However, the assumption that member states always aim to keep the status 
quo received considerable criticism (Haverland, 2000; Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 
2006; Falkner et al., 2007). Our theoretical model goes beyond the original goodness- 
of-fit literature by allowing for both conservative and reformist preferences.
 Finally, from a methodological point of view, this study showed that the coding of 
discretion with the help of the IGT provided much richer information on the substance 
of discretion than existing quantitative measures. The tool revealed that the deontic, 
which is the most widely used aspect to evaluate the level of discretion in quantitative 
studies, is not the only relevant component that determines the level of discretion in 
legislation. This study showed that transposition actors might also pass the buck to 
implementers by maintaining or extending discretion along the aim and condition 
components. This can have considerable implications for the outcomes of 
implementation and needs further attention when studying discretion.
 Having said this, reflections about external validity are in place: we tested the 
delegation theories in the specific policy area of asylum. Accordingly, the findings of 
this study might be limited to the presence of several scope conditions. First of all, 
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through our case selection, we controlled for policy uncertainty and non-statutory 
mechanisms. Because of the high costs of asylum reception and the political 
sensitivity of the topic, the costs of modifying pre-existing levels of discretion were 
relatively high in all three cases, which strengthened preferences regarding the status 
quo. While this mechanism might be typical for many transposition processes, there 
is in principle also the possibility that national legislators are in favour of changing 
national laws because of EU directives (Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006). In these 
instances, transposition will resemble classical delegation theories more closely.
 Consequently, a next step would be to apply the IGT in a quantitative way to 
contribute to our understanding of how states decide to delegate EU discretion in the 
transposition phase for a wider population of directives, member states, and over 
time. Such follow-up studies would allow for a more fine-grained understanding of 
the origins of the EU’s regulatory patchwork (Héritier, 1996), by testing if the 
peculiarities of the transposition context found inductively in this study apply more 
widely.
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Abstract
This chapter tackles the question of how bureaucratic structures condition frontline 
implementers’ use of European Union (EU) migration law. Adopting an organisational 
perspective, this chapter expects that only under discretion do implementers draw 
independently on original EU law. Empirically, the chapter draws on qualitative 
interviews with migration law implementers in the Netherlands and the German 
Bundesland of North Rhine-Westphalia. The analysis reveals that in the nondiscre-
tionary Dutch structure, frontline implementers only rely on EU law when receiving 
instructions from higher administrative levels. The use of EU law is more diverse in the 
German discretionary structure. Under legal tension, several German frontline 
implementers use EU law parallel to national law. However, not all German respondents 
feel comfortable in interpreting original EU law and jurisprudence. Although structural 
discretion conditions use of EU law, the variation of the German case suggests that 
micro-level factors complement explanations for frontline uses of EU law.
Keywords: discretionary structure, EU implementation, EU migration, frontline 
implementer, organisational theory
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1.  Introduction
The European Union (EU) has centralised much of its regulatory policymaking in 
Brussels. Nevertheless, it relies on national administrative actors to put EU rules into 
practice (Knill and Lenschow, 2005, p. 583). Consequently, national administrators 
are increasingly confronted with transposition laws and EU jurisprudence beside 
national laws and administrative guidelines. This leads to the question: which legal 
authority do implementers eventually follow when there is ambiguity between national 
and EU legislation?
 EU implementation studies only rarely address this question. Instead, the EU 
implementation literature has focused mainly on EU transposition (Mastenbroek, 
2005; Angelova et al., 2012; Treib, 2014). This literature featured national administrations 
as a source of ineffective transposition (Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Kaeding, 2006; 
Falkner et al., 2007; Treib, 2014). Similarly, the limited research on the application of 
EU law has considered administrators as the cause for ineffective EU implementation 
(Hille and Knill, 2006; Versluis, 2007; Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2013).
 Studies on national administrations in the EU context (Egeberg, 2008; Trondal, 
2011a; Wockelberg, 2014) provide an alternative view. They argue that under certain 
conditions, national administrations might turn into double-hatted agents who follow 
both national and EU masters (Egeberg and Trondal, 2009). A precondition often 
assumed for double-hatted executive behaviour is that national administrators have 
a direct socialising contact with EU institutions. This assumption has led to a focus on 
higher civil servants who are in direct contact with EU institutions (but see Wockelberg, 
2014).
 Consequently, EU implementation research has, so far, largely neglected the 
role of frontline implementers (Conant, 2012, p. 30). Nevertheless, the frontline of 
EU implementation is a particularly important level of implementation because it 
determines whether and to what extent EU laws reach their intended recipients. 
Through frontline implementation, EU law may become meaningful, even when it is 
not fully transposed. In turn, EU law remains meaningless if implementers do not 
apply it on the ground.
 Tackling the gap of frontline EU implementation studies, Dörrenbächer (2017a34) 
has shown considerable individual-level variation among frontline implementers’ use 
of EU law. However, her study investigated a single country, and did not discuss the 
role of bureaucratic structure for frontline uses of EU law. Consequently, this study 
investigates how bureaucratic structures condition the use of EU law among national 
frontline implementers.
34 This is chapter 6 of this dissertation.
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In order to tackle this question, the study relies on organisational theories. Organisational 
theories expect that human rationality is institutionalised, embedded and contextualised 
(Simon, 1965; Egeberg, 1999, p. 159). Organisational variables constitute systematic 
biases that regulate, constitute and construct political and administrative decision- 
making (Trondal, 2011a; Henökl and Trondal, 2015). Following this perspective, 
organisational structures also condition executive behaviour towards EU law (Trondal 
and Veggeland, 2003; Egeberg, 2008; Trondal, 2011a; Wockelberg, 2014). Applying 
organisational theories to the frontline, this study expects that implementers in discretion- 
constrained structures use EU law only when they receive filtered instructions from 
national political and administrative higher-ups. By contrast, in discretionary structures 
frontline implementers will act as independent experts relying on EU and national law 
as they see fit.
 By focusing on the frontline of EU implementation, this study strives to enhance 
our understanding of EU implementation beyond the predominant focus on EU 
transposition and higher-level administrators. Moreover, by applying an organisational 
perspective, this study responds to the appeal by Hupe and Buffat (2014, p. 549) 
to move frontline studies beyond individual-level variation. Frontline research often 
ignores macro-institutional factors and comparative research is rare. EU implementation 
provides a particularly suitable context to start filling this gap because the same EU 
legal stimuli confront implementers across bureaucratic structures.
 To investigate the theoretical expectations, the study draws on interview data of 
42 Dutch and German migration law implementers. The field of migration fulfils the 
EU-level scope conditions of a highly discretionary policy field in which national 
frontline implementers are regularly confronted with tension between legal levels. The 
Netherlands and Germany share a range of background factors such as a developed 
national migration law, similar influx of migrants and a legalistic administrative culture. 
However, in the migration sector, bureaucratic structures differ considerably. The 
Dutch implementation structure limits frontline discretion, whereas the German 
structure leaves considerable discretion.
 The analysis reveals that both Dutch and German frontline implementers are 
aware of the origins of the laws they apply. Nevertheless, they use original EU law and 
EU jurisprudence in highly diverse ways. Dutch frontline implementers use EU law 
only when it is filtered through the national ministry or their agency’s policy department. 
By contrast, the majority of German respondents use EU law as a parallel legal order 
alongside national and Länder law. Thus, German respondents sometimes consult 
and apply original EU law and jurisprudence along with their professional expertise. 
However, factors at the individual and organisational-level influence how comfortable 
the German respondents feel in acting as independent experts.
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2.   Theory section: An organisational perspective  
on frontline uses of EU law
Frontline implementers are public workers who carry out and enforce actions required 
by laws and public policies (Meyers and Vorsanger, 2003, p. 154). They handle 
individual transactions between the law and its target groups by deciding on the 
distribution of rights and benefits such as unemployment benefits, tax refunds and 
residence permits. Although final decisions are formally handed down by the 
executive agency, in practice it is the individual frontline implementer who decides 
how laws are interpreted in relation to real cases (Bovens and Zouridis, 2002). 
Frontline implementers are formally not included in policymaking. As such, they are 
also not involved in EU policymaking or transposition. During implementation, they 
seldom have direct contact with EU institutions and the national political level, as 
opposed to higher civil servants. Consequently, when the responsible national 
ministries and higher administrators fully incorporate EU law and jurisprudence into 
national law, frontline implementers play no pronounced role in EU decision-making 
and implementation.
 Nevertheless, taking the findings of the EU transposition literature seriously, one 
can assume that national legislators and administrators do not always transpose EU 
directives in time or fully into national law (Mastenbroek, 2005; Steunenberg and 
Toshkov, 2009; Treib, 2014). Moreover, administrative guidelines are not always 
adjusted to EU law, or Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) rulings 
challenge national instructions, making EU jurisprudence directly applicable. These 
situations can create ambiguities between European and national legal guidelines 
that trickle down to the frontline of implementation (see Dörrenbächer, 2017a).
 To investigate how frontline implementers use EU law across administrative 
systems, this study relies on organisational theory. Organisational theory builds on 
the assumption that formal structures create systematic biases in public policy 
because they provide cognitive and normative shortcuts and categories that simplify 
and guide behaviour (Egeberg, 1999). In other words, organisations provide cognitive 
maps that reduce transaction costs by providing cues for appropriate decisions 
(March and Olsen, 1998; Trondal, 2011a).
 Previous studies have shown that organisational theory proves useful in 
explaining executive behaviour in multilevel administrative systems (Egeberg, 2008; 
Trondal, 2011a). For example, Trondal and Veggeland (2003), and Beyers and Trondal 
(2004) have shown how national administrative structures influence the extent to 
which national civil servants act upon national political interest or professional 
expertise when negotiating EU law.
 Applied to domestic implementation of EU policies, Egeberg (2008) has argued 
that the more fragmented national ministerial agencies are, the more the Commission 
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can steer administrative behaviour. By contrast, bureaucrats in tightly coupled 
agencies with limited autonomy continue to follow national ministerial signals when 
implementing EU policies. Similarly, Trondal (2011a) finds that domestic administrative 
structures such as vertical and horizontal specialisation condition executive behaviour 
towards EU law.
 Wockelberg (2014) has explored these mechanisms further by investigating the 
role conceptions of civil servants in the later stage of EU implementations. She has 
argued that a certain level of autonomy may be necessary for national civil servants 
to see themselves as EU servants and to make implementation choices accordingly. 
Although she found limited support for this hypothesis, her results show that national 
civil servants with limited autonomy consider themselves primarily as national servants, 
and civil servants in fragmented agencies consider themselves as independent 
experts when implementing EU law.
 Applying these insights to the frontline of implementation, one can make a very 
similar argument, namely that the level of frontline discretion determines the use 
of EU law. As Bach and Jann (2010), and Christensen and Laegreid (2009) have 
pointed out, frontline implementers operate under diverse structural discretion. As a 
result, the degree of discretion granted to frontline bureaucracies influences how 
implementers experience their legal environment and how they apply the law (Hupe 
and Buffat, 2014).
 One can identify three structural dimensions that capture frontline discretion: (1) 
the number of national principals, (2) the monitoring relationship between national 
principals and frontline organisation and (3) internal frontline organisational controls. 
Starting with the number of national principals, multi-principal settings encourage 
competition between principals who may steer in different directions (Whitford, 2005; 
Dehousse, 2008). This forces frontline implementers to decide which principal they 
follow in their everyday decision-making (May and Winter, 2009). The number of 
national principals differs, particularly between central and federal structures. 
Centralised structures confront frontline implementers with a single rule-making 
principal. By contrast, in federal arrangements there are central and local principals. 
Consequently, Whitford (2002) holds that decentralised implementation results in a 
net loss of control over implementation and frontline discretion.
 Besides the number of principals, the monitoring relationship between the 
political principal(s) and the frontline organisation designates the extent of discretion 
implementers have. In tightly monitored systems, political principals rely on institu-
tionalised oversight mechanisms such as budgetary controls and quality checks 
(McCubbins et al., 1987; Huber et al., 2001, pp. 334–335). Distribution of such 
mechanisms across principals or a lack of institutionalisation results in discretion.
 Finally, internal organisational controls limit frontline discretion (Lipsky, 1980). 
For example, the existence of explicit production targets, strict divisions of frontline 
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labour and centralised flows of information limit the discretionary space of the frontline 
implementers. Similarly, the replacement of client contact with fixed computer manuals 
can limit frontline discretion (Bovens and Zouridis, 2002). Table 5.1 summarises the 
characteristics of discretionary and nondiscretionary frontline structures.
 How do differences in structural discretion relate to the use of EU law? On the 
basis of the discussion above, it can be expected that frontline implementers who 
experience control from only one national political principal are not used to legal 
stimuli outside the central national legislation. In line with the principal-agent theory, 
national parent ministries as direct principals control the implementing agent (Epstein 
and O’Halloran, 1994; Huber and Shipan, 2002; McCubbins and Schwartz, 2009). 
This formal relationship suggests that implementers draw on national law as the 
single centre of executive authority without relying independently on EU law (Trondal, 
2011a). In combination with tight national oversight and organisational control, a 
single national principal will discourage implementers from relying on original EU law. 
Consequently, implementers may not be aware of the origins of the laws they apply. 
Furthermore, under legal tension, such frontline implementers will not consult original 
EU directives or CJEU rulings. Instead, they will prioritise national political and 
administrative instructions. Among higher civil servants, Trondal (2011a) labels such 
administrative behaviour ministry­driven. Similarly, Trondal and Veggeland (2003) 
refer to administrators who typically give priority to national interests as government 
representatives. Applied to the frontline, this leads to the first expectation:
Expectation 1: Frontline implementers who operate in a nondiscretionary structure 
do not use EU law independently of national law and instructions.
Next, implementers who operate in discretionary structures may be used to varying 
legal stimuli. Limited national and organisational monitoring and multiple principals 
leave frontline implementers with discretion to use the different legal authorities 
Table 5.1   Nondiscretionary and discretionary structures 
Indicators Non-discretionary structure Discretionary structure 
Nr. of principals Single principal Multiple principals 
Monitoring relationship Tight monitoring power: e.g. 
budget control, reporting duties 
etc.
Decentralised sanctioning,  
non-institutionalised control  
mechanisms
Organisational control High division of labour
Tight production targets  
Centralised flow of information
Little client contact
Low division of labour 
No production targets 
Fragmented information channels
Much client contact
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alongside each other. Thus, in discretionary structures implementers may use EU law 
parallel to national law by developing strategies to cope with legal tension and 
ambiguity in line with their professional norms (Christensen, 1991; Wockelberg, 2014) 
and capacity limitations (Lipsky, 1980; Tummers et al., 2015). Trondal (2011a) calls 
such administrative behaviour compound behaviour. It implies that implementers are 
aware of the different legal sources and use their professional expertise when 
consulting original EU law alongside national law and administrative instructions. 
Thus, the following can be expected:
Expectation 2: Frontline implementers who operate in a discretionary structure use 
EU law independently and alongside national law and instructions.
Finally, Trondal (2011a) identifies a third executive behaviour towards EU law, namely: 
Commission­driven behaviour. This behaviour captures national administrators who 
act as supranational actors (Trondal and Veggeland, 2003). These actors may bypass 
domestic government by fully shifting their accountabilities to the EU level. However, 
studies have shown that Commission-driven behaviour is rare (Trondal, 2011a; 
Wockelberg, 2014). Frontline implementers are even less likely to engage in such 
behaviour than higher-level administrators are because they lack the direct contact 
with EU institutions. Thus, direct steering by EU institutions and socialisation effects 
are unlikely. Table 5.2 summarises the expected uses of EU law at the front line of 
implementation.
 As Egeberg (1999, p. 161) has stressed, administrative structures are not the only 
factors that affect eventual decisions. Organisational theories do not preclude that 
individual-level variation, sectoral and cultural aspects influence frontline 
implementation. Bureaucratic structures constitute merely a systemic bias that 
conditions the decision-making process. Without neglecting that there may be 
complementing explanations, this study investigates how this systematic bias affects 
EU implementation at the frontline.
 Moreover, frontline discretion may not only result from organisational structures. 
Instead, national principals may also deliberately delegate discretion to implementers 
(Epstein and O’Halloran, 1994; Huber and Shipan, 2002). For the purpose of this 
study, the policy field of migration is selected, in which national principals typically 
aim to stay in control of EU law interpretation. Although Dörrenbächer and 
Mastenbroek (2017)35 have shown that national transposition actors also sometimes 
delegate EU discretion down to practical implementers, they highlight that 
transposition actors typically do so to maintain administrative and legal structures. In 
the field of migration, discretion is typically not delegated to explicitly encourage 
35 This is chapter 4 of this dissertation.
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frontline implementers to circumvent national instructions or to leave interpretations 
to the frontline.
3. EU-level scope conditions: The field of EU migration law
To investigate the expectations, EU-level factors need to remain constant and fulfil 
some scope conditions. The first condition is that a multilevel legal context should 
exist with legal ambiguities between the EU and national law. Second, EU-level 
institutions need to have limited power in implementing EU law and in directly steering 
national implementers. Finally, frontline implementers across bureaucratic structures 
need to determine similar issues with comparable levels of tension between national 
and EU law.
 This study investigates frontline use of EU law in the field of migration. Migration 
is not only a highly topical field of EU law but also provides for the EU-level scope 
conditions. First, migration is a relatively newly harmonised policy field (Dörrenbächer, 
2017a). Most EU legislation only provides minimum criteria and leaves considerable 
discretion to national legislators and implementers (Hartmann, 2016). Contrary to 
regulations that are directly applicable, the most important EU legal instruments in 
the field of migration are directives that need to be incorporated into national 
legislation. National transposition actors are often reluctant to adjust national laws to 
EU obligations, which can lead to legal tension between legal levels (Dörrenbächer 
et al., 2015). In turn, insufficient transposition and vague EU rules have provoked a 
large body of CJEU rulings that annul or challenge national laws. In sum, these char-
acteristics create ambiguities between national rules and vague EU rules that may 
trickle down to the frontline.
 With respect to the second scope condition, the EU has no direct control tools to 
steer frontline migration law implementation. Although the EU established supra- 
national agencies such as FRONTEX and the European Asylum Support Office to 
assist member states with external borders in their day-to-day border controls, the 
distribution of residence permits and visas remains the task of national and local 
Table 5.2   Conceptualising frontline uses of European Union (EU) law
Use of EU law Awareness Consulting  
original EU law 
Priority  
under tension
National Government Representative No No No
Independent Expert Yes Yes Yes/No
Supranational Actor Yes Yes Yes
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administrations. Domestic migration offices operate at a distance to EU institutions 
and require considerable national frontline activities (Christensen and Laegreid, 
2009; Eule, 2014).
 Finally, in order to ensure comparable frontline decision-making contexts with 
similar levels of legal tension between national and EU law, this study focuses on 
family migration. Family migration is one of the most common reasons for migration 
in the EU (Kofman, 2004). The most prominent EU legal instrument is the Family 
Reunification Directive that regulates third-country family reunification (Strik et al., 
2012). Other relevant EU norms for family migration are the Turkey Association 
Agreement and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Across bureaucratic structures, 
frontline implementers evaluate similar conditions for family visa and residence 
permits. Moreover, the CJEU has challenged national laws of both countries included 
in this study, suggesting that there are comparable levels of legal tension.
4.  Country selection
For the purpose of this study, frontline implementers in the Netherlands and the 
German Bundesland of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) are investigated. This country 
selection allows controlling for a range of contextual factors that could influence uses 
of EU law. First, Germany and the Netherlands have comparable percentages of 
foreigners living on their territory. Second, they have well-developed national 
migration laws and an established implementation apparatus. Third, both countries 
are reluctant transposers of EU migration laws, shown by the transposition of key EU 
legislation such as the Family Reunification Directive or the Returns Directive (Strik et 
al., 2012; Dörrenbächer et al., 2015). Fourth, with respect to EU law, Falkner et al. 
(2007) classified both countries into the so-called ‘world of domestic politics’. 
Following this classification, application of EU law typically runs smoothly once EU 
law is transposed into national law. Finally, both countries share a legalistic 
administrative culture in which the rule of law is deeply embedded in administrative 
practice (Painter and Peters, 2010, p. 22). With respect to family migration, the CJEU 
has challenged the transposition laws of both countries (e.g. Chakroun36, K&A 37 and 
Dogan38).
 Beyond these similarities, the two countries employ highly diverse structures for 
the implementation of family migration law. As will be discussed in more detail below, 
implementation in the Netherlands is centralised, and implementation in Germany is 
highly fragmented, suggesting good conditions to observe differences in structural 
36 C-578/08
37 C-153/14.
38 C-138/13.
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discretion. For the German case, the Bundesland of NRW was chosen. The size of 
NRW is comparable to the Netherlands and limiting the study to one Bundesland 
allows holding constant political and legal conditions at the Bundesland level.
5.  Method and data
In order to investigate the established expectations, interviews with 42 Dutch and 
German migration law implementers inform the analysis. In-depth qualitative data 
were required because explanations and examples of how respondents use EU law 
in their everyday tasks are largely unquantifiable. The qualitative design allowed filling 
the established typology of uses of EU law with meaning, beyond predefined 
behavioural categories. In addition, the interview data allowed tracing the relationship 
between macro-level bureaucratic structure and micro-level descriptions of 
individuals’ uses of EU law. In this way, the study goes beyond correlation designs by 
tracing the causal mechanism (George and Bennett, 2005) between structural 
discretion and uses of EU law.
 The explanatory condition – discretion in bureaucratic structure – was operation-
alised by interviewing four employees of the policy department (beleidsafdeling) of 
the Dutch migration agency and three representatives of two district governments 
(Bezirksregierung) in NRW. These respondents constitute the link between the 
political level and the frontline and provided overviews of bureaucratic structures and 
monitoring tools. In addition, organisational control mechanisms were discussed in 
the frontline interviews. The information was crosschecked with administrative 
documents.
 To investigate frontline uses of EU law, 14 caseworkers of the Dutch migration 
agency and 21 German caseworkers in NRW were interviewed from spring 2015 to 
the beginning of 2016. In the Dutch sample, respondents from all three departments 
of the central migration agency, which handle family migration, were interviewed. For 
the German sample, respondents from 10 local foreign offices that decide on family 
migration residence permits and visa were interviewed.39The ten offices include local 
offices in large and small cities as well as on the countryside.
 The number of German respondents was slightly higher because of the great 
variation between local offices that required additional crosschecking of the findings. 
Interviews lasted up to 190 minutes. In both countries, interviews were conducted 
individually or in groups of two to three. Besides accounting for the time constraints 
of the respondents, group interviews helped to determine whether responses differed 
39 In Germany the diplomatic missions formally decide on family visas, with the foreign registration offices 
acting as co-decision makers. Residence permits are decided by the foreign registration offices.
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when their colleagues were observing them (see Dörrenbächer, 2017a). Moreover, 
this data collection method had the advantage of interviewing respondents in their 
usual working environment where respondents typically share offices with colleagues. 
Another advantage of the group interviews is that they allowed observing discussions 
among colleagues, which helped to uncover variation in approaches to EU law. 
A disadvantage of the group interviews was that junior caseworkers participated less 
actively in the discussions than their more advanced colleagues. With respect to the 
reported use of EU law, the analysis revealed no systematic difference between 
individual and group interviews. Interviews were semi-structured, conducted in Dutch 
and German, respectively, recorded40 and transcribed into English.
 In order to operationalise use of EU law, the interview guide included questions 
on the role of EU law in respondents’ daily work. That allowed determining the extent 
to which respondents are aware of the origin of EU law in their field of work. To 
investigate whether respondents consult original EU legislation, the interviewer asked 
respondents to describe the practices following the emergence of new CJEU rulings 
and EU directives. In addition, respondents were asked whether they recalled 
situations of legal conflict and how they handle such situations.
 The strategy for coding the interviews was to sort responses systematically 
according to themes that correspond with the conceptualisation of the three indicators 
of uses of EU law: awareness, consultation of original EU legislation and giving 
priority to EU law (see Table A.5.1 in the Appendix for this chapter). Moreover, 
analysing the interviews allowed tracing how respondents embedded their use of EU 
law in their perceived discretion. The following section first discusses the two settings 
by characterising them as discretionary and nondiscretionary structures. This is 
followed by a presentation of uses of EU law among implementers in the two systems.
6.   Structural discretion in Dutch and German 
migration offices
Starting with the number of principals in the Dutch system, the first aspect to note is 
that implementation of migration law is highly centralised. The central frontline 
organisation is the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND), which is responsible 
for processing visa applications and residence permits. The IND stands directly 
under the Ministry of Security and Justice as single political principal.
 In contrast to the Dutch structure, German frontline migration administrations are 
steered by a number of different political principals. The main frontline organisations 
40  Interviews with respondents of the district government could not be recorded due to concerns of the 
respondents.
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are the Ausländerbehörden, which are sub-departments of the German counties and 
cities (Kreise and Kreisfreie Städte). There are 82 offices in the Bundesland of NRW 
(correspondence with Ministry of Internal Affairs in NRW). Three political actors can 
affect the activities of the Ausländerbehörden, namely the federal legislator, the Land 
and municipal leaders.
 As regards the monitoring relationship, the Dutch case again fits into a nondiscre-
tionary structure. The IND, as a contract agency (agentschap), receives a central 
state budget and a framework document lays down the hierarchical relationship with 
the ministry (Van Thiel, 2001, p. 8). The IND policy department constitutes the link 
between the political level and frontline implementation in the decision-making units. 
When new EU legislation comes about, the departments of the parent ministry 
consults the IND policy department to draft the transposition laws and implementation 
instructions for the frontline (IND_PolDep 1, 2).
 By contrast, the monitoring relationships between the Ausländerbehörden and 
the different political principals are fragmented. Similarly to the Netherlands, new 
migration laws including the transposition of EU laws are the responsibility of the 
national level. However, the federal level has no direct tools to monitor frontline 
implementation. The Ministry of Interior of the Bundesland interprets and clarifies 
federal migration laws through decrees. For the Ausländerbehörden, implementation 
is a delegated task without autonomy (Pflichtaufgabe nach Weisung) meaning they 
have to obey Länder decrees.
 In order to monitor the activities of the Ausländerbehörden, NRW delegates the 
subject supervisions to five district governments (Bezirksregierungen). These 
intermediate administrative bodies communicate between the Ausländerbehörden 
and the Ministry of the Land (NRW_BZR1, NRW_BZR2). The Bezirkregierung can be 
compared with the policy department of the IND. However, contrary to the policy 
department, the Bezirksregierungen are only connected to the Ministry of the 
Bundesland. In addition, they have limited sanctioning power and are less directly 
involved in policymaking of the ministry (NRW_BZR1, NRW_BZR2). The Bezirksre­
gierung can conduct local investigations of files and respond to complaints. However, 
each year only one or two Ausländerbehörden per district are investigated. The 
current refugee crisis limits these controls further (NRW_BZR1, NRW_BZR2). The Be­
zirksregierungen have no direct sanctioning power and only report to the Ministry of 
the Land and the major of the relevant municipality. Municipalities and counties 
operate the Ausländerbehörden and incur personal and financial consequences. 
Thus, political monitoring is fragmented, suggesting larger margins of structural 
discretion for frontline migration organisations in NRW than for their Dutch 
counterparts.
 With respect to internal organisational controls, the first aspect to note is the high 
division of labour within the Dutch IND. The IND employs around 3,000 employees in 
517635-L-bw-Dorrenbacher
Processed on: 20-2-2018 PDF page: 130
130
CHAPTER 5
a hierarchical structure (IND_PolDep1). At each decision-making location, there are 
several teams of circa 30–40 decision makers (IND_PolDep2). Strategic and 
operational managers oversee the day-to-day work in the teams, but they are not 
directly involved in substantive implementation (IND_A.2). For substantive matters, 
senior decision makers supervise new employees and link the frontline to the policy 
department (IND_C.1).
 The IND divides frontline workers into decision makers and practitioners. The latter 
pre-screen visa and residence applications (IND_A.7). Decision makers decide on 
the more complex cases and may issue rejections. The focus of this study is on the 
latter. Among employees, there are different specialisations based on the grounds for 
migration (e.g. family migration, highly skilled migration, labour migration) and deci-
sion-making stage (e.g. first instance and appeal decisions) (IND_PolDep1, 2). 
Furthermore, there are specialised units for follow-up controls (traject controle), 
medical exceptions and hardship clauses (IND_A.1). In line with a discretion-con-
strained organisational structure, caseworkers rarely have personal client contact, 
but take decisions mainly based on documents (Bovens and Zouridis, 2002).
 Finally, there is a fully developed system of quality checks through peer review. 
The IND computer system randomly selects a number of decisions per week, which 
are controlled by decision makers and seniors at other locations (IND_A.1). The IND 
also established benchmarks of the number of hours frontline implementers have at 
their disposal per decision. Although these benchmarks are handled in a flexible way, 
they give the seniors and managers control over frontline activities (IND_B.2). The 
IND policy department distributes implementation instructions including instructions 
for EU law and jurisprudence through the organisation’s intranet (IND PolDep1). 
Furthermore, the IND’s judicial department keeps track of all jurisdictions and offers 
advice to decision makers (IND_B.1).
 Coming to internal organisational control in the Ausländerbehörden, there is 
huge variation. Similarly to the IND, in big city offices, there is a relatively high division 
of labour. Sub-departments, working groups and team leaders oversee the casework 
(locations A, B, C). Moreover, large offices have judicial departments and research 
departments that screen new legislation and advise employees.
 However, in small cities and counties the division of labour is much lower 
(location J, I, H, G). Frontline workers in these offices are all-rounders and decide on 
all migration-related issues of their municipality, ranging from family reunification over 
deportation to citizenship, etc. At the same time, the county offices have more 
employees in the middle civil service compared with bigger offices, which employ 
mainly higher civil servants for the same tasks (location I). The office leadership is 
flexible in organising frontline tasks. Contrary to the IND, caseworkers in NRW have 
daily personal client contact. There is no intranet that connects the Ausländer­
behörden within the Land, let alone within Germany.
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In sum, because of the close supervision by the central ministry and the internal 
control tools of the IND, the Dutch implementation structure can be classified as a 
nondiscretionary structure in which frontline implementers have limited room for 
manoeuvre. This makes the Dutch case a least likely case for independent use of EU 
law. By contrast, frontline implementers in NRW operate in a discretionary structure in 
which frontline implementers are less closely watched by a number of different 
principals. Internal organisational controls vary depending on the size of the 
municipality or county and office leadership. Table 5.3 summarises the differences in 
structural discretion.
Beyond the differences in structural discretion, there are some differences between 
German and Dutch frontline implementers regarding their educational background. 
German frontline workers are civil servants in the Middle or Upper Intermediate 
Service (mittlerer or gehobener Dienst). They typically have a Diploma or Bachelor’s 
degree from an administrative school (Fachhochschule für öffentliche Verwaltung). 
The training includes legal specialisations for regulatory agencies. However, 
according to the respondents, the curriculum typically does not include specific 
trainings in migration law. The Dutch civil servants typically have a social science 
background, but increasingly there are also caseworkers with a legal-university 
background. Generally, these differences in education do not point at distinct patterns 
towards the use of EU law. Similarly to the German caseworkers, Dutch frontline 
Table 5.3   Bureaucratic structures in Dutch and German migration administrations
Netherlands Germany: NRW
Frontline 
organisation
Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (IND)
Local foreign registration offices 
(Ausländerbehörden)
Number of 
principals
Single national principal Several principals at federal,  
Länder, district and local level
Monitoring 
relationship
Several monitoring tools Few monitoring tools
Organisational 
control 
Tight control Varying levels of control
Classification Non-discretionary structure Discretionary structure  
(but with diverse organisational controls)
Expectation of  
use of EU law
National Government 
Representatives
Independent Experts
Note: NRW=North Rhine-Westphalia.
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implementers usually have no prior expertise in migration law. Following the 
respondents, caseworkers receive training in using legal texts and for deciding on 
individual cases on the job through supervision from their peers or complementary 
seminars on specific legal topics. In both systems, frontline implementers receive 
typically no training specific for EU law.
7.  Uses of EU law across implementation structures
To explore the expectations, the following section investigates use of EU law by 
examining awareness and consultation of EU law and practices in case of 
contradictions between EU and national law. Table 5.4 summarises the results.
Awareness
Starting with the Dutch respondents, the first aspect to note is that all respondents 
were aware of the origins of the laws they apply. All respondents specified CJEU 
rulings and EU directives when outlining decision-making practices. Three 
respondents argued that though they were aware of EU law, it played no critical role 
for them. According to them, EU law is not real law but only jurisdiction (IND_B.1); in 
other words:
  For me personally, it (EU law) does not play a role. Of course, I know that the 
laws we have (…) derived from EU law but in fact, this is now national law, so 
it does not really matter where this law comes from. (IND_A.3)
Nevertheless, the majority of Dutch respondents (11) argued that EU law plays a 
major role for them. These respondents identified national laws that changed because 
of EU law. In addition, three respondents highlighted that EU law gave them new 
Table 5.4   Uses of European Union (EU) law by Dutch and German migration  
law implementers
Awareness Consultation Priority  
under conflict 
General behaviour 
 towards EU law
The Netherlands Yes Rarely Always national 
instructions
National Government 
Representatives
Germany: NRW Yes/No Often EU law as parallel 
legal order
Experts but also 
reluctance
Note: NRW=North Rhine-Westphalia.
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room for manoeuvre (IND_B.3; IND_B.4; IND_A.5). Overall, even in nondiscretionary 
structures, respondents experienced an influence of EU law on their work.
 As regards decision makers in NRW, the interviews showed that respondents of 
all foreign registration offices but one agreed that EU law affected their working 
practices. Similarly, as in the Dutch case, many respondents listed substantive 
influences. Respondents in eight of the ten foreign registration offices referred to EU 
law mainly as a source of new complexity in their work (NRW_I.1; NRW_J.2; NRW_A.1; 
NRW_A.2; NRW_F.1; NRW_F.2; NRW_C.1; NRW_C.2; NRW_E.1; NRW_B.1).
 Overall, respondents in the Dutch and German systems were aware of the 
substantive influence of EU law on migration law. However, respondents, particularly 
from the smaller Ausländerbehörden, doubted their own expertise regarding EU law 
more than did the Dutch respondents:
  (…) honestly, I have to say, I do not always have everything in my head. A lot 
of these things (EU law) just slip through. Sometimes these issues are also 
not really forwarded to us. (NRW_J.2)
This perception of low EU expertise may limit independent use of EU law, constituting 
a challenge for the established expectations.
Consultation of EU law
The next indicator for different uses of EU law is whether frontline implementers ever 
read and consult original EU legislation and judgments. Across the two systems, the 
interviews showed considerable variation. Dutch respondents rarely indicated that 
they read original EU legislation. All respondents explained that when EU rulings 
emerge, they only consult the national policy instructions based on the ruling: ‘We 
only use the elements which we get from the policy department’ (IND_A.1). Similarly, 
another respondent explained: ‘You cannot expect from a decision maker to read all 
these judicial texts and then just apply it. For that, you really need the specialist of the 
IND’ (IND_B.4). One of the IND frontline managers confirmed this practice as the 
desirable organisational practice:
  Our employees are not hired to read all the jurisprudence independently and 
to interpret them on their own. This would cost way too much time. There are 
people hired for such things in the policy department. Our people here are 
hired to take decisions and not to read jurisprudence. (IND_A.4)
Only when CJEU rulings come about for which there are not yet any national 
instructions, respondents described that they sometimes look up the original 
judgement. However, this only happens when migrants or their lawyers explicitly rely 
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on new EU rulings to argue in favour of their case (IND_C1; IND_B.4; IND_A.3; 
IND_B.2; IND_B.1). In such situations, they hold the case until they receive instructions 
from higher administrative levels, as explained by this respondent:
  I would tell them that the ruling has so far no direct influence on our national 
policies. I cannot tell them what that ruling means for them. So, a decision 
maker would not look into the original EU law to adjust his practices. 
(IND_C.2)
With respect to German respondents, practices were diverse. The leader of one of 
the larger offices argued that he would not expect his employees to look into EU 
rulings themselves, and therefore relied on a pre-screening procedure (NRW_E.1). 
Nevertheless, when new EU legislation or jurisdiction emerged, most respondents 
argued that they would, first of all, read the original documents or they would consult 
interpretations of legal journals to learn more about EU rules (e.g. NRW_D.1; NRW_H.1; 
NRW_H.2; NRW_A.1; NRW_A.2; NRW_J.2; NRW_F.1; NRW_F.2; NRW_I.1; NRW_B.1). 
The respondents in NRW were used to looking into different legal sources and their 
interpretations. However, there was variation across offices. The differences are 
illustrated well by a respondent who recently transferred from a bigger city office into 
a small county office:
  In my old office, I was part of the team: legal certainty. We filtered new 
legislation and prepared the other caseworkers when new EU rules came 
about. We gave them briefings so that everyone acted upon the new rules in 
the same way. Here, we also get the information, but we are free if we actually 
read the new directives and decrees, and even if I apply them in practice. 
Nobody really checks that. (NRW_J.2)
The quote indicates that frontline implementers in smaller offices have considerable 
discretion at their disposal regarding consultation of EU law.
Practices in case of legal tension
Turning to situations in which EU and national law compete with each other, five 
Dutch respondents explained that they have never encountered such situations. The 
fact that they rarely read original EU laws and do not search for interpretations of EU 
law outside the national administrative instructions may explain this perception. 
Nevertheless, the majority still recalled situations in which EU law demands different 
practices than national laws. In the context of family migration, respondents referred 
mostly to the more liberal approaches in the European Charter of Human Rights or 
the Turkey Association Agreement.
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When asked which laws they use under legal ambiguity, Dutch responses were very 
homogenous. Although some respondents pointed out that EU law stands in principle 
above national law (IND_A.1; IND_A.5), none of them would independently apply EU 
law if it conflicted with national law. Instead, in such situations, respondents notify the 
policy department of their agency. A typical response was: ‘Nobody would start to 
make their own interpretations of the EU judgments. We always wait for official 
instructions’ (IND_A.4). This was justified with respondents’ own understanding of 
their task as implementers: ‘We are implementers, and I have to stay within my level’ 
(IND_A.1). Other colleagues added the following:
  We have a more reluctant approach. We follow the instructions that we get 
once a ruling or law is relevant for our department. So for example with 
Chakroun41, we got a clear guideline of what the ruling means for our daily 
practice. Once there are guidelines we take them of course into account in 
our decision-making. (IND_A.2)
Coming to practices in NRW, responses were much more diverse. Only a few respondents 
with little experience did not recall situations of conflict between EU and national law 
(NRW_J.1). Most respondents recalled situations where they encountered that EU 
directives or judgements were not incorporated in time or only vaguely into national law.
 There was considerable variation in how frontline implementers described their 
use of the different legal levels in case of conflict. One respondent argued that he 
interprets EU law independently (NRW_A.1). He would do so even if it meant 
bypassing national law. The respondent explained that he does not consider it fair 
that the individual migrant has to pay for the failure at the national level in transposing 
directives and rulings on time (see Dörrenbächer, 2017a). Respondents from the Be­
zirksregierung confirmed that because of the supremacy of EU law it was expected 
from the city and district offices to rely on EU law when transposition actors did not 
incorporate EU law within the deadline.
 Despite this expectation, most German respondents adopted more reluctant 
approaches. Typically, the respondents indicated that they would not directly rely on 
directives that were not yet part of German law. They argued that this goes beyond 
their competences. Nevertheless, most German respondents explained that they 
would directly apply CJEU rulings.
 Generally, respondents described that they often put national law, Länder decrees, 
EU directives and CJEU judgements side-by-side to take decisions. In this way, 
they try to fill in gaps in the different legal levels. By ‘putting the laws next to each 
other’ (NRW_J.2) they explained how they distil the principles of EU law and interpret 
41  CJEU ruling challenging Dutch law regarding income conditions for family reunification.
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them in light of national law. Many respondents also explained how they sometimes 
created a ‘line of paragraphs’ (NRW_C.1; NRW_C.2) out of the different legal levels to 
take decisions in individual cases, if the individual legal levels left them with ambiguity. 
In this respect, most respondents argued that EU law:
  (…) constitutes a parallel legal text for us (…). You cannot just open the law 
book and check how to deal with a case. It is a patchwork of all the different 
directives and EU case laws. (NRW_H.2)
Using EU law alongside national law is experienced as a new challenge by many 
implementers, and as one respondent explained: ‘applying EU law is the examination 
of the masters’ (NRW_H.1). In addition, some respondents considered EU law as 
frustrating because they felt discouraged by the different national principals to 
independently rely on new EU law (NRW_F.1; NRW_F.2). As a result, one office leader 
described the emergence of EU rulings as a trial and error process: ‘If you lose the 
second case in front of the administrative court, due to an EU ruling, you will notice 
that maybe in the future you have to consider this aspect’ (NRW_B.1). At the same 
time, particularly in small offices, implementers feel insecure and overwhelmed by 
the many legal levels:
  I have to have so many more things in the back of my mind, and an under- 
standing of where to find all the different laws and I need an understanding 
of how it is meant for each context. Often it is a matter of knowing where  
the discretion actually is. This creates some insecurity. It would be easier if  
I had the law book where I can read literally what conditions there are and 
what exceptions there are. EU law makes it again more blurry. (NRW_J.2)
In small offices, implementers explained that they often ask for advice from their 
district government in case of legal ambiguity. In large offices, the office leadership 
and caseworkers themselves often solve legal ambiguities (NRW_BZR.2).
 Overall, the analysis indicates that whereas EU law has substantive effects on 
their work, the Dutch respondents typically do not struggle with EU law. Instead, they 
rely on the filtered instructions from the ministry or the IND policy department. Instead, 
in the more discretionary German structure, independent compound uses of EU law 
were sometimes required from the frontline implementers. However, practices of the 
German respondents were highly diverse. Although the discretionary structure forces 
implementers to sometimes act as independent experts, respondents differed in how 
comfortable they felt when doing so. Respondents in small Ausländerbehörden 
approached EU law more in line with their Dutch counterparts. This is interesting, as 
they operated under most different discretionary conditions.
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Dutch respondents understood their task as implementers in direct accountability to 
the national legislator, by contrast, respondents in the small Ausländerbehörden 
struggled with the diversity of legal steering signals coupled with a lack of expertise 
and confidence to apply EU law. Frontline implementers in larger German offices saw 
themselves more often as being competent to decide on their own. This active 
approach can be explained by the fact that larger offices provide a more institution-
alised support structure for frontline implementers but are still subject to little external 
supervision.
8.  Conclusion
This study has investigated how bureaucratic structures condition frontline uses of 
EU law. Following an organisational perspective (Egeberg, 1999; Trondal, 2011a; 
Wockelberg, 2014), the chapter added macro-institutional factors and comparative 
research to frontline studies (Hupe and Buffat, 2014, p. 549). It was expected that 
when frontline implementers are confronted with multiple political principals with few 
monitoring tools and little organisational controls, they use EU law more independently 
of national instructions than frontline implementers in discretion-constrained 
structures.
 Using interview data from Dutch and German frontline migration implementers, 
the study largely supports these expectations. Dutch frontline implementers, who 
operate in a nondiscretionary structure, largely acted as national servants. By 
contrast, many German respondents used original EU law parallel to national law. 
The differences between the Dutch and German civil servants in this study resemble 
the differences between the Danish and Swedish implementers studied by 
Wockelberg (2014). Generally, these findings support Trondal’s (2011a) and Egeberg’s 
(2008) claim that organisational variables condition executive behaviour towards EU 
law. Nevertheless, the study challenges Egeberg’s (2008) assumptions that direct 
socialisation contact between national administration and EU institutions is required 
for independent use of EU law. Instead, this study supports Wockelberg’s (2014) 
observation that implementers in the later stages of EU implementation also 
sometimes use EU law independently of national instructions.
 However, going beyond Wockelberg (2014), this study showed that even though 
the German respondents operated under considerable discretion, they did not 
always consider themselves competent enough to act as independent experts. 
Instead, German respondents, particularly those in small local offices, resembled 
their Dutch colleagues in their reluctant approach towards EU law. Yet, the rationale 
for reluctance towards EU law in these most different structures was different. The 
Dutch respondents did not consider it as their task to consult original EU legislation 
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and CJEU rulings, by contrast, the respondents in the small German offices struggled 
with EU law. The findings of this study have implications for organisational theories in 
the EU context. They suggest that whereas discretionary structure may be a necessary 
condition for independent use of EU law, it is not a sufficient condition. In discretionary 
structures, internal organisational structures and micro-level factors complement 
explanations for the use of EU law (see Dörrenbächer, 2017a).
 Finally, this study provides new insight into EU compliance and implementation 
studies, that go beyond the transposition phase (e.g. Knill and Lenschow, 1998; 
Falkner et al., 2007; Versluis, 2007). The Dutch case suggests that discretion-con-
strained administrative structures promote harmonised uses of EU law because 
implementers in such contexts approach laws and administrative guidelines in a 
consistent way. Nevertheless, the downside of this behaviour is that implementers 
may also follow noncompliant national instructions. Moreover, incorporation of CJEU 
rulings on the ground is delayed. By contrast, the German respondents may be more 
Europeanised as their discretion forces them sometimes to consult original EU law. 
This provides the chance to correct vague and noncompliant transposition on the 
ground. However, as the interviews have shown, it is questionable whether frontline 
implementers have the appropriate competencies to interpret original EU laws. 
Although the EU could tackle this issue by offering national implementers more 
guidance on how to use EU law, the diversity of frontline activities in the discretionary 
structures still poses risks for harming legal certainty and accountability. Overall, the 
respondents of this study were very aware of the origins of the laws they apply, and 
their use of law has considerable implications for the final outcomes of EU law. 
Nevertheless, the potential to correct for problematic transposition at the frontline 
should not be overestimated.
 In order to hold EU-level factors constant, this study focused on the specific 
policy context of migration law which is a highly politicised field. This case study 
approach limits the generalisability of the findings. In more technical policy fields, 
implementers might be less aware of EU law due to limited public debates. At the 
same time, the politicisation may make frontline implementers more risk adverse 
which may limit their independent use of EU law. To explore the generalisability of the 
results further, an avenue for future research would be to extend the study across 
policy areas. Moreover, future research should pay more attention to combining 
macro-level with micro-level explanations for frontline use of EU law. A fruitful 
approach could be a cross-country survey research among national implementers, 
which combines individual-level and structural explanations for attitudes and 
approaches towards EU law.
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Abstract
This chapter investigates what motivates the use of European Union (EU) law at the 
street level of migration law implementation. The street level is a crucial venue for 
EU implementation because lower-level implementers critically influence the level 
of EU compliance eventually achieved. Employing a bottom-up approach towards 
implementation, the chapter combines insights from social psychology and the street- 
level literature to develop expectations about the relationship between individuals’ 
motivations and their use of EU law. The study investigates through qualitative 
interviews to what extent German migration administrators use EU law in three 
multilevel decision contexts. The main findings are that uses of EU law vary across 
contexts and individual implementers. Particularly when national regulatory frame- 
works are ambiguous, substantive moral norms and instrumental motivations trigger 
some implementers to rely on EU law. This reliance even has the potential to correct 
for problematic transposition.
Keywords: EU implementation, implementation motivations, migration law, street-level 
bureaucracy
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1.  Introduction
European Union (EU) law increasingly spreads into policy areas which used to be at 
the core of national law. A topical example is EU migration law which gradually shapes 
domestic legislation (Boswell and Geddes, 2011; Zaun, 2016). However, the Union 
lacks an implementation apparatus and relies on national administrations to apply 
its laws (Treib, 2014). This indirect implementation system leads to the question of 
whether individual national administrations turn into ‘double-hatted’ agents, serving 
a national and a European master (Egeberg and Trondal, 2009), and to what extent 
they become ‘guardians of EU law’ (Mastenbroek, 2017).
 These questions have been analysed mainly for higher-level officials at the ministry 
level (Bach et al., 2015). Respectively, in EU implementation studies the practices of 
lower-level implementers remain largely unexplored (but see Gulbrandsen, 2011). 
However, since Lipsky’s (1980) seminal work, it is widely acknowledged that street- 
level implementers at the ‘frontline’, between the laws in the books and actual 
practice, crucially influence the final outcome of policies.
 EU law places street-level implementers at a second frontline, namely between 
domestic and EU regulatory frameworks. The second frontline can lead to new legal 
ambiguities because much EU law introduces fuzzy legal concepts (Treib, 2014, p. 6), 
and national legislators frequently fail to transpose EU law in time or do so in non- 
compliant ways (Angelova et al., 2012; Treib, 2014). This can make EU law directly 
effective and raises the question: to what extent do street-level implementers use 
EU law to solve legal ambiguity and what motivates them when doing so?
 By investigating this question, this study takes up the call by Woll and Jacquot 
(2010) to explore variation in individuals’ motivations for using EU law. So far, most 
compliance studies have adopted top-down perspectives that focus on the member 
state level to explain variation in EU implementation (Thomann and Sager, 2017a). 
These studies have relied on rationalist or constructivist approaches (Dimitrova et al., 
2005; Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006) assuming institutional logics of consequen-
tiality or appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1998).
 Similarly, behavioural perspectives on frontline implementation (Maynard-Moody 
and Musheno, 2012; Tummers et al., 2016) and social psychology studies (Tyler, 2006) 
distinguish between instrumental and normative motivations to explain behaviour. 
Whereas actors driven by instrumental motivations evaluate risks connected to different 
applications of the law, actors driven by normative motivations take guidance from 
procedural or substantive norms. These conceptualisations overlap with institutional 
logics of consequentiality and appropriateness. While institutional actor logics are 
concerned with organisations and individuals, the social psychology literature has 
been proven to be particularly useful to investigate individual-level motivations. 
Therefore, the latter perspective is used in this study.
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Applied to the EU context, it is expected that instrumental motivations discourage use 
of EU law, but normative motivations can generate uses of EU law. By adding the 
behavioural perspective to EU implementation, this study contributes to clarify the 
role of and relationship between the institutional actor logics at the micro level of EU 
implementation. Additionally, the study adds to the emerging bottom-up approaches 
in EU implementation studies that go beyond legal compliance (Thomann, 2015; 
Thomann and Sager, 2017a; Thomann and Zhelyazkova, 2017).
 Furthermore, this study tackles the policy sector bias of many EU implementation 
studies (Treib, 2014; Gollata and Newig, 2017), by exploring the use of EU law and 
implementation motivations in the topical context of EU migration law. EU migration 
law received most explicit attention in studies that focused on the Europeanisation of 
the multilevel legal context (Boswell and Geddes, 2011; Zaun, 2016). The insights of 
these studies and the more general street-level migration literature suggest that the 
field constitutes a crucial case for bottom-up investigations of motivations. First, 
migration law requires considerable street-level implementation (Ellermann, 2006; 
Eule, 2014). Second, the gradual addition of EU law adds a new liberal legal level to 
domestic regulations (Bonjour and Vink, 2013). Member states are reluctant to adjust 
their regulatory frameworks to new EU pressure, leading to new ambiguity at the 
street level. Thus, when street-level implementers decide on residence permits, they 
not only affect the life chances of individual migrants, but they also determine to what 
extent EU migration laws become practice. Third, the normatively laden field of 
migration provides good conditions to observe variation in motivations because 
migration law implementers are often confronted with conflicting positions between 
their role as loyal implementers and their personal normative considerations (Düvell 
and Jordan, 2003).
 The study investigates decision-making of caseworkers of the foreign registration 
offices (Ausländerbehörden) of the German Bundesland of North Rhine-Westphalia. 
These caseworkers decide on residence permits while operating at a local level in 
decentralised administrative structure with much face-to-face interaction with their 
clients (Ellermann, 2006; Eule, 2014). Such working contexts are prone to variation in 
motivations.
 Drawing on qualitative interviews with 21 implementers in ten Ausländer behörden, 
the analysis reveals that street-level implementers use EU law to varying degrees. 
Generally, implementers do not use EU law by extending their discretion in nationally 
tightly regulated contexts, or by explicitly contradict national regulatory frameworks. 
However, when national regulations remain unclear, many implementers use EU law 
next to national law. In line with the expectations, implementers with pronounced 
substantive normative motivations use the legal levels creatively. In contrast to the 
expectations, also instrumental motivations trigger sometimes reliance on EU law. 
Procedural norms are limited in triggering uses of EU law.
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2.   Theorising motivations for street-level use  
of EU law
During street-level implementation use of EU law can be conceptualised as reliance 
on the EU regulatory framework as a frame of reference during decision-making. The 
availability of EU law as legal options depends on the multilevel legal context in which 
implementers operate. When EU and national laws are detailed and in line with each 
other, implementers will draw on the domestic regulatory framework established by 
the domestic principal to which they are directly accountable.
 However, in at least three contexts EU law might play a role for street-level 
implementers. Firstly, EU law can demand margins of discretion beyond national law. 
Secondly, national law can provide frameworks that stand plainly in tension with EU 
law. Finally, when EU legislation is superficially incorporated, the national regulatory 
frameworks can be less explicit than EU rules. In these situations, implementers are 
confronted with ambiguity which they may resolve by relying on domestic regulations, 
EU law or by combining the frameworks.
 In order to develop expectations about the use of EU law, a useful starting point 
is the social psychology literature (Tyler, 2006). Combining the perspectives of this 
literature with insights from the street-level literature allows to group implementation 
motivations into instrumental and normative implementation motivations.
 Instrumental motivations, to begin with, refer to the desire to avoid punishment 
and to evade risks (Winter and May, 2001). In the street-level bureaucracy literature, 
such motivations are prominently assumed by Lipsky (1980). He has argued that 
implementers are primarily driven by the desire to cope with limited resources, 
leading to routines, rationing services and other coping strategies. Thus, implementers 
focus on measurable indicators with low risks to be questioned by the outside world 
(Lipsky, 1980; Hood, 2011). Risks refer to punishments by political principals and 
courts, or personal consequences such as reputation loss and extra workload.
 Applying this instrumental perspective to the multilevel legal context, one can 
assume that implementers are accountable to national principals. National principals 
will prefer implementers to rely closely on national goals (Huber and Shipan, 2002). 
Judicial, legislative and executive checks will discourage implementers to bypass 
national law. Since there might be monetary and political costs if EU law is applied 
inconsistently, implementers will perceive it to be risky to stretch their competences 
by interpreting EU law. Moreover, mastering EU law constitutes extra work. Thus, 
implementers will continue to rely on national law and leave it to courts to challenge 
the national level for potentially non-compliant transposition.
 This effect will be strengthened by the fact that there is no EU principal who 
directly scrutinises street-level behaviour. Hence, there are no direct risks for 
implementers of being punished by EU principals for not relying on EU law. In sum, 
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the instrumental perspective suggests that street-level implementers will consider it 
to be the safest choice to rely on national law, leading to the first expectation:
Expectation 1: Street-level implementers who are motivated by instrumental 
considerations do not use EU law to resolve ambiguities of the multilevel legal context.
In addition to instrumental motivations, research has shown that normative motivations 
play a crucial role in how people respond to the law (May, 2005a; Tyler, 2006). From 
a procedural normative perspective, individuals are loyal to the legal sources they 
consider legitimate (Tyler, 2006). Loyalty as the primary bureaucratic motivation is 
seated deeply in Weberian views on bureaucracy. In street-level studies, loyalty is 
highlighted as a professional imperative according to which implementers see 
themselves as dutiful servants of the legitimate authority (Brodkin, 1997).
 Under multilevel legal ambiguity, implementers evaluate which legal source is 
most legitimate. If loyalties rest on the national level, implementers will continue to rely 
on domestic regulatory frameworks (see Mastenbroek, 2017). Yet, implementers 
might have internalised that EU law is superior to national law and consider it as the 
legitimate legal source above national law. If implementers develop feelings of loyalty 
towards EU law, they rely on EU law, even if there are no direct benefits in taking it into 
account.
 Higher administrators seem to develop only weak EU loyalties, even if they have 
direct contact with EU institutions (Egeberg and Trondal, 2009; Mastenbroek, 2017). 
At the street level, the distance to EU institutions and national policymaking is wide. 
Thus, street-level implementers might have weaker attachments to national loyalties 
in the first place, leading to the second expectation:
Expectation 2: Street-level implementers who are motivated by a sense of EU loyalty 
use EU law to resolve ambiguities of the multilevel legal context.
Finally, substantive normative motivations, which Tyler (2006) labels morality 
considerations, are found to be an important motivation for obeying laws. At the street- 
level, Hertogh (2009) has observed that regardless of whether or not it is the law, 
implementers are often committed to certain norms owing to personal feelings of 
justice (see also Tummers, 2011). The close contact with real cases, make empathy 
and justice evaluations particularly likely to materialise (Winter and May, 2001; May, 
2005a). This can trigger street-level implementers to rely on moral judgments to make 
up for alleged limitations of national policies (Keiser and Soss, 1998), using formal 
laws only as formal justification (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003)
 Arguably, EU law offers implementers a new toolbox to pick and choose within 
the web of national, local and EU laws those arguments that correspond best to their 
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feeling of justice. More concretely, in case national law suggests a negative decision 
on a case, but an implementer has strong feelings of justice that point at a positive 
outcome, liberal EU law might provide for new legal arguments which the implementer 
can use to circumvent restrictive national laws. Vice versa, the domestic regulatory 
framework will be used if it fits implementers’ justice evaluations. Thus, the following 
can be expected:
Expectation 3: Street-level implementers who are motivated by strong personal 
perceptions of justice pick and choose between national and EU law to resolve 
ambiguities of the multilevel legal context.
3.  Method and data
A theory-driven explorative approach is adopted to investigate the expectations. This 
allows plausible connections of mechanisms that have previously not been explored 
or understood (Reiter, 2013, p. 7). For explorative research, case selection should 
focus on cases for which the expected causal mechanism is likely to be most evident 
(ibid.).
 Three scope conditions are necessary for the established expectations to apply. 
First, the policy field needs to have a multilevel legal character, and frontline implementers 
are confronted with ambiguous domestic and EU regulatory frameworks. Second, 
street-level implementers have to have some discretion. Otherwise, instrumental 
motivations may dominate decision-making. Finally, for normative motivations to play 
a role, the field needs to be normatively laden to challenge loyalties and to trigger 
feelings of justice.
 Migration law fulfils these scope conditions particularly well and can be considered 
as a crucial case (Eckstein, 1975). First, migration law is conducted at a multitude of 
levels, including the international, the European, the national, the regional and the 
local (Lahav and Guiraudon, 2006). As a relatively young field of EU harmonisation, 
it is highly dynamic, and national implementers are constantly confronted with new 
multilevel legal frameworks and realities (Zaun, 2016). Tension between the different 
levels are common because member states are reluctant to transpose liberal EU 
migration laws into their more restrictive national laws (Bonjour and Vink, 2013). 
Additionally, many EU migration laws and the ensuing interpretations by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) established fuzzy legal concepts that are 
directly applicable for lower-level implementers.
 Second, the policy field provides for considerable street-level discretion because 
it is very client intensive (Ellermann, 2006; Eule, 2014). Despite the convergence of 
migration laws across the EU, decision-making in migration agencies has been 
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highlighted as very diverse (Jordan et al., 2003a). While migration laws appear to be 
clear on paper, they often lead to variation in practice, when implementers decide on 
individual migrants (ibid.).
 Finally, the field is salient and normatively laden. Conflicting norms related to 
human rights, public welfare and security often clash with each other and have to be 
resolved during implementation (Düvell and Jordan, 2003; Eule, 2014).
 Overall, tension between national and EU migration regulations, wide discretion 
and the normatively laden context offer potential for competing street-level motivations. 
Thus, if we do not find street-level implementers who use EU law in this policy field, 
it is unlikely that implementers in more technical fields use EU law.
 The expectations are investigated among German street-level implementers of 
the Bundesland of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). This administrative context constitutes 
again a crucial case. Germany has a decentralised migration implementation system, 
and NRW established a particularly decentralised structure. Street-level implementation 
is organised and conducted in foreign registration offices (Ausländerbehörden) at 
county and city level. The federal level is the main legislator and is responsible for 
transposition of EU norms. The Länder issue decrees that detail the federal law. There 
is no direct national oversight over the Ausländerbehörden and only indirect oversight 
from five district governments. Thus, there is considerable street-level discretion.
 Additionally, while there is a trend towards more e-service provision in many 
traditional street-level bureaucracies (Bovens and Zouridis, 2002), the implementers 
in this study are typical street-level implementers. They have face-to-face contact 
with their clients and rely little on computer-assisted case assessment. Overall, the 
large margins of discretion and the personal contact provide particularly good 
conditions for normative motivations.
 Important to note is that focusing on a single policy sector within a single member 
state limits the generalisability of the motivations found in this study. Motivations can 
derive from a variety of sources, such as national culture, organisational context and 
policy area (Jordan et al., 2003a). However, the purpose of this study is to investigate 
how different motivations relate to the use of EU law. Thus, adding cross-country or 
sectoral variation would pose the danger of influencing both motivations and the use 
of EU law. This would make it difficult to disentangle the effects.
 A qualitative data collection strategy was adopted. Qualitative methods allow 
uncovering the mechanisms behind decision-making and contributing to theory 
refinement (George and Bennett, 2005). In-depth interviews with 21 implementers in 
10 Ausländerbehörden were conducted in spring 2015. At each location, a senior 
implementer (department leader) and in most locations one or two regular decision 
makers were interviewed (see the Appendix of this chapter). Interviews lasted 40–160 
minutes; records were transcribed into English. Half the interviews were conducted 
individually, the other half in pairs or groups of three, permitting respondents to be 
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interviewed in their daily working environment and to test whether responses differed 
when being observed by colleagues.
 The interviews were semi-structured and left room for examples of difficult cases 
and personal evaluations of the respondents. This contributed to an in-depth image 
of the complex interplay between motivations, decision-making and the use of EU 
law. In order to measure the dependent variable – use of EU law – respondents were 
asked how they go about decision-making in three multilevel legal scenarios. The 
scenarios were tackled in open-ended questions in which the researcher sketched 
typical decision-making contexts (Table 6.1). Respondents were asked to specify 
their decision-making practices and detail their room for manoeuvre. Probing was 
used to investigate which legal tools respondents would use to take decisions and to 
what extent EU law would be used.
 The first scenario concerned a situation where EU and national law were in line 
with each other, but EU law demands slightly more administrative discretion. The 
second scenario constituted a case in which EU law stands in tension with national 
guidelines. The third scenario captured a context of tension with vague national 
guidelines. The substances of the scenarios are described below.
 Implementation motivations were investigated by encouraging respondents 
through open-ended questions to elaborate on what drives them when taking 
decisions, with what they struggle when taking decisions and what constitutes good 
decision-making. Based on examples and anecdotes told by the respondents, a list 
of motivational cues was established (see the Appendix to this chapter). Motivational 
cues are arguments and justifications given explicitly or implicitly by the respondents 
to explain their practices. The cues were grouped under common themes. Motivations 
were instrumental if respondents pointed at workload, risks of overstepping their 
competences, the importance that decisions have standing in court, or possible 
punishments. Risks creating precedent cases and risks to harm the national interest 
and/or the interests of the national legislator were inductively classified as intermediate 
motivations between instrumental and national loyalty motivations.
 Motivations were placed under EU loyalty if respondents mentioned obligations 
and loyalty related to supremacy of EU law. Finally, motivations were grouped under 
the heading of substantive normative motivations when respondents invoked 
emotions or personal feelings of fairness to motivate their implementation practices. 
Respondents could be guided by complex combinations of motivations.
517635-L-bw-Dorrenbacher
Processed on: 20-2-2018 PDF page: 150
150
CHAPTER 6
4.  Analysis
The case studies are structured as follows. The first part outlines the substance of 
the three legal scenarios. The next part presents decision-making practices of the 
respondents and their use of EU law. The last part analyses the underlying implementation 
motivations in light of the established expectations.
Multilevel legal scenarios
Table 6.1 summarises the substance of the EU and national legal framework of the 
three decision-making scenarios discussed with the respondents.
Table 6.1   Three legal scenarios
Legal scenario Main EU law Main National law Decision Scenario
Scenario 1 Income requirement for third country family reunification visa
Discretionary EU law Member states may demand from sponsor of third country family 
reunification a minimum income as guiding criterion for granting the 
visa (Family Reunification Directive 2003/86 EC Art. 7.1.)
Guiding criterion may not be used as hard benchmark to limit right to 
family reunification (CJEU ruling Chakroun)
Evaluations have to take individual circumstances and needs of 
family into account (CJEU ruling Chakroun)
Foreign registration offices required to use standard calculation  
to determine guiding benchmark (German Residence Act. Art. 27, 
Art. 5.1.1, Administrative Guidelines Art. 2.3.4)
Administrative decisions should be prognosis decision, evaluating 
if family can sustain itself in the future (national Administrative 
Guidelines  Art. 2.3.3)
National interpretation of  Chakroun: tax-free amounts may no longer 
be used to the disadvantage of the applicants (BVerwG 1 C 20.09 
and 1 C 21.09)
How does the caseworker decide 
on the visa when the income of the 
sponsor remains 5-10 euro below 
the calculated monthly national 
benchmarks?
Scenario 2 Language requirement for Turkish citizens for family reunification visa
Tension between EU and national law 
with explicit instructions
Member states may require third-country nationals to comply with 
integration measures (Family Reunification Directive Art. 6.2) 
German language requirements not compliant with the standstill 
clause of Turkey Association Agreement (CJEU ruling Dogan) 
Language certificate is required for all visa for family reunification 
including Turkish citizens  (Art. 30. 1AufthG)
National interpretation of Dogan: Implementation instruction from  
the Ministry of External Affairs: Implementers should not change  
their practices regarding Turkish citizens. Existing exceptions based 
on hardship cases are stressed.
How does the caseworker decide  
on the visa when the spouse of  
a Turkish citizen does not provide for 
the German language requirement?
Scenario 3 Application of administrative fees for Turkish citizens and examples  
of transposition gaps 
Tension between EU and national 
law with inexplicit national regulatory 
framework
a)  Administrative fees for residence permits for Turkish citizens  
have to be in line with Turkey Association Agreement  
(see CJEU ruling Sahin)
a)  Several years national legislators declared Sahin ruling not 
applicable to Germany. National ruling (BVerwG 1 C 12.12) 
eventually confirmed Sahin, but it took time until legislator formally 
clarified appropriate fees
b) Late transposition and implicit EU principles in transposition laws
a)  How did the office handle the 
intermediate period between 
a national solution and the EU 
obligations?
b)  How does the caseworker  
handle situations in which  
EU directives and rulings are  
not fully transposed?
517635-L-bw-Dorrenbacher
Processed on: 20-2-2018 PDF page: 151
151
EUROPE AT THE FRONTLINE: STREET-LEVEL MOTIVATIONS FOR THE USE OF EU LAW
6
The first scenario was taken from the field of family migration and related to the 
evaluation of the income requirement for visas for third country family reunification. 
The Ausländerbehörden decide on the visa together with the diplomatic missions 
abroad. One condition for the visa is a sufficient income of the sponsor. Both EU and 
national law demand an individual evaluation of the income condition. Yet EU law 
demands a slightly more discretionary approach to this condition than national law, 
by emphasising an evaluation of the needs of each individual applicant (see CJEU 
ruling in Chakroun). Respondents were asked if, and under which conditions, they 
would agree to a visa application if applicants earn less than required by the national 
benchmarks.
Table 6.1   Three legal scenarios
Legal scenario Main EU law Main National law Decision Scenario
Scenario 1 Income requirement for third country family reunification visa
Discretionary EU law Member states may demand from sponsor of third country family 
reunification a minimum income as guiding criterion for granting the 
visa (Family Reunification Directive 2003/86 EC Art. 7.1.)
Guiding criterion may not be used as hard benchmark to limit right to 
family reunification (CJEU ruling Chakroun)
Evaluations have to take individual circumstances and needs of 
family into account (CJEU ruling Chakroun)
Foreign registration offices required to use standard calculation  
to determine guiding benchmark (German Residence Act. Art. 27, 
Art. 5.1.1, Administrative Guidelines Art. 2.3.4)
Administrative decisions should be prognosis decision, evaluating 
if family can sustain itself in the future (national Administrative 
Guidelines  Art. 2.3.3)
National interpretation of  Chakroun: tax-free amounts may no longer 
be used to the disadvantage of the applicants (BVerwG 1 C 20.09 
and 1 C 21.09)
How does the caseworker decide 
on the visa when the income of the 
sponsor remains 5-10 euro below 
the calculated monthly national 
benchmarks?
Scenario 2 Language requirement for Turkish citizens for family reunification visa
Tension between EU and national law 
with explicit instructions
Member states may require third-country nationals to comply with 
integration measures (Family Reunification Directive Art. 6.2) 
German language requirements not compliant with the standstill 
clause of Turkey Association Agreement (CJEU ruling Dogan) 
Language certificate is required for all visa for family reunification 
including Turkish citizens  (Art. 30. 1AufthG)
National interpretation of Dogan: Implementation instruction from  
the Ministry of External Affairs: Implementers should not change  
their practices regarding Turkish citizens. Existing exceptions based 
on hardship cases are stressed.
How does the caseworker decide  
on the visa when the spouse of  
a Turkish citizen does not provide for 
the German language requirement?
Scenario 3 Application of administrative fees for Turkish citizens and examples  
of transposition gaps 
Tension between EU and national 
law with inexplicit national regulatory 
framework
a)  Administrative fees for residence permits for Turkish citizens  
have to be in line with Turkey Association Agreement  
(see CJEU ruling Sahin)
a)  Several years national legislators declared Sahin ruling not 
applicable to Germany. National ruling (BVerwG 1 C 12.12) 
eventually confirmed Sahin, but it took time until legislator formally 
clarified appropriate fees
b) Late transposition and implicit EU principles in transposition laws
a)  How did the office handle the 
intermediate period between 
a national solution and the EU 
obligations?
b)  How does the caseworker  
handle situations in which  
EU directives and rulings are  
not fully transposed?
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The second scenario was also taken from the field of family migration and concerns 
the so-called language requirement for the visa of family reunification. The CJEU in 
Dogan has explicitly challenged the German obligations in light of the Turkey 
Association Agreement, suggesting that language requirements for Turkish citizens 
are not in line with EU law. However, the national legislator explicitly instructed its 
administrations not to change their practices. Respondents were asked if they would 
agree to a visa application of a Turkish applicant, provided the spouse had no 
language certificate.
 For the third scenario, several situations were discussed. For example, several 
court rulings found that the administrative fees demanded for Turkish residence 
permits are too high under the Turkey Association Agreement. However, it took the 
legislator a considerable period of time to provide instructions on how to handle the 
fees. Here, the leaderships of the foreign registration offices were asked how they 
handled the intermediate period. In order to explore practices beyond the office 
leaders, respondents were asked to elaborate on their practices in the case that EU 
directives and CJEU rulings are not transposed into national law.
 The three scenarios constitute everyday decision-making in a foreign registration 
office. The focus on family migration law was based on the fact that family migration 
constitutes a crucial source of migration and EU family migration law is relatively 
developed (Bonjour and Vink, 2013). Moreover, the three scenarios do not directly 
touch upon aspects related to the current refugee crisis.
Scenario one: use of discretionary EU law
Starting with practices regarding the income requirement, all respondents stressed 
that they take the individual circumstances of applicants into account. However, 
respondents differed widely in interpreting their room for manoeuvre. At least seven 
respondents approached the criterium from a relatively discretionary perspective, 
while 10 took more restrictive approaches.
 Respondents with discretionary approaches indicated that a discrepancy of 
around 5–8 euros per month below the national income benchmark constitutes no 
problem. If they believed applicants can otherwise sustain themselves, they would 
still approve the visa application. With a positive prognosis, three respondents would 
even accept applicants up to 50–100 euros or 10 percent below the calculated 
requirement. As one respondent commented:
  These margins are not explicitly codified (…) if there are 50 euros missing, 
we would decide that we take the risk that this family will not draw on social 
benefits for these 50 euros. We internally decided that you cannot take these 
requirements as hard benchmarks where one cent or euro less leads 
automatically to a rejection. (NRW_B.1)
517635-L-bw-Dorrenbacher
Processed on: 20-2-2018 PDF page: 153
153
EUROPE AT THE FRONTLINE: STREET-LEVEL MOTIVATIONS FOR THE USE OF EU LAW
6
The more restrictive respondents would normally not agree to a visa if the sponsor’s 
income was below the calculated benchmark. As one respondent explained:
  When someone has 10 euro less, we no longer have the option to decide 
positively. (…)  We strictly rely on the legal demands. I cannot paint a nice 
picture if the requirements are not fulfilled. (NRW_I.1)
Coming to the use of EU law, it became clear that even though respondents differed 
considerably in how lenient they were with the income requirement, discretion was not 
informed by EU law but by federal court rulings. Even if respondents argued closely in 
line with the Chakroun ruling (NRW_B.1), the ruling was mostly not explicitly mentioned.
 Two respondents mentioned national rulings that referred to Chakroun, but they 
considered Chakroun as a restriction to their scope of action that no longer allowed 
them to include tax-free amounts in the income benchmark. One respondent claimed 
that this liberalisation would trigger him to consider the calculated benchmark now 
more restrictively (NRW_E.1). Only one respondent referred explicitly to Chakroun. 
However, even he did not use the ruling to extend his room for manoeuvre beyond 
national law (NRW _C.1). Overall, EU law was not used explicitly in case of discretionary 
EU law.
Scenario two: use of EU law under tension with explicit national 
instructions
Practices regarding the language requirements differed only slightly among 
respondents. Whereas some argued that the embassies are responsible for the 
language requirement, other respondents saw their role in checking this condition 
more actively. Overall, respondents referred more often to EU law than in the previous 
scenario. The Dogan ruling was mentioned by most respondents. However, 
eventually, all but one respondent gave priority to the national interpretation of the 
judgment. Some respondents pointed to the wording of the CJEU ruling to justify the 
national interpretation (NRW _F.1, NRW_I.1). Other respondents agreed that there is 
a conflict between the legal levels, but as one respondent explained: ‘If the national 
legislator eventually issues instructions for us, I try to orientate myself on that and not 
explicitly contradict the national interpretation’ (NRW_J.1).
 Thus, while some respondents questioned the national interpretations in light of 
EU law (NRW_A.1), they still pointed at the national regulatory framework as the 
ultimate decision tool. Only one respondent did not mention the national interpreta-
tions and only referred to the CJEU ruling (NRW_C.1). Overall, under legal conflict 
between EU law and explicit national regulatory frameworks, respondents were 
surprisingly aware of EU law, but eventually, they relied on the national regulatory 
framework or pointed to the diplomatic missions as ultimate decision makers.
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Scenario three: use of EU law with inexplicit national regulatory 
framework
Concerning situations in which national regulatory frameworks remain inexplicit, 
respondents indicated highly diverse practices. Regarding the fees for Turkish 
applicants, the leadership of some of the foreign registration offices decided to waive 
the fees before there were explicit national instructions (Location C). Other office 
leaders decided to keep demanding the fees awaiting an official adjustment of 
national regulations (Location I, E). More generally, when EU legislation or CJEU 
rulings are not explicitly transposed, six respondents indicated that for them, EU law 
is not relevant. As these respondents put it, ‘we are mainly implementers of national 
law’ (NRW_A.2) or ‘CJEU rulings confront us sometimes with the situation that 
national law is no longer applicable, but for us legally binding are of course only the 
national laws’ (NRW_D.1).
 However, in situations in which national regulations are missing or not clear, 
the majority of respondents described that they would use EU law next to national 
law. As one respondent explained:
  The EU has established some general legal principles which somehow are 
implied in our national law, but you cannot read them anywhere. In these 
cases, we more or less use our discretion to read the national law in light of 
the principles which derive out of EU law or CJEU rulings. (NRW_F.1)
Two respondents even pointed out how they themselves or their colleagues sometimes 
use EU directives which are not yet transposed (NRW_J.1; NRW_A.1). As Respondent 
A1 claimed:
  The problem in Germany is that almost all EU requirements are transposed 
in the last minute or even with delay. I feel this is a mentality issue of the 
German legislator, to hope that nobody will notice. So, if a new ruling or 
directive emerges, we try to take this into account even it is not yet part of the 
German law or administrative guidelines. Even if the EU law conflicts with the 
national law, we take the EU rules into account. (NRW_A.1)
In sum, when national law does not explicitly define implementation guidelines, 
implementers were surprisingly open to EU law as an additional source of decision- 
making. Table 6.2 summarises the use of EU law across the scenarios.
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Implementation motivations and the use of EU law
In the following, the established expectations are explored. To begin with instrumental 
motivations, the interviews showed that the most important guidance for respondents 
was that their decisions have standing in front of national courts. Regarding the 
income requirement, several respondents argued that national courts demand a 
restrictive approach. Therefore, they could not apply the condition in a discretionary 
way (NRW_D.1). Additionally, several respondents argued that they are afraid that it 
would backfire on them and that social welfare offices would ask them critical 
questions if applicants eventually relied on social welfare (NRW_F.1; NRW_F.2; 
NRW_E.1; NRW_J.2). In line with the expectation, these respondents did not see it as 
an option to extend their room for manoeuvre by using EU law.
 Instrumental motivations were articulated even more explicitly when respondents 
reflected on their practices for the second scenario. Many respondents argued that 
they consider it risky to apply original EU jurisprudence when the national legislator 
provided explicit instructions. For example, six respondents highlighted that 
interpreting EU law goes beyond their competences as implementers (NRW_I.1; 
NRW_I.2; NRW_J.1; NRW_J.2; NRW_H.1; NRW_H.2). Overall, risk, staying within the 
assigned competencies and securing standing in front of the court were considerations 
which triggered reluctant approaches towards EU law and were dominant among 
leading and regular decision makers.
 However, contrary to the first expectation, instrumental motivations were also 
articulated by respondents in leadership positions who used EU law in the third 
scenario. As one respondent argued:
  In terms of the direct results, it can be a safe choice for us to follow the 
(national and local) rules. However, it does not always go well in the long run. 
Sometimes it leads eventually to a change in the rules if there are too many 
Table 6.2   Use of EU law across scenarios
Legal context Legal scenario Use of EU law
• Discretionary EU law Income criterion for third 
country family reunification
Little use
• Tension between EU and 
national law with explicit 
national instructions
Language requirement for 
Turkish family reunification
Active reference but eventual 
reliance on national instructions
• Tension between EU and 
national law with inexplicit 
national regulatory 
framework
Administrative fees for 
Turkish citizens and gaps in 
transposition law 
Some very actively use EU 
law by correcting problematic 
transposition, most respondents 
combine national and EU 
instructions.
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(EU) rulings. That leaves us with a mess if we took a lot of decisions based 
on old rules (…). We are always in between, and eventually, we have to take 
responsibilities for messy decisions which we did not cause. (…) So, we 
evaluate the consequences of the different legal options and then decide. 
(NRW_C.1)
Hence, in contrast to expectation one, in the face of tension between the different 
levels of law, combined with unclear domestic guidelines, leading implementers 
consider it to be risky not to rely on EU law. Following the respondents, national 
courts might eventually rely on EU law even if the national legislator did not adjust the 
law. Therefore, inconsistent decision-making can harm the reputation of the Ausländer ­ 
behörde, and it constitutes extra workload when decisions need to be corrected. 
Consequently, the first expectation that instrumental implementation motivations 
trigger inactive use of EU law only holds in the context of explicit national guidelines. 
Without clear national guidelines, instrumental motivations exist that can trigger use 
of EU law.
 Coming to normative motivations, the analysis showed that both procedural and 
substantive norms played a role for respondents. Around half the respondents 
pointed towards their professional norms as implementers. Often, these norms were 
connected to instrumental motivations. For example, respondents pointed at their 
responsibilities as a good implementer to balance the interests of national society 
and taxpayers, to stay within national legal bounds and their assigned national duty 
(NRW_A.1; NRW_B.1; NRW_C.2; NRW_D.1; NRW_F.1; NRW_H.1). Professional norms 
were mainly related to national loyalties. Loyalty towards EU law was articulated to a 
much lesser extent. If it was articulated, it was mentioned implicitly and in combination 
with other obligations. As one respondent argued:
  It is in many ways a balancing act because particularly our local government 
always says we should only do what is written in the (national) law  (…)  but 
we observe all the new developments, we also get the relevant journals that 
include EU judgments. On the working floor, we are confronted with these 
new developments, and we want to take them on board. Yet, when we meet 
with politicians, they always ask in which national laws we find these things. 
(NRW_H.2)
This respondent finds it challenging not to do justice to EU law and general new 
rulings, but he also receives steering signals from local policy-makers not to rely on 
the new developments. Eventually, this motivates reluctant uses of EU law. Similarly, 
another respondent argued:
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  Of course, we are aware that EU law comes before national law and national 
law is superior to Länder law (…) But I think I would get a punishment if  
I would start transposing EU law myself (…) For such activities, my competences 
are clearly too limited (…) However, if CJEU judgments with direct effect 
challenge national law, then I take it into account, and we define a common 
practice for our office, similar as with the Turkey cases. (NRW_I.1)
Overall, EU loyalties are subordinated to instrumental motivations and professional 
norms of not overstepping one’s competencies. Thus, expectation two receives no 
support: because EU loyalties were generally weak.
 The last expectation held that personal justice evaluations trigger implementers 
to pick and choose between national and EU norms. Almost all respondents 
mentioned their struggle between emotions, morality and legal demands. However, 
respondents differed on the emphasis they put on such personal considerations. 
Some implementers explained that they are not first of all implementers of the law, but 
rather ‘client advisors’ (NRW_A.1). In light of the income requirement, these 
respondents explained how they try to help clients to meet the critical benchmarks 
(NRW_F.2; NRW_G.1; NRW_G.2; NRW_I.2; NRW_J.1). Several implementers called 
this ‘an informal practice’ because national law does not oblige them to advise clients 
(NRW_A.1). These respondents relied creatively on different levels of law but rarely 
used the EU jurisprudence to justify discretion.
 The expectation that substantive morality norms trigger use of EU law is most 
clearly met in the case of legal conflict and ambiguity of national law. For example, 
one respondent pointed out that he encourages his colleagues to:
  Use the law in line with the principle of the IKEA slogan: ‘discover the 
possibilities’. You always have to stay within the law but if the law offers you 
possibilities no one should hinder us to use them  (…)  European law provides  
us especially regarding Turkish citizens more possibilities than the German 
law, and it is interesting for us to discover these new opportunities within  
the law. (NRW_B.1)
This respondent referred to EU law as a source that offers new opportunities to 
become creative. While he stressed that this is only possible within the limits of 
national law, another respondent explicitly argued that he would even interpret EU law 
on his own when the national level failed to do so because ‘in this way we maybe 
harm the German state, but at least we do not harm the individual migrant’ (NRW_A.1).
 Overall, few respondents would rely on EU law at the expense of national law this 
openly. Risk and national loyalty motivations trigger mostly reluctant approaches 
towards EU law. Respondents are particularly afraid to be responsible for precedent 
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cases. However, if national law fails to provide clear guidelines, most implementers 
use EU law parallel to national law. In line with the expectations, a group of respondents 
uses EU law to bring the law closer to their personal justice evaluations. Contrary to 
expectation one, also instrumental motivations can trigger use of EU law.
5.  Conclusion
This chapter has explored the extent to which street-level implementers use EU law 
and what motivates them when doing so. Three decision contexts in which EU law 
might play a role were identified. The scenarios differed in the level of legal ambiguity 
between national and EU regulatory frameworks.
 In order to analyse the use of EU law, the study adopted a bottom-up approach 
(Thomann and Sager, 2017a). By relying on the insights of social psychology (Tyler, 
2006) and the behavioural street-level bureaucracy literature (Lipsky, 1980; Maynard- 
Moody and Musheno, 2012), two perspectives on implementation motivations were 
identified. First, from an instrumental perspective, one could expect that there are few 
incentives for street-level implementers to use EU law. Second, procedural and 
substantive normative motivations were expected to trigger use of EU law. The study 
explored the expectations empirically in the context of EU migration law implementation 
in Germany.
 Four main insights can be drawn from this analysis. First, the study demonstrated 
that EU implementation at the micro-level fruitfully complements the rational and 
constructivist institutional actor logics (March and Olsen, 1998) that have been used 
to explain EU implementation at the member state level.
 Second, in line with the street-level literature (Lipsky, 1980; Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno, 2012) and studies on migration management (Jordan et al., 2003a; 
Ellermann, 2006; Eule, 2014), the implementers investigated in this study were 
creative and flexible in their use of legal tools. While the limited literature on practical 
EU implementation has treated administrations as yet another source for 
non-compliance (Versluis, 2007) or ignored the street-level of EU implementation 
(Treib, 2014), this study has shown that lower level implementers are surprisingly 
aware of the multilevel legal context in which they operate. Most implementers 
eventually give priority to national guidance in their decisions (see also Mastenbroek, 
2017). However, a considerable group of implementers sometimes uses EU law, 
particularly when the national level provides superficial guidelines. Some 
implementers even correct for missing EU transposition. Consequently, the study 
highlighted the importance of adding bottom-up approaches towards EU compliance.
 Third, the study showed that implementers draw on EU law for varying purposes, 
leading to variation in implementation practices. This suggests that Europeanisation 
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does not necessarily harmonise domestic decision-making. Often, active approaches 
towards EU law are contingent on normative implementation motivations. This is in 
line with the theoretical expectations. However, contrary to the established 
expectations, loyalty towards EU law has its limits in promoting uses of EU law. 
Instead, use of EU law can be motivated by substantive morality norms. In light of 
Egeberg and Trondal’s (2009) ‘double-hatted’ agents who promote the interests of 
their national and European master owing to loyalty to the two masters, ‘double-
hatted’ street-level implementers sometime use the different levels of law to bring 
about policy outcomes they personally consider as just.
 Finally, this study showed that instrumental motivations trigger mostly no use of 
EU law. Particularly when national regulatory frameworks are explicit, implementers 
consider it risky to draw on EU law and focus, in line with Lipsky’s (1980) expectations, 
on decision-making with low risks of being questioned by the outside world. However, 
in case of conflict between national and EU norms, combined with lacking national 
guidance, some implementers considered it risky not to rely on EU law. This indicates 
that even though there are no direct personal consequences for implementers, there 
are implicit instrumental motivations for relying on EU law.
 Importantly, this study was limited to a very specific administrative context, 
namely the highly decentralised German administrative setting of North Rhine- 
Westphalia. As a result, motivational patterns observed in this study might be specific 
to several scope conditions, such as the presence of a multilevel legal context with 
ambiguity between national and EU obligations, the high level of discretion in the 
German administrative setting and the normatively laden policy field that requires 
considerable client interactions at the frontline. Yet, from the street-level bureaucracy 
literature, we can expect that other client-intensive and normatively laden fields 
comparable to migration, such as social policies, might reveal similar motivational 
mechanisms as found in this study (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2012). The study 
might be less representative for more technical fields of EU law which may trigger 
less normative motivations. Nevertheless, as this study has shown, even instrumental 
motivations can trigger use of EU law, which suggests that street-level use of EU law 
might not be limited to normatively laden policy fields.
 Follow-up studies should add external validity by bringing in a cross-country or 
cross-sectoral comparative perspective (Thomann and Sager, 2017b). That is to say, 
what role does EU law play for implementers who operate under less discretion? 
Additionally, this study with its explorative elements calls for a more generalisable 
explanatory test of the relationship between motivations and use of EU law. For 
example, a quantitative survey among implementers across policy sectors that differ 
in normative sensitivity could provide such a test to further enhance our understating 
of the role of motivations for EU implementation.
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43 This chapter is currently under review.
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Abstract
This study investigates explanations for frontline implementers’ willingness to 
implement EU migration law. The study connects the newly emerging literature on 
micro-level mechanisms of EU compliance with insights from the frontline bureaucracy 
literature and argues that 1) instrumental, 2) normative and 3) general compliance 
attitudes explain frontline implementers’ willingness to implement EU law. At the 
institutional level, the study identifies variation in national bureaucratic structure as 
moderator of the individual-level explanations. By drawing on original survey data 
from Dutch and German migration caseworkers and the validated measurement 
scales of the frontline literature, this study shows that normative evaluations of 
procedural justice and client meaningfulness feature as strongest predictors of 
caseworkers’ willingness to implement EU migration law. These are followed by 
instrumental risk assessments and general compliance attitudes. National 
bureaucratic context weakly moderates the effect of procedural justice.
Keywords: frontline implementations, EU compliance, willingness to implement, EU 
migration law
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1.  Introduction
The willingness of national policy-makers to implement European Union (EU) law 
features as a crucial factor for EU compliance (Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006; 
Steunenberg, 2006, 2007; Kaeding, 2008). However, not only policy-makers have a 
role during implementation. For example, public administration scholars identified 
implementers’ support for policies and laws as a powerful factor for effective policy 
application (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999; Huber and Shipan, 2002; May and Winter, 
2009). In the EU context, administrative support is particularly relevant in policy areas 
where national and EU legal norms frequently clash, such as in the field of migration 
law. As a young field of Europeanisation, negotiating EU migration policies often lead 
to vague EU regulations that encourage member states to transpose EU obligations 
only superficially into their national legal frameworks (Dörrenbächer and Mastenbroek, 
201744). 
 As a result, the topical area of migration law is particularly prone to EU 
implementation gaps (Trauner, 2016; Scipioni, 2017). The tension between EU 
obligations and national transposition make the attitudes of national caseworkers 
who apply national and EU laws to individual migrants highly relevant for understanding 
EU implementation and compliance (Dörrenbächer, 2017a45). For example, when 
national civil servants decide on residence permits or visa applications for family 
reunification or long-term residence, they are obliged to take into account EU 
Directives and Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) rulings. However, the 
attitudes of these national civil servants towards EU law may crucially affect to what 
extent EU laws reach their intended clients.
 Despite the relevance for EU compliance, the mechanisms through which 
national administrators form attitudes towards EU law are only rarely studied. Instead, 
EU compliance studies have focused primarily on country-level and institutional 
explanations for top-down processes of EU compliance (Thomann and Sager, 
2017a). If studies took EU-related attitudes into account, they relied on aggregate 
societal attitudes with inconsistent conclusions (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003; 
Kaeding, 2006; Gibson and Caldeira, 2009).
 Only recently are EU compliance studies starting to investigate more directly the 
EU-related attitudes of national administrators (Tholen and Mastenbroek, 2013; 
Wockelberg, 2014; Dörrenbächer, 2017a). While these studies point to similar instrumental 
and normative motivations and role conceptions among national civil servants, these 
studies have relied primarily on qualitative data with low generalisability and limited 
systematic comparisons (Tholen and Mastenbroek, 2013; Wockelberg, 2014; 
44 This is chapter 4 of this dissertation.
45 This is chapter 6 of this dissertation.
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Dörrenbächer, 2017a, 2017b46). An exception constitutes a recent study by 
Mastenbroek et al. (2017) which presents a comprehensive quantitative study on 
EU-related attitudes of Dutch civil servants and their propensity to comply with EU 
law (see Burcu-Bayram, 2017 for a similar study among transposition actors). By 
drawing on insights from social psychology (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Jackson et al., 
2012), Mastenbroek et al. (2017) emphasise that civil servants’ normative EU-related 
legitimacy perceptions, combined with instrumental considerations of risk and 
attitudes related to the institutional context explain civil servants’ propensity to comply 
with EU law. By quantifying micro-foundations of implementation, their study has 
uncovered important links between administrative attitudes and EU compliance. 
 This chapter aims to complement this emerging literature on micro-foundations 
of EU compliance with a cross-country study that takes the specifics of the frontline 
of EU migration law into account. More concretely, this study investigates 1) which 
individual­level attitudes explain frontline implementers’ willingness to implement EU 
migration law and 2) to what extent are individual­level explanations moderated by the 
national bureaucratic context in which implementers operate?
 We tackle the first part of the question by relying on the theoretical framework 
developed by Mastenbroek et al. (2017), complementing it with insights from the 
frontline bureaucracy literature (Tummers, 2011; Tummers et al., 2012). In light of the 
second part of the question, we rely on insights from qualitative studies that have 
highlighted the effect of national bureaucratic structures for individual-level mi-
cro-foundations of EU compliance. For example, Dörrenbächer (2017b) has shown 
that client contact, and bureaucratic discretion influence frontline approaches toward 
EU law. 
 Empirically, we draw on original survey data that capture attitudes towards EU 
law of Dutch and German migration caseworkers. The two country settings provide 
excellent conditions to observe the effect of the bureaucratic context because Dutch 
implementers have little room for manoeuvre and client contact, while German 
frontline implementers have more discretion and interact with clients on a daily basis 
(Dörrenbächer, 2017b). 
 Our study makes several additions to the literature. First, we add to the frontline 
literature by presenting one of the few quantitative cross-country comparative studies 
(Hupe and Buffat, 2014). The EU context provides particularly suitable conditions for 
comparative research because it confronts implementers across national contexts 
with converging laws.
 Second, we add to EU compliance research (Treib, 2003; Angelova et al., 2012) 
by going beyond the dominant top-down institutionalist studies (Thomann and 
Sager, 2017a). Thus, we contribute to the newly emerging literature on the micro- 
46 This is chapter 5 of this dissertation.
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foundations of EU compliance (Dörrenbächer, 2017a; Mastenbroek et al., 2017). More 
concretely, we add to existing micro-level studies a cross-country comparison. That 
allows integrating individual-level explanations with institutional country-level 
accounts of EU compliance. Moreover, adding the frontline literature allows 
incorporating notions of client meaningfulness that are specific for the frontline 
context. 
 Next, we apply the validated measurement scales of the frontline literature 
(Tummers et al., 2009, 2012) to EU compliance research. Thereby, we add to previous 
single-item measurements of individual-level EU compliance attitudes (Mastenbroek 
et al., 2017). Finally, by explaining the willingness to implement (Tummers et al., 2012), 
we include notions of support and reported agency. In this way, we move a step 
closer to measurements of actual behaviour than previous individual-level approaches 
towards EU compliance that have focused on perceptions of duty (Mastenbroek 
et al., 2017).
 The statistical analysis reveals that across national bureaucratic contexts, 
normative considerations are the most powerful predictors of the willingness to 
implement EU law. Instrumental considerations of risk and general compliance 
attitudes are weaker but still significant predictors. Nuancing the normative attitudes, 
we show that perceptions of procedural justice and client meaningfulness are 
particularly strong explanations. Contrary to Mastenbroek et al. (2017), we find that at 
the frontline of migration law, perceptions of the societal meaningfulness of EU law do 
not feature as a relevant explanation. Finally, the national bureaucratic context 
moderates the effect of procedural justice.
2.  Theory section: Explaining the willingness to implement
Compliance with EU law consists of several stages (Treib, 2014). Studies have 
focused most explicitly on the first stage, namely the transposition of EU law into 
nation legal frameworks (Mastenbroek, 2005; Angelova et al., 2012; Treib, 2014). 
However, EU compliance also includes processes at the practical stage of 
implementation, where national administrators apply and enforce EU law. Particularly 
EU law that regulates the rights of citizens and other social groups requires that 
national frontline implementers (Lipsky, 1980; Meyers and Vorsanger, 2003) apply 
these rights on the ground. Frontline implementers have to decide how they apply 
CJEU case law to individual clients and how they handle tensions between national 
and EU obligations. For example, in the field of migration, EU compliance entails that 
caseworkers in national migration offices decide on residence permits and visas for 
students, long-term residents, highly qualified workers or applicants for family 
reunification in line with EU obligations. Recent studies have shown that migration 
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caseworkers approach EU law in highly diverse ways with implications for the level of 
Europeanisation eventually achieved (Infantino, 2016; Dörrenbächer, 2017a, 2017b; 
Van der Woude and Van der Leun, 2017). 
 While there may be many factors that determine if implementers eventually use 
EU law, one can assume that implementers who are willing to implement, will be 
inclined to actually use EU law and thus, to comply with it (Burcu-Bayram, 2017). This 
cognitive step before actual compliance refers to a persons’ propensity to comply, 
which Mastenbroek et al. (2017) captured by inquiring about administrators’ 
perceptions of duty to obey EU laws. To come closer to actual administrative 
behaviour, we go beyond perceptions of duty and towards implementers’ intention to 
invest and to put effort into EU implementation. Therefore, we focus on the willingness 
to implement EU law. Contrary to the EU implementation and compliance literature, 
which often connect this concept to notions of rationality (Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 
2006; Steunenberg, 2006, 2007; Kaeding, 2008), we use it in line with the frontline 
literature (Tummers, 2011; Tummers and Bekkers, 2014). Here, the concept is defined 
based on Metselaar’s (1997, p. 42) willingness to change as: ‘a positive behavioural 
intention towards the implementation of modifications in an organisation’s structure, 
or work and administrative processes, resulting in efforts from the organisation 
member’s side to support or enhance the change process’. 
 We take the theoretical framework developed by Mastenbroek et al. (2017) as a 
starting point and complement it with the insights from the frontline bureaucracy 
literature (Tummers et al., 2012; Dörrenbächer, 2017a). By combining the different 
kinds of literature, we identify 1) instrumental attitudes, 2) normative attitudes 3) 
general compliance attitude and 4) national bureaucratic structure as explanations 
for individuals’ willingness to implement EU migration law. 
Instrumental attitudes
Instrumental attitudes, firstly, refer to the calculative self-interest of implementers 
(Dörrenbächer, 2017a; Mastenbroek et al., 2017) which psychological theories have 
studied extensively in light of deterrence arguments (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). The 
rationale of the argument is that implementers only behave in desired ways if they fear 
costs for alternative behaviour or if they receive rewards for the desired behaviour 
(Tyler, 1997). At the frontline of implementation, Tummers et al. (2012) capture such 
instrumental attitudes in the concept of personal meaningfulness that focuses on 
tangible benefits and personal costs of implementation. In the field of EU migration 
law, there are several costs associated with implementing and failing to implement 
EU migration law (Dörrenbächer, 2017a). A first cost is the perceived risks of 
non­compliance (Dörrenbächer, 2017a; Mastenbroek et al., 2017). Courts and society 
tend to blame frontline implementers for problems during implementation (Hood, 
2011). Thus, migration caseworkers easily become scapegoats for tragedies of 
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individual migrants or violations of national security and welfare (Ellermann, 2006). 
These characteristics suggest that implementers who fear risks of not complying with 
EU law, will be more willing to implement EU law, than implementers who do not fear 
any risk for non-compliance, leading to the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The higher caseworkers rate the risks of not complying with EU 
migration law, the higher their willingness to implement EU migration law. 
A second cost is administrative burden. EU migration law often introduces new legal 
complexity into an already complex national legal framework (Dörrenbächer, 2017a, 
2017b). For example, EU migration law is often vague, and it may conflict with national 
instructions. As a result, EU law may constitute a new burden for caseworkers as it 
requires the mastering of a new legal framework, next to national obligations. Thus, 
EU law can contribute to the workload of frontline implementers. Since frontline 
implementers face scarce resources and capacities (Lipsky, 1980), perceptions of 
additional administrative burden will decrease the willingness to implement EU law. 
Thus, we expect:
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher caseworkers rate the administrative burden due to EU 
migration law, the lower their willingness to implement EU migration law. 
Normative attitudes
Beyond instrumental considerations, a main contribution of the framework by 
Mastenbroek et al. (2017) is their integration of normative legitimacy attitudes that 
derive from psychological studies (Tyler, 2006; Jackson et al., 2012) and studies of 
the legitimacy of EU decision-making (Scharpf, 2009; Schmidt, 2013). Following these 
studies, one can expect that legitimacy perceptions can trigger voluntary compliance. 
Mastenbroek et al. (2017) distinguish between substantive and procedural notions 
of legitimacy (also see Dörrenbächer, 2017a) which relate to the output and input side 
of EU legitimacy (Scharpf, 2009). By starting with output legitimacy, compliance 
behaviour may depend on an authority’s perceived performance (Sunshine and 
Tyler, 2003) e.g. of solving societal problems (Mastenbroek et al., 2017). 
 The frontline literature captures this capacity in perceptions of societal 
meaningfulness (Tummers et al., 2012) arguing that implementers prefer to apply 
laws that they consider useful for society (Meyers and Vorsanger, 2003). Respectively, 
implementers who consider laws useless for society experience societal meaning-
lessness (Tummers et al., 2012). Applied to the field of migration, the EU aims with its 
common migration laws an equal share of migration between member states. 
However, frontline implementers may consider EU law useless for these purposes, 
and they may think that EU law is not able to solve current societal challenges such 
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as the current refugee movements or the attraction of highly skills migrants into the 
EU. As a result, frontline implementers will not be willing to implement EU migration 
law. That leads to the third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The higher caseworkers rate the meaningfulness of EU migration law 
for society, the higher their willingness to implement EU migration law.
Next, focusing on specifics of the frontline, where caseworkers apply the law in 
interaction with clients, implementers may have a sense of citizen agency 
(Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2012) or user orientation (Andersen and Kjeldsen, 
2013). These concepts refer to the normative motivation to help individual clients 
(Dörrenbächer, 2017a). In the framework by Tummers (2011) and colleagues 
(Tummers et al., 2012; Tummers and Bekkers, 2014), this aspect is captured by client 
meaningfulness. The concept holds that when frontline workers perceive laws to be 
ineffective to help their clients, they will be frustrated (see also Grant, 2007; May and 
Winter, 2009). This frustration will trigger low willingness to implement these laws. 
 The field of migration is a particular client intensive policy field where frontline 
implementers regularly decide on the path of life of individual migrants. While societal 
meaningfulness and client meaningfulness can overlap in other policy areas, the two 
normative legitimacy perceptions are distinctive in the migration context where the 
interests of society and clients are often diverse (Düvell and Jordan, 2002; Jordan et 
al., 2003a). For example, in the field of family reunification, migration caseworkers 
need to evaluate if the sponsors of family migration have a sufficiently high income to 
sustain their family before a visa or residence permit is granted. In the case law of 
Chakroun (C-578/08) the CJEU obliges practical implementers to conduct individu-
al-level assessments of individual cases to evaluate the income criterium. While it 
may be beneficial to the economic welfare of the host society to apply this criterion 
strictly, a more liberal application of the ruling may be beneficial for the migrant 
clients. To account for client meaningfulness of EU law, we hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 4: The higher caseworkers rate the meaningfulness of EU migration law 
for their clients, the higher their willingness to implement EU migration law.
In addition to substantive normative evaluations, Mastenbroek et al. (2017) highlight 
notions of input legitimacy of EU law as a driver for compliance attitudes. The 
argument is that administrators may support EU law because they consider the 
source of the law fair and legitimate. The logic derives from the social psychology 
literature where it is claimed that even when people disagree with the content of the 
law, they may still obey the law due to perceptions of procedural justice (Tyler, 1990, 
1997). For example, when people believe that the decisions of the judiciary or 
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executive came about in a fair way, they tend to comply with the instructions of these 
institutions (Tyler, 2014). 
 Similarly, the frontline literature assumes that implementers care about the 
process through which new policies and laws emerged. Tummers et al. (2012) focus 
here particularly on factors that allow the implementer a personal and professional 
input during policy establishment. In the EU context, frontline implementers have 
typically no substantive input during EU decision-making. Nevertheless, Mastenbroek 
et al. (2017) find that even without direct socialising contact with the EU (Egeberg and 
Trondal, 2009), the perception that the EU is a legitimate and fair decision maker 
enhances implementers’ propensity to comply with EU law. Applied to the frontline of 
migration law, we expect:
Hypothesis 5: The higher caseworkers rate the procedural justice of EU decision- 
making, the high their willingness to implement EU migration law.
Finally, Mastenbroek et al. (2017) include EU loyalties as normative attitudes towards 
EU law. However, migration caseworkers are not directly accountable to EU 
authorities, and previous studies have shown that migration caseworkers have no 
explicit loyalties towards the EU (Dörrenbächer, 2017a). Thus, to keep the model 
parsimonious and to make it applicable to the frontline context, we leave out loyalty 
perceptions. 
General compliance attitudes
Next, Mastenbroek et al. (2017) show that general compliance attitudes, notwith-
standing the source and substantive meaning of the law, can make people law-abiding 
and increase their willingness to implement EU law. Likewise, the frontline literature 
holds that personality traits related to rule compliance increase the willingness to 
implement the law (Tummers et al., 2012). Rule compliance relates to the internalisa-
tion of the belief that all people under all circumstances should abide the law. Studies 
on bureaucratic personality have argued that bureaucrats are more rule compliant 
than other professionals (Merton, 1940). However, there is also considerable 
variations in bureaucratic personality among civil servants (DeHart-Davis, 2007). 
Accordingly, we expect the following: 
Hypothesis 6: The higher the rule compliance attitudes of caseworkers, the higher 
their willingness to implement EU migration law.
National institutional context as a country-level moderator
As the last block of explanations, Mastenbroek et al. (2017) investigate a range of 
attitudes relating to the institutional context in which civil servants operate, such as 
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political loyalty, political risks and misfit. Instead of these institutional individual-level 
mechanisms, we explore the role of the broader national institutional context in which 
frontline bureaucrats act. This choice allows us to distinguish more explicitly the 
relationship between individual-level attitudes and institutional factors in the 
compliance process. 
 At the country level, national regulatory styles and organisational context have 
been suggested to affect EU implementation (Knill, 2001; Versluis, 2003; Hille and 
Knill, 2006; Trondal, 2007; Egeberg and Trondal, 2009; Bastings et al., 2017). At the 
lowest level of implementation, studies have highlighted that bureaucratic discretion 
and accountability structures are particularly crucial factors for variation in the use of 
EU law among administrators. More concretely, Dörrenbächer (2017b) and 
Wockelberg (2014) have shown that implementers who operate under high levels of 
bureaucratic discretion and decentralised accountability structures, approach EU 
law in more diverse ways than implementers who operate under limited discretion. 
 Another, country-level factor that is related to the national bureaucratic context is 
the level of client contact that implementers have. Studies have shown that the level 
of client contact affects implementers’ willingness to make a prosocial difference 
(Grant, 2007). Thus, client contact may have implications for the strength of the effect 
of the normative perceptions on the willingness to implement. We assume that such 
institutional differences affect the attitudinal mechanisms for the willingness to 
implement EU in four ways. 
 First, when national policy-makers leave national implementers discretion, they 
in fact  ‘pass the buck’ of EU compliance to practical implements (Dörrenbächer and 
Mastenbroek, 2017). This discretion makes caseworkers vulnerable to public blame 
because formal discretion prevents implements to shift potential blame to higher-ups. 
Consequently, high margins of bureaucratic discretion will increase the effect of risk 
perceptions on the willingness to implement EU law.
 Second, under large margins of bureaucratic discretion and decentralised 
accountability structures, frontline implements will be used to construct meanings of 
compliance themselves (Van der Leun, 2006). Thus, in a discretionary national 
context, the effect of rule compliance on the willingness to implement may be less 
pronounced than in discretion-constrained structures in which implementers are 
used to stick tightly on detailed national instructions.
 Third, decentralised discretionary administrative structures will increase the 
effect of procedural justice. When caseworkers are used to drawing on various legal 
sources at the local and national level (Dörrenbächer, 2017b), they will care more 
about how the different laws came about and how legitimate the legal authorities are 
than caseworkers without the discretion to draw on various legal sources in their 
 decision-making. 
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Finally, national administrative structures that allow for much client contact will 
increase the effect of client meaningfulness. For example, Grant, (2007, 2008) holds 
that direct exposure to client reactions increases the importance of client 
meaningfulness of the job. 
 In the field of migration, such institutional variation in bureaucratic discretion, 
national accountability structures and client contact can be observed between 
migration law implementation in Germany and the Netherlands (Dörrenbächer, 
2017b). In Germany, many migration laws, such as the provision of residence permits 
to family members, long-term residents, highly skilled workers students etc. are 
implemented in a decentralised structure. Local foreign registration offices (Ausländer­
behörden) perform much of the frontline decision-making at the municipality level 
and are accountable to the Land when implementing national and EU migration law. 
Caseworkers apply migration laws in direct interaction with migrant clients. Since 
there is no direct oversight from the national level, these offices have considerable 
discretion. In the Netherlands, implementation of migration law is centralised. The 
central implementation agency is directly accountable to the Ministry of Security and 
Justice. Caseworkers operate in a screen-level bureaucracy (Bovens and Zouridis, 
2002) where computer manuals leave only limited discretion and client contact is 
rare. Applying the institutional assumptions to the frontline of migration law 
implementation in Germany and the Netherlands, one can hypothesise that:
Hypothesis 7: The effect of risk perceptions, procedural justice, and client meaning- 
fulness on the willingness to implement EU migration law is stronger among German 
migration caseworkers than among Dutch migration caseworkers. The effect of rule 
compliance is weaker among German migration caseworkers than among Dutch 
migration caseworkers.
3.  Methods
Operationalisation
To test the established theoretical framework, we draw on original survey data. We 
apply the scales developed by Tummers et al. (2012) to measure the willingness to 
implement, as well as societal and client meaningfulness (Table 7.1). The scales have 
the advantage that they are validated and Tummers et al. (2009) explicitly developed 
the items in such a way that they can be applied to various implementation contexts. 
For personal meaningfulness, not all items designed by Tummers et al. (2012) fit the 
EU migration context. Therefore, we use an item that captures risks for non-compliance 
developed by Mastenbroek et al. (2017) and one item from Tummers et al. (2012) that 
captures increased administrative workload. For rule compliance, we combine items 
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from Baker et al. (1973), Dehart Davis (2007) and Tummers et al. (2012) that measure 
general compliance attitudes47. For procedural justice, no established scales exist. 
Mastenbroek et al. (2017) rely on perceptions of several democratic credentials of the 
EU. We decided to measure these aspects more directly, by asking for perceptions 
of legitimacy and fairness of EU decision-making. In order to account for the national 
bureaucratic context, a country dummy for Dutch and German respondents was 
established which serves as a proxy for the bureaucratic context. 
 To test if the modifications made to the Tummers et al. (2012) items still capture 
the expected latent constructs and form valid scales, we conduct a Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) and a Factor Analysis using Principal Axis Factoring 
(PAF). We include all the items that are expected to capture willingness to implement, 
societal meaningfulness, client meaningfulness, rule compliance and procedural 
justice. The results of the PCA and PAF are very similar. Table A.7.1 in the Appendix 
provides the factor loadings and reveals that the items load on the expected factors. 
Cronbach alphas indicate high reliabilities of the scales. We use the mean score of 
the respective Likert items to calculate the individual scales.
 Next, we control for some background factors. First, we control for the objective 
and subjective importance of EU law for the respondents. The objective item refers to 
the field of migration in which implementers take most of their decisions. Migration 
caseworkers who deal on a daily basis with residency issues of EU citizens will be 
more aware of EU law than frontline implementers who decide on migration issues 
that are only recently affected by EU law, such as third country national residency, 
asylum law, or highly qualified migrants. Next, we add perceived importance of EU 
law as a subjective control. One can assume that implementers who do not consider 
EU law relevant for their work do not consider it as their task to implement it. 
 Additionally, we control for management positions of the respondents. Frontline 
managers circulate new laws among their employees and brief the other caseworkers. 
These tasks will make them more aware and thus, willing to implement EU law, than 
caseworkers without management tasks. Next, the study controls for demographic 
variables such as gender and having a migration background. Finally, we control for 
office size, since the local German offices differ in size related to their municipality 
and district (Dörrenbächer, 2017b). Thus, size may affect their capacities and 
knowledge about EU law.48 
47 The long list of items used for rule compliance by Tummers et al. (2012) would have prolonged the 
questionnaire considerably.
48 Mastenbroek et al. (2017) control for involvement in EU decision-making. Yet, migration caseworkers 
are normally not involved in political decision-making. Thus, for this analysis this control is unnecessary. 
Next, Mastenbroek et al. (2017) include perceptions of knowledge of EU law. However, our variables 
on relevance are highly correlated with perceived knowledge. To prevent multicollinearity, we leave out 
knowledge and rely on the more nuanced relevance perceptions.
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Table 7.1 summarises the operationalisation of the variables. If not stated otherwise, 
5-point Likert scales were used. The scales were recoded in such a way that one 
captures complete disagreement and five full agreement.
Sampling and method of analysis
The survey was distributed among frontline employees who work in the Dutch 
migration agency, the so-called IND (Immigratie­ en Naturalisatiedienst) in the 
department dealing with regular stay and citizenship (Directie Regulier Verblijf en 
Nederlanderschap) and local foreign registration offices (Ausländerbehörden) in the 
German Bundesland of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). NRW was chosen because 
as the largest German Bundesland it has a similar size as the Netherlands. 
Nevertheless, with its very local implementation system at the municipal and 
county-level, NRW has a most different bureaucratic structure compared to the Dutch 
implementation structure (for details see Dörrenbächer, 2017b). 
 Germany and the Netherlands share similar levels of immigration and can be 
expected to have comparable administrative capacities. Migration caseworkers in 
both systems are civil servants who decide on the same issues related to residence 
permits, visas and integration measures in the context of legal migration. Legal 
migration includes, for example, family migration, labour migration and student 
migration. In both samples, some respondents also decide on issues of (EU) 
citizenship and aspects related to refugees. However, in both samples, the asylum 
procedure does not fall within the tasks of the caseworkers, as asylum decisions are 
either handled by a different national agency (Germany) or in different departments 
of the IND. All four offices of the IND and seventeen Ausländerbehörden out of the 82 
offices in North Rhine-Westphalia, participated in the survey. The German offices 
capture a representative sample of large and small cities and counties (Kreise). 
 The survey was a self-administered online and paper-and-pencil survey. The 
difference in survey mode was based on preferences of the office leaders and pragmatic 
reasons. Existing survey research has shown that results from a self- administered 
paper-and-pencil survey and self-administered online surveys are comparable 
(Donovan et al., 2000; Fouladi et al., 2002). A crosscheck of the results of the two 
modes supports this view. The online survey was administrated with the online survey 
tool Qualtrics. Each office leader received an individual survey link that he or she sent 
to his or her employees. For details on the sampling frame and the Total Survey Error 
(Groves and Lyberg, 2010) we refer to the codebook (at the end of this dissertation). 
 The German sample consists of 182 respondents and the Dutch sample 
composed of 155 respondents. Response rates were calculated based on reported 
office size of the office leaders. Following these estimates, response rates varied 
between 100% and 32% per office. Of the respondents, 28% of the Dutch and 17% of 
the German respondents did not finish the survey. These breakups lead to some 
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Table 7.1   Operationalisation
Construct Items
Dependent variable
Willingness  
to implement
• I try to convince my colleagues of the importance of EU migration law.
• I stand up for the objectives of EU migration law.
• I try to reduce resistance among my colleagues regarding EU migration law.
• I put effort into a good implementation of EU migration laws.
• I take the time to deepen myself in EU migration law.
Independent variables
Instrumental 
considerations
• Not to comply with EU migration law has possible negative consequences 
for me. 
• I have higher administrative burdens due to EU migration law.
Normative 
considerations
Societal meaningfulness 
• EU migration law leads in the long term to the solution of societal problems.
• EU migration law leads in the short term to the solution of societal problems.
• EU migration law is solving now already societal problems.
Client meaningfulness
• EU migration law contributes to the welfare of my clients. 
• Through EU migration law I can better help my clients.
• EU migration law is eventually good for my clients.
Procedural justice
• The EU is a legitimate legislator in the field of migration. 
• Decision-making at the European level takes place in a fair way.
Bureaucratic 
personality
Rule compliance
• To prevent injustice, it is sometimes necessary to ignore rules. (R)
• Even when I consider a rule not useful, I usually comply with it. 
• Rules have to be respected at all times, regardless of the circumstance.
Country Variable established by merging the Dutch and German data files  
(0= Germany/1 = Netherlands)
Control variables
Gender Dummy (0= male/1= female)
Field of 
migration
In which field of Migration do you take most of your decisions?  
(EU -citizens Dummy: 0= no EU –citizens/ 1 =  EU citizens)
Management Does your current function include management tasks? (0 = yes/ 1= no)
Importance  
of EU law
How important is EU law in your daily work? (4 very important- 1 very 
unimportant)
Own migration 
background
Were you born in Germany/the Netherlands? (Dummy: 0=yes/1=no)
Office size 1= district/small city office (below 30 employees)
2= no small office
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missing data, especially on rule compliance attitudes, which was the last block of 
questions. Nevertheless, no systematic patterns were found concerning breakup 
patterns (see codebook). Thus, also partial responses are included in the analysis. 
 In the following, first descriptive statistics of attitudes towards EU law among 
German and Dutch respondents are compared using independent sample t-tests. 
Next, we use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression to test the hypotheses. To test 
for the moderating effect of national bureaucratic context and the attitudinal variables, 
we include interaction effects with the country dummy.
4.  Results
Descriptive analysis
Starting with the descriptive statistics of the willingness to implement, Figure 7-1 
shows a histogram of the willingness to implement scale. The Figure demonstrates 
that there is considerable variation in the willingness to implement EU migration 
law among the German and Dutch respondents. Moreover, among the German 
Figure 7-1   Histogram of the willingness to implement EU migration law among 
Dutch and German migration caseworkers
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respondents, there is a larger variation in willingness to implement EU law, while the 
Dutch responses are more normally distributed. As shown in Table 7.2, the German 
respondents are with an average score of 2.85 out of 5 relatively unwilling to implement 
EU law. Also, the Dutch respondents have with an average score of 3.08 only a 
moderate willingness to implement EU law. Nevertheless, the Dutch respondents are 
significantly more willing to implement EU law than the German respondents 
(p<0.05). Calculating Cohen’s d as a measure of effect size 49 indicates that the 
practical relevance of the difference is moderately large. 
 Concerning the explanatory conditions, both, German and Dutch respondents 
score the risk of not complying with EU law relatively high. Scores range from 3.58 
among the German respondents to 3.43 among the Dutch respondents, and there is 
no significant difference between respondents across the national bureaucratic 
structures. Next, the Dutch respondents have on average a relatively neutral position 
towards the perception that their administrative burden increases due to EU law (with 
a score of 3.03). Contrary, the German respondents indicate that their administrative 
burden increases due to EU law, with a score of 3.26 out of 5. The difference between 
the two samples is significant at p<0.05. These differences are in line with previous 
qualitative work, which reported that the German implementers struggle more with a 
complex web of Länder, regional, national, and EU migration laws which they have to 
apply next to each other, while the Dutch caseworkers focus mainly on national 
instructions (Dörrenbächer, 2017b). Nevertheless, as shown in Table 7.2, the effect 
size Cohen’s d of the difference is with 0.23 rather small. 
 Regarding normative attitudes, there is no significant difference regarding 
perceptions of societal meaningfulness and client meaningfulness of EU law between 
respondents across national bureaucratic contexts. Overall, respondents consider 
the potential of EU migration law to solve societal problems to be rather limited. 
Average scores range from 2.32 for the German respondents to 2.50 for the Dutch 
respondents. Overall, these scores indicate that many respondents disagree with 
statements regarding the problem-solving capacity of the EU. In an open comment 
section of the survey, respondents criticised especially the potential of misuse of EU 
migration law as a cost for society. With scores ranging from 3.33 for the German 
respondents and 3.43 for the Dutch respondents, both groups of civil servants 
consider the meaningfulness of EU law for their clients on average higher than the 
meaningfulness for society. 
 The average scores on perceptions of procedural justice of EU law are particularly 
interesting. Both, Dutch and German respondents are relatively critical towards 
statements reading the fairness of EU decision-making and the legitimacy of the EU 
49 With d lower than 0.2 indicating a small effect, 0.5 pointing a medium effect, and d above 0.8 capturing 
a large effect size.
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CHAPTER 7
in the field of migration law. Particular the German respondents with an average score 
of 2.82, consider the procedural justice of the EU as low. The Dutch respondents are 
with a mean score of 3.33 significantly (p<0.05) less critical of the procedural 
legitimacy of the EU. The effect size of the difference is with a Cohen’s d of 0.61 
moderately large. 
 Concerning general compliance attitudes, both German and Dutch respondents 
score relatively high on rule compliance, but the German respondents are with a 
score of 3.84 significantly (p<0.05) more in favour of sticking to rules tightly than the 
Dutch respondents (average rating of 3.56). The effect size of this difference is with a 
Cohen’s d = 0.38 small to medium. 
 Concerning the control variables, the descriptive statistics in Table 7.2 show that 
the German respondents consider EU migration law significantly less relevant for 
their daily work (average score of 2.71 out of 4),  than the Dutch respondents with a 
mean rating of (3.24). The practical effect of the difference is moderate in effect size 
(Cohen’s d=0.64). The low importance for the German respondents may relate to the 
fact that for the German respondents EU law is only one of the legal levels amongst 
others that they have to take into account. Thus, next to national, Länder and local 
instructions, EU law is perceived as only one out of many legal sources which may 
decrease perceived importance (Dörrenbächer, 2017b). 
Explanatory analysis
Table 7.3 presents the result of the OLS regression by entering the variables in blocks50. 
The Table presents first the baseline model with the control variables. Subsequently, 
we include the instrumental attitudes, followed by the normative attitudes towards 
EU law and general compliance attitudes. Finally, the interaction effects are included. 
All models are statistically significant at the p<0.001 level. Besides the inclusion of 
the interaction effects, each block significantly adds to the explanatory power of 
the model. The addition of the normative perceptions adds most explanatory power. 
This block of variables also adds most explanatory power when changing or reversing 
the order of the blocks that are entered into the model. In the following, we focus on the 
final model which includes all theorised variables and the expected interaction effects. 
The final model F (17, 240) = 10.40, p<0.000 has an adjusted R square of 0.38. 
 We start with the control variables. Our analysis shows that perceived importance 
of EU law (beta = 0.20, p<0.001) and working predominately in the field of EU-citizens 
(beta = 0.26, p<0.001) significantly increase the willingness to implement EU 
migration law. Next, having a management position significantly increases the 
willingness to implement EU migration law with a beat = - 0.16 (p<0.01). The other 
control variables play no significant role.
50 All statsicts have been replicated indepently by two of the co-authors.
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Interestingly, the national bureaucratic context has only in the baseline model and 
the model including instrumental attitudes a significant association with the willingness 
to implement (beta = 0.15, p<0.05). The association turns insignificant once the normative 
attitudinal variables are included in the model. Thus, when controlling for individual-level 
attitudes, being a migration caseworker in Germany or the Netherlands does not make 
respondents per se significantly more or less willing to implement EU migration law. 
 By examining the effects of the attitudinal predictors of model 5, the instrumental 
attitudes provide mixed explanations for the willingness to implement. Caseworkers 
are significantly driven by risk considerations (beta = 0.13, p>0.05). Nevertheless, 
perceptions of increased administrative burden are not relevant for the willingness to 
implement EU migration law.  
 Regarding the normative considerations, it is interesting that perceptions of the 
societal meaningfulness of EU law play no significant role in explaining the willingness 
to implement EU migration law. However, client meaningfulness is a significant and 
relatively strong predictor (beta = 0.14, p>0.05). This effect supports previous 
observations that indicated that caseworkers are especially concerned with providing 
services to their clients (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2012; Tummers and Bekkers, 
2014; Tummers and Rocco, 2015). 
 Moreover, the perception that the EU is a procedurally just decision maker has 
a beta-coefficient of 0.20 (p<0.01). In relative terms, procedural justice is thus, 
the strongest attitudinal predictor for the willingness to implement EU migration law. 
This finding is somewhat surprising because, in Dörrenbächer’s (2017a) qualitative 
work, migration law implementers did not mention procedural legitimacy as a reason 
to use EU law when being confronted with tensions between national and EU laws. 
Nonetheless, the survey results indicate that when it comes to their willingness to 
implement EU migration law, caseworkers care more about the legitimacy of EU 
 decision-making than about the substance of EU law. Next, general compliance 
attitudes are a significant, but less strong predictor for the willingness to implement 
than the instrumental and normative considerations. 
 Finally, turning to the moderating effect of national bureaucratic context, the 
analysis shows that, contrary to our expectations, the interactions between country 
and the attitudinal perceptions are largely not significant. Only the effect of procedural 
justice with a beta coefficients of -0.11 (p<0.05) is significantly stronger among the 
German respondents than among the Dutch respondents. In light of EU compliance, 
this difference may be relevant because the German respondents consider the 
procedural justice of EU law significantly worse than their Dutch colleagues. Thus, 
while previous qualitative research (Dörrenbächer, 2017b) indicated that Dutch 
migration caseworkers rely less actively on original EU law than the German 
caseworkers, the survey results suggest that less discretion does not make civil 
servants per se less willing to implement EU law.
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Table 7.3   Results of the OLS regression on the willingness to implement EU migration law
Model 1  
baseline with controls
Model 2
adding instrumental 
consideration
Model 3
adding normative 
considerations
Model 4
adding bureaucratic 
personality
Model 5
adding interactions
R square change 0.28*** 0.04** 0.08*** 0.01* 0.01
Adjusted R square 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.38 ***
Controls
Field of migration: EU citizenship  0.22 *** (0.10)  0.22*** (0.10)  0.25*** (0.09)  0.27 *** (0.09)  0.26*** (0.09)
Importance EU law  0.29*** (0.05)  0.23*** (0.05)  0.20** (0.05)  0.20 ** (0.05)  0.20*** (0.05)
Gender  0.01 (0.08)  0.01 (0.08)  - 0.01 (0.08)  0.01 (0.08)  - 0.01 (0.08)
Migration background  0.10 (0.15)  0.10 (0.15)  0.08 (0.14)  0.06 (0.14)  0.05 (0.14)
Management  - 0.25 *** (0.12)  - 0.21*** (0.12)  - 0.19** (0.12)  - 0.18 ** (0.12)  - 0.16** (0.12)
Size   - 0.01 (0.12)  0.02 (0.12)  0.04 (0.11)  0.05 (0.11)  0.05 (0.11)
Country (Ger. = 0, NL = 1)  0.15* (0.09)  0.17** (0.09)  0.09 (0.09)  0.10 (0.09)  0.10 (0.09)
Instrumental considerations
EU higher administrative burden   0.07 (0.04)   0.08 (0.04)  0.07 (0.04)   0.04 (0.04)
Risk   0.20*** (0.04)   0.15 ** (0.04)  0.14* (0.04)   0.13 * (0.04)
Normative considerations
Societal meaningfulness   0.02 (0.05)  0.04 (0.05)  0.06 (0.05)
Client meaningfulness   0.14 ** (0.05)  0.13** (0.05)  0.14* (0.05)
Procedural justice   0.22*** (0.05)  0.23*** (0.05)  0.20 ** (0.05)
General compliance attitude
Rule compliance  0.12 * (0.05)   0.12* (0.05)
Interactions with national context
Country x Risk  - 0.04 (0.04)
Country x Client meaningfulness  - 0.01 (0.04)
Country x Procedural justice  - 0.11* (0.04)
Country x Rule compliance  - 0.01 (0.04)
N: 251
Note: Standardised Beta-coefficients are presented with standard errors in brackets. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01. 
*** p < 0.001, pairwise exclusion of missing data was used. When using listwise exclusion, the results remain 
similar, but rule compliance has no longer a significant effect. This may relate to the fact that not all respondents 
finished the questionnaire, leading to some missing data on the rule compliance variable.
The following criteria are met: Criterion of no multicollinearity (No VIF-values above 10 and average close to 
1. No exclusion of influential outlying cases was required (using casewise diagnostics: Cook’s distance max. 
0.07, criterion < 1). Criteria of homoscedasticity and normality are met (graph of Zresidual against Zpredicted 
shows a random array of points, willingness to implement EU law histogram has a normal-type distribution, 
and PP plot resembles a diagonal line).
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Table 7.3   Results of the OLS regression on the willingness to implement EU migration law
Model 1  
baseline with controls
Model 2
adding instrumental 
consideration
Model 3
adding normative 
considerations
Model 4
adding bureaucratic 
personality
Model 5
adding interactions
R square change 0.28*** 0.04** 0.08*** 0.01* 0.01
Adjusted R square 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.38 ***
Controls
Field of migration: EU citizenship  0.22 *** (0.10)  0.22*** (0.10)  0.25*** (0.09)  0.27 *** (0.09)  0.26*** (0.09)
Importance EU law  0.29*** (0.05)  0.23*** (0.05)  0.20** (0.05)  0.20 ** (0.05)  0.20*** (0.05)
Gender  0.01 (0.08)  0.01 (0.08)  - 0.01 (0.08)  0.01 (0.08)  - 0.01 (0.08)
Migration background  0.10 (0.15)  0.10 (0.15)  0.08 (0.14)  0.06 (0.14)  0.05 (0.14)
Management  - 0.25 *** (0.12)  - 0.21*** (0.12)  - 0.19** (0.12)  - 0.18 ** (0.12)  - 0.16** (0.12)
Size   - 0.01 (0.12)  0.02 (0.12)  0.04 (0.11)  0.05 (0.11)  0.05 (0.11)
Country (Ger. = 0, NL = 1)  0.15* (0.09)  0.17** (0.09)  0.09 (0.09)  0.10 (0.09)  0.10 (0.09)
Instrumental considerations
EU higher administrative burden   0.07 (0.04)   0.08 (0.04)  0.07 (0.04)   0.04 (0.04)
Risk   0.20*** (0.04)   0.15 ** (0.04)  0.14* (0.04)   0.13 * (0.04)
Normative considerations
Societal meaningfulness   0.02 (0.05)  0.04 (0.05)  0.06 (0.05)
Client meaningfulness   0.14 ** (0.05)  0.13** (0.05)  0.14* (0.05)
Procedural justice   0.22*** (0.05)  0.23*** (0.05)  0.20 ** (0.05)
General compliance attitude
Rule compliance  0.12 * (0.05)   0.12* (0.05)
Interactions with national context
Country x Risk  - 0.04 (0.04)
Country x Client meaningfulness  - 0.01 (0.04)
Country x Procedural justice  - 0.11* (0.04)
Country x Rule compliance  - 0.01 (0.04)
N: 251
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5.  Conclusion
EU compliance research is currently shifting attention from top-down institutional 
mechanisms of EU compliance towards bottom-up approaches with attention to 
individual- level explanations for EU compliance (Burcu-Bayram, 2017; Dörrenbächer, 
2017a; Mastenbroek, 2017; Mastenbroek et al., 2017; Thomann and Sager, 2017b). 
This study has contributed to this emerging literature with a quantitative cross-country 
study of frontline implementers in the highly topical field of migration law. 
 This chapter focused on an essential prerequisite of EU law application, namely 
implementers’ willingness to implement EU law. The study established a theoretical 
framework including implementers’ instrumental and normative attitudes as well as 
general compliance attitudes. By exploring how national context effects these 
individual- level explanations, this study incorporated the bureaucratic context in 
which implementers operate into micro-level explanations of EU compliance.
 We tested the framework by relying on an original dataset that captures the 
EU-related attitudes of migration caseworkers in the Netherlands and the German 
Bundesland of North Rhine-Westphalia. While these lower-level implementers have 
no direct socialising contact with EU institutions (Egeberg and Trondal, 2009), they 
crucially influence if and how EU law reaches its intended recipients. The field of 
migration is not only a highly topical area of EU law with considerable implementation 
gaps (Trauner, 2016; Scipioni, 2017) but previous studies have also shown that migration 
caseworkers in this field approach EU law in highly diverse ways (Dörrenbächer, 
2017a).
 This study supports these previous qualitative findings by showing that there is 
considerable variation among migration caseworkers’ willingness to implement EU 
migration law. Variation was particularly strong among the German respondents. The 
variation may relate to the more discretionary German bureaucratic structure which 
gives the German implementers more freedom in how they approach EU law, 
compared to the Dutch respondents who operate in a centralised system. 
 Using OLS regression, our data highlight that among the theorised variables, 
normative considerations of procedural justice and client meaningfulness are the 
most powerful attitudinal explanations for the willingness to implement EU migration 
law. The perception that EU law is meaningless for society does not feature as a 
significant explanation. Instrumental perceptions of risk and general rule compliance 
are significant but weaker predictors than perceptions of procedural justice and client 
meaningfulness. When controlling for individual attitudes, the national bureaucratic 
context has no significant association with the willingness to implement, but the 
interaction between country and procedural justice perceptions is significant. More 
precisely, the perception that the EU is a legitimate and fair decision maker had a 
greater impact on migration caseworkers’ willingness to implement EU law in the 
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decentralised discretionary German structure than in the discretion-constrained 
Dutch structure.
 These findings have important implications for our understanding of EU 
compliance and frontline implementation more broadly. First, the study adds a 
comparative cross-country perspective to frontline research (Hupe and Buffat, 2014). 
We show that the EU context provides suitable conditions for investigating how 
lower-level implementers across national structures form attitudes about the same 
external legal stimuli. Moreover, the theoretical frameworks of the frontline literature 
and its measurement tools (Tummers et al., 2012) proved useful to capture attitudes 
towards EU law. This observation makes the validated attitudinal scales of the frontline 
bureaucracy literature a fruitful addition to micro-level EU compliance studies by 
going beyond previous qualitative (Dörrenbächer, 2017a, 2017b) and single-item 
measurements (Mastenbroek et al., 2017).
 Second, in line with Mastenbroek et al. (2017), this study indicates that the social 
psychology literature (Tyler, 1990; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003) can make significant 
contributions to EU compliance and implementation studies. Our study detailed the 
instrumental and normative attitudes suggested by that literature in light of the 
frontline migration context. At the frontline of migration law, societal meaningfulness 
of EU law does not feature as a relevant explanation for implementers’ approaches 
towards EU law, while client meaningfulness of EU law increases migration 
caseworkers’ willingness to implement EU migration law. While caseworkers did not 
openly admit in previous qualitative studies (Dörrenbächer, 2017b) that procedural 
legitimacy plays a role in their approach towards EU law, this study showed that 
overall, caseworkers cared more about the procedural legitimacy of EU law than 
about its substantive meaningfulness. This finding emphasises that bottom-up 
mechanisms of a positive evaluation of the democratic credentials of the EU and a 
transparent and fair decision-making process could improve the top-down efficiency 
of EU law through compliance on the ground.  
 Nevertheless, these micro-foundations for compliance with EU law may depend 
on the type of national civil servants involved in EU implementation. That becomes 
clear when taking Mastenbroek et al.’s (2017) study among general national civil 
servants into account. In their study societal meaningfulness was a stronger predictor 
than procedural justice evaluations. Thus, the importance of client meaningfulness 
may relate particularly to the normatively laden and client-intensive field of EU 
migration law, where frontline implementers consider the use of EU law for the general 
society to be rather limited.
 Third, our study adds to previous qualitative studies that have highlighted the 
importance of national bureaucratic contexts for EU implementation (Knill and 
Lenschow, 1998; Versluis, 2003; Dörrenbächer, 2017b). While Dörrenbächer (2017b) 
has shown that migration caseworkers in discretion-constrained structures draw less 
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actively on EU law than implementers in discretionary structures, our study highlights 
that this does not make them more or less willing to implement EU law. Thus, contrary 
to the regulatory style literature (Kagan, 1989; Knill, 2001; Versluis, 2003), we show 
that once we control for individual-level attitudes, the national bureaucratic context 
has no independent effect on administrators’ willingness to implement EU law. 
However, in line with our expectations, the national bureaucratic context is still relevant 
because it influences the effect of procedural justice evaluations. Nevertheless, it 
remains to be explored in future research why the German respondents consider the 
legitimating credentials of EU migration law significantly lower than their Dutch 
colleagues did. 
 Another avenue for follow-up studies is to separate effects of bureaucratic 
structure and other country-specific background variables. While our cross-country 
design constitutes a first step to test how individual-level mechanisms interact with 
national context, public sector reforms within a domestic context may provide for 
opportunities of a longitudinal design that can disentangle country-level variation and 
bureaucratic context. Moreover, future studies should go beyond cross-sectional 
correlational designs by investigating the causal relationship between EU-related 
attitudes, the willingness to implement, as well as the link to actual compliance 
behaviour. A fruitful avenue for such research may be experimental approaches, 
such as vignette studies.
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1.  Introduction 
More than ten years after the first EU norms on migration and asylum entered into 
force, the issue of regulating migration and asylum could not be higher on the political 
agendas of EU member states and the EU itself. The goal of this dissertation has 
been to investigate how frontline implementers in national migration offices apply 
EU migration law. The frontline implementation process not only has significant 
consequences for the lives of those migrants who apply for residence permits and 
visas; it also has implications for the European project of contributing to a fair 
distribution of migrants and harmonised standards for legal entry into Europe. 
 Each of the chapters of this dissertation presented an independent study with 
individual conclusions. However, the chapters also complement each other. This 
concluding chapter aims to connect the findings and to situate them in the context of 
the broader EU compliance literature and migration law implementation research 
more generally. The following section summarises the main conclusions of the 
dissertation. The third section answers the central research question. Subsequently, 
the contributions to theory and methods are discussed. The chapter ends with 
implications for practitioners and an outlook on future research.
2.  Key findings of the dissertation
In a nutshell, the dissertation showed that convergence and compliance with the 
substance of EU law during EU transposition at the macro level constitute neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for convergence and compliant frontline deci-
sion-making. Instead, macro- and meso-level factors combined with individual 
attitudes at the micro level influence how implementers apply and respond to EU 
legal inputs. Moreover, the macro and meso level affect the micro-level attitudes of 
frontline implementation.
Findings on the individual in migration offices: The link between  
the meso and micro level 
The dissertation started out by investigating the relationship between national 
bureaucratic context and individual-level attitudes of frontline implementation. 
Chapter 2 studied the cooperation of local German migration caseworkers with other 
frontline organisations when deciding on family reunification. The main finding of the 
sub-study is that asymmetric powers between the frontline organisations fuel 
instrumental motivations of avoiding blame. Moreover, the face-to-face interaction 
with clients at the local level enhances caseworkers’ normative motivation of identifying 
deserving and undeserving clients. Especially when the German embassies follow a 
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restrictive approach, these motivations lead to tensions in inter-institutional cooperation. 
In light of Europeanisation, the chapter indicates that complex national administrative 
arrangements may result in variation in EU migration law applications, even within 
a single EU member state. This variation suggests that while transposition of EU 
migration law lays the foundation for harmonised frontline decision-making, to under- 
stand EU compliance processes, we also need to study the national bureaucratic 
context in which civil servants apply EU law on the ground.
Subsequently, chapter 3 investigated the effect of client contact during case assessment 
on job motivations. The chapter indicates that despite considerable cross-country 
variation of client contact, migration caseworkers in Germany and the Netherlands 
have instrumental and normative job motivations. In the light of normative prosocial 
motivations, a desire to contribute to the welfare of others drives both Dutch and 
German officials. However, respondents with much client contact focus more on the 
meaning of their job for their clients while the caseworkers with limited face-to-face 
client contact concentrate more on the significance of their job for society as a whole. 
These motivational differences may have implications for frontline implementation. 
Concerning EU law application, the chapter shows that while frontline implementers 
across EU member states increasingly handle converging policies and legislation, 
the bureaucratic structures in which they operate remain very diverse. The diversity in 
structures has implications not only for job motivations, but it may also affect the level 
of harmonisation in the application stage.
Findings on the delegation of EU discretion: The link between 
macro and meso level 
Chapter 4 focused on the relationship between macro-level factors of EU migration 
law implementation and national contexts. The chapter mapped and explained levels 
of legal discretion delegated to practical implementers after the transposition of EU 
Chapter 3:
Both frontline implementers with and without client contact have normative prosocial 
job motivations. Client contact triggers strong perceptions of client meaningfulness. 
Absence of client contact enhances perceptions of societal meaningfulness of the job.
Chapter 2:
Asymmetric power enhances instrumental motivations of avoiding blame. Client contact 
at the local level enhances normative motivations of identifying deserving and 
undeserving clients.
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asylum laws. The chapter emphasised that even when states formally comply with 
EU law, the level of EU discretion delegated to practical implementers may vary 
considerably between member states. The fact that national transposing actors do 
not voluntarily engage in regulatory change when transposing EU law could account 
for the patterns. That is to say, domestic preferences regarding the legal status quo 
are an important aspect when explaining levels of discretion left to practical 
implementers after transposition. In turn, high levels of EU discretion delegated to 
practical implementers can turn practical implementers into EU policy-makers and 
force them to fill the legal gaps of national and EU law on the ground.
Findings on frontline applications of EU law: The link between 
macro, meso and micro level 
Building on the observations of the previous chapters, the third part of this dissertation 
investigated how frontline migration law implementers respond to common EU 
migration law in their everyday application of public policies. Chapter 5 compared the 
independent use of EU migration law among migration law implementers in Germany 
and the Netherlands. The chapter’s point of departure was the observation that even 
member states with very similar legal transposition of EU law may have highly diverse 
bureaucratic structures to apply these rules (see chapter 3). Overall, across the 
different structures, lower-level implementers were surprisingly aware of the multilevel 
legal context in which they operate. However, only frontline implementers who operate 
within structures that leave some discretion use EU law independently of national law. 
Even within the German discretionary structure, frontline implementers differ in their 
use of EU law. Thus, discretionary structures are not a sufficient condition for 
independent frontline use of EU law because not all German respondents felt 
comfortable relying on original EU law next to national instructions. The variation 
within the German case suggests that beyond bureaucratic context, micro-level 
variation needs to be taken into account as well to explain the application of EU law 
at the frontline.
Chapter 4:
Preferences of transposing actorst to keep the status quo sustain high and low levels 
of legal discretion after EU transposition. High discretion after transposition turns 
practical implementers into de facto EU lawmakers.
Chapter 5:
Discretion­constrained bureaucratic structures discourage independent use of EU law.
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Consequently, to further explore the role of micro-level variables, chapter 6 investigated 
three contexts with varying levels of legal discretion and individuals’ motivations for 
the use of EU law. The chapter shows that most implementers give priority to national 
guidance. Nevertheless, some caseworkers explained how they use EU law when the 
national level provides only vague guidelines. In extreme cases, some implementers 
even correct for absent EU transposition. Most migration officials base their decisions 
on instrumental motivations such as the evaluation of risks to be questioned by the 
outside world (see also chapter 2). Furthermore, particular implementers with strong 
prosocial normative implementation motivations (see also chapter 3) use EU law 
independently of national law. 
Finally, chapter 7 tested the insights of chapter 5 and 6 with a quantitative analysis. 
The chapter investigated which individual-level attitudes explain frontline implementers’ 
willingness to implement EU law, and to what extent the national bureaucratic context 
moderates the effect of individual attitudes. The chapter relied on survey data of 
German and Dutch migration caseworkers and mostly supports the qualitative 
findings of chapter 5 and 6. More concretely, chapter 7 highlights that beyond 
variation in the (reported) use of EU law (chapter 5 and 6), there is also considerable 
variation in the preceding cognitive step of applying EU law, namely in the willingness 
to implement EU migration laws. In line with chapter 2 and 6, the statistical analysis 
reveals the importance of normative motivations during the implementation process. 
Furthermore, in line with the qualitative findings of chapter 6, instrumental perceptions of 
risk and rule compliance feature as significant predictors for the willingness to 
implement EU migration laws. 
Chapter 6:
Frontline implementers rely on original EU law when national legal guidelines are vaguer 
than EU norms. In such cases, substantive normative and instrumental motivations 
trigger use of original EU law.
Chapter 7:
Normative evaluations of client meaningfulness and procedural justice, instrumental 
evaluations of risk, and general compliance attitudes increase the willingness to 
implement EU law.
 
National bureaucratic structure has no independent effect on willingness to implement 
EU law but moderates effects of procedural justice.
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However, the survey also refined the qualitative findings of the previous chapters. First, it 
emphasises that perceptions of client meaningfulness of EU migration law, but not 
societal meaningfulness, are associated with the willingness to implement EU 
migration law. 
 Second, after controlling for individual-level variation, the national bureaucratic 
context had no independent association with the willingness to implement EU 
migration law. In light of the qualitative findings of chapter 5, this indicates that while 
the Dutch respondents have fewer opportunities to use EU law actively, they are not 
per se less willing to implement EU law than the German respondents.
 Third, it is striking that the normative perception that the EU is a fair and legitimate 
decision maker has the strongest association with the willingness to implement EU 
law. This finding is surprising because procedural legitimacy did not come up as a 
prominent factor for the use of EU law in the qualitative interviews (chapter 6). There 
may be two reasons for this phenomenon. First, while the interview method can 
discover conscious motivations that respondents mention actively, it was a less 
suitable method for revealing unconscious biases of behaviour. For example, the 
perception that the EU is an illegitimate legislature may be a motivating attitude that 
only came to the forefront through the survey that explicitly asked respondents about 
their perception of the legitimacy of EU decision-making. Second, the use of EU law 
(chapter 5 & 6) and the willingness to implement EU migration law (chapter 7) are 
related, but slightly different facets of EU law application. The willingness to implement 
is an attitudinal variable related to implementers’ intentions to support and promote 
EU law. The variable may be more closely related to implementers’ general attitudes 
towards the EU as a legitimate authority than the use of EU law, which relates to 
problem- solving in concrete cases. 
 Finally, chapter 7 shows that there is a significant interaction effect between 
procedural justice and the national bureaucratic context. This moderating effect 
supports the findings of chapter 5 and suggests that implementers who regularly 
draw on a variety of legal sources pay more attention to the process through which 
laws came about than implementers who have little discretion to rely on different legal 
levels when applying the law. 
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3.  Answer to the research question
Taken together, the findings of the individual chapters form an answer to the central 
research question of this dissertation of how do macro­, meso­, and micro­level 
factors structure frontline application of EU migration law? 
 At the macro level, legal discretion and conflicts between national and European 
law add new complexities to decision-making (chapter 4). Frontline implementers 
resolve such complications depending on the national bureaucratic context in which 
they operate and their attitudes towards EU law (chapter 5, 6). 
 At the meso level, only frontline implementers with some structural discretion use 
original EU law alongside national law (chapter 5). Discretion at the meso level also 
has implications for individual-level attitudes towards EU law. Implementers who 
regularly operate between various legal levels pay more attention to considerations 
of procedural justice than implementers who work in a centralised legal system 
(chapter 7). 
 Other individual-level attitudes remain unaffected by macro- and meso-level 
variation. For example, while client contact makes implementers more aware of 
the client meaningfulness of their job (chapter 3), for the willingness to implement EU 
law, perceptions of client meaningfulness play an equally important role across 
bureaucratic contexts (chapter 7). Beyond client meaningfulness and procedural 
justice, instrumental evaluations of risks and general rule compliance attitudes affect 
frontline implementers’ approaches to EU law (chapter 6, 7) and policy application 
more generally (chapter 2). Figure 8.1 summarises the key findings along the theoretical 
framework established in chapter 1.
4.  Contribution to theory
This dissertation has made a twofold theoretical contribution. First, concerning the 
implementation of migration law, the thesis added to theory development of the 
management of migration law in the EU context. Second, in light of studies on 
EU compliance, this dissertation added theoretical insight from general public 
administration research and social psychology to develop a bottom-up multilevel 
theoretical perspective. The following section specifies the contributions in more detail.
Contribution to frontline implementation of migration law
Regarding studies on the implementation of migration law, this dissertation has 
added standard public administration theories and the EU compliance literature as 
theoretical lenses to shed new light on the application of migration law in a multilevel 
legal context. 
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First, by relying on the research on blame avoidance (Hood, 2011; Hinterleitner, 2017) 
and the standard street-level literature (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003, 2012; 
Lipsky, 2010), the dissertation traced the mechanisms behind inter-institutional 
cooperation at the frontline of migration law. By focusing on inter-institutional 
cooperation, the dissertation contextualised individual-level explanations of migration 
law implementation in the national bureaucratic context. 
 Second, by providing one of the few cross-country comparisons of frontline 
 decision-making in the field of migration law, this dissertation highlights how the 
diversity of national implementation settings, for example regarding client contact 
and bureaucratic discretion, affect job motivations of migration law implementers. 
Thereby the study revealed that the EU context provides particularly favourable 
conditions for adding organisational context (Egeberg, 1999; Trondal, 2011b) to 
frontline research because EU law confronts frontline implementers across national 
bureaucratic settings with similar legal stimuli. 
 Third, by adding the European level to the study of frontline migration law 
applications, this thesis showed that EU law often sustains or even increases frontline 
discretion. This finding adds to the control gap debate in migration studies. The 
discussion revolves around the argument that national actors increasingly lose power 
and discretion to EU institutions (Kaunert and Léonard, 2012; Acosta Arcarazo and 
Geddes, 2013; Bonjour and Vink, 2013; Bonjour et al., 2018). In line with some recent 
frontline studies that take the Europeanisation of migration law into account (Infantino, 
2016; Van der Woude and Van der Leun, 2017), this dissertation refined this argument 
by showing that at the frontline of implementation, EU migration law may also create 
new discretionary and legal ambiguities.
Contribution to the study of EU compliance
Regarding the study of EU compliance, this dissertation moved beyond the dominant 
focus on transposition and towards the practical application of EU law. In line with 
Treib (2014), the point of departure for this study was that we need to apply standard 
public administration theories more actively when examining the practical 
implementation of EU law. Consequently, to add insights into EU compliance in the 
application phase, this dissertation has complemented EU compliance studies with 
the insights of well-developed public administration and political science theories. 
 First, the thesis relied on theories from the frontline bureaucracy literature 
(Lipsky, 1980; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2012; Tummers et al., 2012), social 
psychology (Tyler, 1990; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003) and job motivations (Perry and 
Wise, 1990; Grant, 2007). Applying these theories to EU compliance research 
allowed going beyond top-down and institutionalist approaches to EU compliance 
(Mastenbroek et al., 2017; Thomann and Sager, 2017a). Additionally, these theories 
provide frontline motivations that are more detailed than the institutional actor logics 
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commonly applied in EU compliance research (Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006; 
Treib, 2014).
 Moreover, by incorporating standard organisational theory (Egeberg, 1999; 
Trondal, 2011a) into EU compliance research, the dissertation emphasised the 
importance of bureaucratic context for EU compliance. Seen in this light, the 
dissertation supports previous studies (Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Knill, 2001; Hille 
and Knill, 2006) that have emphasised the importance of administrative structures for 
EU compliance and Europeanisation. Earlier studies have focused primarily on the 
compatibility of national administrative structures with EU obligations. This dissertation 
went beyond the structural compatibility and identified general organisational 
features, such as local client contact and domestic accountability to trace the effects 
on frontline applications of EU law. These factors connect the present approach with 
public administration research beyond the EU context.
 Finally, this dissertation revealed that EU compliance studies and standard 
delegation theories (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1994, 1999; Huber et al., 2001; Huber 
and Shipan, 2002) provide promising additions to each other. First, domestic 
delegation theories highlight that, despite formally compliant transposition, there can 
be considerable variation in the legal discretion that policy-makers delegate to 
practical implementers through transposition. By pointing at this variation, this 
dissertation adds to a new stream of EU compliance research that goes beyond 
binary understandings of compliance (Hartmann, 2016) towards the customisation 
(Thomann, 2015) and quality (Bondarouk and Mastenbroek, 2018) of EU 
implementation. Respectively, domestic delegation theories add to EU compliance 
research by providing well-established theoretical expectations on political variables 
in the EU delegation process. Additionally, the Europeanisation and EU compliance 
literature (Duina, 1997; Knill and Lenschow, 1998), with its emphasis on institutional 
misfit contribute a major mechanism to the standard delegation literature, namely the 
relevance of national policy-makers’ preferences to maintain the status quo.
5.  Methodological contribution
This dissertation made four methodological contributions. First, the dissertation 
provides one of the few cross-country comparative studies on frontline bureaucratic 
decision-making (chapter 3, 5, 7). While the number of countries included in this 
study is limited, the cross-country design shows important aspects of the national 
bureaucratic structure and their effects on frontline motivations and decision-making, 
which frontline studies have often neglected (Hupe and Buffat, 2014).
 A second methodological contribution is the connection of legal analysis with 
social science methods of discovering empirical social mechanisms (e.g. chapter 6). 
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In the EU compliance literature, there has been only limited communication among 
legal scholars (e.g. Pascouau and Labayle, 2011; Strik, 2011; Strik et al., 2012) and 
social scientists (e.g. Mastenbroek, 2003; Falkner et al., 2004; Toshkov, 2007; 
Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009; Dörrenbächer et al., 2015). Therefore, to connect 
legal and social science approaches to EU law, in chapter 4 this dissertation 
introduced an innovative measurement tool to systematically measure legal discretion 
(see also Hartmann, 2016 for previous attempts). The tool relies on the Institutional 
Grammar Tool developed by Crawford and Ostrom (1995; see also Basurto et al., 
2010; Siddiki et al., 2012) and has been suggested by Toshkov (2013) as an addition 
to EU compliance research. The tool adds necessary content-specific depth to 
pre-existing quantitative measures of discretion used in political science (Epstein and 
O’Halloran, 1999; Huber and Shipan, 2002) and adds a systematic approach to the 
legal analysis of discretion.
 A third methodological contribution of this dissertation is the presentation of 
empirical data from the topical field of migration. By focusing on migration, this thesis 
has partly tackled the ‘policy sector bias’ (Toshkov, 2011, p. 5) which many EU 
compliance studies suffer as they have focused to a large extent on environmental 
and social policies (Angelova et al., 2012). Since migration law is a relatively young 
field of Europeanisation, it is not surprising that little EU compliance research has 
covered this policy area. 
 Another reason for the lack of studies in this field may be the significant barriers 
of access to empirical data. Migration law applications include decision-making on 
the residence status of individual migrant clients. Data on individual decision-making 
are highly sensitive and not openly accessible. Due to privacy concerns and to 
prevent blame for precedence cases, administrators are often selective in making 
their decisions transparent to the public. Accordingly, this barrier also became 
apparent in the process of this project. Besides the increased workload, the high 
level of public attention paid to the field of migration also played a role for some 
migration offices to either grant or to deny access to their frontline implementers for 
the interviews and survey research. However, given the high salience and topicality 
of migration policy, it is of particular importance to gain first-hand insights into 
migration administrations and the mechanisms through which they deal with EU law. 
Thus, a significant contribution of this project is the original cross-country data from 
the frontline of migration law implementation, which provides a glance into a field of 
public decision-making that remains mostly outside the public eye.
 The fourth contribution of this dissertation is the combination of qualitative and 
quantitative analyses of frontline applications of policy and law. So far, research on 
frontline implementation of migration laws (e.g. Eule, 2014; Infantino, 2016a; Jordan 
et al., 2003a) has relied primarily on ethnographic studies. While these studies 
provided thick descriptions of individual behaviour, they often lack systematic 
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comparison. Regarding general frontline implementation studies, scholars have 
typically either relied on thick descriptions and narratives (Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno, 2012) or standardised measurement tools, such as surveys (Tummers 
et al., 2012). By combining qualitative and quantitative data, this dissertation 
combined the best of two cultures of research regarding internal and external validity 
(Mahoney and Goertz, 2006). 
 While each of the chapters of this dissertation focused on individual research 
questions that were answered following specific methodological approaches 
(Haverland and Yanow, 2012), this dissertation argues that interpretive logics and 
positivist logics of inquiry may build on each other. The qualitative and more 
interpretive chapters provided the context for understanding frontline policy 
application. In turn, this allowed testing of the observed mechanisms systematically 
by relying on standardised measurement tools. Notably, the survey that applied 
adjusted measurement scales from the frontline literature may also prove useful for 
students of EU implementation and compliance that focus on policy sectors other 
than migration. In combination, the qualitative and quantitative methods 
complemented each other by providing in-depth insights into the micro-, meso-, and 
macro-level mechanisms of EU law application. 
6.  Implications for practice
Beyond the advances in theory and method, this dissertation provides several 
concrete implications for practitioners. In the following section, lessons for 1) EU 
policy-makers, 2) domestic policy-makers, 3) frontline implementers, and 4) migrants 
and their lawyers are discussed.
Lessons for EU policy-makers
The main lesson for EU policy-makers flowing from this study is that member states 
are not unitary actors that either comply or fail to comply with EU law. Instead, national 
transposition is only one aspect that contributes to national compliance with EU law. 
Beyond transposition, national bureaucratic contexts and implementers’ attitudes 
determine the extent to which EU laws reach their target groups, e.g. migrants and 
their family members. Thus, there is considerable variation in EU law application 
within member states. This observation has several implications. 
 First, EU policy-makers should be aware that when leaving discretion to member 
states, they also lose control of who wields this discretion at the national level. When 
national policy-makers delegate EU discretion to practical implementers, these 
actors, in fact, become EU policy-makers. This phenomenon can be problematic 
because practical implementers do not have the democratic legitimacy to make 
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policy. Additionally, scrutiny of national civil servants requires a decentralised 
enforcement mechanism, for example through costly litigation. Only recipients of EU 
law who are aware of their rights may benefit from decentralised enforcement, and 
breaches of EU law that benefit service recipients are unlikely to be scrutinised at all. 
 Beyond litigation, the EU Commission only rarely monitors practical implementation 
of EU law. Instead, the Commission tends to focus on the monitoring of national 
transposition laws. While there are monitoring reports that include examples of 
practical implementation of EU law (e.g. the Odysseus reports in the field of migration), 
it is mostly legal scholars who establish these reports. Consequently, the reports 
mostly do not capture the frontline of EU law. Thus, for a better understanding of the 
effectiveness of its legislation and policies, as well as the level of EU harmonisation, 
the EU Commission may be advised to invest more into monitoring reports that also 
include frontline practices.
 Moreover, when the aim of EU law is the harmonisation of domestic administrative 
practices, EU policy-makers should be aware that the convergence of legal obligations 
is not sufficient. Beyond the compatibility between national administrative structures 
and EU requirements (Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Knill, 2001; Hille and Knill, 2006), 
national bureaucratic context also affects which role EU law plays for civil servants, 
how they interpret it, and which EU-related attitudes they develop. Thus, the 
convergence of bureaucratic structures and the delegation of administrative 
competencies to EU administrations could overcome some of the high costs of 
monitoring EU policy application. Admittedly, this may only be a long-term solution, 
as member states are often reluctant to delegate the implementation of core state 
powers to EU administrations.
 Next, this study has shown that domestic frontline implementers are well aware 
of the multilevel legal context in which they operate. However, several respondents 
feared to misapply EU law because they did not consider themselves EU law experts. 
To reduce this fear, the EU Commission is advised to provide more concrete guidance 
and training for practical implementers. Previously national judges received such 
training to enhance the quality of the preliminary ruling procedure, and similar 
initiatives could also be useful for frontline implementers to improve the quality of 
implementation and to reduce the costs of litigation. 
 Through training and direct encounters between national frontline organisations 
and EU institutions, the Commission may also invite frontline implementers to provide 
feedback on the practical use of EU law for clients and society. The provision of such 
first-hand expert feedback from the frontline could increase actual and perceived 
meaningfulness of EU law for frontline implementers. In combination, this may 
improve the effectiveness of EU law in the application phase.
 Finally, the dissertation has shown that for lower-level implementers to be willing 
to implement EU law; it is of particular importance that they consider EU law 
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procedurally just and meaningful for their clients. Thus, the Commission, the 
European Parliament, but also the Council of Ministers need to communicate better 
to frontline implementers how EU laws came about and the reasons for EU law. This 
aspect ties in with the general democratic deficit of the EU, but it also has concrete 
implications for national bureaucratic behaviour and the extent to which EU policies 
become effective.
Lessons for domestic policy-makers
The main lesson for domestic policy-makers drawn from this study is that the 
delegation of EU discretion to practical implementers can have substantial unintended 
consequences during policy application. Discretion leaves practical implementers 
with considerable ambiguity and uncertainty of how to use national and EU laws in 
practice. Such uncertainty may lead to high variation in decision-making beyond the 
control of national policy-makers, particularly when the CJEU challenges national 
transposition laws.
 Despite these complications, this dissertation also showed that in the field of 
migration, much of the recent CJEU case law requires national policy-makers to leave 
some EU discretion to practical implementers. For example, in the case law of 
Chakroun (C-578/08) K. and A, (C-153/14) or Khachab (C-558/14), the CJEU obliges 
practical implementers to conduct individual-level assessments of individual cases. 
Consequently, EU law delegates competencies not only to the EU level but also to 
national practical implementers. Thus, national policy-makers are advised to prepare 
their national administrations for this new leeway, for example by training them in the 
independent application of national and EU laws.
 On a more general note, the study showed that national bureaucratic structures 
are no neutral tools for the provision of public services. Instead, the decision to 
centralise or decentralise bureaucracies, to allow for client contact or to rely on 
document-based systems has direct consequences for the motivations of civil 
servants and their reliance on the legal tools offered to them. These implications are 
relevant to consider when policy-makers establish administrative procedures and 
when they transpose EU law.
Lessons for frontline implementers
The findings of this study also have implications for frontline implementers and the 
organisations in which they operate. The fact that similar EU laws increasingly 
confront frontline organisations makes the sharing of best practices across national 
boundaries valuable. In the field of migration, there are only a few horizontal 
cross-country administrative networks. An example is the European Migration 
Network (EMN), which provides comparable information on migration and asylum 
policy to the EU, national policy-makers and practitioners. However, the reports of the 
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network typically do not include the practicalities of frontline decision-making. 
Overall, the respondents of this study indicated considerable interest in learning 
more about how caseworkers abroad tackle common challenges of EU law or general 
migration law. For example, respondents were interested in learning more about the 
identification of cases of fraud, the handling of unfriendly client contact, IT tools, and 
the validation of foreign documents. Beyond their national or local administrative 
context, the respondents had no contact points for such sharing of practices. Thus, 
EU administrative networks may constitute a fruitful addition to national networks. 
 European administrative networks gradually institutionalise administrative capacities 
within the EU (Trondal et al., 2013). So far, they typically consist of institutional 
 representatives of the national executive, such as higher civil servants of ministry 
departments or agencies with a role in EU implementation (Hofmann, 2008; Danielsen 
and Yesilkagit, 2014; Mastenbroek and Martinsen, 2018). The results of this dissertation 
suggest that frontline inclusion in European administrative networks could allow 
frontline implementers to share their experiences with EU law across national borders. 
In sum, more horizontal cooperation may enhance bottom-up solutions for common 
challenges regarding EU law and other implementation tasks. 
Lessons for migrants and their lawyers
Finally, the dissertation provides insights that may be useful for the targets of EU 
migration law, namely migrants and their lawyers. First, the study showed that even 
when national transposition laws are not yet adjusted, migrants (and lawyers) may 
actively make frontline implementers aware of EU law or demand a halt of their case 
until bureaucratic instructions include EU obligations. Accordingly, it may be beneficial 
for clients and their lawyers to rely actively on EU law when submitting applications 
and especially when appealing administrative decisions.
 Moreover, understanding the national bureaucratic structure and motivations of 
frontline implementers may help clients and their lawyers to use the different 
implementation regimes to their advantage. In this respect, it is particularly important 
for clients to understand where the actual decision-making takes place. For example, 
in the German visa system, it is useful to understand the accountability structure, and 
connected to that, the asymmetric power relations between the diplomatic missions 
and the foreign registration offices. Knowing who is responsible for which part of a 
visa may help to clarify reasons for visa denials. Similarly, in the Dutch document-based 
system it needs to be clear that civil servants, with their personal motivations, take 
decisions on residence permits and visas, even when they decide without client 
contact. Keeping these aspects in mind when applying for visas and residence 
permits or when issuing appeals could help to overcome misunderstandings between 
clients and the civil servants who decide on their residence status. 
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7.  Directions for future research
Migration law is a relatively young field of Europeanisation. Consequently, research 
on the practical application of EU migration law is still relatively new. However, 
considering its political salience and contestation, insights into how civil servants 
implement EU migration law are highly relevant to evaluating its practical relevance 
and effectiveness in solving pressing societal problems. The importance of the 
application stage applies more broadly to the implementation of EU law. EU 
compliance studies have mostly focused only on the transposition of EU law and 
often neglected the fact that only through application and enforcement do EU laws 
reach their target groups. This dissertation has provided a first step toward discovering 
the mechanisms of practical implementation of EU migration law. Nonetheless, this 
study also points towards several avenues for follow-up studies. 
 First, as has been highlighted in the different chapters, this study deliberately 
focused on a single EU policy area and some selected subfields within the field of 
migration. Connected to these choices, the frontline implementers covered in this 
dissertation operate in a highly normatively-laden and client-intensive policy area. 
Future research should extend the research of frontline application and decision- 
making to other Europeanising policy areas to explore if and how similar mechanisms 
at the micro-, meso-, and macro-level also operate in other fields. For example, less 
normative implementation motivations may drive frontline implementers in more 
technical policy areas (e.g. Wockelberg 2014), especially if their work has less direct 
implications for individual clients (e.g. EU environmental policies, as discussed in 
Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017; Bondarouk and Mastenbroek, 2018). Thus, 
implementers in such fields may apply EU law differently than frontline implementers 
in the field of migration.
 Second, this study has focused on a limited number of EU member states and in 
the case of Germany on one Bundesland. While this selection served the goal of drawing 
meaningful comparisons, it limits the generalisability of the findings. Considering the 
high variation between EU member states and their approaches towards EU law 
during transposition and practical implementation (Falkner et al., 2007; Falkner and 
Treib, 2008), future research should extend the sample of countries studied. 
 Within the field of migration, it would be particularly relevant to include not only 
old immigration countries such as the Netherlands and Germany but also newer 
immigration countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece (Triandafyllidou, 2014). Often 
these countries have lower administrative capacities for the regulation of migration 
than the countries studied in this dissertation, and EU law confronts these countries 
with very specific challenges at the EU’s external borders. These meso- and macro- 
level contexts make it relevant to explore how frontline implementers cope with capacity 
constraints when implementing EU migration law at the EU’s external borders.
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Moreover, future research should also pay attention to the newer EU member states 
in Eastern Europe. EU compliance studies often neglect these countries (but see 
Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2013, 2014 for a study on the implementation of EU 
cultural heritage policies in Bulgaria). However, regarding migration, some of the 
Eastern European countries approach migration laws from historical, political and 
cultural viewpoints that differ considerably from those of the countries studied in 
this dissertation. An example is the reluctance of some Eastern European countries 
to participate in the EU resettlement scheme or the re-erection of border fences in 
Hungary (Trauner, 2016) as well as the recent refusal of the Hungarian government 
to recognise CJEU rulings in the field of migration. Including these countries in a 
study on frontline applications of EU migration law would allow future research to 
explore how practical implementers handle discrepancies between EU and national 
instructions that go beyond the levels of legal conflict present in the case studies of 
this dissertation. 
 Third, concerning the causal mechanisms studied in this dissertation, it is 
relevant to point out that the qualitative data to trace micro-level factors used in 
chapter 2, 3, 5 and 6 derived from the same respondents. Moreover, chapter 6 and 7 
relied on the same respondents for the independent and dependent micro-level 
variables. These data choices pose the risk of a common source bias. A common 
resource bias refers to the problem that overlapping variability may be due to data 
collection, instead of the theorised causal mechanisms (Tummers et al., 2015). Such 
data collection effects could endanger the validity of the research (Favero and 
Bullock, 2015). The dissertation tackled the risk of a common source bias through the 
qualitative interviews, which could trace causal mechanisms in greater depth than 
correlational designs are typically able to do. Additionally, established theories 
provided confidence in the observed causal mechanisms. Furthermore, relying on 
multiple methods in chapter 6 and 7 for similar micro-level causal mechanisms 
across a different sample of respondents aimed at validating the findings. 
 However, in light of the behavioural turn in public administration research 
(Bouwman and Grimmelikhuijsen, 2016; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017), future 
research may deepen the discovered causal mechanisms. For example, experimental 
methods may be able to disentangle attitudes and behaviour through vignette 
studies, laboratory research or longitudinal designs. For the research goal of this 
dissertation, these alternatives did not constitute realistic options because of the 
practical constraints of convincing migration civil servants to participate in laboratory 
experiments and the high time and capacity demands of longitudinal studies. 
However, studies that focus on less sensitive policy fields and with better access 
to civil servants may explore the opportunities for such alternative approaches to 
enhancing our confidence in the causal mechanisms proposed in this study.
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Moreover, while this dissertation has made a first attempt at combining legal methods 
and social science approaches to empirical behaviour, such multi disciplinary research 
needs further strengthening (see also Hartmann, 2016). To do justice to the legal 
environment in which frontline implementers operate, knowledge about case-specific 
interpretations of national and EU regulations and case law is as important as 
expertise in social behaviour and decision-making processes. Thus, collaborative 
research among legal scholars and social scientists needs further encouragement.
 Next, future research is advised to explore to what extent the recent politicisation 
of the field of migration and its changing legal context influence frontline attitudes 
towards EU law, their use of EU law and policy application more generally. For 
example, in March 2016, Germany restricted family reunification rules for subsidiary 
protected migrants as a response to the increased migration pressure of 2015. These 
restrictions caused considerable debate among implementers and the wider public. 
Due to the limited time frame of this research project, it remains to be seen to what 
extent the politicisation of the topic and the increased administrative workload 
stimulate the implementation of EU migration law in the long run.
 Finally, and more generally, the task for future research is to pay more attention 
to the locations of (EU) implementation and the diversity of actors with a role in 
the compliance process. Due to the complexity of many policy areas, public 
 administrations across institutional levels often have to work together to implement 
public policies across organisational boundaries. The interinstitutional cooperation 
between local actors and central authorities, such as embassies abroad, has not 
yet been fully explored and deserves closer scholarly attention. Moreover, frontline 
implementers often have to cooperate with external actors such as NGOs, lawyers 
and national judges. Across national bureaucratic contexts, these actors may 
approach EU law in various ways with implications for the outcomes of EU (migration) 
law. Overall, closing these gaps is important because only by understanding how 
civil servants apply common rules can we evaluate to what extent national and 
European regulatory frameworks work, how they affect their target groups and what 
implications they have for the politics in Europe.
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Interview guide chapter 2, 3, 5, 6
Introduction
Introducing myself
Topic of the PhD
Outline of the interview:
Five major topic areas 
1) Discussion of the structure of your office and your personal task and experiences 
within the foreign office.
2) Discussion of the standard procedure of family reunification
3) Discussion of possible difficulties you face during decision-making in different 
steps by going through some hypothetical case constellations. 
4) Discussion of the role of EU law in your everyday practice. 
5) Discussion of some personal issues, of what you find particularly motivating or 
burdensome in your everyday work in general and when you have to exercise 
discretion in particular.
Everything we discuss will be treated anonymously. I will neither mention respondents’ 
names nor the city of your foreign office. I will only mention the Land. If you are ok with 
it, I would like to record our talk. The records will remain in my possession and will not 
be distributed to any other person.
 
- Ask for verbal agreement
- Do you have any questions before we begin?
- Switch on recorder
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Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Table A.1.1   Inventory of job motivations
NRW: Street level N (%) Dutch: Screen level N (%) 
PSM 16  (76.2) 11 (78.5)
Intrinsic task specific 14 (66.7) 9 (64.2)
Extrinsic instrumental 4 (19.1) 5 (35.7)
Table A.4.1   Coding results
France Germany Netherlands
Topic Directive
article
Aim  Deontic Condition Aim Deontic Condition Aim Deontic Condition
Access to  
labor market
Art 11.1 - 0 0 - 0 + - 0 -
Art 11.2 - 0 0 - 0 + - 0 -
Art 11.4 Na 0 0 - Na
Material 
Conditions
Art 13.1 - 0 - + 0 - 0 0 -
Art 13.2 - 0 Na - 0 Na - 0 -
Art 13.3 Na Na - - -
Art 13.4 - - - - (0/-) - - 0/- -
Art 13.5 - - - + 0 0 - - -
Accommodation Art 14.1 0 0 0 + 0 + - 0 -
Art 14.2 a) + 0 + + 0 + 0 0 +
Art 14.3 - 0 - 0 (+/0) - - 0 0
Art 14.4 Na Na 0 + +
Art 14.5 Na Na - 0 -
Art 14.7
Art 14.2 b)
+ 0 - - + 0 0 0 -
Art 14.8 + - 0 Na + 0 +
Healthcare Art 15.1 - 0 - - 0 + - 0 -
Art 15.2
Art 17.1
- 0 + 0 + - + 0 -
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DPM/CI3/2007 du 3 mai 2007 relative aux missions des centres daccueil pour demandeurs dasile, aux 
modalités d’admission dans ces centres et de sortie de ces centres et au pilotage du dispositif 
(supplement to Circular on the missions of asylum seekers reception centers)
Germany
AufenthG: Aufenthaltsgesetz (Residence Act)
AsylVfG: Asylverfahrensgesetz (Asylum Procedure Act)
AsylbLG: Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz (Asylum Seekers’ Benefits Act)
Richtlinien Umsetzungsgesetz 2007
Netherlands
Vw 2000: Vreemdelingenwet 2000 (2000 Aliens Act)
Wet COA: Wet Centraal Opvang Orgaan (Act of the Agency of Reception)
RvA 2005: Regeling verstrekkingen asielzoekers en andere categorieën vreemdelingen 2005 (Rva 2005) 
(2005 Regulation on benefits for asylum seekers and other categories of foreigners)
Wav: Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen (Aliens Labour Act)
Uitvoeringsbesluit Uitvoeringsregels (Implementation rules of Wav)
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Article  
of the RCD
Asylum Reception Condition Directive 
wording of the article (deontic in bold,  
aims underlined, conditions in italics)
Wording French transposition Wording German transposition Wording Dutch transposition
Art 11.1 Member States shall determine a period of time, starting 
from the date on which an application for asylum was 
lodged, during which an applicant shall not have access 
to the labour market. 
L’accès au marché du travail ne peut être 
autorisé au demandeur d’asile que dans 
le cas où l’office, (…), n’a pas statué sur 
la demande d’asile dans un délai d’un an 
suivant l’enregistrement de la demande. 1
1) Für die Dauer der Pflicht, in einer 
Aufnahmeeinrichtung zu wohnen, darf der 
Ausländer keine Erwerbstätigkeit ausüben. Im 
Übrigen kann einem Asylbewerber, der sich 
seit einem Jahr gestattet im Bundesgebiet aufhält, 
abweichend von § 4 Abs. 3 des Aufenthaltsgesetzes 
die Ausübung einer Beschäftigung erlaubt werden 
(…)2
In afwijking van artikel 8, eerste lid, onderdelen a, b en d, van de 
Wet arbeid vreemdelingen mag een vreemdeling als bedoeld in 
artikel 8, tweede lid, van die wet arbeid verrichten indien:
die vreemdeling een verblijfsvergunning asiel, bedoeld in artikel 
28 van de Vreemdelingenwet 2000, heeft aangevraagd en deze 
aanvraag blijkens een verklaring van Onze Minister van Justitie 
tenminste zes maanden in behandeling is (…).3
Art 11.2 If a decision at first instance has not been taken within one 
year of the presentation of an application for asylum and 
this delay cannot be attributed to the applicant, Member 
States shall decide the conditions for granting access to 
the labour market for the applicant 
L’accès au marché du travail ne peut être 
autorisé au demandeur d’asile que dans le 
cas où l’office, pour des raisons qui ne sont 
pas imputables au demandeur, n’a pas statué 
sur la demande d’asile dans un délai d’un an 
suivant l’enregistrement de la demande. 
Dans ce cas, le demandeur d’asile est 
soumis aux règles de droit commun 
applicables aux travailleurs étrangers pour 
la délivrance d’une autorisation provisoire 
de travail. La situation de l’emploi lui est 
opposable.4
Further specifications:5
Im Übrigen kann einem Asylbewerber, der 
sich seit einem Jahr gestattet im Bundesgebiet 
aufhält, abweichend von § 4 Abs. 3 des 
Aufenthaltsgesetzes die Ausübung einer 
Beschäftigung erlaubt werden, wenn die 
Bundesagentur für Arbeit zugestimmt hat oder 
durch Rechtsverordnung bestimmt ist, dass die 
Ausübung der Beschäftigung ohne Zustimmung 
der Bundesagentur für Arbeit zulässig ist.6 
Further specifications:7
In afwijking van artikel 8, eerste lid, onderdelen a, b en d, van de 
Wet arbeid vreemdelingen mag een vreemdeling als bedoeld in 
artikel 8, tweede lid, van die wet arbeid verrichten indien:
•a.die vreemdeling een verblijfsvergunning asiel, bedoeld in 
artikel 28 van de Vreemdelingenwet 2000, heeft aangevraagd 
en deze aanvraag blijkens een verklaring van Onze Minister van 
Justitie tenminste zes maanden in behandeling is, verstrekkingen 
geniet voorzien bij of krachtens de  Wet Centraal Orgaan opvang 
asielzoekers of een ander wettelijk voorschrift dat soortgelijke 
verstrekkingen regelt en de vreemdeling op basis van artikel 8, 
onderdelen f of h, van de Vreemdelingenwet 2000 rechtmatig in 
Nederland verblijft;
•b.die vreemdeling houder is van een op grond van artikel 14, 
eerste lid, onderdeel e, van de Vreemdelingenwet 2000verleende 
verblijfsvergunning voor bepaalde tijd onder beperking voor verblijf 
als alleenstaande minderjarige vreemdeling;
•c.die vreemdeling houder is van een op grond van artikel 14, 
eerste lid, onderdeel e, van de Vreemdelingenwet 2000 verleende 
verblijfsvergunning voor bepaalde tijd onder de beperking van 
voortgezet verblijf, verband houdend met eerder verblijf als 
 alleenstaande minderjarige vreemdeling;
d.de vreemdeling, bedoeld in onderdeel a, b en c, de in de 
 vergunningsaanvraag aangegeven werkzaamheden onder 
marktconforme voorwaarden zal verrichten, en
e.de vreemdeling, bedoeld in onderdeel a en b, binnen een 
tijdsbestek van 52 weken een arbeidsperiode van in totaal twaalf 
weken niet overschrijdt.8
Art 11.4 For reasons of labour market policies, Member States may 
give priority to EU citizens and nationals of States parties 
to the Agreement on the European Economic Area and 
also to legally resident third-country nationals 
Not transposed9 (2) Die Bundesagentur für Arbeit kann der 
Erteilung einer Aufenthaltserlaubnis zur Ausübung 
einer Beschäftigung nach § 18 zustimmen, wenn  
1. a) sich durch die Beschäftigung von 
Ausländern nachteilige Auswirkungen auf den 
Arbeitsmarkt, insbesondere hinsichtlich der 
Beschäftigungsstruktur, der Regionen und der 
Wirtschaftszweige, nicht ergeben und  
b) für die Beschäftigung deutsche Arbeitnehmer 
sowie Ausländer, die diesen hinsichtlich der 
Arbeitsaufnahme rechtlich gleichgestellt sind 
oder andere Ausländer, die nach dem Recht 
der Europäischen Union einen Anspruch auf 
vorrangigen Zugang zum Arbeitsmarkt haben, 
nicht zur Verfügung stehen oder
 Not transposed
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Art 11.1 Member States shall determine a period of time, starting 
from the date on which an application for asylum was 
lodged, during which an applicant shall not have access 
to the labour market. 
L’accès au marché du travail ne peut être 
autorisé au demandeur d’asile que dans 
le cas où l’office, (…), n’a pas statué sur 
la demande d’asile dans un délai d’un an 
suivant l’enregistrement de la demande. 1
1) Für die Dauer der Pflicht, in einer 
Aufnahmeeinrichtung zu wohnen, darf der 
Ausländer keine Erwerbstätigkeit ausüben. Im 
Übrigen kann einem Asylbewerber, der sich 
seit einem Jahr gestattet im Bundesgebiet aufhält, 
abweichend von § 4 Abs. 3 des Aufenthaltsgesetzes 
die Ausübung einer Beschäftigung erlaubt werden 
(…)2
In afwijking van artikel 8, eerste lid, onderdelen a, b en d, van de 
Wet arbeid vreemdelingen mag een vreemdeling als bedoeld in 
artikel 8, tweede lid, van die wet arbeid verrichten indien:
die vreemdeling een verblijfsvergunning asiel, bedoeld in artikel 
28 van de Vreemdelingenwet 2000, heeft aangevraagd en deze 
aanvraag blijkens een verklaring van Onze Minister van Justitie 
tenminste zes maanden in behandeling is (…).3
Art 11.2 If a decision at first instance has not been taken within one 
year of the presentation of an application for asylum and 
this delay cannot be attributed to the applicant, Member 
States shall decide the conditions for granting access to 
the labour market for the applicant 
L’accès au marché du travail ne peut être 
autorisé au demandeur d’asile que dans le 
cas où l’office, pour des raisons qui ne sont 
pas imputables au demandeur, n’a pas statué 
sur la demande d’asile dans un délai d’un an 
suivant l’enregistrement de la demande. 
Dans ce cas, le demandeur d’asile est 
soumis aux règles de droit commun 
applicables aux travailleurs étrangers pour 
la délivrance d’une autorisation provisoire 
de travail. La situation de l’emploi lui est 
opposable.4
Further specifications:5
Im Übrigen kann einem Asylbewerber, der 
sich seit einem Jahr gestattet im Bundesgebiet 
aufhält, abweichend von § 4 Abs. 3 des 
Aufenthaltsgesetzes die Ausübung einer 
Beschäftigung erlaubt werden, wenn die 
Bundesagentur für Arbeit zugestimmt hat oder 
durch Rechtsverordnung bestimmt ist, dass die 
Ausübung der Beschäftigung ohne Zustimmung 
der Bundesagentur für Arbeit zulässig ist.6 
Further specifications:7
In afwijking van artikel 8, eerste lid, onderdelen a, b en d, van de 
Wet arbeid vreemdelingen mag een vreemdeling als bedoeld in 
artikel 8, tweede lid, van die wet arbeid verrichten indien:
•a.die vreemdeling een verblijfsvergunning asiel, bedoeld in 
artikel 28 van de Vreemdelingenwet 2000, heeft aangevraagd 
en deze aanvraag blijkens een verklaring van Onze Minister van 
Justitie tenminste zes maanden in behandeling is, verstrekkingen 
geniet voorzien bij of krachtens de  Wet Centraal Orgaan opvang 
asielzoekers of een ander wettelijk voorschrift dat soortgelijke 
verstrekkingen regelt en de vreemdeling op basis van artikel 8, 
onderdelen f of h, van de Vreemdelingenwet 2000 rechtmatig in 
Nederland verblijft;
•b.die vreemdeling houder is van een op grond van artikel 14, 
eerste lid, onderdeel e, van de Vreemdelingenwet 2000verleende 
verblijfsvergunning voor bepaalde tijd onder beperking voor verblijf 
als alleenstaande minderjarige vreemdeling;
•c.die vreemdeling houder is van een op grond van artikel 14, 
eerste lid, onderdeel e, van de Vreemdelingenwet 2000 verleende 
verblijfsvergunning voor bepaalde tijd onder de beperking van 
voortgezet verblijf, verband houdend met eerder verblijf als 
 alleenstaande minderjarige vreemdeling;
d.de vreemdeling, bedoeld in onderdeel a, b en c, de in de 
 vergunningsaanvraag aangegeven werkzaamheden onder 
marktconforme voorwaarden zal verrichten, en
e.de vreemdeling, bedoeld in onderdeel a en b, binnen een 
tijdsbestek van 52 weken een arbeidsperiode van in totaal twaalf 
weken niet overschrijdt.8
Art 11.4 For reasons of labour market policies, Member States may 
give priority to EU citizens and nationals of States parties 
to the Agreement on the European Economic Area and 
also to legally resident third-country nationals 
Not transposed9 (2) Die Bundesagentur für Arbeit kann der 
Erteilung einer Aufenthaltserlaubnis zur Ausübung 
einer Beschäftigung nach § 18 zustimmen, wenn  
1. a) sich durch die Beschäftigung von 
Ausländern nachteilige Auswirkungen auf den 
Arbeitsmarkt, insbesondere hinsichtlich der 
Beschäftigungsstruktur, der Regionen und der 
Wirtschaftszweige, nicht ergeben und  
b) für die Beschäftigung deutsche Arbeitnehmer 
sowie Ausländer, die diesen hinsichtlich der 
Arbeitsaufnahme rechtlich gleichgestellt sind 
oder andere Ausländer, die nach dem Recht 
der Europäischen Union einen Anspruch auf 
vorrangigen Zugang zum Arbeitsmarkt haben, 
nicht zur Verfügung stehen oder
 Not transposed
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Wording French transposition Wording German transposition Wording Dutch transposition
Art 11.4 2. sie durch Prüfung nach Satz 1 Nr. 1 Buchstabe 
a und b für einzelne Berufsgruppen oder für 
einzelne Wirtschaftszweige festgestellt hat, 
dass die Besetzung der offenen Stellen mit 
ausländischen Bewerbern arbeitsmarkt­ und 
integrationspolitisch verantwortbar ist, und 
der Ausländer nicht zu ungünstigeren 
Arbeitsbedingungen als vergleichbare deutsche 
Arbeitnehmer beschäftigt wird. Für die 
Beschäftigung stehen deutsche Arbeitnehmer 
und diesen gleichgestellte Ausländer auch dann 
zur Verfügung, wenn sie nur mit Förderung der 
Agentur für Arbeit vermittelt werden können. Der 
Arbeitgeber, bei dem ein Ausländer beschäftigt 
werden soll, der dafür eine Zustimmung benötigt, 
hat der Bundesagentur für Arbeit Auskunft 
über Arbeitsentgelt, Arbeitszeiten und sonstige 
Arbeitsbedingungen zu erteilen.  
(3) Absatz 2 gilt auch, wenn bei Aufenthalten zu 
anderen Zwecken nach den Abschnitten 3, 5, 
6 oder 7 eine Zustimmung der Bundesagentur 
für Arbeit zur Ausübung einer Beschäftigung 
erforderlich ist.  
(4) Die Zustimmung kann die Dauer und 
die berufliche Tätigkeit festlegen sowie die 
Beschäftigung auf bestimmte Betriebe oder 
Bezirke beschränken.  
(5) Die Bundesagentur für Arbeit kann der 
Erteilung einer Niederlassungserlaubnis nach § 19 
zustimmen, wenn sich durch die Beschäftigung 
des Ausländers nachteilige Auswirkungen auf den 
Arbeitsmarkt nicht ergeben.10
Art 13.1 Member States shall ensure that material reception 
conditions are available to applicants when they make 
their application for asylum.
For regular benefits:
Bénéficient, sur leur demande, de l’aide 
sociale pour être accueillis dans les centres 
d’accueil pour demandeurs d’asile les 
étrangers en possession d’un des documents 
de séjour mentionnés à l’article L. 742­1 du 
code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers 
et du droit d’asile. Les centres d’accueil 
pour demandeurs d’asile ont pour mission 
d’assurer l’accueil, l’hébergement ainsi que 
l’accompagnement social et administratif 
des demandeurs d’asile en possession de 
l’un des documents de séjour mentionnés 
à l’article L. 742­1 du code de l’entrée et 
du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile, 
pendant la durée d’instruction de leur 
demande d’asile. 11
(For temporary benefits 12)
(1) Leistungsberechtigt nach diesem Gesetz sind 
Ausländer, die sich tatsächlich im Bundesgebiet 
aufhalten und die
1.eine Aufenthaltsgestattung nach dem Asylgesetz 
besitzen13
•	 1) Het orgaan draagt zorg voor de centrale opvang van 
asielzoekers door erin te voorzien dat hen opvang wordt 
geboden in een opvangvoorziening.
•	 2) Tot de in het eerste lid bedoelde categorieën asielzoekers aan 
wie opvang wordt geboden behoren:
o a.de asielzoeker als bedoeld in artikel 1, eerste lid, aanhef en 
onder d van deze regeling;
o b.de asielzoeker als bedoeld in artikel 1, eerste lid, aanhef en 
onder e van deze regeling.14
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Art 11.4 2. sie durch Prüfung nach Satz 1 Nr. 1 Buchstabe 
a und b für einzelne Berufsgruppen oder für 
einzelne Wirtschaftszweige festgestellt hat, 
dass die Besetzung der offenen Stellen mit 
ausländischen Bewerbern arbeitsmarkt­ und 
integrationspolitisch verantwortbar ist, und 
der Ausländer nicht zu ungünstigeren 
Arbeitsbedingungen als vergleichbare deutsche 
Arbeitnehmer beschäftigt wird. Für die 
Beschäftigung stehen deutsche Arbeitnehmer 
und diesen gleichgestellte Ausländer auch dann 
zur Verfügung, wenn sie nur mit Förderung der 
Agentur für Arbeit vermittelt werden können. Der 
Arbeitgeber, bei dem ein Ausländer beschäftigt 
werden soll, der dafür eine Zustimmung benötigt, 
hat der Bundesagentur für Arbeit Auskunft 
über Arbeitsentgelt, Arbeitszeiten und sonstige 
Arbeitsbedingungen zu erteilen.  
(3) Absatz 2 gilt auch, wenn bei Aufenthalten zu 
anderen Zwecken nach den Abschnitten 3, 5, 
6 oder 7 eine Zustimmung der Bundesagentur 
für Arbeit zur Ausübung einer Beschäftigung 
erforderlich ist.  
(4) Die Zustimmung kann die Dauer und 
die berufliche Tätigkeit festlegen sowie die 
Beschäftigung auf bestimmte Betriebe oder 
Bezirke beschränken.  
(5) Die Bundesagentur für Arbeit kann der 
Erteilung einer Niederlassungserlaubnis nach § 19 
zustimmen, wenn sich durch die Beschäftigung 
des Ausländers nachteilige Auswirkungen auf den 
Arbeitsmarkt nicht ergeben.10
Art 13.1 Member States shall ensure that material reception 
conditions are available to applicants when they make 
their application for asylum.
For regular benefits:
Bénéficient, sur leur demande, de l’aide 
sociale pour être accueillis dans les centres 
d’accueil pour demandeurs d’asile les 
étrangers en possession d’un des documents 
de séjour mentionnés à l’article L. 742­1 du 
code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers 
et du droit d’asile. Les centres d’accueil 
pour demandeurs d’asile ont pour mission 
d’assurer l’accueil, l’hébergement ainsi que 
l’accompagnement social et administratif 
des demandeurs d’asile en possession de 
l’un des documents de séjour mentionnés 
à l’article L. 742­1 du code de l’entrée et 
du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile, 
pendant la durée d’instruction de leur 
demande d’asile. 11
(For temporary benefits 12)
(1) Leistungsberechtigt nach diesem Gesetz sind 
Ausländer, die sich tatsächlich im Bundesgebiet 
aufhalten und die
1.eine Aufenthaltsgestattung nach dem Asylgesetz 
besitzen13
•	 1) Het orgaan draagt zorg voor de centrale opvang van 
asielzoekers door erin te voorzien dat hen opvang wordt 
geboden in een opvangvoorziening.
•	 2) Tot de in het eerste lid bedoelde categorieën asielzoekers aan 
wie opvang wordt geboden behoren:
o a.de asielzoeker als bedoeld in artikel 1, eerste lid, aanhef en 
onder d van deze regeling;
o b.de asielzoeker als bedoeld in artikel 1, eerste lid, aanhef en 
onder e van deze regeling.14
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Art 13.2 Member States shall make provisions on material 
reception conditions to ensure a standard of living 
adequate for the health of applicants and capable of 
ensuring their subsistence. 15
Réception in CADA: -Les personnes 
hébergées qui ne disposent pas d’un 
niveau de ressources fixé par arrêté 
bénéficient d’une allocation mensuelle de 
subsistance servie par le centre d’accueil 
pour demandeurs d’asile pour leur permettre 
de subvenir à des besoins essentiels non 
couverts par l’établissement. Le montant 
de l’allocation, qui peut être versée selon 
une périodicité hebdomadaire, est fixé par 
le même arrêté, sur la base d’un barème 
prenant en compte les ressources des 
intéressés, la composition familiale des 
ménages accueillis, ainsi que la nature 
des prestations offertes par le centre 
d’hébergement. Le coût de cette allocation 
est pris en compte pour le calcul de la 
dotation globale de financement prévue à 
l’article R. 314-150. 16
(For temporary benefits 17)
Der notwendige Bedarf an Ernährung, 
Unterkunft, Heizung, Kleidung, Gesundheits- 
und Körperpflege und Gebrauchs- und 
Verbrauchsgütern des Haushalts wird durch 
Sachleistungen gedeckt. Kann Kleidung nicht 
geleistet werden, so kann sie in Form von 
Wertgutscheinen oder anderen vergleichbaren 
unbaren Abrechnungen gewährt werden. 
Gebrauchsgüter des Haushalts können leihweise 
zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Zusätzlich erhalten 
Leistungsberechtigte  
1. bis zur Vollendung des 14. Lebensjahres 40 
Deutsche Mark,  
2. von Beginn des 15. Lebensjahres an 80 
Deutsche Mark  
monatlich als Geldbetrag zur Deckung 
persönlicher Bedürfnisse des täglichen 
Lebens. Der Geldbetrag für in Abschiebungs- 
oder Untersuchungshaft genommene 
Leistungsberechtigte beträgt 70 vom Hundert des 
Geldbetrages nach Satz 4.  
(2) Bei einer Unterbringung außerhalb von 
Aufnahmeeinrichtungen im Sinne des § 44 
des Asylverfahrensgesetzes können, soweit es 
nach den Umständen erforderlich ist, anstelle 
von vorrangig zu gewährenden Sachleistungen 
nach Absatz 1 Satz 1 Leistungen in Form von 
Wertgutscheinen, von anderen vergleichbaren 
unbaren Abrechnungen oder von Geldleistungen 
im gleichen Wert gewährt werden. Der Wert 
beträgt  
1. für den Haushaltsvorstand 360 Deutsche Mark,  
2. für Haushaltsangehörige bis zur Vollendung 
des 7. Lebensjahres 220 Deutsche Mark,  
3. für Haushaltsangehörige von Beginn des 8. 
Lebensjahres an 310 Deutsche Mark  
monatlich zuzüglich der notwendigen Kosten für 
Unterkunft, Heizung und Hausrat. Absatz 1 Satz 3 
und 4 findet Anwendung. 
(3) Das Bundesministerium für Arbeit und 
Soziales setzt im Einvernehmen mit dem 
Bundesministerium des Innern und dem 
Bundesministerium der Finanzen durch 
Rechtsverordnung mit Zustimmung des 
Bundesrates die Beträge nach Absatz 1 Satz 
4 und Absatz 2 Satz 2 jeweils zum 1. Januar 
eines Jahres neu fest, wenn und soweit dies 
unter Berücksichtigung der tatsächlichen 
Lebenshaltungskosten zur Deckung des in Absatz 
1 genannten Bedarfs erforderlich ist. Für die Jahre 
1994 bis 1996 darf die Erhöhung der Beträge 
nicht den Vom-Hundert-Satz übersteigen, um 
den in diesem Zeitraum die Regelsätze gemäß § 
22 Abs. 4 des Bundessozialhilfegesetzes erhöht 
werden.  
(4) Leistungen in Geld oder Geldeswert sollen 
dem Leistungsberechtigten oder einem 
volljährigen berechtigten Mitglied des Haushalts 
persönlich ausgehändigt werden.18
De opvang in een opvangvoorziening omvat in elk geval de 
volgende verstrekkingen:
•	 a.onderdak;
•	 b.een wekelijkse financiële toelage ten behoeve van voedsel, 
kleding en andere persoonlijke uitgaven; 
•	 c).een eenmalige bijdrage aan kleedgeld;
•	 d.recreatieve en educatieve activiteiten;
•	 e.de dekking van de kosten van medische verstrekkingen 
overeenkomstig een daartoe te treffen ziektekostenregeling;
•	 f.een verzekering tegen de financiële gevolgen van wettelijke 
aansprakelijkheid;
•	 g.betaling van buitengewone kosten.19
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Art 13.2 Member States shall make provisions on material 
reception conditions to ensure a standard of living 
adequate for the health of applicants and capable of 
ensuring their subsistence. 15
Réception in CADA: -Les personnes 
hébergées qui ne disposent pas d’un 
niveau de ressources fixé par arrêté 
bénéficient d’une allocation mensuelle de 
subsistance servie par le centre d’accueil 
pour demandeurs d’asile pour leur permettre 
de subvenir à des besoins essentiels non 
couverts par l’établissement. Le montant 
de l’allocation, qui peut être versée selon 
une périodicité hebdomadaire, est fixé par 
le même arrêté, sur la base d’un barème 
prenant en compte les ressources des 
intéressés, la composition familiale des 
ménages accueillis, ainsi que la nature 
des prestations offertes par le centre 
d’hébergement. Le coût de cette allocation 
est pris en compte pour le calcul de la 
dotation globale de financement prévue à 
l’article R. 314-150. 16
(For temporary benefits 17)
Der notwendige Bedarf an Ernährung, 
Unterkunft, Heizung, Kleidung, Gesundheits- 
und Körperpflege und Gebrauchs- und 
Verbrauchsgütern des Haushalts wird durch 
Sachleistungen gedeckt. Kann Kleidung nicht 
geleistet werden, so kann sie in Form von 
Wertgutscheinen oder anderen vergleichbaren 
unbaren Abrechnungen gewährt werden. 
Gebrauchsgüter des Haushalts können leihweise 
zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Zusätzlich erhalten 
Leistungsberechtigte  
1. bis zur Vollendung des 14. Lebensjahres 40 
Deutsche Mark,  
2. von Beginn des 15. Lebensjahres an 80 
Deutsche Mark  
monatlich als Geldbetrag zur Deckung 
persönlicher Bedürfnisse des täglichen 
Lebens. Der Geldbetrag für in Abschiebungs- 
oder Untersuchungshaft genommene 
Leistungsberechtigte beträgt 70 vom Hundert des 
Geldbetrages nach Satz 4.  
(2) Bei einer Unterbringung außerhalb von 
Aufnahmeeinrichtungen im Sinne des § 44 
des Asylverfahrensgesetzes können, soweit es 
nach den Umständen erforderlich ist, anstelle 
von vorrangig zu gewährenden Sachleistungen 
nach Absatz 1 Satz 1 Leistungen in Form von 
Wertgutscheinen, von anderen vergleichbaren 
unbaren Abrechnungen oder von Geldleistungen 
im gleichen Wert gewährt werden. Der Wert 
beträgt  
1. für den Haushaltsvorstand 360 Deutsche Mark,  
2. für Haushaltsangehörige bis zur Vollendung 
des 7. Lebensjahres 220 Deutsche Mark,  
3. für Haushaltsangehörige von Beginn des 8. 
Lebensjahres an 310 Deutsche Mark  
monatlich zuzüglich der notwendigen Kosten für 
Unterkunft, Heizung und Hausrat. Absatz 1 Satz 3 
und 4 findet Anwendung. 
(3) Das Bundesministerium für Arbeit und 
Soziales setzt im Einvernehmen mit dem 
Bundesministerium des Innern und dem 
Bundesministerium der Finanzen durch 
Rechtsverordnung mit Zustimmung des 
Bundesrates die Beträge nach Absatz 1 Satz 
4 und Absatz 2 Satz 2 jeweils zum 1. Januar 
eines Jahres neu fest, wenn und soweit dies 
unter Berücksichtigung der tatsächlichen 
Lebenshaltungskosten zur Deckung des in Absatz 
1 genannten Bedarfs erforderlich ist. Für die Jahre 
1994 bis 1996 darf die Erhöhung der Beträge 
nicht den Vom-Hundert-Satz übersteigen, um 
den in diesem Zeitraum die Regelsätze gemäß § 
22 Abs. 4 des Bundessozialhilfegesetzes erhöht 
werden.  
(4) Leistungen in Geld oder Geldeswert sollen 
dem Leistungsberechtigten oder einem 
volljährigen berechtigten Mitglied des Haushalts 
persönlich ausgehändigt werden.18
De opvang in een opvangvoorziening omvat in elk geval de 
volgende verstrekkingen:
•	 a.onderdak;
•	 b.een wekelijkse financiële toelage ten behoeve van voedsel, 
kleding en andere persoonlijke uitgaven; 
•	 c).een eenmalige bijdrage aan kleedgeld;
•	 d.recreatieve en educatieve activiteiten;
•	 e.de dekking van de kosten van medische verstrekkingen 
overeenkomstig een daartoe te treffen ziektekostenregeling;
•	 f.een verzekering tegen de financiële gevolgen van wettelijke 
aansprakelijkheid;
•	 g.betaling van buitengewone kosten.19
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Article  
of the RCD
Asylum Reception Condition Directive 
wording of the article (deontic in bold,  
aims underlined, conditions in italics)
Wording French transposition Wording German transposition Wording Dutch transposition
Art 13.3 Member States may make the provision of all or some of 
the material reception conditions and healthcare subject 
to the condition that applicants do not have sufficient 
means to have a standard of living adequate for their health 
and to enable their subsistence.
Not explicit transposed but overlap with Art 
13.420
Not explicit transposed but overlap with Art 13.421 Deze regeling heeft uitsluitend betrekking op een asielzoeker 
en de daarmee gelijkgestelde categorieën, als bedoeld in artikel 
3 derde en vierde lid van deze regeling, die niet beschikt over 
voldoende middelen om in de noodzakelijke kosten van het 
bestaan te voorzien, als bedoeld in de Wet Werk en Bijstand.22
Art 13.4 Member States may require applicants to cover or 
contribute to the cost of the material reception conditions 
and of the healthcare provided for in this Directive, 
pursuant to the provision of paragraph 3, if the applicants 
have sufficient resources, for example if they have been 
working for a reasonable period of time.
Regular CADA réception:
les conditions de fonctionnement et de 
financement des centres d’accueil pour 
demandeurs d’asile sont fixées par décret en 
Conseil d’Etat. Ce décret précise notamment 
les modalités selon lesquelles les personnes 
participent à proportion de leur ressources à 
leur frais d’hébergement, de restauration et 
d’entretien23. 
Temporary waiting allowance: Peuvent 
bénéficier d’une allocation temporaire 
d’attente les ressortissants étrangers ayant 
atteint l’âge de dix-huit ans révolu dont le titre 
de séjour ou le récépissé de demande de 
titre de séjour mentionne qu’ils ont sollicité 
l’asile en France et qui ont présenté une 
demande tendant à bénéficier du statut de 
réfugié, s’ils satisfont à une condition de 
resources24
1) Einkommen und Vermögen, über 
das verfügt werden kann, sind von 
dem Leistungsberechtigten und seinen 
Familienangehörigen, die im selben Haushalt 
leben, vor Eintritt von Leistungen nach diesem 
Gesetz aufzubrauchen. § 20 des Zwölften 
Buches Sozialgesetzbuch findet entsprechende 
Anwendung. (...) Bei der Unterbringung in 
einer Einrichtung, in der Sachleistungen 
gewährt werden, haben Leistungsberechtigte, 
soweit Einkommen und Vermögen im Sinne 
des Satzes 1 vorhanden sind, für erhaltene 
Leistungen dem Kostenträger für sich und 
ihre Familienangehörigen die Kosten in 
entsprechender Höhe der in § 3 Abs. 2 Satz 2 
genannten Leistungen sowie die Kosten der 
Unterkunft und Heizung zu erstatten; für die 
Kosten der Unterkunft und Heizung können die 
Länder Pauschalbeträge festsetzen oder die 
zuständige Behörde dazu ermächtigen.  
(2) Einkommen aus Erwerbstätigkeit bleiben 
bei Anwendung des Absatzes 1 in Höhe von 
25 vom Hundert außer Betracht, höchstens 
jedoch in Höhe von 60 vom Hundert des 
maßgeblichen Betrages aus § 3 Abs. 1 und 2. 
Eine Aufwandsentschädigung nach § 5 Abs. 2 gilt 
nicht als Einkommen.  
(3) Hat ein Leistungsberechtigter einen Anspruch 
gegen einen anderen, so kann die zuständige 
Behörde den Anspruch in entsprechender 
Anwendung des § 93 des Zwölften Buches 
Sozialgesetzbuch auf sich überleiten.  
(4) Die §§ 60 bis 67 des Ersten Buches 
Sozialgesetzbuch über die Mitwirkung 
des Leistungsberechtigten sowie § 99 des 
Zehnten Buches Sozialgesetzbuch über 
die Auskunftspflicht von Angehörigen, 
Unterhaltspflichtigen oder sonstigen Personen 
sind entsprechend anzuwenden. 25
1) De asielzoeker is verplicht onverwijld uit eigen beweging, of 
op verzoek van het orgaan, mededeling te doen van alle feiten of 
omstandigheden waarvan hem redelijkerwijs duidelijk moet zijn 
dat zij van invloed kunnen zijn op het recht op verstrekkingen, 
het geldend maken van het recht op verstrekkingen, de duur van 
verstrekkingen of de hoogte van de toelagen die aan hem worden 
betaald. Indien deze feiten of omstandigheden betrekking hebben 
op een kind dan wordt de mededeling gedaan door de asielzoeker 
te wiens laste het kind komt en in het geval dit meer dan één 
asielzoeker betreft, door één van die asielzoekers.
2) Indien een asielzoeker die verblijft in een opvangvoorziening 
beschikt over een vermogen groter dan de vermogensgrens 
ex artikel 34 van de Wet Werk en Bijstand of inkomsten heeft, 
anders dan een uitkering op grond van de Kinderbijslagwet of op 
basis van deze regeling, is die asielzoeker aan het orgaan een 
vergoeding verschuldigd in de kosten van zijn opvang alsmede 
van de opvang van zijn gezinsleden. De tegemoetkoming 
bedraagt per maand ten hoogste de economische waarde van de 
aan een asielzoeker feitelijk geboden verstrekkingen, vermeerderd 
met de economische waarde van de aan ieder gezinslid feitelijk 
geboden verstrekkingen, met dien verstande dat de vergoeding 
niet meer bedraagt dan het bedrag van het in de eerste volzin 
bedoelde vermogen of de in de eerste volzin bedoelde inkomsten.
•	 3) Indien na zijn verblijf in een opvangvoorziening blijkt dat een 
vreemdeling tijdens dit verblijf beschikte over een vermogen of 
inkomsten, bedoeld in het tweede lid, kan het orgaan de kosten 
van de opvang van deze vreemdeling alsmede de kosten 
van opvang van zijn gezinsleden van hem terugvorderen. 
De terug te vorderen kosten per maand zijn niet hoger dan 
de economische waarde van de aan de vreemdeling feitelijk 
geboden verstrekkingen, vermeerderd met de economische 
waarde van de aan ieder gezinslid feitelijk geboden 
verstrekkingen, met dien verstande dat het terug te vorderen 
bedrag niet meer bedraagt dan het bedrag van het in het 
tweede lid bedoelde vermogen of de in het tweede lid bedoelde 
inkomsten.26
Art 13.5 Material reception conditions may be provided in kind, 
or in the form of financial allowances or vouchers or 
in a combination of these provisions. Where Member 
States provide material reception conditions in the form of 
financial allowances or vouchers, the amount thereof shall 
be determined in accordance with the principles set out 
in this Article.
See provisions above 27
Additionally :
Pour l’application du I de l’article R. 348-4, 
le préfet fixe dans chaque département 
le montant de la participation financière 
acquittée par la personne accueillie dans un 
centre d’accueil pour demandeurs d’asile, en 
tenant compte des conditions particulières 
offertes par chaque centre, notamment de 
la qualité des prestations d’hébergement et 
d’entretien offertes (… details on amounts)28
Der notwendige Bedarf an Ernährung, 
Unterkunft, Heizung, Kleidung, Gesundheits- 
und Körperpflege und Gebrauchs- und 
Verbrauchsgütern des Haushalts wird durch 
Sachleistungen gedeckt. Kann Kleidung nicht 
geleistet werden, so kann sie in Form von 
Wertgutscheinen oder anderen vergleichbaren 
unbaren Abrechnungen gewährt werden. 
Gebrauchsgüter des Haushalts können leihweise 
zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Zusätzlich erhalten  
(details on amounts…).
•	 Iedere asielzoeker aan wie opvang wordt verleend in een 
opvangvoorziening hier te lande maakt aanspraak op de 
verstrekking van een wekelijkse financiële toelage, bedoeld 
in artikel 9, eerste lid, aanhef en onder b van deze regeling, ten 
behoeve van voedsel, kleding en andere persoonlijke uitgaven.
•	 2De hoogte van de in het eerste lid bedoelde toelage is in de 
opvangvoorziening waarin de bewoners volledig zelf het eigen 
eten verzorgen als volgt (…details on amounts for different 
centres)
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of the RCD
Asylum Reception Condition Directive 
wording of the article (deontic in bold,  
aims underlined, conditions in italics)
Wording French transposition Wording German transposition Wording Dutch transposition
Art 13.3 Member States may make the provision of all or some of 
the material reception conditions and healthcare subject 
to the condition that applicants do not have sufficient 
means to have a standard of living adequate for their health 
and to enable their subsistence.
Not explicit transposed but overlap with Art 
13.420
Not explicit transposed but overlap with Art 13.421 Deze regeling heeft uitsluitend betrekking op een asielzoeker 
en de daarmee gelijkgestelde categorieën, als bedoeld in artikel 
3 derde en vierde lid van deze regeling, die niet beschikt over 
voldoende middelen om in de noodzakelijke kosten van het 
bestaan te voorzien, als bedoeld in de Wet Werk en Bijstand.22
Art 13.4 Member States may require applicants to cover or 
contribute to the cost of the material reception conditions 
and of the healthcare provided for in this Directive, 
pursuant to the provision of paragraph 3, if the applicants 
have sufficient resources, for example if they have been 
working for a reasonable period of time.
Regular CADA réception:
les conditions de fonctionnement et de 
financement des centres d’accueil pour 
demandeurs d’asile sont fixées par décret en 
Conseil d’Etat. Ce décret précise notamment 
les modalités selon lesquelles les personnes 
participent à proportion de leur ressources à 
leur frais d’hébergement, de restauration et 
d’entretien23. 
Temporary waiting allowance: Peuvent 
bénéficier d’une allocation temporaire 
d’attente les ressortissants étrangers ayant 
atteint l’âge de dix-huit ans révolu dont le titre 
de séjour ou le récépissé de demande de 
titre de séjour mentionne qu’ils ont sollicité 
l’asile en France et qui ont présenté une 
demande tendant à bénéficier du statut de 
réfugié, s’ils satisfont à une condition de 
resources24
1) Einkommen und Vermögen, über 
das verfügt werden kann, sind von 
dem Leistungsberechtigten und seinen 
Familienangehörigen, die im selben Haushalt 
leben, vor Eintritt von Leistungen nach diesem 
Gesetz aufzubrauchen. § 20 des Zwölften 
Buches Sozialgesetzbuch findet entsprechende 
Anwendung. (...) Bei der Unterbringung in 
einer Einrichtung, in der Sachleistungen 
gewährt werden, haben Leistungsberechtigte, 
soweit Einkommen und Vermögen im Sinne 
des Satzes 1 vorhanden sind, für erhaltene 
Leistungen dem Kostenträger für sich und 
ihre Familienangehörigen die Kosten in 
entsprechender Höhe der in § 3 Abs. 2 Satz 2 
genannten Leistungen sowie die Kosten der 
Unterkunft und Heizung zu erstatten; für die 
Kosten der Unterkunft und Heizung können die 
Länder Pauschalbeträge festsetzen oder die 
zuständige Behörde dazu ermächtigen.  
(2) Einkommen aus Erwerbstätigkeit bleiben 
bei Anwendung des Absatzes 1 in Höhe von 
25 vom Hundert außer Betracht, höchstens 
jedoch in Höhe von 60 vom Hundert des 
maßgeblichen Betrages aus § 3 Abs. 1 und 2. 
Eine Aufwandsentschädigung nach § 5 Abs. 2 gilt 
nicht als Einkommen.  
(3) Hat ein Leistungsberechtigter einen Anspruch 
gegen einen anderen, so kann die zuständige 
Behörde den Anspruch in entsprechender 
Anwendung des § 93 des Zwölften Buches 
Sozialgesetzbuch auf sich überleiten.  
(4) Die §§ 60 bis 67 des Ersten Buches 
Sozialgesetzbuch über die Mitwirkung 
des Leistungsberechtigten sowie § 99 des 
Zehnten Buches Sozialgesetzbuch über 
die Auskunftspflicht von Angehörigen, 
Unterhaltspflichtigen oder sonstigen Personen 
sind entsprechend anzuwenden. 25
1) De asielzoeker is verplicht onverwijld uit eigen beweging, of 
op verzoek van het orgaan, mededeling te doen van alle feiten of 
omstandigheden waarvan hem redelijkerwijs duidelijk moet zijn 
dat zij van invloed kunnen zijn op het recht op verstrekkingen, 
het geldend maken van het recht op verstrekkingen, de duur van 
verstrekkingen of de hoogte van de toelagen die aan hem worden 
betaald. Indien deze feiten of omstandigheden betrekking hebben 
op een kind dan wordt de mededeling gedaan door de asielzoeker 
te wiens laste het kind komt en in het geval dit meer dan één 
asielzoeker betreft, door één van die asielzoekers.
2) Indien een asielzoeker die verblijft in een opvangvoorziening 
beschikt over een vermogen groter dan de vermogensgrens 
ex artikel 34 van de Wet Werk en Bijstand of inkomsten heeft, 
anders dan een uitkering op grond van de Kinderbijslagwet of op 
basis van deze regeling, is die asielzoeker aan het orgaan een 
vergoeding verschuldigd in de kosten van zijn opvang alsmede 
van de opvang van zijn gezinsleden. De tegemoetkoming 
bedraagt per maand ten hoogste de economische waarde van de 
aan een asielzoeker feitelijk geboden verstrekkingen, vermeerderd 
met de economische waarde van de aan ieder gezinslid feitelijk 
geboden verstrekkingen, met dien verstande dat de vergoeding 
niet meer bedraagt dan het bedrag van het in de eerste volzin 
bedoelde vermogen of de in de eerste volzin bedoelde inkomsten.
•	 3) Indien na zijn verblijf in een opvangvoorziening blijkt dat een 
vreemdeling tijdens dit verblijf beschikte over een vermogen of 
inkomsten, bedoeld in het tweede lid, kan het orgaan de kosten 
van de opvang van deze vreemdeling alsmede de kosten 
van opvang van zijn gezinsleden van hem terugvorderen. 
De terug te vorderen kosten per maand zijn niet hoger dan 
de economische waarde van de aan de vreemdeling feitelijk 
geboden verstrekkingen, vermeerderd met de economische 
waarde van de aan ieder gezinslid feitelijk geboden 
verstrekkingen, met dien verstande dat het terug te vorderen 
bedrag niet meer bedraagt dan het bedrag van het in het 
tweede lid bedoelde vermogen of de in het tweede lid bedoelde 
inkomsten.26
Art 13.5 Material reception conditions may be provided in kind, 
or in the form of financial allowances or vouchers or 
in a combination of these provisions. Where Member 
States provide material reception conditions in the form of 
financial allowances or vouchers, the amount thereof shall 
be determined in accordance with the principles set out 
in this Article.
See provisions above 27
Additionally :
Pour l’application du I de l’article R. 348-4, 
le préfet fixe dans chaque département 
le montant de la participation financière 
acquittée par la personne accueillie dans un 
centre d’accueil pour demandeurs d’asile, en 
tenant compte des conditions particulières 
offertes par chaque centre, notamment de 
la qualité des prestations d’hébergement et 
d’entretien offertes (… details on amounts)28
Der notwendige Bedarf an Ernährung, 
Unterkunft, Heizung, Kleidung, Gesundheits- 
und Körperpflege und Gebrauchs- und 
Verbrauchsgütern des Haushalts wird durch 
Sachleistungen gedeckt. Kann Kleidung nicht 
geleistet werden, so kann sie in Form von 
Wertgutscheinen oder anderen vergleichbaren 
unbaren Abrechnungen gewährt werden. 
Gebrauchsgüter des Haushalts können leihweise 
zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Zusätzlich erhalten  
(details on amounts…).
•	 Iedere asielzoeker aan wie opvang wordt verleend in een 
opvangvoorziening hier te lande maakt aanspraak op de 
verstrekking van een wekelijkse financiële toelage, bedoeld 
in artikel 9, eerste lid, aanhef en onder b van deze regeling, ten 
behoeve van voedsel, kleding en andere persoonlijke uitgaven.
•	 2De hoogte van de in het eerste lid bedoelde toelage is in de 
opvangvoorziening waarin de bewoners volledig zelf het eigen 
eten verzorgen als volgt (…details on amounts for different 
centres)
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Art 13.5 2) Bei einer Unterbringung außerhalb von 
Aufnahmeeinrichtungen im Sinne des § 44 des 
Asylverfahrensgesetzes können, soweit es 
nach den Umständen erforderlich ist, anstelle 
von vorrangig zu gewährenden Sachleistungen 
nach Absatz 1 Satz 1 Leistungen in Form von 
Wertgutscheinen, von anderen vergleichbaren 
unbaren Abrechnungen oder von Geldleistungen 
im gleichen Wert gewährt werden. Der Wert 
beträgt (…)29
5) De financiële toelage wordt iedere week bij vooruitbetaling 
op een door het orgaan vastgestelde tijd (en plaats) aan de 
asielzoeker beschikbaar gesteld.
1) Asielzoekers ontvangen bij aanvang van de opvang eenmalig 
een bedrag van € 36,30 ten behoeve van de aanschaf van kleding 
en schoeisel. (slightly more discretion in case of unaccompanied 
minors)30
Art 14.1 Where housing is provided in kind, it should take one or a 
combination of the following forms:
(a) premises used for the purpose of housing applicants 
during the examination of an application for asylum 
lodged at the border;
(b) accommodation centres which guarantee an 
adequate standard of living;
(c) private houses, flats, hotels or other premises adapted 
for housing applicants.
Article L.348-1 of the CASF 
See
Loi n° 2002-2 du 2 janvier 2002 rénovant 
l’action sociale et médico-sociale (1) NOR: 
MESX0000158L Version consolidée au 26 
juillet 2016
See Circulaire IOC/L/11/14302/C du 19 
août 2011 relative aux missions des centres 
d’accueil pour demandeurs
d’asile 
Some aspects not explicitly transposed
1) Die Länder sind verpflichtet, für die 
Unterbringung Asylbegehrender die dazu 
erforderlichen Aufnahmeeinrichtungen zu 
schaffen und zu unterhalten sowie entsprechend 
ihrer Aufnahmequote die im Hinblick auf den 
monatlichen Zugang Asylbegehrender in den 
Aufnahmeeinrichtungen notwendige Zahl von 
Unterbringungsplätzen bereitzustellen. 31
Opvangvoorziening: een accommodatie waarin door of onder 
verantwoordelijkheid van het orgaan opvang wordt geboden aan 
asielzoekers32
Het orgaan draagt zorg voor de centrale opvang van asielzoekers 
door erin te voorzien dat hen opvang wordt geboden in een 
opvangvoorziening33. Details see Wet COA and Programma van 
Eisen
Art 14.2 a) Member States shall ensure that applicants provided with 
the housing referred to in paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c) are 
assured:
(a) protection of their family life;
en vue d’assurer le respect du droit à une 
vie familiale des membres des familles 
accueillies dans les établissements ou 
services mentionnés aux 1° et 7° de l’article 
L. 312-1, ces établissements ou services 
doivent rechercher une solution évitant la 
séparation de ces  personnes ou, si une telle 
solution ne peut
être trouvée, établir, de concert avec les 
personnes accueillies, un projet propre
à permettre leur réunion dans les plus 
brefs délais, et assurer le suivi de ce projet 
jusqu’à ce qu’il aboutisse. Dans ce but, 
chaque schéma départemental des centres 
d’hébergement et de réinsertion sociale 
évalue les besoins en accueil familial du 
département et prévoit les moyens pour y 
répondre34
Bei der Zuweisung sind die 
Haushaltsgemeinschaft von Familienangehörigen 
im Sinne des § 26 Absatz 1 bis 3 oder sonstige 
humanitäre Gründe von vergleichbarem Gewicht 
zu berücksichtigen.35
Bij haar bevoegdheid op grond van het eerste lid van dit artikel 
handhaaft het orgaan, voor zover mogelijk en met instemming 
van de asielzoeker, de eenheid van het gezin en neemt zij de 
bescherming van het gezinsleven tot uitgangspunt. 36
Art 14.3 Member States shall ensure, if appropriate, that minor 
children of applicants or applicants who are minors are 
lodged with their parents or with the adult family member 
responsible for them whether by law or by custom
(See above)
En vue d’assurer le respect du droit à une 
vie familiale des membres des familles 
accueillies dans les établissements ou 
services mentionnés aux 1°, 8° et 13° du I 
de l’article L. 312-1, ces établissements ou 
services doivent rechercher une solution 
évitant la séparation de ces personnes ou, si 
une telle solution ne peut être trouvée, établir, 
de concert avec les personnes accueillies, un 
projet propre à permettre leur réunion dans 
les plus brefs délais, et assurer le suivi de ce 
projet jusqu’à ce qu’il aboutisse.
Dans ce but, chaque plan départemental 
d’accueil, d’hébergement et d’insertion des 
personnes sans domicile évalue les besoins 
en accueil familial du département et prévoit 
les moyens pour y répondre.37
Sind Eltern eines minderjährigen ledigen Kindes 
verpflichtet, in einer Aufnahmeeinrichtung 
zu wohnen, so kann auch das Kind in der 
Aufnahmeeinrichtung wohnen, auch wenn es 
keinen Asylantrag gestellt hat38
•	 Bij haar bevoegdheid op grond van het eerste lid van dit artikel 
ziet het orgaan, op voorwaarde dat dit in het belang van het 
kind is, erop toe dat het minderjarig kind van een asielzoeker, 
danwel de minderjarigevreemdeling wordt gehuisvest bij zijn 
ouder, dan wel een volwassen familielid.
•	 Het orgaan zal, voor zover mogelijk, minderjarige broers en 
zussen gezamenlijk huisvesten.39
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Art 13.5 2) Bei einer Unterbringung außerhalb von 
Aufnahmeeinrichtungen im Sinne des § 44 des 
Asylverfahrensgesetzes können, soweit es 
nach den Umständen erforderlich ist, anstelle 
von vorrangig zu gewährenden Sachleistungen 
nach Absatz 1 Satz 1 Leistungen in Form von 
Wertgutscheinen, von anderen vergleichbaren 
unbaren Abrechnungen oder von Geldleistungen 
im gleichen Wert gewährt werden. Der Wert 
beträgt (…)29
5) De financiële toelage wordt iedere week bij vooruitbetaling 
op een door het orgaan vastgestelde tijd (en plaats) aan de 
asielzoeker beschikbaar gesteld.
1) Asielzoekers ontvangen bij aanvang van de opvang eenmalig 
een bedrag van € 36,30 ten behoeve van de aanschaf van kleding 
en schoeisel. (slightly more discretion in case of unaccompanied 
minors)30
Art 14.1 Where housing is provided in kind, it should take one or a 
combination of the following forms:
(a) premises used for the purpose of housing applicants 
during the examination of an application for asylum 
lodged at the border;
(b) accommodation centres which guarantee an 
adequate standard of living;
(c) private houses, flats, hotels or other premises adapted 
for housing applicants.
Article L.348-1 of the CASF 
See
Loi n° 2002-2 du 2 janvier 2002 rénovant 
l’action sociale et médico-sociale (1) NOR: 
MESX0000158L Version consolidée au 26 
juillet 2016
See Circulaire IOC/L/11/14302/C du 19 
août 2011 relative aux missions des centres 
d’accueil pour demandeurs
d’asile 
Some aspects not explicitly transposed
1) Die Länder sind verpflichtet, für die 
Unterbringung Asylbegehrender die dazu 
erforderlichen Aufnahmeeinrichtungen zu 
schaffen und zu unterhalten sowie entsprechend 
ihrer Aufnahmequote die im Hinblick auf den 
monatlichen Zugang Asylbegehrender in den 
Aufnahmeeinrichtungen notwendige Zahl von 
Unterbringungsplätzen bereitzustellen. 31
Opvangvoorziening: een accommodatie waarin door of onder 
verantwoordelijkheid van het orgaan opvang wordt geboden aan 
asielzoekers32
Het orgaan draagt zorg voor de centrale opvang van asielzoekers 
door erin te voorzien dat hen opvang wordt geboden in een 
opvangvoorziening33. Details see Wet COA and Programma van 
Eisen
Art 14.2 a) Member States shall ensure that applicants provided with 
the housing referred to in paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c) are 
assured:
(a) protection of their family life;
en vue d’assurer le respect du droit à une 
vie familiale des membres des familles 
accueillies dans les établissements ou 
services mentionnés aux 1° et 7° de l’article 
L. 312-1, ces établissements ou services 
doivent rechercher une solution évitant la 
séparation de ces  personnes ou, si une telle 
solution ne peut
être trouvée, établir, de concert avec les 
personnes accueillies, un projet propre
à permettre leur réunion dans les plus 
brefs délais, et assurer le suivi de ce projet 
jusqu’à ce qu’il aboutisse. Dans ce but, 
chaque schéma départemental des centres 
d’hébergement et de réinsertion sociale 
évalue les besoins en accueil familial du 
département et prévoit les moyens pour y 
répondre34
Bei der Zuweisung sind die 
Haushaltsgemeinschaft von Familienangehörigen 
im Sinne des § 26 Absatz 1 bis 3 oder sonstige 
humanitäre Gründe von vergleichbarem Gewicht 
zu berücksichtigen.35
Bij haar bevoegdheid op grond van het eerste lid van dit artikel 
handhaaft het orgaan, voor zover mogelijk en met instemming 
van de asielzoeker, de eenheid van het gezin en neemt zij de 
bescherming van het gezinsleven tot uitgangspunt. 36
Art 14.3 Member States shall ensure, if appropriate, that minor 
children of applicants or applicants who are minors are 
lodged with their parents or with the adult family member 
responsible for them whether by law or by custom
(See above)
En vue d’assurer le respect du droit à une 
vie familiale des membres des familles 
accueillies dans les établissements ou 
services mentionnés aux 1°, 8° et 13° du I 
de l’article L. 312-1, ces établissements ou 
services doivent rechercher une solution 
évitant la séparation de ces personnes ou, si 
une telle solution ne peut être trouvée, établir, 
de concert avec les personnes accueillies, un 
projet propre à permettre leur réunion dans 
les plus brefs délais, et assurer le suivi de ce 
projet jusqu’à ce qu’il aboutisse.
Dans ce but, chaque plan départemental 
d’accueil, d’hébergement et d’insertion des 
personnes sans domicile évalue les besoins 
en accueil familial du département et prévoit 
les moyens pour y répondre.37
Sind Eltern eines minderjährigen ledigen Kindes 
verpflichtet, in einer Aufnahmeeinrichtung 
zu wohnen, so kann auch das Kind in der 
Aufnahmeeinrichtung wohnen, auch wenn es 
keinen Asylantrag gestellt hat38
•	 Bij haar bevoegdheid op grond van het eerste lid van dit artikel 
ziet het orgaan, op voorwaarde dat dit in het belang van het 
kind is, erop toe dat het minderjarig kind van een asielzoeker, 
danwel de minderjarigevreemdeling wordt gehuisvest bij zijn 
ouder, dan wel een volwassen familielid.
•	 Het orgaan zal, voor zover mogelijk, minderjarige broers en 
zussen gezamenlijk huisvesten.39
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Art 14.4 Member States shall ensure that transfers of applicants 
from one housing facility to another take place only when 
necessary. 
Not transposed Not transposed •	 Het orgaan bepaalt in welke opvangvoorziening een asielzoeker 
wordt geplaatst en is bevoegd een asielzoeker naar een andere 
voorziening over te plaatsen.
•	 Na overplaatsing van een asielzoeker naar een andere 
opvangvoorziening worden de in artikel 9 eerste lid van deze 
regeling bedoelde verstrekkingen in deze andere voorziening 
aangeboden.40
Art 14.2 b 
Art 14.7
Member States shall ensure that applicants provided with 
the housing referred to in paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c) are 
assured:
b) the possibility of communicating with relatives, legal 
advisers and representatives of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) recognised by 
Member States
Legal advisors or counsellors of asylum seekers 
and representatives of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees or non-governmental 
organizations designated by the latter and recognised 
by the Member State concerned shall be granted 
access to accommodation centres and other housing 
facilities in order to assist the said asylum seekers. 
Limits on such access may be imposed only on 
grounds relating to the security of the centres and 
facilities and of the asylum seekers
only implicit transposition
Les centres d’accueil pour demandeurs 
d’asile ont pour mission d’assurer l’accueil, 
l’hébergement ainsi que l’accompagnement 
social et administratif des demandeurs 
d’asile, pendant la durée d’instruction de leur 
demande d’asile41
1) Der Ausländer kann sich an den Hohen 
Flüchtlingskommissar der Vereinten Nationen 
wenden. Dieser kann in Einzelfällen in Verfahren 
beim Bundesamt Stellung nehmen. Er kann 
Ausländer aufsuchen, auch wenn sie sich in 
Gewahrsam befinden oder sich im Transitbereich 
eines Flughafens aufhalten 42
2) Zur Wahrnehmung von Terminen 
bei Bevollmächtigten, beim Hohen 
Flüchtlingskommissar der Vereinten Nationen und 
bei Organisationen, die sich mit der Betreuung 
von Flüchtlingen befassen, soll die Erlaubnis 
unverzüglich erteilt werden. (Verlassen den 
aufenthaltsberichs) 43
Tijdens het verblijf in de opvangvoorziening bestaat voor 
de asielzoeker de mogelijkheid om te communiceren met 
familieleden, raadslieden en vertegenwoordigers van de Hoge 
Commissaris van de Verenigde Naties voor vluchtelingen (UNHCR) 
en door Onze Minister erkende niet-gouvernementele organisaties 
(NGO’s). Juridisch adviseurs of raadslieden van asielzoekers en 
vertegenwoordigers van de UNHCR of van de door het Bureau 
van de Hoge Commissaris gemachtigde en door Onze Minister 
erkende NGO’s hebben toegang tot de opvangvoorziening, zodat 
zij de asielzoekers kunnen bijstaan.
•	 De in het vorige lid bedoelde toegang kan worden beperkt 
om redenen die verband houden met de veiligheid van de 
opvangvoorziening of de veiligheid van de asielzoeker44
Art 14.5 Persons working in accommodation centers shall 
be adequately trained and shall be bound by the 
confidentiality principle as defined in the national law in 
relation to any information they obtain in the course of 
their work
Not transposed  full discretion to NGOs Not transposed full discretion to Lander Soft law and centralized internal COA guidelines45
Art 14.8 Member States may exceptionally set modalities for 
material reception conditions different from those 
provided for in this Article, for a reasonable period which 
shall be as short as possible, when:
— material reception conditions, as provided for in this 
Article, are not available in a certain geographical area,
— housing capacities normally available are temporarily
exhausted,
(leaving out condition on detention)46
Par suite d’arrivées importantes et excédant 
les possibilités d’admission laissés à 
l’initiative de la DDASS, l’accueil des 
demandeurs d’asile peut ne pas pouvoir 
être satisfait de manière durable sur le 
département. Une solution d’urgence doit 
être recherchée en priorité au niveau du 
département, et la commission nationale 
saisie pour une entrée dans un centre 
du DNA au terme de cet hébergement 
temporaire.47
Not transposed Onze Minister is bevoegd om, indien het orgaan aangeeft dat 
er sprake is van een capacitaire noodsituatie of enige andere 
bijzondere omstandigheid, het orgaan de bevoegdheid toe te 
kennen bepaalde categorieën asielzoekers uit te sluiten van 
opvang.48
Art 15.1 Member States shall ensure that applicants receive 
the necessary health care which shall include, at least, 
emergency care and essential treatment of illness 
(implicit: at all times)
Regular procedure
- Pour être affiliées ou rattachées en 
qualité d’ayants droit au régime général, 
les personnes visées à l’article L. 380­1 
doivent justifier qu’elles résident en France 
métropolitaine ou dans un département 
d’outre­mer de manière ininterrompue depuis 
plus de trois mois. 
(..)
1) Zur Behandlung akuter Erkrankungen und 
Schmerzzustände sind die erforderliche ärztliche 
und zahnärztliche Behandlung einschließlich der 
Versorgung mit Arznei- und Verbandmitteln sowie 
sonstiger zur Genesung, zur Besserung oder zur 
Linderung von Krankheiten oder Krankheitsfolgen 
erforderlichen Leistungen zu gewähren. Eine 
Versorgung mit Zahnersatz erfolgt nur, soweit 
dies im Einzelfall aus medizinischen Gründen 
unaufschiebbar ist. 52
De opvang in een opvangvoorziening omvat in elk geval 
de volgende verstrekkingen: de dekking van de kosten van 
medische verstrekkingen overeenkomstig een daartoe te treffen 
ziektekostenregeling53
Het treffen van een ziektekostenregeling bedoeld in artikel 9 eerste 
lid, onderdeel e van deze regeling, houdt in het afsluiten van een 
ziektekostencontract ter dekking van de kosten van het door Onze 
Minister vastgestelde pakket medische verstrekkingen.54
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Art 14.4 Member States shall ensure that transfers of applicants 
from one housing facility to another take place only when 
necessary. 
Not transposed Not transposed •	 Het orgaan bepaalt in welke opvangvoorziening een asielzoeker 
wordt geplaatst en is bevoegd een asielzoeker naar een andere 
voorziening over te plaatsen.
•	 Na overplaatsing van een asielzoeker naar een andere 
opvangvoorziening worden de in artikel 9 eerste lid van deze 
regeling bedoelde verstrekkingen in deze andere voorziening 
aangeboden.40
Art 14.2 b 
Art 14.7
Member States shall ensure that applicants provided with 
the housing referred to in paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c) are 
assured:
b) the possibility of communicating with relatives, legal 
advisers and representatives of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) recognised by 
Member States
Legal advisors or counsellors of asylum seekers 
and representatives of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees or non-governmental 
organizations designated by the latter and recognised 
by the Member State concerned shall be granted 
access to accommodation centres and other housing 
facilities in order to assist the said asylum seekers. 
Limits on such access may be imposed only on 
grounds relating to the security of the centres and 
facilities and of the asylum seekers
only implicit transposition
Les centres d’accueil pour demandeurs 
d’asile ont pour mission d’assurer l’accueil, 
l’hébergement ainsi que l’accompagnement 
social et administratif des demandeurs 
d’asile, pendant la durée d’instruction de leur 
demande d’asile41
1) Der Ausländer kann sich an den Hohen 
Flüchtlingskommissar der Vereinten Nationen 
wenden. Dieser kann in Einzelfällen in Verfahren 
beim Bundesamt Stellung nehmen. Er kann 
Ausländer aufsuchen, auch wenn sie sich in 
Gewahrsam befinden oder sich im Transitbereich 
eines Flughafens aufhalten 42
2) Zur Wahrnehmung von Terminen 
bei Bevollmächtigten, beim Hohen 
Flüchtlingskommissar der Vereinten Nationen und 
bei Organisationen, die sich mit der Betreuung 
von Flüchtlingen befassen, soll die Erlaubnis 
unverzüglich erteilt werden. (Verlassen den 
aufenthaltsberichs) 43
Tijdens het verblijf in de opvangvoorziening bestaat voor 
de asielzoeker de mogelijkheid om te communiceren met 
familieleden, raadslieden en vertegenwoordigers van de Hoge 
Commissaris van de Verenigde Naties voor vluchtelingen (UNHCR) 
en door Onze Minister erkende niet-gouvernementele organisaties 
(NGO’s). Juridisch adviseurs of raadslieden van asielzoekers en 
vertegenwoordigers van de UNHCR of van de door het Bureau 
van de Hoge Commissaris gemachtigde en door Onze Minister 
erkende NGO’s hebben toegang tot de opvangvoorziening, zodat 
zij de asielzoekers kunnen bijstaan.
•	 De in het vorige lid bedoelde toegang kan worden beperkt 
om redenen die verband houden met de veiligheid van de 
opvangvoorziening of de veiligheid van de asielzoeker44
Art 14.5 Persons working in accommodation centers shall 
be adequately trained and shall be bound by the 
confidentiality principle as defined in the national law in 
relation to any information they obtain in the course of 
their work
Not transposed  full discretion to NGOs Not transposed full discretion to Lander Soft law and centralized internal COA guidelines45
Art 14.8 Member States may exceptionally set modalities for 
material reception conditions different from those 
provided for in this Article, for a reasonable period which 
shall be as short as possible, when:
— material reception conditions, as provided for in this 
Article, are not available in a certain geographical area,
— housing capacities normally available are temporarily
exhausted,
(leaving out condition on detention)46
Par suite d’arrivées importantes et excédant 
les possibilités d’admission laissés à 
l’initiative de la DDASS, l’accueil des 
demandeurs d’asile peut ne pas pouvoir 
être satisfait de manière durable sur le 
département. Une solution d’urgence doit 
être recherchée en priorité au niveau du 
département, et la commission nationale 
saisie pour une entrée dans un centre 
du DNA au terme de cet hébergement 
temporaire.47
Not transposed Onze Minister is bevoegd om, indien het orgaan aangeeft dat 
er sprake is van een capacitaire noodsituatie of enige andere 
bijzondere omstandigheid, het orgaan de bevoegdheid toe te 
kennen bepaalde categorieën asielzoekers uit te sluiten van 
opvang.48
Art 15.1 Member States shall ensure that applicants receive 
the necessary health care which shall include, at least, 
emergency care and essential treatment of illness 
(implicit: at all times)
Regular procedure
- Pour être affiliées ou rattachées en 
qualité d’ayants droit au régime général, 
les personnes visées à l’article L. 380­1 
doivent justifier qu’elles résident en France 
métropolitaine ou dans un département 
d’outre­mer de manière ininterrompue depuis 
plus de trois mois. 
(..)
1) Zur Behandlung akuter Erkrankungen und 
Schmerzzustände sind die erforderliche ärztliche 
und zahnärztliche Behandlung einschließlich der 
Versorgung mit Arznei- und Verbandmitteln sowie 
sonstiger zur Genesung, zur Besserung oder zur 
Linderung von Krankheiten oder Krankheitsfolgen 
erforderlichen Leistungen zu gewähren. Eine 
Versorgung mit Zahnersatz erfolgt nur, soweit 
dies im Einzelfall aus medizinischen Gründen 
unaufschiebbar ist. 52
De opvang in een opvangvoorziening omvat in elk geval 
de volgende verstrekkingen: de dekking van de kosten van 
medische verstrekkingen overeenkomstig een daartoe te treffen 
ziektekostenregeling53
Het treffen van een ziektekostenregeling bedoeld in artikel 9 eerste 
lid, onderdeel e van deze regeling, houdt in het afsluiten van een 
ziektekostencontract ter dekking van de kosten van het door Onze 
Minister vastgestelde pakket medische verstrekkingen.54
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Art 15.1 3° Aux personnes reconnues réfugiés, 
admises au titre de l’asile ou ayant demandé 
le statut de réfugié.49
Les personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 861-
1 ont droit, sans contrepartie contributive, 
à la prise en charge, sous réserve de la 
réduction, de la suppression ou de la 
dispense de participation prévues par le 
présent code ou stipulées par les garanties 
collectives obligatoires professionnelles 
:1° De la participation de l’assuré aux 
tarifs de responsabilité des organismes 
de sécurité sociale pour les prestations 
couvertes par les régimes obligatoires 2° 
Du forfait journalier prévu à l’article L. 174-
4 ;3° Des frais exposés, en sus des tarifs 
de responsabilité, pour les soins dentaires 
prothétiques ou d’orthopédie dento-faciale 
et pour les dispositifs médicaux à usage 
individuel admis au remboursement, dans 
des limites fixées par arrêté interministériel. 
La prise en charge prévue au 1° ci-dessus 
peut être limitée par décret en Conseil d’Etat 
afin de respecter les dispositions de l’article 
L. 871-1 et de prendre en compte les avis 
de la Haute Autorité de santé eu égard à 
l’insuffisance du service médical rendu des 
produits, actes ou prestations de santé. 
L’arrêté mentionné au 3° ci-dessus précise 
notamment la liste des dispositifs et la limite 
du montant des frais pris en charge. Les 
personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 861-1 
sont dispensées de l’avance de frais pour les 
dépenses prises en charge par les régimes 
obligatoires des assurances maladie et 
maternité et celles prévues au présent article 
dans les conditions fixées au troisième alinéa 
de l’article L. 162-16-7.Les personnes ayant 
souscrit un acte d’adhésion, transmis à leur 
caisse d’assurance maladie, formalisant 
leur engagement auprès d’un médecin 
référent dans une démarche qualité fondée 
sur la continuité et la coordination des soins 
bénéficient de la procédure de dispense 
d’avance de frais pour les frais des actes 
réalisés par ce médecin ou par les médecins 
spécialistes qui se déclarent correspondants 
de ce médecin, pour eux-mêmes ou leurs 
ayants droit. Les personnes dont le droit 
aux prestations définies aux six premiers 
alinéas du présent article vient à expiration 
bénéficient, pour une durée d’un an à 
compter de la date d’expiration de ce droit, 
de la procédure de dispense d’avance 
des frais prévue à l’alinéa précédent pour 
la part de leurs dépenses prise en charge 
par les régimes obligatoires d’assurance 
maladie et maternité. Pour l’application de 
cette dispense d’avance de frais, un décret 
détermine les modalités de paiement des 
professionnels et établissements de santé 
permettant notamment qu’ils aient un 
interlocuteur unique pour l’ensemble de la 
procédure..50For Accelerated procedure:51
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Art 15.1 3° Aux personnes reconnues réfugiés, 
admises au titre de l’asile ou ayant demandé 
le statut de réfugié.49
Les personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 861-
1 ont droit, sans contrepartie contributive, 
à la prise en charge, sous réserve de la 
réduction, de la suppression ou de la 
dispense de participation prévues par le 
présent code ou stipulées par les garanties 
collectives obligatoires professionnelles 
:1° De la participation de l’assuré aux 
tarifs de responsabilité des organismes 
de sécurité sociale pour les prestations 
couvertes par les régimes obligatoires 2° 
Du forfait journalier prévu à l’article L. 174-
4 ;3° Des frais exposés, en sus des tarifs 
de responsabilité, pour les soins dentaires 
prothétiques ou d’orthopédie dento-faciale 
et pour les dispositifs médicaux à usage 
individuel admis au remboursement, dans 
des limites fixées par arrêté interministériel. 
La prise en charge prévue au 1° ci-dessus 
peut être limitée par décret en Conseil d’Etat 
afin de respecter les dispositions de l’article 
L. 871-1 et de prendre en compte les avis 
de la Haute Autorité de santé eu égard à 
l’insuffisance du service médical rendu des 
produits, actes ou prestations de santé. 
L’arrêté mentionné au 3° ci-dessus précise 
notamment la liste des dispositifs et la limite 
du montant des frais pris en charge. Les 
personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 861-1 
sont dispensées de l’avance de frais pour les 
dépenses prises en charge par les régimes 
obligatoires des assurances maladie et 
maternité et celles prévues au présent article 
dans les conditions fixées au troisième alinéa 
de l’article L. 162-16-7.Les personnes ayant 
souscrit un acte d’adhésion, transmis à leur 
caisse d’assurance maladie, formalisant 
leur engagement auprès d’un médecin 
référent dans une démarche qualité fondée 
sur la continuité et la coordination des soins 
bénéficient de la procédure de dispense 
d’avance de frais pour les frais des actes 
réalisés par ce médecin ou par les médecins 
spécialistes qui se déclarent correspondants 
de ce médecin, pour eux-mêmes ou leurs 
ayants droit. Les personnes dont le droit 
aux prestations définies aux six premiers 
alinéas du présent article vient à expiration 
bénéficient, pour une durée d’un an à 
compter de la date d’expiration de ce droit, 
de la procédure de dispense d’avance 
des frais prévue à l’alinéa précédent pour 
la part de leurs dépenses prise en charge 
par les régimes obligatoires d’assurance 
maladie et maternité. Pour l’application de 
cette dispense d’avance de frais, un décret 
détermine les modalités de paiement des 
professionnels et établissements de santé 
permettant notamment qu’ils aient un 
interlocuteur unique pour l’ensemble de la 
procédure..50For Accelerated procedure:51
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Table A.4.2   Continued
Article  
of the RCD
Asylum Reception Condition Directive 
wording of the article (deontic in bold,  
aims underlined, conditions in italics)
Wording French transposition Wording German transposition Wording Dutch transposition
Art 15.2
 Art 17. 1
Member States shall provide necessary medical or other 
assistance to applicants who have special needs. 
Member States shall take into account the specific 
situation of vulnerable persons such as minors, 
unaccompanied minors, disabled people, elderly 
people, pregnant women, single parents with minor 
children and persons who have been subjected to 
torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, 
physical or sexual violence, in the national legislation 
implementing the provisions of Chapter II relating to 
material reception conditions and health care.
2. Paragraph 1 shall apply only to persons found to 
have special needs after an individual evaluation of their 
situation
Not explicitly transposed but partly covered 
by general health care
Sonstige Leistungen können insbesondere 
gewährt werden, wenn sie im Einzelfall 
zur Sicherung des Lebensunterhalts oder 
der Gesundheit unerläßlich, zur Deckung 
besonderer Bedürfnisse von Kindern geboten 
oder zur Erfüllung einer verwaltungsrechtlichen 
Mitwirkungspflicht erforderlich sind. Die 
Leistungen sind als Sachleistungen, bei Vorliegen 
besonderer Umstände als Geldleistung zu 
gewähren. 
(2) Personen, die eine Aufenthaltserlaubnis 
gemäß § 24 Abs. 1 des Aufenthaltsgesetzes 
besitzen und die besondere Bedürfnisse haben, 
wie beispielsweise unbegleitete Minderjährige 
oder Personen, die Folter, Vergewaltigung oder 
sonstige schwere Formen psychischer, physischer 
oder sexueller Gewalt erlitten haben, soll die 
erforderliche medizinische oder sonstige Hilfe 
gewährt werden.55
Voor bijzonder kwetsbare personen omvat de opvang naast 
de in het eerste lid bedoelde verstrekkingen tevens specifieke 
begeleiding.56
For condition component see tasks of Community Health Services 
for Asylum Seekers
1 Décret 46-1574 modifié par le décret 2005-151 du 23 août 2005 (JORF 30 août 2005), version consolidée au 28 
février 2006, Art 16.3
2 AsylVG 61. 1- 2
3 Uitvoeringsbesluit Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen, article 2a 
4 Décret 46-1574 modifié par le décret 2005-151 du 23 août 2005 (JORF 30 août 2005), version consolidée au 28 
février 2006, Art 16.3
5 Ctrav R. 341
6 AsylVG 61. 1- 2
7 Art 21 VI of the Residence Act prohibiting self-employment, AufentG Art 39 Beschäftigungsverfahrensverordnung 
priority right for those with more privileged positions
8 Uitvoeringsbesluit Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen, article 2a 
9 Code du travail L-341-4, L341-2, R341-7-8, Décret 46-1574 modifié par le décret 2005-151 du 23 août 2005 (JORF 
30 août 2005), version consolidée au 28 février 2006, Art 16.3
10 AufentG Art 39 see also Beschäftigungsverfahrensverordnung 
11 Art. L. 348. 1-2 CAF (modifié par l’article 154 de la loi de finance pour 2006), for details on standards see 
12 L. 351-9. 1 du Code du travail (modifié par l’article 154 de la loi de finance pour 2006) 
13 AsylbLG Art 1.1, AsylVG 55, 1-2 for details on the benefits see following paragraphs
14 Rva2005 Art.3.1-2
15 I left out: Member States shall ensure that that standard of living is meeting the specific situation of persons who 
have special needs, in accordance with Article 17, as well as in relation to the situation of persons who are in 
detention because special needs are also regulated in Art 17 and would go beyond the scope of this article to 
investigate all different groups that can fall under this provision (that article was not explicitly transposed by any of 
the member states of this study)
16 Article R348-4 Established by Decree No. 2007-399 of 23 March 2007 - s. 4 Journal officiel of 24 March 2007 the 
amount is detailed by decree each year. The same applies for the temporary waiting allowance.
17 L. 351-9. 1 du Code du travail (modifié par l’article 154 de la loi de finance pour 2006) 
18 AsylbLG Art 3. 1.1, (other benefits see also Art 4.2, 6 AzylLG)
19 Rva2005Art. 9.1
20 LOI n° 2006-911 du 24 juillet 2006 relative à l’immigration et à l’intégration Art348-2, Article 351-9 of the Labour 
Code Article R348-4 Créé par Décret n°2007-399 du 23 mars 2007 - art. 4 JORF 24 mars 2007
21 AsylbLG Art 7
22 Rva 2005, Art. 2.1-2
23 La loi du 30 juin 2006. le L.348, l’article R. 348-4 du code de l‘action sociale et des familles 
24 Art  351-9 du Code du travail 
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Table A.4.2   Continued
Article  
of the RCD
Asylum Reception Condition Directive 
wording of the article (deontic in bold,  
aims underlined, conditions in italics)
Wording French transposition Wording German transposition Wording Dutch transposition
Art 15.2
 Art 17. 1
Member States shall provide necessary medical or other 
assistance to applicants who have special needs. 
Member States shall take into account the specific 
situation of vulnerable persons such as minors, 
unaccompanied minors, disabled people, elderly 
people, pregnant women, single parents with minor 
children and persons who have been subjected to 
torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, 
physical or sexual violence, in the national legislation 
implementing the provisions of Chapter II relating to 
material reception conditions and health care.
2. Paragraph 1 shall apply only to persons found to 
have special needs after an individual evaluation of their 
situation
Not explicitly transposed but partly covered 
by general health care
Sonstige Leistungen können insbesondere 
gewährt werden, wenn sie im Einzelfall 
zur Sicherung des Lebensunterhalts oder 
der Gesundheit unerläßlich, zur Deckung 
besonderer Bedürfnisse von Kindern geboten 
oder zur Erfüllung einer verwaltungsrechtlichen 
Mitwirkungspflicht erforderlich sind. Die 
Leistungen sind als Sachleistungen, bei Vorliegen 
besonderer Umstände als Geldleistung zu 
gewähren. 
(2) Personen, die eine Aufenthaltserlaubnis 
gemäß § 24 Abs. 1 des Aufenthaltsgesetzes 
besitzen und die besondere Bedürfnisse haben, 
wie beispielsweise unbegleitete Minderjährige 
oder Personen, die Folter, Vergewaltigung oder 
sonstige schwere Formen psychischer, physischer 
oder sexueller Gewalt erlitten haben, soll die 
erforderliche medizinische oder sonstige Hilfe 
gewährt werden.55
Voor bijzonder kwetsbare personen omvat de opvang naast 
de in het eerste lid bedoelde verstrekkingen tevens specifieke 
begeleiding.56
For condition component see tasks of Community Health Services 
for Asylum Seekers
25 AsylbLG Art 7
26 Rva2005 Art.20
27 Article R. 348-4 of the Code of Social Action and Families, Code du travail Art L351-9,
28 L’article R. 348-4 du code de l’action sociale et des familles
29 AsylbLG Art 31.1, Art 4.2, 6
30 Rva2005 Art.14
31 Art 44.2 AsyVG
32 Rva2005 Art1, h,
33 Rva 2005 Art3.1
34 Art L-311-9 CAF
35 Art 50.4 AsylVG
36 Rva 2005 Art.3.3d
37 L-311-9 CAF
38 Art 47.2 AsylVG.
39 Rva2005 Art11.3-5
40 Rva2005 Art 11.1-2
41 Art. L. 348-2 CASF.
42 Art 9.1 AsylVG
43 Art 57 AsylVG
44 Rva 2005 Art 11.3 Rva 2005 Art 3.3d, Art 11.3
45 COA Gedragscode See also TK 2003­2004, 19 637, nr. 779
46 I left out the detention as a reason for different modalities because it opens up a whole new body of law in most 
member states
47 La circulaire 99-399 DPM du 8 juillet 1999 (NOR/MES/N/99/30331/C) Art 4, (later replaced by Circulaire n° 
IOCL1113932C du 24 Mai 2011 sur le pilotage du dispositif as a reaction to the directive d’hébergement d’urgence)
48 Rva2005 Art4.1
49 Code de la sécurité sociale L-380
50 Code de la sécurité sociale  L861-3, 
51 Décret n°2005-860 du 28 juillet 2005 relatif aux modalités d’admission des demandes d’aide médicale de l’État  
52 AsylbLG Art 4
53 Rva2005 Art 9.1 e)
54 Rva 2005 Art 16.1
55 AsylLG Art 6
56 Art 9. 4
517635-L-bw-Dorrenbacher
Processed on: 20-2-2018 PDF page: 250
250
APPENDIX
Table A.4.3   Transposition table
Topic Directive 
article
French transposition law German Transposition law Dutch Transposition law
Access to labour 
market
Art 11.1 Décret 46-1574 modifié par le décret 2005-151 du 23 août 2005 
(JORF 30 août 2005), version consolidée au 28 février 2006,  
Art 16.3)57
AsylVG  Art. 61. 1- 2 Uitvoeringsbesluit Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen,  
Art 2a) 
Art 11.2: Décret 46-1574 modifié par le décret 2005-151 du 23 août 2005 
(JORF 30 août 2005), version consolidée au 28 février 2006,  
Art 16.3
Ctrav Art R. 341-4
AsylVG Art. 61. 2
Art 21 VI of the Residence Act 
AufentG Art 39
Beschäftigungsverfahrensverordnung 
Uitvoeringsbesluit, Art. 2a) 
See above
Art 11.4 Not transposed but see conditions set in Art 11.2 
Ctrav Art L-341-4, L341-2, R341-7-8,  Décret 46-1574 modifié  
par le décret 2005-151 du 23 août 2005 (JORF 30 août 2005), 
version consolidée au 28 février 2006, Art 16.3
AufentG Art 39
Beschäftigungsverfahrensverordnung 
Uitvoeringsregels, Art 22
See above
Material conditions Art 13.1: Temporary allowance: L. 351-9. 1 du Ctrav (modifié par l’article 
154 de la loi de finance pour 2006), 
Regular allowance in CADA:
LOI n° 2006-911 du 24 juillet 2006 relative à l’immigration et à 
l’intégration (1), L348. 1-4
AsylbLG Art 1.1, AsylVG 55, 1-2 Rva2005 Art. 3.1-2
Art 13.2 Temporary waiting: L. 351-9 du Ctrav (modifié par l’article 154  
de la loi de finance pour 2006)
Reception in CADA: Art R348-4 Established by Decree No. 2007-
399 of 23 March 2007 - s. 4 Journal officiel of 24 March 2007
AsylbLG Art 3. 1.1, Art 4.2, 6 Rva2005 Art. 9.1
 Art 13.3. See below See below Rva2005 Art. 2.1-2
Art 13.4 CASF Art 351-9 
CASF Art R348-4 
AsylbLG Art 7 Rva2005 Art. 20
Art 13.5: CASF Art R. 348-4
Ctrav Art L351-9, ATA la loi de finances de 2006
(follow up Circulaire )
AsylbLG Art 31.1,
Art 4.2, 6
Rva2005 Art.14
Accommodation Art 14.1 CASF Art L.348-1 of the Loi n° 2002-2 du 2 janvier 2002 rénovant 
l’action sociale et médico-sociale 
Sec. 44 para 2 Asylum Procedures Act Rva2005 Art. 1, h, Art3.1
Art 14.2 a) CASF Art L-311.9 AsylVG Art 50.4 Rva2005 Art. 3.3d, Art11.3,
Art 14.3 CASF Art L 312-1 1et 7,  L-311-9 Art 47.2  AsylVG. Rva2005 Art. 11.3-5
Art 14.4: Not transposed Not transposed Rva2005 Art. 11.1-2
Training of personnel Art 14.5 Not transposed Not transposed
Access to NGOs Art 14.2 b)  
Art 14.7
CASF Art L. 348-2 (implicitly) Art 9.1 AsylVG, Art 57 AsylVG Rva 2005 Art. 9. 6-8
Training of personnel Art 14.5 Not transposed Not transposed COA Gedragscode
See also TK 2003-2004, 19 637, nr. 779
Emergency Art 14.8 Circulaire 99-399 DPM du 8 juillet 1999 (NOR/MES/N/99/30331/C) 
Circulaire n° (later : IOCL1113932C du 24 Mai 2011 sur le 
pilotage du dispositif d’hébergement d’urgence)
(additional reasons for reduction introduced) Rva2005 Art. 4.1
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Table A.4.3   Transposition table
Topic Directive 
article
French transposition law German Transposition law Dutch Transposition law
Access to labour 
market
Art 11.1 Décret 46-1574 modifié par le décret 2005-151 du 23 août 2005 
(JORF 30 août 2005), version consolidée au 28 février 2006,  
Art 16.3)57
AsylVG  Art. 61. 1- 2 Uitvoeringsbesluit Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen,  
Art 2a) 
Art 11.2: Décret 46-1574 modifié par le décret 2005-151 du 23 août 2005 
(JORF 30 août 2005), version consolidée au 28 février 2006,  
Art 16.3
Ctrav Art R. 341-4
AsylVG Art. 61. 2
Art 21 VI of the Residence Act 
AufentG Art 39
Beschäftigungsverfahrensverordnung 
Uitvoeringsbesluit, Art. 2a) 
See above
Art 11.4 Not transposed but see conditions set in Art 11.2 
Ctrav Art L-341-4, L341-2, R341-7-8,  Décret 46-1574 modifié  
par le décret 2005-151 du 23 août 2005 (JORF 30 août 2005), 
version consolidée au 28 février 2006, Art 16.3
AufentG Art 39
Beschäftigungsverfahrensverordnung 
Uitvoeringsregels, Art 22
See above
Material conditions Art 13.1: Temporary allowance: L. 351-9. 1 du Ctrav (modifié par l’article 
154 de la loi de finance pour 2006), 
Regular allowance in CADA:
LOI n° 2006-911 du 24 juillet 2006 relative à l’immigration et à 
l’intégration (1), L348. 1-4
AsylbLG Art 1.1, AsylVG 55, 1-2 Rva2005 Art. 3.1-2
Art 13.2 Temporary waiting: L. 351-9 du Ctrav (modifié par l’article 154  
de la loi de finance pour 2006)
Reception in CADA: Art R348-4 Established by Decree No. 2007-
399 of 23 March 2007 - s. 4 Journal officiel of 24 March 2007
AsylbLG Art 3. 1.1, Art 4.2, 6 Rva2005 Art. 9.1
 Art 13.3. See below See below Rva2005 Art. 2.1-2
Art 13.4 CASF Art 351-9 
CASF Art R348-4 
AsylbLG Art 7 Rva2005 Art. 20
Art 13.5: CASF Art R. 348-4
Ctrav Art L351-9, ATA la loi de finances de 2006
(follow up Circulaire )
AsylbLG Art 31.1,
Art 4.2, 6
Rva2005 Art.14
Accommodation Art 14.1 CASF Art L.348-1 of the Loi n° 2002-2 du 2 janvier 2002 rénovant 
l’action sociale et médico-sociale 
Sec. 44 para 2 Asylum Procedures Act Rva2005 Art. 1, h, Art3.1
Art 14.2 a) CASF Art L-311.9 AsylVG Art 50.4 Rva2005 Art. 3.3d, Art11.3,
Art 14.3 CASF Art L 312-1 1et 7,  L-311-9 Art 47.2  AsylVG. Rva2005 Art. 11.3-5
Art 14.4: Not transposed Not transposed Rva2005 Art. 11.1-2
Training of personnel Art 14.5 Not transposed Not transposed
Access to NGOs Art 14.2 b)  
Art 14.7
CASF Art L. 348-2 (implicitly) Art 9.1 AsylVG, Art 57 AsylVG Rva 2005 Art. 9. 6-8
Training of personnel Art 14.5 Not transposed Not transposed COA Gedragscode
See also TK 2003-2004, 19 637, nr. 779
Emergency Art 14.8 Circulaire 99-399 DPM du 8 juillet 1999 (NOR/MES/N/99/30331/C) 
Circulaire n° (later : IOCL1113932C du 24 Mai 2011 sur le 
pilotage du dispositif d’hébergement d’urgence)
(additional reasons for reduction introduced) Rva2005 Art. 4.1
517635-L-bw-Dorrenbacher
Processed on: 20-2-2018 PDF page: 252
252
APPENDIX
Examples of difficult codlings and solutions
Example 1: 
Art 11.2 RCD transposition in French law (aim component)
The aim of French law (establishing conditions for access to the labour market) is 
more detailed than the directive. This is why the aim was scored with a minus. 
However, it should be noted that French law also explicitly allows prefectures to 
establish additional rules (the same applies for Art 13.5 in French law).
Example 2:
Art 13.1 RCD transposition in German law (aim component)
The directive asks member states to ensure material conditions. The French and 
Dutch law explicitly discusses the mission and obligations of the reception centres as 
practical implementers. German law only provides rights of material conditions to 
the asylum seekers. Therefore, German law was scored as more discretionary for 
the aim component than the directive because it does not establish explicitly what 
the practical implementers have to do to ensure material reception conditions.
Example 3
Art 13.2 RCD transposition in Dutch law (condition component)
While the directive introduces no condition component, Dutch law reduced discretion 
even more by highlighting that the material conditions have to be granted “in any 
case”. Therefore, the component was scored to constrain discretion more than the 
directive. The aim of this provision is in Dutch law even more detailed than in the other 
two transposition laws because Dutch law includes more explicit benefits. Therefore, 
the component was scored with a minus.
Table A.4.3   Continued
Topic Directive 
article
French transposition law German Transposition law Dutch Transposition law
Healthcare Art 15.1 CASF Art L-380-1, L861-3 
Décret n°2005-860 du 28 juillet 2005 relatif aux modalités 
d’admission des demandes d’aide médicale de l’Etat  
AsylbLG Art 4
 
Rva2005 Art. 9.1e, Art. 16.1
Art 15.2 /  
Art 17
Covered by general health care AsylLG Art 6 Rva2005 Art. 9. 4
For condition see tasks of the Community Health 
Services
for Asylum Seekers
57 number provided from the IND human resource department
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Example 4: 
Art 13.4 RCD transposition in Germany (deontic component)
The German transposition law is not fully clear on the deontic. On the one hand 
German law obliges asylum seekers to first use up their own resources, but on 
the other hand, the Länder “can” set some modalities of the fixed amounts 
for accommodation and heating etc. Therefore, the deontic was scored to be 
discretionary.
Example 5:
Art 13.5. RCD transposition in German law (aim and condition component)
While the RCD allows member states to provide material conditions in kind through 
vouchers or monetary benefits, German law gives priority to benefits in kind. However, 
the aim component of German law is so vague that in fact the provision only declares 
that the implementer shall provide benefits in kind, vouchers, or through monetary 
benefits. Contrary to the directive, there is no explicit remark that vouchers should 
have an amount in line with the directive. Also, the condition of when benefits are not 
provided in kind is discretionary because implementers are only provided with the 
guidance of “if necessary due to the circumstances”. This shows that the deontic can 
be discretion constrained, but the overall provision remains discretionary if aim and 
condition components remain discretionary.
Example 6:
Art 14.7 and 14.2 b) RCD transposition in German law (all components) 
The directive demands that member states secure that asylum seekers can 
communicate with NGOs and that NGOs have access to the reception centres. 
German law only obliges the implementers not to forbid asylum seekers to leave the 
Table A.4.3   Continued
Topic Directive 
article
French transposition law German Transposition law Dutch Transposition law
Healthcare Art 15.1 CASF Art L-380-1, L861-3 
Décret n°2005-860 du 28 juillet 2005 relatif aux modalités 
d’admission des demandes d’aide médicale de l’Etat  
AsylbLG Art 4
 
Rva2005 Art. 9.1e, Art. 16.1
Art 15.2 /  
Art 17
Covered by general health care AsylLG Art 6 Rva2005 Art. 9. 4
For condition see tasks of the Community Health 
Services
for Asylum Seekers
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area for visiting NGOs. This leaves considerable discretion in all components for 
implementers to decide if they actually allow or secure access.
Example 7:
Art 14.2a and 14.3 RCD transposition in French law
French law uses the same provision to secure family unity and to lodge parents with 
their children. However, comparing the wording of the provision with the two provisions 
of the directive that regulate these aspects shows that the same national provisions 
results in different discretion scores for each of the RCD sub-articles because Art 
14.2 a) of the directive leaves less explicit discretion to member states in the aim and 
condition component than Art 14.3 of the directive. This shows the inconsistency in 
discretion within the directive itself.
Example 8:
Art 14.2 a) transposition in Dutch law (condition component)
Dutch law introduces the discretionary condition for family unity “as far as possible 
and in agreement with the asylum seeker”. This gives the agency more discretion 
than the original condition of the RCD which has no condition, thus implying that 
family unity has to be guaranteed at all times. Therefore, the component was scored 
as discretionary, even though the provision is regulated more explicitly than in the 
other two countries.
Example 9:
Art 14.3 RCD transposition in German law (deontic component)
The directive obliges that member states secure that parents are logged with their 
children. German law only states that children “can” live with their parents. This leaves 
it questionable if this is an obligation for the implementer or only an option. Therefore, 
it was decided to score the deontic component more discretionary than the directive.
Example 10: 
Art 14.8. RCD transposition in Dutch law (attribute component)
Dutch emergency legislation is relatively discretionary allowing broader exceptions 
than the directive. However, the discretion was not delegated to practical implementers. 
Thus, transposition actors remain in control of this aspect. Thus, even though aim 
and condition delegate considerable discretion, this discretion cannot be used by 
practical implementers. 
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Example 11:
Art 13 RCD and Art 14 RCD transposition in French law
French law distinguished between different types of asylum seekers (e.g. those in 
regular reception centres, those in Dublin procedures, those in the accelerated 
procedures, those in emergency reception and applicants who are on the waiting list 
for the reception centre). It is difficult to classify these groups along the articles of 
the directive because different reception standards apply for the different groups. 
The coding focused mainly on general reception in regular reception centres.
Chapter 5
Table A.5.1   Uses of EU law per respondent
Germany (NRW)
Location
Respondent Awareness Consultation Priority under tension
A 1 Yes Yes Yes, even against  
national interests
2 Yes Yes No
3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
B 1 Yes Yes Yes but not directives against 
national law
2 n.a. n.a. n.a.
C 1 Yes Yes Yes, as parallel legal order  
next to national law
2 Yes Yes Yes, as parallel legal order  
next to national law
3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
D 1 Yes Yes Not explicitly but some 
frustration in case of conflict
E 1 Yes Yes Not against national law
F 1 Yes Yes No, but frustrating in case  
of conflict
2 Yes Yes No, but frustrating in case  
of conflict
G 1 No No No
2 No No No
3 No No No
H 1 Yes Yes Yes, as parallel legal order  
next to national law
2 Yes Yes Yes, as parallel legal order  
next to national law
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Table A.5.1   Continued
Germany (NRW)
Location
Respondent Awareness Consultation Priority under tension
I 1 Yes Yes Yes, as parallel legal order  
next to national law
2 Yes Yes Yes, as parallel legal order next 
to national law
J 1 Yes Yes General interest to use if but 
often  limited time to get into 
EU law
2 Not very 
explicit
Not much 
experience
No
The Netherlands 
(IND)
Respondent Awareness Consultation Priority under tension
A 1 Yes No No
2 Yes No No
3 Yes No No
4 Yes Not explicitly No own interpretations but 
sometimes checking ECHR
5 Yes Not explicitly No
6 Yes Not explicitly No
7 Yes No No
B 1 Yes No No
2 Yes No No
3 Yes Not explicitly No
4 Yes Not explicitly No
C 1 Yes No/ rarely No
2 Yes No No
3 Yes Seldom No
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Chapter 6
Table A.6.1   Motivational cues
Cues for instrumental 
motivations
Cues for procedural 
normative 
motivations 
(national loyalty and 
professional norms)
Cues for 
procedural 
normative 
motivations (EU 
loyalty)
Cues for 
substantive 
normative 
motivations
• Decision has to have 
standing in front 
of (national, local) 
courts
• Decision cannot 
be challenged by 
politicians
• Decision cannot be 
challenged by other 
intuitions (Social 
welfare offices)
• Decision 
cannot overstep 
implementer’s  
competencies
• Decision constitutes 
extra/ less work
• Decision reflects 
the intentions of 
the legislator
• Decision fulfils duty 
as servant of the 
state
• Decision does 
justice to the rule 
of law
• Decision serves 
German society, 
public, taxpayer
• Decision has to 
reflect intentions 
of EU legislator
• Decision fulfils 
duty under EU 
law
• Decision reflects 
supremacy of EU 
law
• Decision 
responds to client 
demands
• Decisions are  
just/ fair 
• Decision is in line 
with personal 
moral 
• Decision has to 
feel right
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Chapter 7
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APPENDIX
Table A.7.2   Factor loadings of the Principal Axis Factoring
Pattern Matrixa
Factor
1 2 3 4 5
Convince colleagues ,879
Stand up for Goals ,741
Reduce resistance ,737
Take time to deepen ,570
Efforts good implementation ,341
Short-term societal problem solving -,815
Already societal problem solving -,775
Long-term societal problem solving -,760
Client welfare ,906
Client good ,862
Client help ,674
Rules to be followed all the times ,779
Comply despite useless ,653
Ignore rules for justice ,563
EU is legitimate ,960
EU decision-making is fair ,575
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 6 iterations. Listwise exclusion
N=261
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List of respondents and survey codebook
Interviews conducted for chapters 2, 3, 5, 6
Location NRW A
Interviews held on 01-04-2015 (group)
Respondent 1: Department leader
Respondent 2: Sub-department leader
Respondent 3: Team leader 
Location NRW B 
Interviews held on 10-03-2015 (individual)
Respondent 1: Department leader
Interviews held on 10-03-2015 (individual)
Respondent 2: Caseworker
Location NRW C 
Interviews held on 19-03-2015 (group)
Respondent 1: Department leader
Respondent 2: Senior caseworker
Respondent 1: Junior caseworker
Location NRW D 
Interviews held on 23-03-2015 (individual)
Respondent 1: Former caseworker now section leader
Location NRW E 
Interviews held on 25-03-2015 (individual)
Respondent 1: Senior caseworker
Location NRW F
Interviews held on 27-03-2015 (group)
Respondent 1: Department leader
Respondent 2: Senior caseworker
Location NRW G 
Interviews held on 11-03-2015 (group)
Respondent 1: Senior caseworker
Respondent 2: Caseworker
Respondent 3: Caseworker
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Location NRW H
Interviews held on 12-03-2015 (group)
Respondent 1: Department leader
Respondent 2: Senior caseworker
Location NRW I 
Interviews held on 08-05-2015 (group)
Respondent 1: Department leader
Respondent 2: Caseworker
Location NRW J 
Interviews held on 04-05-2015 (individual)
Respondent 1: Department leader
Interviews held on 04-05-2015 (individual)
Respondent 2: Caseworker
Bezirksregierung
Location 1 interview held on 24-02-2016 one respondent
Location 2 interview held on 26-01-2016 two respondents (group interview)
Location IND A
Interview held on 21-10-2015 (group)
Respondent 1. Senior caseworker
Respondent 2: Caseworker
Interview held on 21-10-2015 (individual)
Respondent 3: Manager
Interview held on 10.11.2015 (group)
Respondent 4: Caseworker
Respondent 5: Caseworker
Respondent 6: Senior caseworker
Interview held on 10-11-2015 (individual)
Respondent 7: Manager
Location IND B
Interview held on 27-10-2015 (group)
Respondent 1: Senior caseworker
Respondent 2: Senior caseworker
Interview held on 27-10-2015 (group)
Respondent 3: Caseworker
Respondent 4: Caseworker
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Location IND C 
Interview held on 05-01-2016 (each individual)
Respondent 1: Senior caseworker 
Respondent 2: Caseworker 
Respondent 3: Caseworker 
IND Policy department
Interview held on 17-09-2015 (individual)
Responded 1: Human Resource Department
Interview held on 17-09-2015 (group)
Respondent 2: Policy Officer
Respondent 3: Policy Officer
Respondent 4: Policy Department external contact 
Respondents for chapter 4
Respondent 1, Negotiator of the EU Commission for the Directive, telephone interview, 
December 14, 2014.
Respondent 2, Representative of a French Asylum NGO, telephone interview, 
November 5, 2014.
Respondent 3, Expert from a French Migration Research Institute, e-mail enquiry, 
October 2014.
Respondent 4, Researcher at a European Policy Centre, e-mail enquiry, October 2014.
Respondent 5, Representative of a French Asylum NGO, e-mail enquiry, October 2014.
Respondent 6, Representative of French Asylum agency, e-mail enquiry, October 2014.
Respondent 7, Representative of practical implementer network in Germany, e-mail 
enquiry, October 2014.
Respondent 8, Representative of the Deutscher Städtetag, telephone interview, 
December 2, 2014.
Respondent 9, Representative of a German Refugee NGO, personal interview, 
January 23, 2014.
Respondent 10, Representative of a German Ministry responsible for transposition, 
telephone interview, December 17, 2014.
Respondent 11, Representative of a German Ministry responsible for transposition, 
e-mail enquiry, November 2014.
Respondent 12, Representative of a German NGO active in advising applicants in 
a reception centre, personal interview, January 22, 2014
Respondent 13, Representative of UNCHR, telephone interview, November 12, 2014
Respondent 14, Representative of Dutch implementation Agency, telephone interview, 
January 3, 2014.
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Respondent 15, Representative of a Dutch Ministry, e-mail enquiry, November 2014.
Respondent 16, Researcher and Asylum law lawyer in the Netherlands, e-mail 
enquiry October 2014.
Respondent 17, Representative Refugee Council the Netherlands, personal interview, 
January 7, 2014.
Respondent 18, Representative Refugee Council, the Netherlands, several personal 
background interviews, November 2013.
Respondent 19, Representative of Dutch implementation agency (during transposition) 
and later administrative employee of a Dutch Ministry, e-mail enquiry, January 2015.
Respondent 20, Representative of a Germany city council responsible for reception, 
personal interview, January 27, 2015.
Respondent 21, Representative of French NGO and reception organization, telephone 
interview January 30.01, 2015.
Respondent 22, Representative of local German implementing NGO, personal 
interview February 2015.
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Codebook for the survey used in chapter 7 
Background
This codebook provides the background to the Radboud Survey on attitudes towards 
EU migration law among frontline decision makers. The survey was designed and 
executed by Nora Dörrenbächer (Radboud University) and is part of her doctoral 
dissertation. The survey aimed to capture attitudes and work experiences of Dutch 
and German migration caseworkers about EU law. The survey was conducted from 
December 2016 to March 2017. The collected data informs the statistical analysis of 
the chapter 7:  ‘A willing frontline? Analysing the willingness to implement EU migration 
law across national bureaucratic structures’. The survey builds on previous qualitative 
interview research, conducted from 2015/2016 (see Dörrenbächer 2017 a, b). Prof dr. 
Eelke de Jong, (International Economics), Prof. dr. Ellen Mastenbroek (Public 
Administration), Dr Tineke Strik (Migration Law), and Dr Martin Van der Velde (Human 
Geography) (all Radboud University) supervise the dissertation. The following 
codebook uses the Total Survey Error (TSE) framework (Groves and Lyberg, 2010) to 
discuss the measurement and representativeness of the survey (see Figure A.7-1).51
Measurement
The constructs to be measured in this survey derive from theories of frontline 
implementation (Tummers, 2011; Tummers et al., 2012) that explain the willingness to 
implement the domestic law and the European implementation literature focusing on 
civil servants’ propensity to comply with EU law (Mastenbroek et al., 2017). 
Consequently, a top-down theory-driven operationalisation of the key concepts was 
adopted to establish the items used in the questionnaire. The items derive primarily 
from existing scales and attitudinal questions used in this literature. Inspiration was 
particularly drawn from items developed and tested by Tummers (2011) and Tummers 
et al. (2012). Tummers (2011) developed items on willingness to implement and 
societal, personal and client meaningfulness. He tested the items and scales on 
validity and reliability. Tummers (2011) explicitly encourages researchers to use and 
adjust the items to measure attitudes of frontline implementers across different public 
sectors and research context.
 Moreover, this survey includes (adjusted) items used and tested by Dr Caspar 
Van den Berg, Prof dr. Ellen Mastenbroek, and Prof dr. Sebastiaan Princen in the 
Eurocrats 2.0: Europeanization survey. The Eurocrats 2.0 survey captures the Euro-
peanization of Dutch civil servants. The survey included several variables that are 
51 Generally, the survey project benefited from a two week summer school course on survey design and 
questionnaire design offered by the Gesis Lepipniz Institute in Cologne (August 2016). Experts in the 
field of survey design provided valuable advice regarding the appropriate survey mode, item choices, 
scaling of the items and questionnaire design.
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also useful for the present research context. The items of the Tummers et al. (2012) 
and Eurocrats 2.0 survey were adjusted to the migration context and the frontline 
population. To reduce the effects of measurement error and to increase reliability, 
multiple items (e.g. 2-4 items per construct) measure the key constructs. Validity is 
measured using factor analysis, and reliability is tested using Cronbach alphas. For a 
full list of items used in the questionnaire, see the Table A.7.5 at the end of this 
dissertation).
 In order to develop the Dutch questionnaire, the original survey items from 
Tummers et al. (2012) and Tummers (2011) and the Eurocrats 2.0 questionnaire were 
requested from the respective authors. Several native Dutch speakers (e.g. Prof dr. 
Ellen Mastenbroek, Dr Tineke Strik), as well as experts in survey design (e.g. Dr Peter 
Kruyen), reviewed the adjustments to the Dutch items. Moreover, through peer 
reviews of several colleagues at Radboud University the comprehensiveness of 
the items was discussed. Nora Dörrenbächer (German native speaker) translated 
the Dutch items into German. Several other German native speakers checked the 
comprehensiveness of the German items. Regarding difficult translation issues, 
Figure A.7-1   Total Survey Error (Groves et al., 2004)
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the advice of a Dutch/German translator was taken. The survey items were also sent 
to office leaders in the German offices and approval of the survey items was received 
from the IND.
 The survey was designed as a self-administered survey. It included mainly 
closed questions, such as five-point Likert scales (in line with the original items). Due 
to the attitudinal character of the Likert items, a ‘don’t know’- option was not provided. 
Open questions were established for the variables Experience, Birth, Field_of_
migration_other (semi-closed question) and the comment section (see the coding of 
the variables in Table A.7.5 at the end of the codebook).  The survey was established 
for two survey modes. First, with the help of a graphical designer, the design was set 
up as a paper-and-pencil survey. Second, the survey was programmed as an online 
survey in Qualtrics. The survey flow and design remained in both modes the same. 
Processing errors were reduced by the fact that the Qualtrics online survey tool codes 
the data automatically into SPSS files, which can be directly downloaded. The paper 
and pencil mode was only used for 31 respondents and coded by hand into an SPSS 
file. Missing values were coded as 99. After examining the distribution of the variables, 
it became clear that some respondents entered for the variable Experience the 
numbers of years they already worked in the migration office (e.g. 2). However, the 
questionnaire asked for the year in which respondents started working in the foreign 
administration (e.g. 2015).  These instances were corrected by hand.
Representativeness
Target population
The target populations of this survey are migration caseworkers who operate in Dutch 
and German (NRW) public migration administrations that decide on residence 
permits and visas. The target population does not extend to caseworkers who are 
involved in the asylum procedure. The aim was to obtain a probability sample. 
However, contrary to general population survey, a challenge for evaluating the repre-
sentativeness of this survey sample is that relatively little information is available for 
the general population. Moreover, the sampling frame was dependent on the 
cooperation of the public offices. The following describes separately the steps taken 
to establish the sample frame and sample for the Dutch and German respondents.
Sample frame and sampling of the German respondents
In Germany, the implementation of regular migration law (residence permits, visa etc.) 
is decentralised. That means that the Bundesländer are responsible for the 
implementation. It was decided to establish a sample frame that focuses on the 
Bundesland of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) as one of the biggest Bundesländer 
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with a comparable size as the Netherlands. North Rhine-Westphalia delegates the 
implementation of regular migration law to the cities and districts where foreign 
registration offices (Ausländerbehörden) apply the law on the ground. These charac-
teristics make cluster sampling a useful sampling strategy to derive a representative 
sample of decision makers in NRW. For evaluating the representativeness of the 
sample frame, the survey builds on previous qualitative interview research in ten 
foreign registration offices in NRW.
 As a first step to establishing the sampling frame, the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
of NRW was contacted to provide a list of all foreign registration offices in NRW. Since 
the ministry does not communicate directly with all 82 offices, the Ministry could only 
provide postal addresses of each of foreign registration offices. As the ministry did 
not want to make the survey compulsive for the local offices, it advised contacting 
each of the 82 offices individually to ask for permission of the office leader to 
participate in the survey.
 Through online research, a list of the 82 office leaders and contact information of 
the foreign registration offices was established. Of the 82 offices, four offices could 
not be contacted because no appropriate contact information was available online or 
from the ministry. For all other offices, a personalised e-mail was sent to the office 
leaders to invite them and their colleagues to take part in the survey. In a reminder, a 
direct online link to the survey was included which the office leaders could directly 
forward to the employees. A disclaimer regarding anonymity, the purpose of the 
survey, use of the data and contact possibilities was included both in the e-mail to the 
office leaders as well as in the introduction of the survey.
 From 47 offices, I did not receive any reaction even after the reminder was sent. 
From 14 offices, I received a negative reply. Reasons for a negative reply were diverse. 
Several office leaders argued that due to the current refugee crisis, new IT technology 
or too many vacancies, the capacities are too low to participate in research projects. 
Other office leaders argued that EU law is not important enough for his or her 
employees to answer the questions. Moreover, particularly office leaders in the 
smaller district offices were afraid that the survey could be too sensitive. Additionally, 
they argued that the attitudes of decision makers in a public office should not be 
researched. Some offices requested official statements from their advisory institutions 
of the districts to clarify if they may participate in the survey. Despite several attempts 
to smooth such concerns, these considerations decreased the cooperation rate of 
the office leaders.
 Nevertheless, 17 offices agreed to participate in the survey (ca. 21% of the 
sample frame). The sample includes several of the biggest cities in NRW (office A, B, 
C), several small cities (office G, H, I, J, L, M, K) and several district offices (e.g. office, 
F, R, D). Office leaders of the ten offices that had previously already agreed to take 
part in the qualitative interviews agreed more often than offices where no previous 
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personal contacts could be established. Due to the gatekeeping function of the office 
leadership, offices with extreme capacity problems or non-cooperative leaders are 
likely to be underrepresented. It is difficult to predict how this possible selection bias 
influences the responses. However, there are little reasons to believe that the decision 
makers in offices with supportive leadership are more homogenous than the general 
population of decision makers. Moreover, this possible selection bias applies equally 
to the Dutch sample.
 The managers of each office were left with the choice of either distributing a pa-
per-and-pencil survey or forwarding an online link. All, but one manager (office A) 
decided for the online link. Each manager was requested to send up to three 
reminders to the decision makers to participate in the survey (after several weeks and 
after monitoring the response pattern). Moreover, in order to trace unit response rates 
each of the offices’ managers were requested to provide the number of decision 
makers in their office to which they had sent the survey. The office manager in office 
A personally distributed and collected the paper and pencil questionnaire to his 
employees. The rationale for using the office leaders to distribute the survey was 
twofold. First, a lack of direct access to the decision makers made this sampling 
necessary. Moreover, office leaders agreed that it would increase the response rate 
when the office leader requests his or her employees to participate in the survey, 
instead of an external request.
 Unfortunately, not all office managers provided the exact numbers of caseworkers 
in their teams. In that case, it was required to consult the web pages of the offices to 
retrieve an estimate of the employees in each office or to rely on the previous 
interviews. Following these estimates response rates varied between 100% and 32% 
per office. The response rate in the smaller offices was higher than in, the larger ones. 
Possible reasons are first that all of the employees in the smaller offices are 
caseworkers. In the larger offices, there is also supporting staff (e.g. legal advisers, 
IT services etc.). The more specialised staff in the larger offices may have considered 
the survey not relevant for them personally. Moreover, in small offices, the link 
between manager and decision makers is closer than in the larger offices. This direct 
link may have increased the response rate in the small office.
In four offices, the contacted caseworkers and managers were not able to distribute 
the survey among all of their employees. Instead, only one respondent answered the 
questionnaire. While several requests were made to distribute the survey in the whole 
office, this seemed to be impossible (e.g. capacity problems or unwillingness of the 
leadership to distribute the survey). Since the four respondents of these offices seem 
to be no outliers, they were left in the dataset. Table A.7.2 summarises the response 
rates per office in NRW.
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Sample frame and sampling of the Dutch respondents
In 2014 an application was submitted to the head of the central migration agency of 
the Netherlands (IND: Immigration and Naturalization Service) to conduct qualitative 
interviews with decision makers to retrieve their attitudes and practices towards EU 
migration law. The qualitative research was conducted between 2015 and 2016. 
Building on the qualitative insights a request was made to the IND to extend the 
research to a quantitative survey among a more general sample of IND decision 
makers. The IND accepted the request to conduct a survey among 100-200 IND 
decion makers in all four IND departments that deal with regular stay and citizenship 
(Directie Regulier Verblijf en Nederlanderschap). It was agreed with the IND that at 
least one manager of each of the four departments is asked to distribute the 
52 Please note that the codes for the offices used in the survey do not correspond with the codes for the 
offices used for the interviews
Table A.7.2  Response rates in the offices in NRW52
Office Questionnaire sent to N 
respondents 
(population targeted)
Responses from N 
decision makers
Unit response rate (%)
A 50 31 62
B 30-40 37 Ca. 100
C 68 22 32.4
D 47 16 34
E 24 12 50
F 18 10 56
G 7 (from webpage) 6 86
H 8 6 75
I 5 (from webpage) 5 100
J 8 4 50
K 7 4 57
L 5 3 60
M 7 3 43
N n.a. 1 n.a
O n.a. 1 n.a
P n.a. 1 n.a
Q n.a. 1 n.a.
R 22 19 86
Total 182
517635-L-bw-Dorrenbacher
Processed on: 20-2-2018 PDF page: 270
270
LIST OF RESPONDENTS AND SURVEY CODEBOOK
questionnaire among his or her team of decision makers. An e-mail to request the 
collaboration of the mangers was sent from within the IND. Using snowball sampling, 
the managers who agreed to distribute the survey were asked to request also 
cooperation from the other managers from their office location.
 All managers had the choice to distribute either a paper-and-pencil survey or 
an online link among their employees. All managers decided to distribute the online 
link. Each manager was requested to send up to three reminders to the decision 
makers. Moreover, in order to trace the unit response rate each of the IND managers 
was requested to provide me with the number of decision makers in their team to 
which they sent the survey. Table A.7.3 provides an overview of the response rates 
across the offices.
Item non-response and survey break-up
While the survey left the option to skip questions, the respondents typically did not 
skip individual questions. Some item non-response could be found regarding the 
year of birth, and two respondent explained in the comment section that they could 
not rate two items because they considered the scale not fully suitable for their more 
nuanced view. A more severe problem in the Dutch and the German sample were 
surveys breakup. Not all respondents filled out the survey to the end. In the Dutch 
sample ca. 28% of the respondents started the survey, but did not finish it to the end. 
In the German sample survey break up was slightly lower with ca. 17%. The high 
breakup rate might be related to the online mode. There are no survey breakups in 
the office that used the paper-and-pencil survey. There is no clear pattern of survey 
breakups. Breakups mostly happened after the responded finished one block of the 
questionnaire and had to click ‘continue’ to go on with the questionnaire. A fatigue 
effect is not an intuitive explanation for the survey breakup because the surveys took 
the respondents typically only between 8 and 4 minutes to complete. Instead, the 
breakup may be related to the fact that respondents answered the questions at work 
and on a computer. Thus, work-related e-mails, requests and the regular case work 
might have prevented the completion. 
53 number provided from the IND human resource department
Table A.7.3  Response rate IND
IND Questionnaire sent to N 
respondents  
(Population targeted)
Responses from N
decision makers
Unit response rate (%)
33953 156 46
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Respondent representativeness
Little is known about the general population of the migration caseworkers in Germany 
and in the Netherlands. Particularly in the German sample where case work is 
organised at the municipal level, little is known about the full population. These 
uncertainties make it particularly difficult to judge how representative the sample is. 
However, in the following, some key characteristics of the respondents are discussed 
to assess the sample.
Gender representativeness
In both samples, more female than male respondents answered the questionnaire 
(Figure A.7-2). These results seem to be in line with the general population. According 
to respondents in the policy department of the IND, there is a clear majority of female 
caseworkers in the IND. The qualitative interviews with leaders of the German offices 
confirmed that there are also more female caseworkers in NRW due to good part-time 
work conditions.
Figure A.7-2   Gender patters
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Field of Migration
Table A.7.4 provides the distribution of respondents by their main field of work. 
Respondents could provide several answers. In Germany and the Netherlands, most 
respondents take decisions regarding regular migration. Regular migration includes 
family migration, student residence permits, working residence permits etc. The 
patterns are slightly more diverse among the German respondents who often have 
several tasks and are less specialised than the respondents are in the centralised 
Dutch system. For example, the German respondents also take decisions on family 
reunification of asylum seekers (not the actual asylum decision), while the Dutch IND 
decides on asylum family migration issues in a separate unit for asylum.
Figure A.7-3   Pattern of respondents with managing tasks
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Table A.7.4  Fields of migration
Field Germany % (N) Netherlands % (N)
Asylum 48 (87) 12 (18)
Regular Migration 70 (128) 84 (131)
EU citizens 32 (58) 22 (35)
Naturalisation 14 (25) 5 (7)
Other 22 (40) 8 (13)
N 182 156
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Managers/regular caseworkers:
As can be expected from the general population, there are more respondents without 
managing task than with managing tasks (Figure A.7-3). 
 Among the German respondents, there are more respondents with managing 
tasks than among Dutch respondents. These results are in line with the fact that each 
of the municipal offices has a managing team. In the Netherlands, the centralised 
structure requires fewer employees in management positions.
Experience
The respondents in Germany and the Netherlands are on average relatively 
experienced in their job. In Germany, caseworkers have on average 9 years of job 
experience in a foreign registration office (Figure A.7-4). Those with managing tasks 
have on average 13 years of experience and those without 7 years. Their Dutch 
colleagues have even longer job experience (average 13 years). Those with managing 
tasks have on average 18 years of experience and those without 13 years. The sample 
is in line with experiences from the qualitative interviews in which respondents from 
the IND policy department mentioned that the IND hired particularly in the early 
2000s new employees and since then If there was a hiring stop. In Germany, it is 
particularly visible that several municipalities started hiring new employees because 
of the refugee influx. In the qualitative interviews, it was also confirmed that the 
turnover in the German municipal offices is higher than among caseworkers of the 
IND.
Age
The German respondents are on average 40 years old, and their Dutch colleagues 
are on average 44 years old (Figure A-7-5). One difference between Dutch and 
German respondents seems to be that the German sample consists of more extremes 
with older and younger employees than the Dutch sample, which is more normally 
distributed. The German pattern might be related to the fact that many municipal 
public servants start their careers in the foreign registration office because they are 
appointed to free vacancies. Many move later on into different departments and 
public offices of the muncipality. In the Dutch context, respondents decide more 
explicitly for a career in the foreign administration.
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Table A.7.5  Data file description
Survey question English Survey question DTL Survey question NL Variable name Measure Value and label  
(value for survey question)
1 Since which year do you work in a foreign 
registration office /IND
Seit welchem Jahr arbeiten Sie in einer 
Ausländerbehörde?
Sinds welke jaar werkt u bij de IND? Experience Scale
2 In which field of Migration do you take most of your 
decisions
(wording in DTL slightly different because of 
organisational structure)
In welchen Migrationsbereichen sind Sie derzeit 
tätig?
Op welke terreinen van het 
immigratierecht neemt u meestal 
beslissingen?
2.1 Asylum Asyl Asiel Asylum Nominal Dummy
0= no asylum
1 =  Asylum
2.2 Regular migration Aufenthaltsrecht Regulier Verblijf Regular_Migration Nominal Dummy
0= no regular migration
1 =  regular migration
2.3. EU -citizens EU Bürger EU-burgers EU_citizens Nominal Dummy
0= no EU -citizens
1 =  EU citizens
2.4 Naturalisation Einbürgerung Naturalisatie Citizenship Nominal Dummy
0= no naturalisation
1 =  naturalisation
2.5 Other, namely, (...) Anderer Bereich, nämlich ( ) Overig, namelijk (…) Other (with  
open question of 
explanation)
Nominal Dummy
0= no other
1 =  other
(if 1, string variable for explanation)
3 How often in the last month did you meet your 
clients (migrants) in person for appointments?
Wording slightly different in NL and DTl because  
in DT personal meetings are possible without 
appointment for advise
Wie oft haben Sie im letzten Monat Klienten 
(Migranten) persönlich in der Ausländerbehörde für 
Termine und Beratung getroffen?
Hoe vaak heeft u de laatste maand 
uw cliënten (migranten) voor 
afspraken persoonlijk ontmoet?
client_contact Scale 1= not at all
2= 2-3 x per month
3= 1 x per week
4= 2-3 x per week
5= daily
4 Does your current function include management 
tasks
Beinhaltet Ihre derzeitige Position 
Führungstätigkeiten?
Behelst uw huidige positie 
leidinggevende activiteiten? 
Management Nominal 1 = yes
2= no
5 How important is EU law in your daily work? Wie wichtig ist EU-Recht für Ihre tägliche Arbeit? Hoe belangrijk is EU-wetgeving in 
uw dagelijkse werkzaamheden?
Importance Scale 1= not at all
2= rather unimportant
3= rather important
4= very important 
6 Decision-making at the European level takes place 
in a fair way.
Auf Europäischer Ebenen laufen 
Entscheidungsprozesse auf faire Weise ab.
Besluitvorming op Europees niveau 
verloopt op een faire manier.
EU_fair Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
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Survey question English Survey question DTL Survey question NL Variable name Measure Value and label  
(value for survey question)
1 Since which year do you work in a foreign 
registration office /IND
Seit welchem Jahr arbeiten Sie in einer 
Ausländerbehörde?
Sinds welke jaar werkt u bij de IND? Experience Scale
2 In which field of Migration do you take most of your 
decisions
(wording in DTL slightly different because of 
organisational structure)
In welchen Migrationsbereichen sind Sie derzeit 
tätig?
Op welke terreinen van het 
immigratierecht neemt u meestal 
beslissingen?
2.1 Asylum Asyl Asiel Asylum Nominal Dummy
0= no asylum
1 =  Asylum
2.2 Regular migration Aufenthaltsrecht Regulier Verblijf Regular_Migration Nominal Dummy
0= no regular migration
1 =  regular migration
2.3. EU -citizens EU Bürger EU-burgers EU_citizens Nominal Dummy
0= no EU -citizens
1 =  EU citizens
2.4 Naturalisation Einbürgerung Naturalisatie Citizenship Nominal Dummy
0= no naturalisation
1 =  naturalisation
2.5 Other, namely, (...) Anderer Bereich, nämlich ( ) Overig, namelijk (…) Other (with  
open question of 
explanation)
Nominal Dummy
0= no other
1 =  other
(if 1, string variable for explanation)
3 How often in the last month did you meet your 
clients (migrants) in person for appointments?
Wording slightly different in NL and DTl because  
in DT personal meetings are possible without 
appointment for advise
Wie oft haben Sie im letzten Monat Klienten 
(Migranten) persönlich in der Ausländerbehörde für 
Termine und Beratung getroffen?
Hoe vaak heeft u de laatste maand 
uw cliënten (migranten) voor 
afspraken persoonlijk ontmoet?
client_contact Scale 1= not at all
2= 2-3 x per month
3= 1 x per week
4= 2-3 x per week
5= daily
4 Does your current function include management 
tasks
Beinhaltet Ihre derzeitige Position 
Führungstätigkeiten?
Behelst uw huidige positie 
leidinggevende activiteiten? 
Management Nominal 1 = yes
2= no
5 How important is EU law in your daily work? Wie wichtig ist EU-Recht für Ihre tägliche Arbeit? Hoe belangrijk is EU-wetgeving in 
uw dagelijkse werkzaamheden?
Importance Scale 1= not at all
2= rather unimportant
3= rather important
4= very important 
6 Decision-making at the European level takes place 
in a fair way.
Auf Europäischer Ebenen laufen 
Entscheidungsprozesse auf faire Weise ab.
Besluitvorming op Europees niveau 
verloopt op een faire manier.
EU_fair Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
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Survey question English Survey question DTL Survey question NL Variable name Measure Value and label  
(value for survey question)
7 The EU is a legitimate legislator in the field of 
migration.
Die EU ist ein legitimer Gesetzgeber im 
Migrationsbereich.
De EU is een legitieme wetgever op 
het terrein van migratie.
EU_legitimacy Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree 
8 EU migration law makes my work more interesting. EU-Migrationsrecht macht meine Arbeit 
interessanter.
EU-immigratierecht maakt mijn werk 
interessanter.
EU_interesting Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree 
9. My work does not become easier through EU 
migration law. (R)
Meine Arbeit wird durch EU-Migrationsrecht nicht
einfacher. (R)
Mijn werk wordt door het EU- 
immigratierecht niet gemakkelijker. 
(R)
EU_Not_Easy Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
10 I have higher administrative burdens due to EU 
migration law. 
Durch das EU-Migrationsrecht habe ich mehr 
administrative Arbeit.
EU-immigratierecht zorgt ervoor dat 
ik meer administratieve lasten krijg.
EU_More_Admin Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
11 The content of EU migration law agrees with me. Ich erkenne mich in den Inhalten des  
EU-Migrationsrechtes gut wieder.
Ik kan me goed vinden in de inhoud 
van het EU-immigratierecht.
EU_Content Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
12 EU migration law contributes to the welfare of  
my clients.
EU-Migrationsrecht ist förderlich für das  
Wohl meiner Klienten.
EU-immigratierecht is bevorderlijk 
voor het welzijn van mijn cliënten.
Client_welfare Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
13 Through EU migration law I can better help  
my clients.
Durch das EU-Migrationsrecht kann ich  
meinen Klienten besser helfen.
EU-immigratierecht zorgt ervoor dat 
ik cliënten beter kan helpen.
Client_help Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
14 EU migration law is eventually good for my clients. EU-Migrationsrecht is im Endeffekt gut für  
meine Klienten.
EU-immigratierecht is uiteindelijk 
goed voor mijn cliënten.
Client_good Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
15 EU migration law leads in the long term to the 
solution of societal problems.
EU-Migrationsrecht löst auf lange Sicht 
gesellschaftliche Probleme.
EU-immigratierecht leidt op de 
lange termijn tot het oplossen van 
maatschappelijke problemen.
Longterm_soprob Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
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Survey question English Survey question DTL Survey question NL Variable name Measure Value and label  
(value for survey question)
7 The EU is a legitimate legislator in the field of 
migration.
Die EU ist ein legitimer Gesetzgeber im 
Migrationsbereich.
De EU is een legitieme wetgever op 
het terrein van migratie.
EU_legitimacy Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree 
8 EU migration law makes my work more interesting. EU-Migrationsrecht macht meine Arbeit 
interessanter.
EU-immigratierecht maakt mijn werk 
interessanter.
EU_interesting Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree 
9. My work does not become easier through EU 
migration law. (R)
Meine Arbeit wird durch EU-Migrationsrecht nicht
einfacher. (R)
Mijn werk wordt door het EU- 
immigratierecht niet gemakkelijker. 
(R)
EU_Not_Easy Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
10 I have higher administrative burdens due to EU 
migration law. 
Durch das EU-Migrationsrecht habe ich mehr 
administrative Arbeit.
EU-immigratierecht zorgt ervoor dat 
ik meer administratieve lasten krijg.
EU_More_Admin Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
11 The content of EU migration law agrees with me. Ich erkenne mich in den Inhalten des  
EU-Migrationsrechtes gut wieder.
Ik kan me goed vinden in de inhoud 
van het EU-immigratierecht.
EU_Content Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
12 EU migration law contributes to the welfare of  
my clients.
EU-Migrationsrecht ist förderlich für das  
Wohl meiner Klienten.
EU-immigratierecht is bevorderlijk 
voor het welzijn van mijn cliënten.
Client_welfare Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
13 Through EU migration law I can better help  
my clients.
Durch das EU-Migrationsrecht kann ich  
meinen Klienten besser helfen.
EU-immigratierecht zorgt ervoor dat 
ik cliënten beter kan helpen.
Client_help Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
14 EU migration law is eventually good for my clients. EU-Migrationsrecht is im Endeffekt gut für  
meine Klienten.
EU-immigratierecht is uiteindelijk 
goed voor mijn cliënten.
Client_good Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
15 EU migration law leads in the long term to the 
solution of societal problems.
EU-Migrationsrecht löst auf lange Sicht 
gesellschaftliche Probleme.
EU-immigratierecht leidt op de 
lange termijn tot het oplossen van 
maatschappelijke problemen.
Longterm_soprob Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
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Survey question English Survey question DTL Survey question NL Variable name Measure Value and label  
(value for survey question)
16 EU migration law leads in the short term to the 
solution of societal problems
EU-Migrationsrecht löst auf kurze Sicht 
gesellschaftliche Probleme.
EU-immigratierecht leidt op de 
korte termijn  tot het oplossen van 
maatschappelijke problemen.
Shortterm_soprob Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
17 EU migration law is solving now already societal 
problems
EU-Migrationsrecht hat bereits gesellschaftliche
Probleme gelöst.
EU-immigratierecht leidt nu al tot 
het oplossen van maatschappelijke 
problemen.
Already_soprob Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
18 I have enough expertise regarding the contents of 
EU migration law.
Ich habe genügend Expertise bezüglich der
Inhalte des EU-Migrationsrechtes.
 Ik heb voldoende kennis van de 
inhoud van het EU-immigatierecht.
Expertise Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
19 I try to convince my colleagues of the importance 
of EU migration law.
Ich versuche, meine Kollegen von der Wichtigkeit 
des EU-Migrationsrechtes zu überzeugen.
Ik probeer mijn collega’s te 
overtuigen van het belang van EU-
immigratierecht.
Will_ConvCol Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
20 I stand up for the objectives of EU migration law Ich setze mich für die Ziele des 
EU-Migrationsrechtes ein.
Ik zet me in voor de doelstellingen 
van het EU immigratierecht.
Will_StandGoal Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
21 I try to reduce resistance among my colleagues 
regarding EU migration law.
Ich versuche, Widerstand gegen das 
EU-Migrationsrecht bei meinen Kollegen zu 
vermindern.
 Ik probeer weerstand tegen het EU-
immigratierecht bij mijn collega’s te 
verminderen.
Will_RedRes Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
22 I put effort into a good implementation of EU 
migration laws
Ich bemühe mich um eine gute Ausführung
des EU-Migrationsrechtes.
Ik doe moeite om tot een 
goede uitvoering van het EU-
immigratierecht te komen.
Will_GoodImp Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
23 I take the time to deepen myself in EU migration 
law.
Ich nehme mir die Zeit, mich im EU-Migrationsrecht
zu vertiefen.
Ik maak tijd vrij om me te verdiepen 
in het EU-immigratierecht.
Will_time Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
24 Not to comply with EU migration law has possible 
negative consequences for me.
Nichtbeachtung des EU-Migrationsrechtes
hat mögliche negative Konsequenzen für mich.
Niet-naleving van het Europese 
recht  heeft mogelijk negatieve 
consequenties voor mij.
Risk_Noncomp Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
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16 EU migration law leads in the short term to the 
solution of societal problems
EU-Migrationsrecht löst auf kurze Sicht 
gesellschaftliche Probleme.
EU-immigratierecht leidt op de 
korte termijn  tot het oplossen van 
maatschappelijke problemen.
Shortterm_soprob Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
17 EU migration law is solving now already societal 
problems
EU-Migrationsrecht hat bereits gesellschaftliche
Probleme gelöst.
EU-immigratierecht leidt nu al tot 
het oplossen van maatschappelijke 
problemen.
Already_soprob Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
18 I have enough expertise regarding the contents of 
EU migration law.
Ich habe genügend Expertise bezüglich der
Inhalte des EU-Migrationsrechtes.
 Ik heb voldoende kennis van de 
inhoud van het EU-immigatierecht.
Expertise Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
19 I try to convince my colleagues of the importance 
of EU migration law.
Ich versuche, meine Kollegen von der Wichtigkeit 
des EU-Migrationsrechtes zu überzeugen.
Ik probeer mijn collega’s te 
overtuigen van het belang van EU-
immigratierecht.
Will_ConvCol Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
20 I stand up for the objectives of EU migration law Ich setze mich für die Ziele des 
EU-Migrationsrechtes ein.
Ik zet me in voor de doelstellingen 
van het EU immigratierecht.
Will_StandGoal Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
21 I try to reduce resistance among my colleagues 
regarding EU migration law.
Ich versuche, Widerstand gegen das 
EU-Migrationsrecht bei meinen Kollegen zu 
vermindern.
 Ik probeer weerstand tegen het EU-
immigratierecht bij mijn collega’s te 
verminderen.
Will_RedRes Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
22 I put effort into a good implementation of EU 
migration laws
Ich bemühe mich um eine gute Ausführung
des EU-Migrationsrechtes.
Ik doe moeite om tot een 
goede uitvoering van het EU-
immigratierecht te komen.
Will_GoodImp Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
23 I take the time to deepen myself in EU migration 
law.
Ich nehme mir die Zeit, mich im EU-Migrationsrecht
zu vertiefen.
Ik maak tijd vrij om me te verdiepen 
in het EU-immigratierecht.
Will_time Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
24 Not to comply with EU migration law has possible 
negative consequences for me.
Nichtbeachtung des EU-Migrationsrechtes
hat mögliche negative Konsequenzen für mich.
Niet-naleving van het Europese 
recht  heeft mogelijk negatieve 
consequenties voor mij.
Risk_Noncomp Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
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25 I see it as my duty to comply with EU migration law. Ich sehe es als meine Pflicht an, das  
EU-Migrationsrecht zu beachten.
Ik zie het als mijn plicht om het 
Europese recht na te leven.
EU_Duty Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
26 When the national law is inconclusive, I take into 
account EU law in my decision-making.
Wenn nationales Recht Unklarheiten lässt, fließt
EU Recht in meine Entscheidungsprozesse ein.
Wanneer nationaal recht geen 
uitsluitsel geeft, houd ik bij mijn 
besluitvorming rekening met EU 
recht.
Use_inconc Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
27 If there is a tension between EU law and national 
policy demands, I rely on EU law in my decision-
making
Bei Spannungen zwischen EU Recht und 
nationalen Politikanforderungen, beachte ich in 
meinen Entscheidungsprozessen EU Recht.
Als er een spanningsveld tussen 
Europees recht en nationale 
beleidswensen bestaat, houd ik me 
in mijn besluitvormingen aan EU 
recht.
Use_tension Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
28 If there is a tension between EU law and national 
policy demands, it is risky for me to rely on EU law.
Bei Spannungen zwischen EU Recht und 
nationalen Politikanforderungen, ist es riskant für 
mich EU-Migrationsrecht zu beachten.
Als er een spanningsveld tussen 
Europees recht en nationale 
beleidswensen bestaat, is het 
voor mij riskant om me aan EU-
migratierecht te houden
Risk_use Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
29 In order to prevent injustice, it is sometimes 
necessary to ignore rules.
(R) 
Um Unrecht zu verhindern ist es manchmal nötig 
Regeln zu ignorieren. (R)
Om onrecht te voorkomen is het 
soms noodzakelijk om regels te 
negeren.
(R)
Rule_IgnoreJust Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
30 Even when I consider a rule not useful, I usually 
comply with it.
Selbst wenn ich eine Regel nicht als sinnvoll 
erachte, halte ich mich normalerweise daran.
Zelfs als ik een regel niet nuttig vind, 
houd ik me er normaal gesproken 
wel aan.
Rules_Useful Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
31 Rules have to be respected at all times, regardless 
of the circumstance.
Regeln müssen zu jeder Zeit respektiert
werden, ungeachtet der Umstände.
Regels moeten te allen tijde worden 
gerespecteerd, ongeacht de 
omstandigheden.
Rules_all_times Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
32 Sometimes I wish I had a job where I had more 
autonomy over my decisions.
Manchmal wünsche ich mir eine Arbeit, bei der ich 
mehr Autonomie in meinen Entscheidungen habe.
Soms zou ik een baan willen hebben 
waar ik meer autonomie over mijn 
beslissingen heb.
Auton_wish Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
33 It irritates me when I am told what to do. Es ärgert mich, wenn mir gesagt wird, was
ich tun soll.
Het irriteert me als me wordt verteld 
wat ik moet doen.
Auton_instr Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
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25 I see it as my duty to comply with EU migration law. Ich sehe es als meine Pflicht an, das  
EU-Migrationsrecht zu beachten.
Ik zie het als mijn plicht om het 
Europese recht na te leven.
EU_Duty Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
26 When the national law is inconclusive, I take into 
account EU law in my decision-making.
Wenn nationales Recht Unklarheiten lässt, fließt
EU Recht in meine Entscheidungsprozesse ein.
Wanneer nationaal recht geen 
uitsluitsel geeft, houd ik bij mijn 
besluitvorming rekening met EU 
recht.
Use_inconc Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
27 If there is a tension between EU law and national 
policy demands, I rely on EU law in my decision-
making
Bei Spannungen zwischen EU Recht und 
nationalen Politikanforderungen, beachte ich in 
meinen Entscheidungsprozessen EU Recht.
Als er een spanningsveld tussen 
Europees recht en nationale 
beleidswensen bestaat, houd ik me 
in mijn besluitvormingen aan EU 
recht.
Use_tension Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
28 If there is a tension between EU law and national 
policy demands, it is risky for me to rely on EU law.
Bei Spannungen zwischen EU Recht und 
nationalen Politikanforderungen, ist es riskant für 
mich EU-Migrationsrecht zu beachten.
Als er een spanningsveld tussen 
Europees recht en nationale 
beleidswensen bestaat, is het 
voor mij riskant om me aan EU-
migratierecht te houden
Risk_use Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
29 In order to prevent injustice, it is sometimes 
necessary to ignore rules.
(R) 
Um Unrecht zu verhindern ist es manchmal nötig 
Regeln zu ignorieren. (R)
Om onrecht te voorkomen is het 
soms noodzakelijk om regels te 
negeren.
(R)
Rule_IgnoreJust Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
30 Even when I consider a rule not useful, I usually 
comply with it.
Selbst wenn ich eine Regel nicht als sinnvoll 
erachte, halte ich mich normalerweise daran.
Zelfs als ik een regel niet nuttig vind, 
houd ik me er normaal gesproken 
wel aan.
Rules_Useful Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
31 Rules have to be respected at all times, regardless 
of the circumstance.
Regeln müssen zu jeder Zeit respektiert
werden, ungeachtet der Umstände.
Regels moeten te allen tijde worden 
gerespecteerd, ongeacht de 
omstandigheden.
Rules_all_times Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
32 Sometimes I wish I had a job where I had more 
autonomy over my decisions.
Manchmal wünsche ich mir eine Arbeit, bei der ich 
mehr Autonomie in meinen Entscheidungen habe.
Soms zou ik een baan willen hebben 
waar ik meer autonomie over mijn 
beslissingen heb.
Auton_wish Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
33 It irritates me when I am told what to do. Es ärgert mich, wenn mir gesagt wird, was
ich tun soll.
Het irriteert me als me wordt verteld 
wat ik moet doen.
Auton_instr Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
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Table A.7.5  Continued
Survey question English Survey question DTL Survey question NL Variable name Measure Value and label  
(value for survey question)
34 The worst aspect of my work is that I have to  
follow orders.
Der nervigste Aspekt
meiner Arbeit ist, dass
ich Anweisungen
befolgen muss.
Het vervelendste aspect van 
mijn werk is dat ik bevelen moet 
opvolgen.
Auton-Obed Scale 1 = I completely agree
2 = I rather agree 
3 = I don’t agree, don’t disagree
4 = I rather disagree
5 = I completely disagree
35 What is your gender? Was ist Ihr Geschlecht? Wat is uw geslacht? Gender Nominal Dummy
1= male
2= female
36 In which year are you born? In welchem Jahr sind Sie geboren? Wat is uw geboortejaar? Birth Scale
37 Are you born in Germany/the Netherlands? Sind Sie in Deutschland geboren? Bent u in Nederland geboren? Migrat_back Nominal Dummy
1=yes
2=no
38 Comments Kommentare Commentaar
Variables established for analysis
Variable established by merging the Dutch and 
German data files
country Nominal Dummy
o: Germany
1: Netherlands
Code for identifying the office in which the data 
was collected based on survey link
office Nominal A: 1
B: 2
...
Zwo: 22
Willingness to implement EU migration law Will_to_imp Scale 1-5 (mean of item 19-23)
Client meaningfulness Client_mean Scale 1-5 mean of item 12-14)
Societal meaningfulness Soc_mean Scale 1-5 (mean of item 15-17)
Procedural justice Proc_just Scale 1-5 (mean of item 6 and 7)
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SUMMARY
Summary
More than ten years ago, the European Union (EU) started to harmonize the first 
norms on migration and asylum. Ever since the issue of migration remained high on 
the political agendas of EU member states and the EU itself. A peak in public attention 
to the issue of migration could be observed in 2015 when the number of asylum 
seekers who asked for humanitarian protection in Europe reached new records. The 
goal of this dissertation has been to investigate how frontline implementers in national 
migration offices apply EU migration law when deciding on residence permits and 
visas of individual migrants. 
 The dissertation aimed at extending EU implementation research to frontline 
bureaucrats by adding standard public administration theories to the EU compliance 
literature. In order to do so, an innovative theoretical framework was developed. The 
framework takes account of factors at the micro level related to individual bureaucratic 
motivations, such as their instrumental and normative considerations during decision 
making. Second, the framework includes the meso level of the national bureaucratic 
context, with special emphasis on the level of discretion left to frontline implementers. 
Finally, the framework contains the national and European legal context in which 
lower level caseworkers operate when taking decisions on individual clients.
 By applying the framework empirically, the dissertation presents the results of 
fresh cross-country empirical data on bureaucratic attitudes and discretion. Thereby, 
a mixed-method design that combines legal analysis, document studies, expert and 
practitioner inter views with a quantitative survey amongst migration law implementer 
in the Netherlands and Germany is applied. 
 The first empirical chapter (chapter 2) shows qualitatively that asymmetric 
powers between local German migration caseworkers and embassies structure the 
German family reunification process at the local level. Local caseworkers are 
particularly driven by instrumental motivations of avoiding public blame. However, 
their local face-to-face contact with migrants also triggers normative motivations, 
such as empathy with clients. During visa decision making, this can lead to tensions 
between the local level and the embassies. The chapter shows that while transposition 
of EU migration law lays the foundation for harmonised frontline decision-making, to 
understand EU compliance processes the national bureaucratic context in which civil 
servants apply EU law on the ground needs to be explored further.
 Subsequently, based on qualitative interviews with caseworkers chapter 3 
investigates the effect of client contact on job motivations of lower level implementers. 
The chapter indicates that caseworkers in Germany and the Netherlands share 
similar instrumental motivations, despite considerable cross-country variation in 
client contact during decision making. However, in light of normative motivations, 
caseworkers with regular client contact focus more on the meaning of their job for 
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their clients, while the caseworkers with limited face-to-face client contact concentrate 
more on the significance of their job for society as a whole. Overall, despite harmonized 
legal obligations, the national bureaucratic structure can have implications for the 
individual level attitudes of implementers on the ground.
 Turning more specifically to the EU perspective, chapter 4 adopts a macro-level 
perspective on national bureaucratic discretion after the transposition of EU asylum 
directives. Using an innovative measurement tool for legal discretion and interviews 
with stakeholders, the study indicates that even states that formally comply with EU 
law delegate varying levels of EU discretion to practical implementers. This can turn 
frontline bureaucrats into de facto EU policymakers. Beyond existing delegation 
theory, domestic preferences regarding the legal status quo turn out to be an 
important aspect to explain the varying levels of bureaucratic discretion. 
 Turning to frontline applications of EU law, chapter 5 compares the independent 
use of EU migration law among migration law implementers in Germany and the 
Netherlands. The qualitative investigation shows that across the two bureaucratic 
structures, lower-level implementers are aware of the multilevel legal context in which 
they operate. However, only the German caseworkers that have considerable 
structural discretion at their disposal use EU law independently of national law. 
However, not all German respondents feel comfortable relying on original EU law next 
to national instructions. Thus, discretionary structures are not a sufficient condition 
for independent frontline use of EU law. 
 In order to further explore the role of micro-level variables for frontline use of EU 
law, chapter 6 investigates the individual motivations for the use of EU law across 
contexts with varying levels of legal discretion. Across the legal contexts, interviews 
indicate that most implementers give priority to national guidance by pointing at their 
instrumental motivation of avoiding risks. Nevertheless, when the national level 
provides only vague standards, some implementers take guidance from EU law or 
even correct for absent EU transposition on the ground. Beyond risk consideration, 
such behaviour is justified by strong prosocial normative motivations of doing justice 
to individual migrant clients. 
 Finally, the last empirical chapter tests the insights of the previous chapters with 
a quantitative survey approach. The chapter examines which individual-level attitudes 
explain frontline implementers’ willingness to implement EU law, and to what extent 
the national bureaucratic context moderates the effect of individual attitudes. The 
chapter highlights that beyond variation in the use of EU law, there is considerable 
variation in the preceding cognitive step, namely in the willingness to implement EU 
migration laws among migration caseworkers. In line with the previous qualitative 
chapters, the statistical analysis reveals the importance of normative motivations 
during the implementation process. Furthermore, instrumental perceptions of risk 
and rule compliance feature as significant predictors for the willingness to implement 
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EU migration laws. Going beyond the qualitative chapters, the quantitative analysis 
emphasizes the importance of perceptions of the meaningfulness of EU law for the 
migrant clients. Moreover, after controlling for individual-level variation, the national 
bureaucratic context has no independent association with the willingness to 
implement EU migration law. Overall, the strongest predictor of the willingness to 
implement EU law are perceptions of procedural justice of EU decision making. 
These perceptions interacted with the national bureaucratic contexts.
 In light of the established theoretical framework, the chapters of this dissertation 
show that at the macro level, legal discretion and conflicts between national and 
European law add new complexities to decision-making which implementers resolve 
depending on the national bureaucratic context in which they operate and their 
attitudes towards EU law. At the meso level, only frontline implementers with some 
structural discretion use original EU law alongside national law and implementers who 
regularly operate between various legal levels pay more attention to considerations 
of procedural justice than implementers who work in a centralised structure. Other 
individual-level attitudes remain unaffected by macro- and meso-level variation. 
Nevertheless, at the micro level, individual-level attitudes such as normative motivations of 
doing good to clients and perceptions of procedural justice, as well as instrumental 
evaluations of risk and general rule compliance attitudes have a direct effect on frontline 
implementers’ approaches to EU law and their policy application more generally.
 To summarise, the main argument put forward in this dissertation is that 
convergence and compliance with the substance of EU law during EU transposition 
at the macro level constitute neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
convergence and compliant frontline decision-making on the ground. Instead, 
macro- and meso-level factors combined with individual attitudes at the micro level 
influence how implementers apply and respond to EU legal inputs. Moreover, the 
macro and meso level affect the micro-level attitudes of frontline implementation. 
 As highlighted in the conclusion of this book, the findings of this dissertation do 
not only refine established theories of EU implementation, street-level bureaucracy 
theories and migration studies more generally. Instead, the findings also have 
implications for practitioners. In order to remain de facto policymakers, EU and 
national policymakers may pay more attention to the struggles and variation in 
attitudes of those individuals who eventually turn EU policies into actual practice on 
the ground. Moreover, considering the importance of procedural legitimacy for 
frontline implementers, lower level implementers may solve some of their struggles 
with EU law by sharing best practices more systematically within national contexts or 
even across national bureaucratic structures. This may help them to find bottom-up 
solutions for common multilevel problems.
 Building on the findings of this dissertation, future research may explore the 
established theoretical framework further by extending the investigation beyond the 
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field of migration and by adding national bureaucratic structures through the inclusion 
of further country studies. To better understand bureaucratic behaviour in a national 
and European legal context, future studies may also broaden the methodological 
toolkit with experimental approaches and additional multidisciplinary methods that 
combine legal and social science approaches. 
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Samenvatting
Ruim tien jaar geleden begon de Europese Unie (EU) met de harmonisatie van natio-
naleregelgeving inzake migratie en asielrecht. Sindsdien staat het migratievraagstuk 
hoog op de politieke agenda van de EU en van individuele lidstaten. De publieke 
aandacht voor dit vraagstuk bereikte een hoogtepunt in 2015, toen het aantal asiel- 
zoekers dat bescherming op humanitaire gronden binnen Europa zocht naar 
recordhoogte steeg. De doelstelling van dit proefschrift is te onderzoeken op welke 
wijze ambtenaren die bij de directe uitvoering van de Europese migratieregels betrokken 
zijn, deze toepassen bij besluiten over verblijfsvergunningen en asielaanvragen.
 Het doel van dit proefschrift is implementatieonderzoek van de EU uit te breiden 
naar frontlijnambtenaten door standaardtheorieën over openbaar bestuur toe te 
voegen aan de literatuur over de naleving van EU-regelgeving. Hiervoor is een 
innovatief theoretisch kader ontwikkeld. Dit kader omvat allereerst factoren op 
microniveau, die verband houden met de individuele beweegredenen van 
ambtenaren, zoals hun instrumentele en normatieve overwegingen tijdens besluit-
vormingsprocessen. Dan volgt het mesoniveau, oftewel de bestuurlijke context op 
landelijk niveau, met speciale aandacht voor de speelruimte die ambtenaren in de 
frontlijn hebben. Tenslotte omvat dit kader de landelijke en Europese juridische 
context – het macroniveau – waarbinnen uitvoerende ambtenaren opereren wanneer 
zij besluiten moeten nemen over individuele cliënten.
 Door dit kader empirisch toe te passen, was het mogelijk recente gegevens uit 
meerdere landen over de opstelling en speelruimte van ambtenaren in dit proefschrift 
op te nemen. Daarbij wordt een gemengde methode gebruikt waarin juridische 
analyse, documentstudies en gesprekken met experts en ervaringsdeskundigen 
worden gecombineerd met een kwantitatieve enquête onder uitvoerders van 
migratieregels in Nederland en Duitsland. 
 Hoofdstuk 2, het eerste empirische hoofdstuk, laat in kwalitatieve termen zien 
hoe de asymmetrische krachten tussen lokale Duitse migratieambtenaren en 
ambassades het Duitse gezinsherenigingsproces op lokaal niveau bepalen. Lokale 
uitvoerende ambtenaren worden vooral gedreven door de instrumentele motivatie 
om publieke ophef te vermijden. Echter, hun directe contact met migranten leidt ook 
tot normatieve motivaties, zoals empathie met hun cliënten. Bij de besluitvorming 
over verstrekking van visa’s kan dit tot spanning leiden tussen de lokale instanties en 
ambassades. Het hoofdstuk laat zien dat, hoewel omzetting van Europese mi-
gratiewetgeving als basis dient voor een geharmoniseerde besluitvorming op locatie, 
goed inzicht in de wijze waarop naleving van Europese regels in zijn werk gaat nader 
onderzoek vereist van de landelijke bestuurlijke context waarbinnen ambtenaren de 
Europese regels in de praktijk toepassen. 
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 Daarna, in hoofdstuk 3, wordt, op basis van kwalitatieve informatie uit gesprekken 
met uitvoerende ambtenaren, het effect onderzocht van de contacten met cliënten op hun 
werkmotivatie. We zien in dit hoofdstuk dat uitvoerende ambtenaren in Duitsland en 
Nederland vergelijkbare instrumentele beweegredenen hebben, ondanks aanzienlijke 
verschillen tussen de twee landen in de wijze van contact met migranten bij de 
besluitvorming. Echter, uit oogpunt van normatieve motivaties richten uitvoerende 
ambtenaren met regelmatig contact met migranten zich meer op de betekenis van 
hun werk voor hun cliënten, terwijl uitvoerende ambtenaren met beperkte rechtstreekse 
contacten zich meer concentreren op de betekenis van hun werk voor de samenleving 
als geheel. Dus algemeen gezien kan, ondanks de harmonisatie van wettelijke 
verplichtingen, de landelijke administratieve structuur dus consequenties hebben 
voor de houding van individuele uitvoerende ambtenaren ter plaatse.
 Meer specifiek op Europees niveau wordt in hoofdstuk 4 op macroniveau gekeken 
naar de administratieve speelruimte die voor individuele landen overblijft na de omzetting 
van Europese asielrichtlijnen. Met behulp van een innovatief meetinstrument voor de 
juridische speelruimte en aan de hand van interviews met betrokken partijen laat het 
onderzoek zien dat zelfs lidstaten die in formele zin voldoen aan Europese wetgeving 
een verschillende mate van speelruimte toekennen aan de praktische uitvoerders. 
Hierdoor kunnen frontlijnambtenaren in feite bepalend zijn voor het Europese beleid. 
Los van bestaande delegatietheorieën blijken landelijke voorkeuren met betrekking 
tot de juridische status quo van wezenlijke invloed te zijn voor de verschillende 
niveaus van administratieve speelruimte.
 Hoofdstuk 5 gaat over de toepassing van Europese wetgeving op lokaal niveau, 
met name de onafhankelijke toepassing van Europees migratierecht door functio-
narissen in Duitsland en Nederland. Het kwalitatief onderzoek laat zien dat lagere 
functionarissen in de twee landen bewust zijn van de gelaagde juridische context 
waarin zij opereren.  Echter, alleen Duitse uitvoerende ambtenarendie aanzienlijke 
structurele speelruimte hebben, hanteren Europese wetgeving onafhankelijk van 
landelijke wetgeving. Toch voelen niet alle Duitse respondenten zich comfortabel 
met een beroep op de wezenlijk Europese wetgeving naast landelijke richtlijnen. 
Discretionaire structuren vormen dus geen voldoende voorwaarde voor zelfstandige 
invulling van Europese wetten op lokaal niveau.
 Verder onderzoek naar de rol van variabelen op microniveau bij de toepassing 
van Europese wetgeving op lokaal niveau staat centraal in hoofdstuk 6. Specifiek 
behandelt dit hoofdstuk de individuele beweegredenen bij de toepassing van Europees 
wetgeving in lokale situaties waarbij de mate van speelruimte verschilt. In de diverse 
juridische kaders kwam uit interviews naar voren dat de meeste uitvoerders de 
voorkeur geven aan landelijke richtlijnen, hetgeen aansluit bij hun instrumentele 
overwegingen, met name hun neiging tot risicomijding. Niettemin, wanneer op landelijk 
niveau alleen vage normen bestaan, richten sommige uitvoerders zich toch op 
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Europese wetgeving of corrigeren zij zelfs ter plaatse voor het ontbreken van landelijke 
omzetting. Naast risico-overwegingen wordt dit gedrag gestimuleerd door een sterke 
maatschappelijke normatieve motivatie om recht te doen aan individuele asielzoekers.
 In het laatste empirische hoofdstuk zijn de inzichten van de voorgaande 
hoofdstukken getoetst aan de hand van een kwantitatieve enquête. In dit hoofdstuk 
wordt onderzocht welke individuele grondhoudingen als verklaring gelden voor de 
bereidheid van lokale uitvoerders om Europese wetgeving te implementeren, en in 
hoeverre de landelijke bestuurlijke context het effect van een individuele houding 
matigen. Het hoofdstuk maakt duidelijk dat, naast de verschillen in de wijze waarop 
Europese wetgeving wordt toegepast, er ook aanzienlijk verschillen bestaan in de 
daaraan voorafgaande cognitieve stap, namelijk in de bereidheid onder uitvoerende 
ambtenaren die met migranten te maken hebben om Europese migratiewetten uit te 
voeren. Overeenkomstig de eerdere kwalitatieve hoofdstukken laat statistische 
analyse het belang zien van normatieve motivaties in het uitvoeringsproces. Ook 
gelden instrumentele percepties van risico en naleving van regels als belangrijke 
voorspellers van de mate van bereidheid om Europese migratiewetgeving uit te 
voeren. De kwantitatieve analyse overstijgt de kwalitatieve hoofdstukken, want deze 
benadrukt het belang van perceptie van de betekenis van het Europese recht voor de 
migrant. Wanneer we corrigeren voor variatie op lokaal niveau blijkt dat de landelijke 
bestuurlijke context niet los staat van de bereidheid om Europese migratiewetgeving 
uit te voeren. In het algemeen is de beste voorspeller van de bereidheid om Europese 
wetgeving uit te voeren de mate waarin Europese besluitvorming als procedureel 
rechtvaardig wordt gezien. Deze perceptie heeft een wisselwerking met de landelijke 
bestuurlijke context.
 In het licht van het geschetste theoretische kader laat dit proefschrift zien dat, op 
macroniveau, de mate van juridische speelruimte en de tegenstrijdigheden tussen 
landelijke en Europese wetgeving voor nieuwe complexiteiten zorgen bij de besluiten 
die uitvoerders moeten nemen, dit alles afhankelijk van de landelijke bestuurlijke 
context waarin zij opereren en van hun houding ten opzichte van Europese wetgeving. 
Op mesoniveau zien we dat alleen lokale uitvoerders met enige structurele beweg-
ingsvrijheid Europees recht naast landelijk recht hanteren, en dat uitvoerders die 
regelmatig moeten opereren tussen verschillende juridische niveaus meer aandacht 
schenken aan overwegingen van procedureel recht dan uitvoerders die in een meer 
gecentraliseerde structuur werken. Andere houdingen op individueel niveau worden 
niet beïnvloed door verschillen op macro- en mesoniveau. Op microniveau echter 
heeft een persoonlijke houding, zoals een normatieve motivatie van rechtvaardigheid 
ten opzichte van cliënten en percepties van procedurele rechtvaardigheid, evenals 
instrumentele risico-inschattingen en houdingen ten opzichte van de naleving van 
algemene regels, een rechtstreeks effect op de benadering door lokale uitvoerders 
van Europees recht en van beleidstoepassing in het algemeen.
517635-L-bw-Dorrenbacher
Processed on: 20-2-2018 PDF page: 294
294
SAMENVATTING
 Samenvattend is het belangrijkste betoog in dit proefschrift dat convergentie en 
naleving van de essentie van Europese wetgeving bij Europese omzetting op 
macroniveau geen noodzakelijke of voldoende voorwaarde vormen voor convergentie 
en volgzame besluitvorming ter plaatse. In plaats daarvan zijn factoren op macro- en 
mesoniveau, samen met de persoonlijke houding op microniveau, van invloed op de 
wijze waarop uitvoerders reageren op Europese juridische input en die toepassen. 
Verder zijn macro- en mesoniveau van invloed op de houding op microniveau ten 
opzichte van lokale uitvoering.
 Zoals benadrukt in de conclusie betekenen de bevindingen van dit proefschrift 
een verfijning van bestaande theorie over de uitvoering van Europese regels, van 
bestuurskundige theorieën op ‘street level’ niveau en van migratieonderzoek meer in 
het algemeen. Daarnaast hebben de bevindingen gevolgen voor de praktijk. Om hun 
rol als beleidsbepalers waar te maken, zullen Europese en landelijke beleidsbepalers 
meer aandacht moeten schenken aan de worstelingen en de verschillen in instelling 
van de mensen die Europees beleid uiteindelijk in de praktijk moeten brengen. 
Daarnaast moeten uitvoerders ter plaatse, gezien het belang van hun procedurele 
legitimiteit, problemen met Europese wetgeving kunnen oplossen door praktijken die 
voor hen goed werken meer systematisch te delen binnen de landelijke bestuurlijke 
context, of zelfs internationaal. Op die manier kunnen zij praktische oplossingen 
bieden voor gezamenlijke problemen op diverse niveaus.
 Voortbouwend op de bevindingen in dit proefschrift kan toekomstig onderzoek 
het bestaande theoretische kader verder uitdiepen door de studie uit te breiden 
voorbij het terrein van migratie en door toevoeging van landelijke bestuurlijke 
structuren via verder landenonderzoek. Om ambtelijk gedrag beter te begrijpen 
binnen de landelijke en Europese context kan toekomstig onderzoek ook het 
methoden arsenaal uitbreiden met een experimentele aanpak en met verdere multi-
disciplinaire methodes waarbij juridische en sociologische aspecten worden 
gecombineerd.
517635-L-bw-Dorrenbacher
Processed on: 20-2-2018 PDF page: 295
295
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Acknowledgements
When writing a PhD about issues of migration, borders and the struggles of crossing 
them are omnipresent. Beyond the topic of this thesis, the process of writing this 
book required me to cross several borders and I was lucky to receive many helping 
hands that supported me during the different steps.
First, there was the physical border between Germany and the Netherlands that I 
crossed for 4.5 years almost every day to come to the office in Nijmegen. This 
commuting forced me not only to finally become a routinized driver (Elena, I am 
aware that this was not a glorious achievement in terms of air quality and I am now 
trying to make up for it), it also gave me a personal sense of some of the difficulties 
of migration. Admittedly, Germany and the Netherlands are in many ways very similar. 
Due to Europeanization, the physical border crossing often remains unnoticed. 
However, there remain language borders and administrative differences when 
dealing with the bureaucracies of the two countries ranging from university adminis-
trations, tax systems or health insurance. Experiencing these differences helped me 
realize the practical relevance of bureaucratic structures that are taken for granted on 
both sides of the border.
The second type of borders that I crossed during the thesis writing process were 
disciplinary borders. With four supervisors from four disciplines, including Economics, 
Public Administration, Law, and Geography, I migrated between departments which 
gave me the opportunity to add to my own Political Science background challenging 
and inspiring new perspectives. Therefore, I would like to thank first of all my supervision 
team for their concerted efforts to help me move between the disciplines, enabling 
me to profit from all four perspectives. More specifically, I would like to thank my 
promotor, Eelke de Jong. Your optimism and calm nature were always very reassuring. 
At all times, you kept supporting the thesis and contributed with your reliable and 
valuable feedback to the content and all organizational and process related matters. 
Next, I would like to thank Ellen Mastenbroek, my daily supervisor. I think it is safe to 
say that you were closest to the project. Your contributions concerned not only your 
expertise in public administration theory. I also learned from you a great deal about 
structuring my thoughts by identifying “the research puzzle”. Moreover, you always 
provided strategic advice regarding journal choices, summer schools, conferences, 
included me in additional research projects and pointed me to experts that could be 
interesting for me. This “thinking along” was extremely valuable and helped me to 
find my way in the academic landscape. Maybe even more importantly, you always 
had a feeling for my personal worries and paid exceptional attention to my strengths 
517635-L-bw-Dorrenbacher
Processed on: 20-2-2018 PDF page: 296
296
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
and weaknesses. Without your pushes to use my strengths more actively and your 
constructive advice for tackling some of my weak spots, it would have been a lot 
harder to finish this dissertation. I also would like to thank Tineke Strik, who brought 
the legal perspective into the supervision team. Your insights on the legal complications 
of national and European migration law were essential to the project. I also benefited 
greatly from your contacts when planning the first interviews. Beyond all this, your 
enthusiasm for the topic was contagious. I often left meetings with you with the 
motivating feeling that I finally knew how to connect the different dots of my research. 
Next, Martin van der Velde, you brought in a Human Geography viewpoint into the 
project. Your repeated calls to “make the migration issue more prominent” helped me 
to go beyond the theoretical perspective of my papers. Moreover, your expertise in 
quantitative research methods was very valuable.
Despite the great help from the supervision team, a major challenge of the dissertation 
remained the aspect of data gathering. Thus, my thanks go the IND and the managers 
of the local German foreign registration offices for giving me the opportunity to 
conduct the case studies. I would like to thank particularly all the anonymous 
respondents of the Dutch and German migration and foreign registration offices who, 
despite their work pressure and the public attention to their work, took the time to talk 
with me and to participate in the survey. In addition, I would like to thank Henrika 
Wörmann from the Dutch contact point of the European Migration Network who 
helped me to coordinate my fieldwork at the IND. Without your help to find suitable 
interview partners, your solution-oriented approach for executing the survey and your 
uncomplicated screening of the research outputs, the Dutch case study would have 
been an even harder challenge.
A PhD project is also always a product of the everyday collegial support at the 
university. Here I would like to thank particularly the TvA 5 PhD gang that went (parts) 
of the- sometimes rocky- road of writing a dissertation together with me. First of all, 
thank you, Elena, for sharing an office with me for four years. We also shared the most 
challenging moments of frustrations, as well as the breakthrough moments, the many 
major and everyday personal events, an endless road trip to Speyer, many kilos of 
chocolate and Haribo peaches. I enjoyed all our coffee breaks, dinners and random 
office talks. Starting a PhD at the same time with a related topic can be competitive, 
but I always felt honestly supported by you and I am glad that you made sure that we 
never grew lonely in the office. Lianne, you joined our office later and due to fieldwork 
and the commuting from Amsterdam, the times we were with the three of us in the 
office were scarce. Nevertheless, it made these days even more special and fun. 
I enjoyed our debates about research philosophy and the more down to earth 
discussions about weekend plans etc. Thanks also to Robin for the many 11:00 
517635-L-bw-Dorrenbacher
Processed on: 20-2-2018 PDF page: 297
297
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
coffee breaks with your provocative statements and all your knowledge about boats. 
Michelle, thank you for joining me at the summer school in Syracuse where we were 
the strange Europeanists of Political Science. Thank you Sjors and Joost for acting as 
the wise PhD grandparents in the first years of the project. Bart, Jacqueline and 
Fahad, I will never forget the competitive round of Uno at the PhD weekend. Daniel, 
Annelies and Gaard, thanks for several after work borrels that provided me with new 
perspectives on music, socialism and much more. 
Special thanks also to Lars Tummers for your extremely fruitful tutorials on street-level 
bureaucracy and for providing me with the items of the “willingness to implement” 
scale. Jarle Trondal, thank you for hosting me at the University of Agder in Kristiansand. 
Eva Thomann, thank you for your highly valuable feedback on several chapters of this 
dissertation, as well as for inviting me to the University of Exeter. I hope I will be able 
to make up for this missed opportunity someday. Thanks also to Tobias Eule whose 
advice on researching local German foreign registration offices was extremely helpful. 
Betty de Hart, thank you for organizing together with Tineke and me a seminar on 
decision making in migration offices. I hope we will also soon be able to finish the 
special issue that derived out of this seminar. Thanks also to the PhDs and the 
colleagues at the RU Centre for Migration Law who were always very welcoming and 
accessible to share thoughts on issues of migration research.
Additionally, I would like to thank my friends and family who supported me during 
the ups and downs of the PhD process. Thanks for proofreading the German survey 
items to Fabienne and my sister Judith, who both worked parallel with me on their 
PhDs in Germany. Thanks to my brother, Johannes, for letting me stay at your 
place for some of the early interviews. Thanks to Hanna and Lea for the mental 
non-academic support throughout the last years. Danke Mama, für deinen Fokus auf 
mein psychologisches Wohlergehen und Papa, für das akademische Interesse an 
meinem Projekt.
Last but not least, Jonas, I am unbelievably grateful that you stood by my side during 
this stressful time and that you put up with the many moments when I worried and 
doubted myself (ok, I am sure that you would not call them “moments”). I am glad that 
you managed to remind me that there are more important things in life than 
publications. I am even more excited that the last years did not shy you away from 
embarking on even greater adventures with me. This eventually brings me to the little 
person who is about to join us and who may have taught me the final lessons of this 
project: while planning and timekeeping are important, there are limits of control 
when it comes to finishing a PhD … and that may be perfectly fine.
517635-L-bw-Dorrenbacher
Processed on: 20-2-2018 PDF page: 298
